In Northeast Syria, US and Russia in Fragile Coexistence

A US military convoy (L) and a Russian patrol are seen in this January picture crossing paths on the key M4 highway in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province | AFP
A US military convoy (L) and a Russian patrol are seen in this January picture crossing paths on the key M4 highway in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province | AFP
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In Northeast Syria, US and Russia in Fragile Coexistence

A US military convoy (L) and a Russian patrol are seen in this January picture crossing paths on the key M4 highway in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province | AFP
A US military convoy (L) and a Russian patrol are seen in this January picture crossing paths on the key M4 highway in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province | AFP

On a Syrian highway, Hussein Abdel Hamid recently found himself trapped inside his car. A US army patrol had encountered Russian tanks down the road, neither allowing the other passage.

The incident two weeks ago is not a rare sight in war-torn northeastern Syria, where Russian and US forces demonstrate a fragile coexistence despite backing opposite sides in the nine-year conflict.

"We always see US and Russian forces going head-to-head," AFP quoted Abdel Hamid, a 55-year-old Syrian Kurd, as saying.

"Just like taxis," they keep trying to cut each other off on the road, he added.

A staunch opponent of the Syrian regime, Washington first deployed troops in northeast Syria in 2014 as part of a coalition to combat the ISIS group.

Russia, for its part, has militarily backed the government of President Bashar al-Assad since 2015, but did not deploy its forces in the northeast until late last year, following a Turkish invasion against Kurdish fighters.

Turkey's offensive in October was spurred in part by US President Donald Trump who said he was pulling his forces out of border areas in the northeast.

Feeling abandoned by their erstwhile allies in the anti-ISIS battle, the Kurds turned to Damascus and Moscow to prevent a deeper incursion into their region.

Since then, Russian soldiers and American troops have rubbed shoulders in Kurdish-held territories, where their patrols cross paths regularly, flags fluttering simultaneously on opposite sides of the road.

AFP correspondents have often seen soldiers using binoculars to watch each other's movements.

- 'Exceptional situation' -

"I think the joint presence of Russia and the United States in northeastern Syria is an exceptional situation," said Syria researcher Samuel Ramani.

In a video shared on social media in February, a US military vehicle is seen nudging a Russian armored vehicle that was trying to overtake it off the road.

But the presence of Russian troops has also helped US forces avoid a face-off with Syrian regime forces.

In early March, two American armored vehicles found themselves only 50 meters (yards) from a Syrian army position and had to wait for the return of a Russian patrol in order to leave, local sources said.

In February, Moscow said Russia came to the rescue of American troops who came under attack by Assad loyalists who opened fire and tried to block its passage.

Despite all these tensions, Ramani said he thought "the risk of a major confrontation is very limited".

"Russia and the US might not have much experience with close geographical proximity, but they have a history of fighting in tandem on opposite sides in the Syrian civil war," he said.

Charles Thepaut, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed that "neither the Russians nor the Americans are interested in direct confrontation".

But these incidents did however "show how fragile the situation is on the ground".

"The concentration of forces hostile to each other... in a small area where everybody has to use the same roads makes things dangerous," he added.

- Competing interests -

Syria is the only country in decades to have seen both American and Russian forces on the ground at the same time.

In February 2018, US-led coalition strikes killed dozens of regime and allied fighters near oil and gas installations in eastern Syria.

Moscow said five Russians were likely among the victims, blaming the incident on a "lack of co-ordination" by the pro-Assad group with Russian command.

But today, deconfliction channels in place since 2015 to prevent any clash between the Russians and the Americans seem to be bearing their fruit.

Any escalation will likely be contained, "unless one of the parties really wants to show strength," Thepaut said.

But long term, both sides have very different goals.

Although Trump in October said he would withdraw US troops from Syria, he later added that at least 500 personnel would remain, including to protect oil installations in the east.

"The goal of Russia is to get all US troops to leave Syria to reinstall the regime in all of Syria, which is impossible with US troops on the ground," Thepaut said.

"Their goal is also to pressure the (Kurdish-led) Syrian Democratic Forces to negotiate with the regime."

Caught between both sides, the SDF find themselves having to deal with both the Russians and the Americans if they want to salvage some of their semi-autonomy in Syria's northeast.

Residents say they hold little hope in either side.

"We no longer trust the Americans or the Russians," said 61-year-old Yaqub Kassar.

"All countries are only looking out for their own interests."



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.