9 Years Since the Start of the Syrian Revolution: An Arena for Regional Wolves

FILE PHOTO: Soldiers walk past damaged buildings in the Yarmouk Palestinian camp in Damascus, Syria May 22, 2018. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki
FILE PHOTO: Soldiers walk past damaged buildings in the Yarmouk Palestinian camp in Damascus, Syria May 22, 2018. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki
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9 Years Since the Start of the Syrian Revolution: An Arena for Regional Wolves

FILE PHOTO: Soldiers walk past damaged buildings in the Yarmouk Palestinian camp in Damascus, Syria May 22, 2018. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki
FILE PHOTO: Soldiers walk past damaged buildings in the Yarmouk Palestinian camp in Damascus, Syria May 22, 2018. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki

The 9th anniversary of the Syrian revolution has left a severe bitterness in the mind and heart. Here, where beginnings seem distant and details are lost while endings are unforeseeable behind a horizon of destruction, displacement and broken fates. This anniversary leaves behind it an Arab world that is frozen awaiting change.

Perhaps the lessons learned from this betrayed revolution are negative, in the sense that they should not be followed. They are lessons about today’s world, its values, institutions and standards all of which appear as a scandal when compared with the image marketed since the end of the Cold War when quotes were promoted on human rights, international protection and the role of non-governmental organizations as alternatives to the balance of power imposed by the two camps and the ability of countries and their peoples to make tangible gains under a struggle between the two mighty forces, socialism and capitalism, such as the national liberation of colonized countries and the welfare state in wealthy nations.

Since the start of the revolution, near and far countries have offered nothing but opportunistic policies that looked more like 19th-century policies than the new international order that was established after the Cold War. The Syrian Revolution shed light on the fake concerns of the United Nations, and on the inability of its delegates to produce solutions through their diplomatic pleas and shenanigans.

The revolution revealed the true bitterness of the extent that violence could reach in an ethnically and religiously divided country, where nothing is left of power and arms other than the delusion of exterminating the other.
Among the things that the revolution displayed in front of its followers in the East, was the bloody undertones of the notions of majority and minority. Those who classify themselves as a majority, see the latter as nothing but a means to crush and marginalize minorities and deprive them of their rights to political participation based on the miserable experience of the Baath rule and the Alawite sect that has dominated it since it reached power in the coup of March 1963.

The minority, however, raising slogans of progress and secularism, is quick to turn these slogans into means to eliminate the identity of the majority and destroy it under the pretense that it would guarantee the rights of minorities and prevent political Islam from reaching power.

Between these two views, and after different opposition groups failed over nine years to provide any viable model for them to coexist by accepting diversity among the opposition, it is not strange that the opposition was eroded and their activists assassinated in the “liberated" areas and in countries that were thought to be safe for the opposition.

The opposition's demands for a civil state were all struck down by foreign and Syrian murderers. They opened the door for international powers to divide Syria into areas under Russian, American and Iranian influence with Turkish monitors, let alone the sectarian militias brought from Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq that have no use except in raising the wall against a political solution after the opposition's military venture failed.

The defeat of both the opposition and the regime, whose ghosts only remain now, has invited wolves from the outside to negotiate and split up gains among them. The Syrian people and society will need a very long time before they have any influence again.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.