Exclusive - Abdul Halim Khaddam: From Vice President of Syria to Exile in Paris

Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)
Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Abdul Halim Khaddam: From Vice President of Syria to Exile in Paris

Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)
Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)

Abdel Halim Khaddam’s biography reads like a significant period of Syria’s history. He started his career as a Baath party member, was appointed governor of Hama in turmoil and Quneitra when it was occupied. He was close to late President Hafez Assad in sickness and in health. He managed Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon for decades and ended his final years in exile. He was ill, just like the country he left behind. He passed away of a heart attack in Paris just as the coronavirus came knocking on the doors of his hometown and former place of power.

Khaddam was born in Baniyas in 1932. He studied law at Damascus University and later joined the Baath party that was headed at the time by Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar. The Baath would assume power in Syria in March 1963. At university, he met a fellow Baathist friend, Hafez Assad, a Syrian air force pilot. They were bound by the same party and geography, despite their different sectarian background. Khaddam returned to Latakia where he worked as a lawyer and became engaged in politics.

Besieged Hama
When the Baath came to power, Khaddam, a Sunni, was appointed the governor of Hama. The city was known for its opposition to the regime and then president Amin al-Hafez. In his book “Steel and Silk: Men and Women who Shaped Syria”, Sami Moubayed wrote that in April 1964, the Muslim Brotherhood carried out a military coup that started from Hama. Khaddam tried to use diplomacy to resolve the crisis, but failed. Amin Hafez then turned to force to stifle it.

Khaddam was later appointed governor of Quneitra in the Golan Heights. He was forced to quit the area in June 5, 1967 when Israel occupied it. At the time, it was said Syria was being ruled by “three doctors”: President Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Prime Minister Dr. Youssef Zuayyin and Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim Makhous. After the occupation of the Golan Heights, Makhous was famously quoted as saying: “It’s not important to lose cities, because the enemy aims to destroy the revolt” – referring to the March uprising when the Baath swept to power. His statement is particularly significant today when five different armies are embroiled in a power struggle in Syria.

In 1968, Atassi briefly appointed Khaddam as governor Damascus and then minister of economy in 1969. A struggle for power ensued between Atassi and Makhous and between Hafez Assad, with the latter eventually prevailing in the “Corrective Revolution” of November 1970. He promptly jailed his “comrades”, save for Makhous, who fled to Algeria.

President’s friend
When Hafez Assad came to power, he appointed his friend Khaddam as foreign minister, deputy prime minister and lawmaker. Khaddam spearheaded political efforts against the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 1983, Hafez Assad suffered a heart attack and Khaddam appointed a military-political committee that would run the country and rein in Rifaat Assad, the president’s brother. When Hafez recovered in 1984, he appointed Khaddam as his deputy for political affairs and Rifaat as his deputy for military affairs. Khaddam consequently became one of Hafez’s closest aides alongside late defense minister Mustafa Tlas, who died in exile in Paris in June 2017. Farouk al-Sharaa was appointed foreign minister at the time and Khaddam assumed the position of vice president of Syria. He rose to prominence with his handling of the “Lebanese file” as Syria had deployed its troops to its smaller neighbor. Khaddam managed Syria’s political relations with Palestinian and Iraqi factions and security and military affairs were left to other figures of the regime. He played a significant role in solidifying Damascus’ relations with Tehran after Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Ending isolation
Moubayed says Khaddam played a major role in ending Syria’s international isolation between 1963 and 1970 and in boosting Syria’s ties with its Arab neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In May 1974, he moved against opponents of the Agreement on Disengagement with Israel that was drafted by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after the 1973 Arab–Israeli War.

In 1978, Khaddam relayed to Arab leaders Hafez’s opposition of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. Confronted with new pressure on Damascus, he turned to Iran, boosting ties with the regime after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Later that year, he visited Tehran, describing its revolution as “one of the most important developments in our modern history.” He played a central role in coordinating the “alliance” with Khomeini. However, he made sure to maintain a balanced relationship with Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia.

Assad’s envoy
In 1975, Khaddam became Hafez’s “special envoy” to Lebanon where he mediated between warring parties during the civil war and helped expand the influence of Syrian intelligence in the country. In 1985, he helped mediate the “trilateral agreement” between Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri and Elie Hobeika to persuade them to work towards a ceasefire and peace in Lebanon.

In 1989, Saudi Arabia and Syria helped draft the Taef Accord that ended the 15-year civil war. Khaddam later negotiated prime minister Michel Aoun’s departure from power and drafted international agreements, including the April ceasefire agreement after Israel’s 1996 operation against southern Lebanon. He was known for adopting a hard line in negotiations with Israel during the 1990s.

Historians say that Khaddam, with Hafez’s support, backed Lebanese President Elias Hrawi and late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri during his electoral runs in 1992 and 2000. Khaddam was known in popular circles as “Lebanon’s ruler” from Damascus, referring to his influence over Lebanese politics. Hafez kept the “Lebanese file” under Khaddam’s control until 1998 when he handed it over to his son, Bashar, who had returned to Syria from London after his brother’s death in 1994. The shift did not sit well with Khaddam and his allies in Lebanon.

‘Smooth transition’
Hafez died in 2000 and differences emerged on who should manage Syria during its transition. Khaddam tried to play a prominent role, but he eventually succumbed to pressure and signed the decrees for the “smooth transition” of power between June 10 and 17. Bashar was appointed commander of the Syrian army and in July 2000 he became president. He kept Khaddam in his post as vice president.

Khaddam attempted to restore his role as the strongman in Lebanon by boosting relations with late Maronite Patriach Butors Sfeir in 2000. In 2001, he tried to mediate between then President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Syrian analysts have said that Khaddam played the role of “referee” between Lahoud and Hariri from 2000 and 2002 and kept communications open with Jumblatt, whose ties with Damascus had turned sour after Hafez’s death.

As his political influence waned, Khaddam released a book on his political views in 2003. In 2005, he announced his resignation as vice president and retained his position in the Baath party. He then chose exile in Paris. He departed from Lebanon where he was seen off by his Lebanese friends.

Syria landed itself in Arab and western isolation after Rafik Hariri’s 2005 assassination, widely blamed on Damascus. In September later that year, Khaddam defected from the Syrian regime, accusing it of murdering his friend, the Lebanese prime minister. In exile, he formed an opposition front against the regime and was later accused of high treason and his properties were seized by Damascus.

Khaddam did not play a prominent role after Syria’s 2011 revolt, but he did say that the people needed to take up arms to defend themselves if the world did not intervene to protect them. His health deteriorated in recent years. He spent his time writing his memoirs and died of a heart attack on Tuesday.



What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian Nuclear-linked Site Threatened by Trump?

A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
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What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian Nuclear-linked Site Threatened by Trump?

A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

US President Donald Trump has threatened to attack a site linked to Iran's nuclear program known as Pickaxe Mountain, a fortified facility buried deep underground near one of Tehran's main nuclear sites.

"We're going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to be ready," Trump said in a July 13 interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show.

The threat reflects escalating tensions as Tehran and Washington trade fire in the Gulf, setting back efforts to end the conflict.

Here's what we know about Pickaxe Mountain:

WHERE IS IT?

Pickaxe Mountain is located 220 km (140 miles) south of Tehran and 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Natanz nuclear complex.

The Natanz site, where two of Iran's uranium enrichment plants were located, was bombed during the war started by the United States and Israel on February 28, and during last year's 12-day war.

The tunnel facility under construction at Pickaxe Mountain wasn't targeted in either of those wars, according to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a US-based think-tank focused on nuclear non-proliferation.

The peak rises to some 1,600 meters above sea level. There were two enrichment plants in operation at Natanz - one above and one below ground.

The UN nuclear watchdog has said the above-ground one was destroyed. The other, underground one was likely at least badly damaged.

WHAT'S THE HISTORY OF THE SITE?

The site is ⁠linked to Iran's ⁠nuclear program, which has long caused tension between the West and Iran, which denies seeking an atomic bomb.

Construction of the facility at Pickaxe Mountain began in 2020, according to ISIS, following what Iranian authorities reported at the time as an explosion caused by an act of sabotage at the Natanz facility.

Iran said at the time the Natanz sabotage had caused significant damage that could slow the development of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.

In September that year, Iran's then-nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, said Iran had started building "a more modern, larger and more comprehensive hall in all dimensions in the heart of the mountain near Natanz" for making advanced centrifuges.

Rafael Grossi, the chief of the UN nuclear watchdog, in an ⁠interview with PBS Frontline in March, noted that Iran had previously announced its intention to have nuclear activity at Pickaxe Mountain.

"This was part of their quite systematic intention to put their most sensitive facilities underground," Reuters quoted him as saying.

FILE PHOTO: A satellite view shows tunnel entrances at Pickaxe Mountain, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 30, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

WHAT HAS IRAN BUILT THERE?

ISIS, which has analyzed satellite imagery of the site, says it features two pairs of entrances, which are assumed to lead to one facility estimated to be at least 100 meters under the mountain.

The physical defensive measures consist primarily of a large security perimeter and the extensive hardening of tunnel entrances, ISIS said in a July 14 report.

The pair of eastern tunnel portal entrances have been partially backfilled since the wars to obstruct ground vehicle access but they have not been sealed fully, the ISIS report said.

Sam Lair, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who also reviewed recent satellite imagery of the site, told Reuters that increasing the strength of the tunnel entrances would complicate "targeting with penetrating munitions like bunker busters.”

IS THE SITE FUNCTIONING AND WHAT COULD IT BE USED FOR?

Trump, in his July 13 ⁠remarks, said Washington was watching Pickaxe ⁠Mountain closely.

"We see no activity there. They're not doing well with their nuclear situation. Every time we hear about it, we blow it up. So they don't like talking about it. But we'll probably give Pickaxe a shot relatively soon," he said.

ISIS, in its report, said its assessment "is that the facility is not yet operational, but construction continues,” and that it was unclear when it could be operational, based on satellite imagery alone.

"It is also unclear if Iran still plans on installing a large-scale assembly facility, given the destruction of Iran’s centrifuge program, including Iran’s ability to make centrifuge components needed for an assembly plant.

"Nonetheless, if Iran starts to rebuild its centrifuge manufacturing capability, it could plan to install a smaller centrifuge assembly facility in Pickaxe Mountain able to serve a nuclear weapons program," ISIS said.

HOW MIGHT THE SITE BE ATTACKED?

Experts assess the deeply buried complex is beyond the reach of the most powerful bunker buster bombs in the US arsenal.

ISIS said the site "would be more suitable for ground forces to attack or sabotage.”

"However, vulnerabilities may also exist that can be exploited by deep earth penetrating weapons via aerial attacks," it said.

Lair said: “We can infer that there are ongoing activities at Pickaxe Mountain the Iranians wish to continue but are still concerned enough about a potential attack that they are taking steps to bolster their defenses.”


Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
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Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)

Andy Burnham got to the top through a mix of patience and risk-taking.

A decade ago, Burnham abandoned a 20-year climb up the Labour Party ladder in London to head north and run for mayor of Greater Manchester. A month ago, he returned to Parliament by winning a risky special election. On Monday, he will become Britain’s 59th prime minister.

The sudden downfall of Prime Minister Keir Starmer after just two years in office has swept the 56-year-old Burnham into office — unelected and largely untested. He will enter No. 10 Downing St. carrying the heavy weight of expectation, and big questions about how he will shoulder it.

“A whole range of people across the Labour movement and in the country have projected onto Andy Burnham their hopes and their fantasies about how the country should be run and what Labour should stand for and what Andy Burnham stands for,” said Joshi Herrmann, founder of Manchester news site The Mill, who has covered Burnham for years.

“He has got lots of people’s hopes up.”

Burnham has made his name in Manchester, but he was born in Liverpool, and grew up in a commuter village between the rival northwest English cities.

His father worked as a British Telecom engineer and his mother as a receptionist, and he was raised in a close-knit Catholic family.

Burnham and his brothers were the first generation of their family to go to university. And not just any university — Burnham attended Cambridge, one of the country’s oldest and most prestigious institutions.

“He needed a lot of persuading to apply because he felt that as a working-class boy, going off to Cambridge wasn’t for him,” Stephen Harrington, Burnham’s former English teacher at St. Aelred’s Catholic High School, told the BBC. “He didn’t believe in himself. But he did it, and the rest is history.”

Burnham has said he felt out of place at Cambridge, where many of his classmates had gone to posh private schools in the more affluent south of England. But he got a degree in English and met his future wife, Dutch fellow student Marie-France Van Heel, now a marketing executive. The couple married in 2000 and have a son and two daughters.

After graduating, Burnham worked as a journalist at trade magazines before becoming a researcher and adviser to Labour politicians.

Elected to Parliament for the Manchester-area district of Leigh in 2001, he rose through the government ranks under Labour Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. He served in Brown’s Cabinet between 2007 and 2010 as chief secretary to the Treasury, culture secretary and health secretary.

A formative experience came in 2009, when he was heckled at a commemoration of the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster, when 97 Liverpool football fans were crushed to death. Bereaved families had fought for years to overturn a false narrative offered by police that unruly fans had been to blame.

Burnham became a champion for the families and helped push for a new inquest, an apology and a law that imposes a duty of candor on public officials to tell the truth about tragedies whatever the impact on their reputation.

After Labour lost power in 2010, Burnham ran for leadership of the party that year and in 2015, losing both times. He quit Parliament in 2017, a low ebb for Labour nationally, to run for mayor of Greater Manchester.

Being mayor played to his strengths: an ability to bring people together, a sharp eye for opportunities and a wide streak of pragmatism. His approach became known as “Manchesterism,” a brand of business-friendly socialism that aims to harness private and public money to invest in areas like transport, housing and infrastructure.

Manchester was a former manufacturing powerhouse — known as the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution — that had been hollowed out as British industry crumbled. During his tenure the city boomed, with skyscrapers blooming on vacant post-industrial sites. Burnham won praise for taking a piecemeal public transport system under public control and improving it.

He shed suit and tie for jeans and dark T-shirts, spoke about his love for Oasis, The Smiths and New Order and spent spare time playing football or spinning 1990s tunes during DJ battles.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, he harangued Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson over what he called a “London-centric” approach to the crisis that was punishing northern cities. That’s when he gained the nickname King of the North, a “Game of Thrones”-inspired nod both to his championing of his home region and his political ambition.

He has said he saw his work in central government as “unfinished business,” and got his chance when Starmer was pushed to resign by Labour colleagues alarmed at the party’s unpopularity.

But Burnham still needed a seat in Parliament. A Labour lawmaker agreed to resign, triggering a special election for the Manchester-area district of Makerfield. Burnham trounced the candidate from anti-immigration party Reform UK, cementing his credentials as a winner.

In the subsequent contest to replace Starmer as Labour leader, he was the only candidate.

He’s promising to restore hope Now he says he will deliver “a new politics based on unity and hope” and “an economy that works for everybody,” no matter where they live. A key plank is giving regional leaders more powers, and he plans to move part of the prime minister’s office to a “No. 10 North” in Manchester.

Herrmann said Burnham has clear strengths, especially an ability to tell a persuasive story and a sense of empathy that many politicians lack.

He added that the incoming prime minister has “a set of principles about trying to make the country fairer, trying to bring people out of poverty, that he really does believe in.”

Critics claim Burnham’s politics are vague on key points, such as where the money will come from to pay for his pledges. He will face many of the same political and economic challenges that stymied Starmer, including a sluggish economy, overstretched public services and a cost-of-living squeeze. He has little experience of foreign policy issues, from the Ukraine war to dealing with US President Donald Trump.

And running a country of 70 million is a lot different from overseeing a region of 3 million.

But Sacha Lord, a Manchester music entrepreneur who served as Burnham’s nighttime economy adviser, said the politician has a steely side that will help him rise to the occasion.

“He’s not scared of locking horns with people,” Lord said. “Everybody thinks Andy’s this nice, cheeky-chappy guy. But trust me, when he wants something ... he tends to get it.”


How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
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How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)

Yemen’s leadership viewed an Iranian aircraft’s attempt to land at Sanaa airport last Monday as more than an aviation incident that could be overlooked to avoid further escalation.

It saw the attempted landing as a direct challenge to state sovereignty and an effort to impose a new political and military reality outside the country’s legitimate institutions at a time of unprecedented regional tension.

Unlike in previous crises, the government responded through a coordinated mix of calculated military action, organized political measures, and legal and diplomatic efforts. It also sought to avoid a wider confrontation that it believed Tehran wanted in order to turn Yemen once again into an arena for regional conflict.

From the first hours of the crisis, Yemen’s leadership emphasized a central message: defending sovereignty does not conflict with pursuing peace, and the state can enforce the law without abandoning its responsibility to protect civilians or preserve the prospects of a political settlement.

The targeting of Sanaa airport’s runway to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing was therefore the final step in a long series of political and legal measures that preceded the use of force.

The government said it had exhausted all official channels to operate the airport and had offered alternatives to ensure the continuation of civilian flights via Yemenia Airways, the national carrier legally authorized to operate them.

What distinguished the government’s handling of the crisis was that it did not merely respond to the incident but also sought to shape the political narrative surrounding it.

From the outset, official statements stressed that the dispute was not over the operation of Sanaa airport or citizens’ ability to travel. It concerned an attempt to seize one of the state’s most important sovereign powers: control over its airspace and international ports of entry.

The Yemeni leadership repeatedly said the problem was not the aircraft itself, but the operation of international flights without the approval of the legitimate authorities, in violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and UN Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

The government also said it had proposed practical solutions before the escalation, including transporting the Houthi delegation from Tehran aboard an aircraft chartered by Yemenia Airways.

It said the group rejected the offer, strengthening the government’s argument before the international community that it had resorted to force only after exhausting other options.

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi said the priority was to protect civilian lives and public property and avoid widening the confrontation in a way that would serve Iran’s goal of drawing Yemen into regional conflicts.

The message was intended to reassure the public and show that the military decision remained subject to careful political calculations rather than emotional reactions.

The government’s continuous meetings and the formation of a national crisis-management team also reflected a shift toward a unified approach combining military, political, diplomatic and media efforts.

This gave the official response greater coherence than in previous crises.

Domestic, International Support

Observers say the Yemeni government also succeeded in turning the crisis from a confrontation between itself and the Houthis into an issue concerning respect for the sovereignty of a UN member state.

Domestically, the House of Representatives, the Shura Council, the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission and the National Bloc of Political Parties and Components quickly declared their full support for the measures taken by the PLC.

They described the incident as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty rather than merely a political dispute.

The significance of this alignment was that it came from official institutions and political parties affiliated with the legitimate authorities, giving the leadership political cover against attempts to portray it as lacking internal consensus in its handling of the crisis.

Internationally, Yemen’s diplomatic efforts appeared to have preceded the UN Security Council meeting, after the government succeeded in persuading several major powers to adopt positions close to its account of the incident.

The United States described the Iranian landing as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty and linked it to the possible transfer of military experts and equipment to the Houthis, saying this would breach Security Council resolutions.

Britain said any flights conducted without the approval of the legitimate government constituted a violation of international law and called for an investigation through UN mechanisms.

France went further, linking the incident to what it described as Iran’s destabilizing conduct in the region.

It renewed its call for an end to the transfer of military equipment to the Houthis while reaffirming its support for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty.

Although the United Nations maintained its traditional call for de-escalation, it also stressed the need to respect Yemen’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, giving the government additional political support in defending its position.

Multiple Messages

The legitimate Yemeni authorities’ handling of the Iranian aircraft crisis can be seen as an attempt to deliver three parallel messages.

The first was directed at Iran: Yemen was no longer an open arena where new realities could be imposed through air traffic or sovereign ports of entry, and any attempt to bypass state institutions would face practical measures, even as the government remained committed to peace.

The second message was aimed at the Houthis: using civilian suffering or Sanaa airport as political leverage would not lead to recognition of authorities operating in parallel to the state.

The government would not allow sovereign powers to be established outside its institutions.

The third message had an international dimension.

The government called on the Security Council to move from condemnation to deterrence by strictly enforcing sanctions and council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2140 and 2216.

It said continued tolerance of violations would encourage their repetition.

Despite the political and diplomatic gains achieved by the legitimate authorities, however, the crisis has not ended in practical terms.

It remains tied to the international community’s ability to translate condemnation into measures that prevent similar incidents and ensure respect for the Yemeni state’s sovereignty over all land, sea and air entry points.

The continuing efforts of UN envoy Hans Grundberg, alongside international positions supporting de-escalation, also reflect growing recognition that preserving the fragile truce requires addressing the roots of the crisis.

These include ending the Houthi coup and preventing humanitarian issues and sovereign ports of entry from being used as tools of conflict.

For the Yemeni government, observers say, the crisis was more a political test than a military one.

Through its response, it sought to establish a new equation: defending sovereignty does not contradict the pursuit of peace, and the state can combine restraint with resolve while respecting international law and asserting its authority.