Exclusive - Abdul Halim Khaddam: From Vice President of Syria to Exile in Paris

Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)
Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Abdul Halim Khaddam: From Vice President of Syria to Exile in Paris

Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)
Exiled former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam holding a news conference on the political situation in Syria from Brussels on April 7, 2011. (Reuters)

Abdel Halim Khaddam’s biography reads like a significant period of Syria’s history. He started his career as a Baath party member, was appointed governor of Hama in turmoil and Quneitra when it was occupied. He was close to late President Hafez Assad in sickness and in health. He managed Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon for decades and ended his final years in exile. He was ill, just like the country he left behind. He passed away of a heart attack in Paris just as the coronavirus came knocking on the doors of his hometown and former place of power.

Khaddam was born in Baniyas in 1932. He studied law at Damascus University and later joined the Baath party that was headed at the time by Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar. The Baath would assume power in Syria in March 1963. At university, he met a fellow Baathist friend, Hafez Assad, a Syrian air force pilot. They were bound by the same party and geography, despite their different sectarian background. Khaddam returned to Latakia where he worked as a lawyer and became engaged in politics.

Besieged Hama
When the Baath came to power, Khaddam, a Sunni, was appointed the governor of Hama. The city was known for its opposition to the regime and then president Amin al-Hafez. In his book “Steel and Silk: Men and Women who Shaped Syria”, Sami Moubayed wrote that in April 1964, the Muslim Brotherhood carried out a military coup that started from Hama. Khaddam tried to use diplomacy to resolve the crisis, but failed. Amin Hafez then turned to force to stifle it.

Khaddam was later appointed governor of Quneitra in the Golan Heights. He was forced to quit the area in June 5, 1967 when Israel occupied it. At the time, it was said Syria was being ruled by “three doctors”: President Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Prime Minister Dr. Youssef Zuayyin and Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim Makhous. After the occupation of the Golan Heights, Makhous was famously quoted as saying: “It’s not important to lose cities, because the enemy aims to destroy the revolt” – referring to the March uprising when the Baath swept to power. His statement is particularly significant today when five different armies are embroiled in a power struggle in Syria.

In 1968, Atassi briefly appointed Khaddam as governor Damascus and then minister of economy in 1969. A struggle for power ensued between Atassi and Makhous and between Hafez Assad, with the latter eventually prevailing in the “Corrective Revolution” of November 1970. He promptly jailed his “comrades”, save for Makhous, who fled to Algeria.

President’s friend
When Hafez Assad came to power, he appointed his friend Khaddam as foreign minister, deputy prime minister and lawmaker. Khaddam spearheaded political efforts against the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 1983, Hafez Assad suffered a heart attack and Khaddam appointed a military-political committee that would run the country and rein in Rifaat Assad, the president’s brother. When Hafez recovered in 1984, he appointed Khaddam as his deputy for political affairs and Rifaat as his deputy for military affairs. Khaddam consequently became one of Hafez’s closest aides alongside late defense minister Mustafa Tlas, who died in exile in Paris in June 2017. Farouk al-Sharaa was appointed foreign minister at the time and Khaddam assumed the position of vice president of Syria. He rose to prominence with his handling of the “Lebanese file” as Syria had deployed its troops to its smaller neighbor. Khaddam managed Syria’s political relations with Palestinian and Iraqi factions and security and military affairs were left to other figures of the regime. He played a significant role in solidifying Damascus’ relations with Tehran after Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Ending isolation
Moubayed says Khaddam played a major role in ending Syria’s international isolation between 1963 and 1970 and in boosting Syria’s ties with its Arab neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In May 1974, he moved against opponents of the Agreement on Disengagement with Israel that was drafted by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after the 1973 Arab–Israeli War.

In 1978, Khaddam relayed to Arab leaders Hafez’s opposition of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. Confronted with new pressure on Damascus, he turned to Iran, boosting ties with the regime after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Later that year, he visited Tehran, describing its revolution as “one of the most important developments in our modern history.” He played a central role in coordinating the “alliance” with Khomeini. However, he made sure to maintain a balanced relationship with Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia.

Assad’s envoy
In 1975, Khaddam became Hafez’s “special envoy” to Lebanon where he mediated between warring parties during the civil war and helped expand the influence of Syrian intelligence in the country. In 1985, he helped mediate the “trilateral agreement” between Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri and Elie Hobeika to persuade them to work towards a ceasefire and peace in Lebanon.

In 1989, Saudi Arabia and Syria helped draft the Taef Accord that ended the 15-year civil war. Khaddam later negotiated prime minister Michel Aoun’s departure from power and drafted international agreements, including the April ceasefire agreement after Israel’s 1996 operation against southern Lebanon. He was known for adopting a hard line in negotiations with Israel during the 1990s.

Historians say that Khaddam, with Hafez’s support, backed Lebanese President Elias Hrawi and late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri during his electoral runs in 1992 and 2000. Khaddam was known in popular circles as “Lebanon’s ruler” from Damascus, referring to his influence over Lebanese politics. Hafez kept the “Lebanese file” under Khaddam’s control until 1998 when he handed it over to his son, Bashar, who had returned to Syria from London after his brother’s death in 1994. The shift did not sit well with Khaddam and his allies in Lebanon.

‘Smooth transition’
Hafez died in 2000 and differences emerged on who should manage Syria during its transition. Khaddam tried to play a prominent role, but he eventually succumbed to pressure and signed the decrees for the “smooth transition” of power between June 10 and 17. Bashar was appointed commander of the Syrian army and in July 2000 he became president. He kept Khaddam in his post as vice president.

Khaddam attempted to restore his role as the strongman in Lebanon by boosting relations with late Maronite Patriach Butors Sfeir in 2000. In 2001, he tried to mediate between then President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Syrian analysts have said that Khaddam played the role of “referee” between Lahoud and Hariri from 2000 and 2002 and kept communications open with Jumblatt, whose ties with Damascus had turned sour after Hafez’s death.

As his political influence waned, Khaddam released a book on his political views in 2003. In 2005, he announced his resignation as vice president and retained his position in the Baath party. He then chose exile in Paris. He departed from Lebanon where he was seen off by his Lebanese friends.

Syria landed itself in Arab and western isolation after Rafik Hariri’s 2005 assassination, widely blamed on Damascus. In September later that year, Khaddam defected from the Syrian regime, accusing it of murdering his friend, the Lebanese prime minister. In exile, he formed an opposition front against the regime and was later accused of high treason and his properties were seized by Damascus.

Khaddam did not play a prominent role after Syria’s 2011 revolt, but he did say that the people needed to take up arms to defend themselves if the world did not intervene to protect them. His health deteriorated in recent years. He spent his time writing his memoirs and died of a heart attack on Tuesday.



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.