Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria

Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria
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Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria

Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria

US Ambassador James Jeffrey, the State Department’s special representative for the Syrian war and the fight against ISIS, said the US supports "in every possible way", diplomatically and logistically, Israeli raids on Iranian sites in Syria.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Jeffrey said that "Iran has very established footholds in the Syrian state and within Syrian society, "noting that many Arab countries" will never be in harmony with a man like (President Bashar) Assad. They can claim that they can distance him from the Iranian orbit, but I see that this is absolutely not possible."

The American envoy emphasized that his country will continue to impose sanctions on Damascus, and "we support the entry into force of sanctions on the Syrian regime until its acceptance of a political solution," explaining: "Economic sanctions make the situation worse for the circle of people very close to the head of the regime, and this is what we are always trying to reach."

And we want to make it clear to these figures that there is no clear future for them if they continue to support Assad. They should rather press for political transition. ” He pointed out that the recent Russian media campaign against Damascus is evidence that Moscow is also aware of “what kind of ally” they have in Syria today. He said that Idlib is "the citadel of opposition” and will not return to Damascus soon.

Here is the text of the exclusive interview that Asharq Al-Awsat did by Phone Thursday:

· Let’s start with Covid-19. Could you give me your assessment? Also, yesterday in the Security Council the Russians once again rejected reopening Yarobiyeh, the crossing between Iraq and Syria. What is your assessment on that as well?

First of all, we’re following the situation of the coronavirus throughout Syria. We have to look at it in three different areas; the northeast where we have the best eyes on, the northwest where we rely on Turkish information, and of course the regime areas which are totally under-reported and under-represented. We have only notional information from the regime areas. We think that there’s a considerable amount of cases there, but we can’t measure it. We do not see at the moment a significant outbreak of the virus in the northwest, but of course with so many people jammed together and with such bad medical support, particularly as the Russians and Syrians have bombed most of the hospitals and other medical facilities there, that would be of great concern.

In the northeast, there have been one or two reports of infections but we are yet to see a significant outbreak.

To some degree the few reported cases are due to the limit on travel in and out of the country, other than for the Iranians who we think spread it initially in regime areas. So the effects of it have been limited but that can change at any time. The UN is worried about this, the WHO is worried about this, and we are as well.

The Russians and the regime by blocking the transfer of medical supplies to those areas where Assad does not hold sway of course have made the situation worse. It’s Assad’s fault. It’s his fault in his own areas for having devastated his own country and not caring about its people. He is even more at fault in those areas not under his control that he denies assistance to, even though that is his responsibility as the sovereign entity in Syria.

*Do you think being in this pandemic paves the way for renewal or updating of the UN Security Council resolution regarding the humanitarian border crossing? Because I think we’re supposed to be in June/July, and directions in December?

In July, UNSC 2504 has to be renewed. It is our hope that Russia will renew at a minimum the two crossings in the northwest. We are very, very insistent on that, and we would also like to see a new crossing to service the northeast. As you know the crossing there, the Rabia crossing, was blocked from being included in the new resolution by the Russians and Chinese so that is where we are.

· As you may know in the last few weeks, even months, since the beginning of the pandemic the Russians and the regime twisted the whole argument. They’re saying now that they’re blaming the US and the European sanctions. What is your reaction to that?

The collapse of the Lebanon monetary and financial system has nothing to do with our sanctions, and that is perhaps the biggest impact on Assad. Frankly his own bad management is the second reason he is in such dire economic shape, and then thirdly, it’s the fact that this country is still at war and important areas, including agriculture and energy-producing areas, are not under his control, nor should they be until he accepts a compromise political settlement. That is why he is faced with great economic difficulties that are impacting all of the people. Our sanctions do not include sanctions on humanitarian or medical goods, those items can flow freely. And the sanctions are carefully selected and packaged to target regime figures and not the average person.

· In May/June I think the Europeans, the EU are supposed to renew their sanctions, so what is your view on that?

We are very much in favor of these sanctions staying in place until the Regime accepts a political solution. We see the glimmer of hope in the longer-term ceasefire in Idlib and the regime’s acquiescence in a common agenda for the constitutional committee in Geneva. These things would not have happened without the tough position of the international community, be it the Turks in Idlib or all of our efforts maintaining our sanctions. So we are really happy that the EU is maintaining them.

· What would you tell some Syrians who buy the narrative of the regime and blame the US for their suffering?

I cannot help anyone if after almost a decade of Assad’s terror, they still believe Assad over the international community.

· In this regard, we saw some new developments by some Arab countries who reconnected with Damascus and they took the pandemic as a pretext. Did you speak with those Arab countries? And if you did, what did you tell them?

That’s kind of vague without identifying which Arab countries. The Arab countries I am thinking of, and I do not want to disclose them publicly but we know who they are, we are talking to them constantly.

We think two things. First of all they will have no impact. They will not win any prizes from Assad. We saw when one of them, and this one I can name because it has been discussed in the media, the UAE extended diplomatic recognition and they got nothing from Assad. I think they barely got a thank you. We know as well that they’re not going to change his policies nor are they going to undercut our policy.

We think that some people in the region have the mistaken idea, even though I am in media all the time, and Secretary Pompeo and President Trump speak out frequently on Syria, that maybe there is another American policy that allows us to be friends with Assad. There is no such American policy. There will never be such an American policy. There wasn’t even such a policy under the Obama administration.

· In this regard what do you expect from the Arab Summit that is due in June but might be delayed a little bit. The Algerians are now working hard to bring the Syrians back to the Arab League.

Our question to the Arab League is: What has changed from when you took the decision (to freeze Syria membership in 2012)? Have fewer people died now had died then? We think the number now is almost 500,000 Arab citizens of Syria. That is not a very encouraging thing to invite them back. Has the Regime complied with any of the UN calls for reconciliation? No.

What percent of the population has been ridden from their homes or fled their homes due to the regime in 2012 when the Arab League took the decision? Perhaps 5-10 percent of the population. What percentage of that population today? 50 percent.

The Arab League has to ask itself: Does it just have as an interlocutor states or does it also have as an interlocutor people of those states? Because the people of this state, Syria, have shown repeatedly their courage and their commitment by half the population fleeing Assad’s rule.

· Some Arab countries believe that by bringing the regime back to the League, maybe they would distance it away from Iran. What do you think?

It’s a crazy idea. First of all, Iran is deeply embedded in the Syrian state and society. It’s not as bad as Hezbullah in Lebanon or with the Militias in Iraq, and I know both situations, particularly Iraq, very well. But it is very concerning, not just to us, we know it is also concerning to the regime and the Russians. You have militias that are created and paid for by the Iranian government and reports to the Iranian government.

But the other thing is, and people really need to think about this, Syria is a state where Assad’s brutality to his own people is unique in the world, even faced with Venezuela or North Korea. Assad only knows one tool, butchering his population, particularly the Sunni Arab population.

Now, does anybody think he’s going to change his ways? It is one thing to think he is going to change his alliance with Iran, I don’t think he can but at least theoretically it is possible. But does anyone think he is going to change the way he rules and the population is going to accept this mass murderer, this uber torturer as leader? No. He has to run an absolutely horrific brutal totalitarian state.

What country is willing to accept a partnership with a brute like that? We only know of two, Russia and Iran. We do not think the decent countries of the Gulf and the Arab World would be in the same bed with someone like him. They can claim they can wean him away from Iran, I doubt that very much. Will these countries provide the ground forces, the Hizbullah troops, and the Shia from Afghanistan and other countries to keep the Sunni Arab and many other ethnic groups in the opposition from attacking Assad? No, they won't go that far and I don’t think they will sign up to support a government as terrible as Assad’s. They won’t bear the responsibility. That is something Iran and Russia will have to do.

· Recently, there were a lot of Israeli airstrikes around Damascus, Damascus - Beirut highway, and in Palmyra. What is your view on this?

The US supports Israel’s efforts to secure its self-defense. Israel is facing an existential threat from Iran, as they have said a thousand times that their mission is to destroy Israel. The Iranians are in Syria in large numbers, passing on long-range weapon systems to Hezbullah that threaten Israel. We know probably two elements associated with the Iranians, also in Syria, and Israel has the right to take whatever action it needs, being careful about Syrian casualties which the Israelis are, for the goal of saving Israel. Therefore, we are supportive of them in any way we can.

· What kind of support? Political or Logistical? Through the Tanf military base?

We give the support that is needed for effective Israeli actions to protect itself, and in protecting itself it is protecting all neighbors of Assad: Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon.

· The Israeli Minister of Defense said recently that this is to finish, not limit, the Iranian influence on Syria. Do you think that is possible?

Our policy is that all Iranian-commanded forces have to leave Syria, along with frankly all other military forces that entered after 2011. This includes the United States, if all of the reports are correct about the Israeli Air Force that would include the Israelis, and it would include the Turks.

· And the Russians?

The Russians entered before 2011, therefore they are exempt. Everyone else came after the war had begun. If there is a political solution to the war, and neighbors such as Israel and Turkey no longer feel threatened by the situation in Syria, we think they would be willing to let the country return to normal. As far as we are concerned, returning to normal is our goal and that means, among others, all Iranian-commanded forces have to leave.

· You said earlier that the sanctions are working, and that there are indications proving that. What are they?

Given the incompetence of the Assad administration, who is good at sucking the blood, literally and figuratively, in terms of money, goods, and property from its own people and in running a corrupt financial and economic system, but are not good at holding the country together and attracting foreign investments, they have done much of the damage themselves. Who would invest in a country Assad runs? They have also destroyed much of their own infrastructure, driven away a large percentage of the country’s doctors, and on and on.

It’s hard to say if you look at the unlimited fall of the Syrian pound (now 1300 to the US dollar) and the claims by people who are trying to support the regime that they have lost $244 billion, four times the GDP of the country, in the last few years because of the war, it is very hard to say what is due to the Regime’s own actions and what part of it is due to the sanctions. I would say that in general, in terms of the economy, it is mainly what the Regime has done to itself. Sanctions make life hard for those people in the inner circle, and that is what we are trying to get at. To make it clear to them that they don’t have an economic future by supporting Assad. They need to push for a political transition in Syria.

· You say the sanctions will push the regime to change its behavior?

We think it is a combination of everything. The 50 percent of the population that’s fled, stripping the country of most of its demographic resources, or much of it. The major swaths of territory that are not under Assad’s hand and unlikely to come into his hands because significant outside powers, including the US, who are on the ground. The pummeling (attacks) that the Iranians and the Syrians are getting from the air (Israeli Strikes) with ever more aggressive and effective airstrikes. The lack of reconstruction assistance. The ostracism of the Regime by the Arab League and by the Europeans.

We think that at the end of the day this formula will push the regime to eventually seek a negotiated settlement rather than claim a military victory and no compromise, which is what they have been doing up until now.

· You just said that keeping regime out of Idlib is a strategic thing. Right?

Yes. That is correct

· And you said that you want Turkey to fight extremists in Idlib?

Yes, we do. And we see signs that they are, more effectively.

How can you combine those two goals, keep Idlib out of the regime’s control and fight terrorism? And what do you think of the Turkish Russian deal over Idlib?

I think the deal will maintain as long as Turkey continues pressure on HTS. We do not see HTS as a serious threat to Russian forces, as they claim. It is a threat to all of us because it is a terrorist organization, and it is a threat to the more moderate and armed opposition in Idlib, which is of concern to us.

We see no reason, no excuse, no justification for this offensive (regime in Idlib) to start up again. By the same token, we are happy that the Turks are dealing independently with HTS. They committed to that in September 2018 and in the most recent agreement and that is a good thing.

· And you think that deal is holding?

I think that it will hold for the next few months, at least.

· Let move to North East of Syria which is where the American forces are. Recently we have noticed the Russians sending more military enforcement and they took a Qamshli military base and are getting closer and closer to the Americans. What is your assessment of the situation?

The Russians have some lightly armed military police units, they travel around in three, four, five vehicles, and sometimes they’re here, sometimes they’re there, but there is no Russian significant military force on the ground. There is no Russian occupation. Frankly, the Syrian government, other than in a few bases in Qamishli and the city of Deir El Zoor, has no real presence either. There are a few outposts and a few patrols. The people with the large, tens of thousands forces on the ground is the SDF, our partner against ISIS.

· In December, President Trump spoke of withdrawing from the North East of Syria and the Americans are there now. How long will they remain?

We will remain there until we have completed our military mission of the enduring the defeat of ISIS.

· Can we say it is an open-ended presence there?

I would never say the word open-ended. I would say only what I have just said.

· What would you tell your allies, the SDF, in advance before pulling out?

Pulling out of northeast Syria is not on the agenda, as we have not seen yet the enduring defeat of ISIS.

· Back to the current relationship between Washington and Moscow. There were some talks between some American officials and Russian officials in Washington, Moscow, and Vienna. Where are we in that regard? Is the step-by-step approach still valid?

As you know, we have various levels of talks with the Russians. We maintain generally our radio silence on these talks. One exception was when Mike Pompeo traveled to Sochi to meet with FM Lavrov and President Putin to talk about Syria and to talk about our efforts to get a compromised solution. We laid the whole thing out to both Putin and Lavrov and we did a joint press conference with Lavrov. It’s all on the record.

What do you make of the Russian media criticism of Assad?

We think that Russia knows very well what’s going on in the country. We think Russia knows what sort of ally they have in the Syrian President. And we think those articles speak for themselves.

· Do you think the Russians are upset with Damascus?

I think the articles speak for themselves. You are a journalist and when you write your articles, you want us to read what you write. Right? Then, believe what is printed in the papers.

· Did the Russians convey the same thing with you?

We do not share the details of diplomatic exchanges with our valued Russian interlocutors.

· We Know the OPCW report blamed Damascus for Ltamneh (Hamah) chemical attack in 2017 and we know that Damascus dined that. What is the next step?

The OPCW is reporting its findings to the UN Security Council, which were dramatic, and talk not just about Regime forces using chemical weapons but that the decisions were taken at the highest levels of the government to do so.

Meanwhile, the Security Council is also dealing with the UN Board of inquiry that found the regime, and to some degree the Russians, culpable for exploiting the UN’s passing of coordinates of humanitarian installations that should be on a no strike list, but in fact were deliberately struck.

We see the UN, from OCHA Chief Mark Lowcock to Secretary-General Guterres himself, speaking out in very clear and tough terms of the humanitarian risks of closing these border crossings from Iraq and eventually Turkey and the failure of the regime to allow crossline transfers of humanitarian goods to those areas. We see German courts pursuing Assad’s torturers who had gone after Syrian citizens. These citizens and their torturers now find themselves in Germany with cases open against them.

This is just the tip of the iceberg of all of the accountability efforts that we, the UN, the international community, and the media are doing to expose, that’s the word I would use, expose the absolute moral bankruptcy of that regime and those who are associated with it.

· What about the UN peace process? We hear UN special Envoy Mr. Gier Pederson saying that he made a deal between regime and opposition about agenda of the constitutional committee?

Pederson has this account and we support him 150 percent, including his call for a nationwide ceasefire. We support his efforts to build on the agreement on the agenda. That is a small, but important step forward.

· Do you think that it is realistic to talk about presidential elections under UN auspices in 2021?

We think the elections are the right way to go. If Assad holds his elections, this year or next year, they will have none, zero international credibility. They will be dismissed by the international community. The international community will redouble its efforts to pursue real elections monitored by the UN. That is the way forward. That is what the US supports.

The policy that we are pursuing is not going to change. We look very much forward to working with the media and the voices and people of the entire Middle East in speaking as one to call for a political solution and an end to the fighting.

· It this realistic?

Some people think it is not realistic. I don’t know but two years ago people thought that it was unrealistic to think that the last citadel of the armed opposition in Idlib would hold out for very long. Two years later there it is. Some people thought it was impossible for the Syrian Opposition and representatives of the Syrian government could meet together in Geneva, they have done so. Trust us that we are not only pursuing this policy, we think it has had some limited success and we think it has the potential to have a great deal more success.



Healey to Asharq Al-Awsat: UK Has More Jets Flying in the Region Than at Any Time in the Last 15 Years

British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026.  EPA/ANDY RAIN
British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026. EPA/ANDY RAIN
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Healey to Asharq Al-Awsat: UK Has More Jets Flying in the Region Than at Any Time in the Last 15 Years

British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026.  EPA/ANDY RAIN
British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026. EPA/ANDY RAIN

British Defense Secretary John Healey revealed Wednesday that UK pilots and aircrew have flown over 1,200 hours on defensive missions across the Middle East since the conflict with Iran erupted, saying they have now had over 80 engagements together with RAF Regiment Gunners.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat following his visit to Saudi Arabia, Healey said that the UK has around 1,000 personnel in the region and an extra 500 air defense personnel in Cyprus.

“I continue to work closely with our partners in the region on what further support we can provide,” he said, lauding the UK-Saudi Arabia defense partnership which he said is “founded on mutual security interests and longstanding industrial collaboration.”

“Although our friendship is historic, it has evolved into a modern partnership that responds to contemporary challenges,” he added.

On ties between Moscow and Iran, Healey did not rule out a hidden Russian hand behind some of the Iranian tactics.

The following are the key points from the interview:

80 engagements

“UK pilots and aircrew have flown over 1,200 hours on defensive missions across the region. Together with our RAF Regiment Gunners, they have now had over 80 engagements since the conflict began,” said Healey.

“I am proud of the work that our UK Armed Forces are doing alongside our Gulf partners to help keep people safe in the region. Their dedication and professionalism is helping to save lives as Iran indiscriminately targets countries across the Gulf,” he added.

Heavy Deployment

“The UK has around 1,000 personnel deployed to the region, not including our personnel in Cyprus,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Force protection is at the highest levels for UK bases in the region.”

“We have more UK jets flying in the region than at any time in the last 15 years. We are undertaking defensive counter air operations over Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE as well as Cyprus,” he said.

“Since January, I have deployed extra equipment and people to the region. This includes Typhoon and F-35 jets, Wildcat helicopters armed with purpose-built counter-drone Martlet missiles, a Merlin Crowsnest helicopter, providing airborne surveillance and control plus radar systems, air defense systems and counter-drone units.”

He added that there are now an extra 500 air defense personnel in Cyprus, and the warship, HMS Dragon - which is fully integrated within the layered air defense system with allies and partners - is deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Defense Systems to Support the Gulf

“I continue to work closely with our partners in the region on what further support we can provide, which was the purpose of my visit (to Riyadh) this week,” Healey told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I confirmed during my meeting with the Defense Minister, His Royal Highness Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, that we will deploy Sky Sabre to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - an air defense system that will be integrated into Saudi Arabia’s defenses to support Saudi Arabia's efforts in repelling Iran's attacks,” he added.

He also said that Rapid Sentry – a system made up of a radar and a missile launcher – was deployed to Kuwait, and Lightweight Multiple Launchers to Bahrain.

“We have extended the operations of our jets in Qatar which are flying defensive missions every night, and through Taskforce Sabre we're ensuring UK industry steps up too. The Taskforce brings together industry who offer counter drone and air defense capabilities with governments, including Gulf partners ... to rapidly provide them with the equipment they need.”

Advanced defense partnership with Saudi Arabia

On his visit to Saudi Arabia, he said the trip was aimed at showing support “during this period of sustained and indiscriminate Iranian attacks, and also to discuss further cooperation between our nations to protect our people and our shared interests in the Kingdom. That's why I was delighted to meet with His Royal Highness Prince Khalid bin Salman to discuss recent events in the region.”

“The UK and Saudi Arabia have a close, longstanding friendship, and share a decades-long defense partnership, founded on mutual security interests and longstanding industrial collaboration.”

That friendship “has evolved into a modern partnership that responds to contemporary challenges. This really matters in times like today: it means we have the trust and the shared understanding to respond quickly and decisively when the security environment demands it. It is precisely because of that deep foundation that we are able to act as we have done, such as deploying Sky Sabre to Saudi Arabia.”

Russian-Iranian cooperation

On Russia’s role in the Iran war, Healey said: “Our assessment is that, even prior to US and Israeli strikes, Russia highly likely shared intelligence and provided training to Iran, including on things such as drone technology and operations, and electronic warfare. And our intelligence also indicates that this cooperation is ongoing.”

“No one will be surprised that Putin’s hidden hand may be behind some of the Iranian tactics and potentially some of their capabilities as well. We see an axis of aggression between Russia and Iran - two countries that menace their neighbors and that pose a threat more widely to us all.”

No assessment on targeting Europe

Healey said that there is no assessment Iran is trying to target Europe with missiles. “Even if they did, we have the resources and alliances we need to keep the UK and our allies safe from any kind of attacks, whether it's on our soil or from abroad. The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself and protection of forces is at the highest levels for our bases in the region.”


Spain’s FM Backs Saudi Arabia, Tells Asharq Al-Awsat that Iranian Attacks Are ‘Unjustified’

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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Spain’s FM Backs Saudi Arabia, Tells Asharq Al-Awsat that Iranian Attacks Are ‘Unjustified’

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares has expressed Madrid’s support to Saudi Arabia, describing Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and other countries in the Gulf as “unjustified.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat published Thursday, the minister revealed that efforts were being exerted by Spain as part of several European countries and in coordination with nations in the Middle East to de-escalate, resort to diplomacy and put an end to the US-Israeli-Iranian war.

Albares said “Spain has openly condemned” the Iranian attacks and summoned Iran’s ambassador to convey “its firm rejection of violence.”

The Spanish Foreign Ministry also “called for an immediate cessation of these attacks," he said.

“The attacks conducted by Iran are completely unjustified,” Albares told Asharq Al-Awsat, while stressing full solidarity with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries against the Iranian attacks.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has recently received a phone call from the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, who expressed “Spain’s support and solidarity in light of the unjustified attacks that the country is suffering.”

“Spain's stance is firmly rooted in defending international law and the United Nations Charter, rather than the principle of might makes right,” said Albares.

This message has been conveyed to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, Türkiye, Egypt, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, he added.

Call for de-escalation and negotiation

“Spain advocates de-escalation, negotiation, and respect for international law. Our voice aims to bring reason and restraint to the current situation. We cannot accept the idea of war becoming a means by which countries interact with one another or a mechanism for establishing a balance of power in the Middle East. Violence never brings peace, stability or democracy; it only creates more violence and chaos,” said the minister.

“In light of this military escalation, Spain is acting coherently in accordance with the values of peace and solidarity that define Spanish society — values that are also shared by the majority of European states. Our country makes its decisions in line with European principles, the UN Charter, and international law,” he added.

The war has already had consequences that extend beyond the Middle East. For example, it has affected Cyprus and Türkiye, he said, warning that this increases the risk of the ongoing conflict spreading beyond the region.

The minister told Asharq Al-Awsat that the war is also affecting international trade and production of energy, which have a direct impact on global economies and geopolitics.

“The unpredictable consequences of the current conflict are making the situation extremely dangerous for the security and stability of the Middle East, including the Gulf states, which are being particularly targeted,” he said in response to a question.

Countries involved in the confrontation

Albares spoke about the situation of several countries in the region, including Lebanon, which he said “is facing a dramatic situation with numbers of victims increasing daily, an overstretched medical system incapable to attend them, more than a million of displaced people, and the destruction of civil infrastructure. The life of the people of Lebanon is disappearing before their eyes.”

He said Spain has condemned the attacks carried out by Hezbollah, that are fueling the spiral of confrontation, as well as Israel's attacks. “An Israeli land invasion is already ongoing, a grave error in a country that has already endured immense suffering.”

“We cannot ignore the attacks by Israel and non-State actors on UN forces, on UNIFIL, in which Spain has a significant presence, nor the repeated violations of international humanitarian law," Albares said.

The minister also expressed concern over the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. “There is no clear vision for the future, and humanitarian aid is not reaching the area, with access blocked and NGOs and humanitarian actors prevented to operate on the ground. In the West Bank in particular, settlement expansion and settler violence continues to increase with impunity,” he said.

High-risk situation defined by an unpredictable conflict

“We are facing an escalation of violence that has already killed thousands of people and negatively impacted maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and critical energy infrastructures, with direct consequences for global energy security,” he said.

“In short, it is an extremely high-risk situation defined by an unpredictable conflict that poses a direct threat to the security and stability of the Middle East, with repercussions that can be felt across the globe,” he added.

Asked about his views of the Gulf's concern about the war’s repercussions, Albares said: “Spain fully understands the Gulf countries' concerns about the consequences of this war. This has been reflected in the diplomatic outreach that I have conducted with my counterparts in the region.”

“Increasing insecurity in countries under attack from missiles and drones without justification — attacks that Spain firmly condemns — particularly those launched by Iran, contribute to an increasingly dangerous and complex situation. In this context, Spain advocates clear de-escalation, negotiation and respect for international law, insisting that we must avoid anything that adds to the tension.”

He added that “the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is also extremely worrying, as its impact on energy security and international trade is clear.”

He stressed that the conflict has human and humanitarian dimensions, such as loss of life and displacement, warning that this could have direct consequences also in Europe. So, he called for “a responsible solution based on solidarity.”

Unified position

“The only clear thing is that a response is necessary, and in this sense, Spain supports a response based on the unity of the international community around the universal applicability and respect of International law and the UN Charter,” said Albares.

Asked to what extent the current situation is likely to explode into a broader war,” the minister said: “The consequences of the actions of Israel, as well as Iran’s response, are unpredictable. We are entering a situation that makes it difficult to determine where the escalation could lead and what the ultimate effects could be.”


Al-Khanbashi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Warn Against Incitement, Hadramout Has Room for All

Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
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Al-Khanbashi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Warn Against Incitement, Hadramout Has Room for All

Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) member and Governor of Yemen's eastern Hadramout province Salem al-Khanbashi says he believes that “Hadramout triumphed for itself,” and that what took place there in December 2025 and early January 2026 marked a decisive moment in which Hadhramis reclaimed their right to protect their identity and blocked any political project seeking to dissolve the “Hadhrami self” under the slogans of outsiders.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Podcast, recorded in Riyadh on February 9, 2026, al-Khanbashi advised the new Yemeni government led by Dr. Shayea al-Zindani to steer clear of partisanship, raise performance levels, and combat corruption. During the discussion, he presented his account of events, framing the operation as a “takeover of military camps,” not the “ignition of a war.” He broadened the discussion to what he views as the priority of the current phase: consolidating stability, activating development, and opening the door to long-awaited Hadhrami investments returning home.

“Liberate us" from ourselves?

In describing the outcome of the confrontation, the deputy rejects reducing the picture to who won and who lost. He says the real victory was achieved when the people of Hadramout rejected the notion that someone could arrive and say, “We came to liberate you,” asking: “Liberate you from whom? From ourselves?” He stresses that the governorate, with its history stretching back “thousands of years,” cannot have another identity imposed upon it. He records his appreciation for those who stood in defense of this distinctiveness, while at the same time extending explicit thanks to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its leadership and role, which he said was a key player in containing last month’s events.

On the moment he was tasked with the governorship at an extremely sensitive time, al-Khanbashi recounts that he was residing in Hadramout and did not leave except when necessary, before receiving a call from President Rashad al-Alimi and from parties including Saudi officials and colleagues on the Leadership Council, asking him to assume responsibility for the governorate “because we need you.”He says he tried to decline, but accepted under the pressure of “necessity,” emphasizing that he is a son of Hadramout who spent most of his life there, and that he accepted the post fully aware of the weight and complexity of the phase.

The picture becomes heavier as al-Khanbashi moves to his successive roles: governor, then commander of the National Shield Forces in Hadramout , then a member of the Leadership Council with the rank of vice president. He deliberately labels the January operation a “battle to take over the camps,” so that it would not be understood as targeting civilian society or as a search for settling scores.

Al-Khanbashi says his overriding concern was to spare Hadramout street fighting, protect civilian infrastructure, and minimize human losses. He describes the operation as “swift and decisive,” with a limited number of casualties.

Securing withdrawals... and a political outlet

Asked whether the military operation in Hadramout ended with reprisals against opponents, al-Khanbashi is keen to deny this. He says the withdrawal of departing forces was secured and that they were not subjected to any military or popular harassment. “We instructed that no one who was in the Southern Transitional Council, whether military or civilian, be harmed,” he says. At the same time, he explains that he took decisions to dismiss certain security and military leaders accused of involvement in looting weapons and ammunition or of poor performance, and that they will be referred for accountability in accordance with what they committed against the governorate.

Amid this, al-Khanbashi reiterates a message he wants widely understood: “Hadramout has room for all.” He calls for civic conduct that avoids incitement, and warns against marches he believes target civil peace and provoke the local scene.

He again urges adherence to civil behavior without incitement, citing gatherings that took place in early February 2026 in Seiyun. He suggests they were not spontaneous, saying: “We have evidence that these people were paid, and we want them not to force us to take measures involving a degree of coercive force against those who want to practice such acts. We are still under a state of emergency, and all measures can be taken.”

In the broader political context, al-Khanbashi speaks of moves to convene a broad Hadhrami meeting in Saudi Arabia bringing together political and social components, including Hadhramis from the Southern Transitional Council, with the aim of preparing a unified vision in the name of Hadramout to be presented to the Southern Dialogue Conference. He notes that a preparatory committee was formed in Mukalla to draft a position reflecting “all societal and political forces” in the governorate, alongside a parallel desire to represent the voice of Hadhrami expatriates within a single vision.

Electricity and investment

Electricity tops the services file, according to the governor. He places it at the head of priorities, explaining that the needs of the coast and the valley differ, but the headline is the same: energy that does not meet demand, especially in summer, with humidity and heat on the coast and harsh desert conditions in the valley.

He speaks of support projects to generate 300 megawatts for the coast, and other projects for the valley, alongside proposals for gas-powered plants and private-sector solar energy options with capacities that could reach 150 megawatts. He believes that a medium-term solution is not a substitute for a long-term strategic project for a large gas plant capable of covering Hadramout's future needs.

From energy he turns to investment as the other face of stability. Al-Khanbashi lists opportunities he sees as promising: tourism, real estate, the export of high-purity gypsum, potential minerals, coal in specific areas, black sands and heavy elements, fisheries, and the idea of aquaculture. He recalls his participation in a Hadhrami investment conference, calling on businessmen to balance their external investments with investing in Hadramout, while pledging to provide facilitation and an attractive environment.

On government affairs, al-Khanbashi describes the discussions that preceded the formation of the new government as having focused on criteria of competence, experience, and geographic balance, while rejecting the principle of quota-sharing. He then offers three pieces of advice he places at the core of the government’s test: moving away from ego and partisan drift, combating entrenched corruption in several ministries, and raising the level of revenue collection and transferring it to the central bank, especially in revenue-generating ministries. He highlights the need to regulate the financial relationship between the center and the governorates in accordance with the Local Authority Law, arguing that strict application would ease many chronic problems.

He recalls Hadramout's experience with oil revenues before exports were halted, noting that the governorate received 20 percent of the value of exported oil and used it for development projects such as electricity, roads, health, and education, before this resource stopped after the Houthis targeted export facilities.

"No barriers" with Saudi Arabia

In assessing Saudi development support, al-Khanbashi links relief and reconstruction as a single window for enabling Yemen to overcome its crisis, pointing to packages of projects in electricity, roads, health services, and others within Hadramout.

He places this within a relationship he describes as intertwined, difficult to separate socially, economically, and politically, invoking the extended borders, shared tribes, and cultural ties, to conclude that it is not possible to erect a “barrier” between Hadramout and the Kingdom.

Asked about the moment that remained most vivid in his memory during the 48 hours of the operation, al-Khanbashi says he feared the forces might not withdraw easily and what that could entail in terms of destruction and casualties, before the operation ended in record time with limited losses. He says this is what he will continue to take pride in: that Hadramout succeeded in avoiding internal fighting. In his message to the people of Hadramout, he calls for unity, abandoning the causes of division, and prioritizing security and development, pledging that the expansion of stability will lead to a “bright development era” reflected in the lives of the governorate’s residents.