The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
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The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)

Syrian billionaire Rami Makhlouf came out with two Facebook videos on April 30 and May 3, loaded with symbolism on a political, economic and social level. Within Syria and beyond, the 51-year old businessman raised eyebrows in terms of form, content, timing and historical context of what he was saying.

Across a running time of 25 minutes, Makhlouf did not try to deny or underplay the prominent economic role that he played in Syria over the past quarter century. Western media often described him as “the richest man in Syria” while back home in Damascus, but few could put a face to the name as he seldom went out in public. Unlike other sons of prominent figures in the Syrian government, he was always confined to his office, away from the media. When then did Rami Makhlouf change so suddenly to appear in two online videos within less than a week, championing the poor while appealing to the president—his cousin—to right the wrongs of the present system?

The rise

It all began with Mohammad Makhlouf, the father of Rami and brother of Anisa, wife of President Hafez al-Assad. As the president’s in-law for three solid decades, Mohammad Makhlouf played a pivotal role in the Syrian economy from 1970 to 2000. From his position as manager of the state-run Tabac de Regie, he sponsored major deals, especially in the oil sector, throughout the 1980s. While Hafez al-Assad served on the military and political sectors, Makhould took charge of economics, becoming its godfather.

Rami and his generation started their careers as partners with prominent businessmen in the private sector, moving on to lead that sector and take over its main firms.

Rami started with a company called RAMAC, handling duty free shops at Syria’s border crossings and Damascus International Airport. In conjunction with the death of Hafez al-Assad and the transfer of power to his son Bashar in July 2000, Rami turned to the promising telecommunications sector. After extensive negotiations, SyriaTel emerged, along with a rival company called MTN, obtaining a BOT license in 2001. For two entire decades the two companies monopolized the telecommunications sector along with its massive revenue. Those who criticized that monopoly, like ex-parliamentarian Riad Seif were either silenced or jailed, accused of crossing “red-lines.”

From SyriaTel Makhlouf expanded his empire, taking businesses in oil and gas, banking, tourism and trade. That came hand-in-hand with the post-2000 period of economic openness. Experts argued that this policy reduced the size of the Syrian middle class, concentrating wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. That monopoly seems to have caused the regime’s grassroots support to erode, snapping the social contract that had existed since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970. Some believe that among the many reasons who Syrians rose in 2011 was to protest the increase in Makhlouf’s wealth.

The first test

Some called him the “exclusive agent for Syria.” Others envied him, wanting shares in the cake that he was devouring. Opponents were highly critical, demanding a different future for Syria, on both a political and economic level. When the chance arose to reform the economy, through the signing of a partnership agreement with the EU, Makhlouf stood as a prime opponent, fearing that it would break his monopoly and diminish his influence.

This was his first test and in light of the mounting criticism, he left for the United Arab Emirates in 2004. Subsequently, and according to former economic official who spoke to me: “That year was the best for Syria in terms of foreign investment.” With Makhlouf gone, many were willing to step in.

He met the test silently and sought invest in the UAE without any fuss. He eventually returned to Syria after the wave of political pressure that mounted after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. New realities made it mandatory for him to return to Damascus and ward off the international pressure that was being exerted to blame Syria for the murder. Makhlouf’s comeback coincided with what was described back then as the “Beirutization of Damascus” or opening up a series of banks, universities and retail shops that would create a Lebanon in Syria, compensating for what was lost in the economic crisis.

After the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Makhlouf and his partners set up “Sham Holding Co” with the aim of institutionalizing his massive expansionism in Syria. By 2006, Makhlouf was controlling around 7% of Syria’s GDP, said the former official, “but his role in economic decision-making was much greater than that.”

When the protests erupted in 2011, banners and slogans were raised mentioning Makhlouf by name, asking Bashar al-Assad to restrict his role and hold him accountable for amassing wealth at the state’s expense. Opponents claimed that Makhlouf lobbied his cousin to strike with an iron fist, even influencing the content of his speech in parliament that March.

Makhlouf also met with several western officials, including US ambassador Robert Ford and French ambassador Eric Chevalier. Relations with the west were not new, given that the Makhlouf family, Rami and his brother Mohammad, had even hosted John Kerry during one of his visits to Damascus when serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Congress.

In mid-2011, Rami did the most unusual thing. First, he gave an interview to Anthony Shadid of The New York Times, saying: “There will be no stability in Israel if there is no stability in Syria.” Secondly, he called for a press conference in Damascus, saying that he was going to retire and donate all his property to charity. Many saw that PR stunt as a last-minute effort to contain the peaceful demonstrations, saying that Makhlouf never really retired. On the contrary, he set up his own militia, called al-Boustan, tasked with fighting alongside Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah forces.

Little brother

Rami's younger brother, Colonel Hafez Makhlouf was then serving as a senior security official and played an important role in crushing the protests offering “security advice” to Bashar.

Yet by 2014, Colonel Makhlouf was suddenly removed from his post. He subsequently left for Russia where he remained briefly before receiving permission to return to Syria, albeit as a private citizen with no role in the security services. He continues to divide his time between Damascus, Moscow and Kiev. The exact reasons for his dismissal are not known, although some believe that it carries a connection to Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group that has sent mercenaries to fight along the Syrian Army.

They suspect that Makhlouf was trying to carve out a greater security role for himself in coordination with the Russians. He reportedly also accepted a reshuffle of sectarian quotes in the political system, thus expanding the powers of the Sunni prime minister and reducing those of the Alawite president. What is confirmed is that the regime believed “he was in contact with foreign powers without having permission from the president”.

New players

In 2015, Makhlouf transferred the SyriaTel license into an official contract with the state-run Telecommunications Authority, instead of a BOT as it had been since 2001. Days earlier Russia Today quoted a Syrian economist as saying that amending the contract both with SyriaTel and MTN had resulted in a loss of $482 billion USD, which ought to have gone to the state treasury.

Between 201-2020 new factors emerged. On the one hand, Makhlouf continued to play his backdoor role in the Syrian economy. He did not end his financial support for al-Boustan, bankrolling families of martyrs and the wounded with monthly salaries, especially in the coastal villages. He also provided support for the so-called “poverty belts” around Damascus, in addition to supporting the army, security apparatus and other state institutions. Among his beneficiaries was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, an old political party in which the Makhlouf family had taken great pride and to which Makhlouf himself was affiliated.

Yet new business figures were emerging—fast, marking the steady decline of Makhlouf’s influence and visibility. Among them were the Qaterji brothers, Wassim Qattan and Samer al-Foz, who bought Makhlouf’s shares at the Four Seasons Hotel. Their work focused on importing oil derivatives from Iran and concluding deals for oil transport from areas under control of the US and its Kurdish allies, east of the Euphrates River.

A new generation of younger businessmen started to take on all important contracts, like Muhiddine Muhannad Dabbagh and Yasar Ibrahim, the most important of which was for a third GSM operator, affiliated with an Iranian firm that is connected to the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And there was the “Smart Card” that controls the daily purchases of all citizens, ranging from oil and gasoline to bread.

Most of the new businessmen were Sunnis. In his second online appearance Makhlouf spoke about “others” controlling the scene in Syria, a reference that might be to the abovementioned names. Accused of being warlords, the EU and US placed many of them on its sanction list, which already included Makhlouf.

Dismantling of networks

In August 2019, Assad started a crackdown on Makhlouf’s network of companies. He started with al-Boustan, which was disbanded although the monthly salary of its militiamen stood at an impressive $350 USD, double that of a regular soldier in the Syrian army.

Then came dissolving of Makhlouf’s “Syrian Social Nationalist Party”. And in late 2019, Makhlouf was accused of failing to support the local currency, which was depreciating fast against the US dollar. The Central Bank of Syria asked big businesspeople to pitch in flooding the market with American dollars in order to depreciate its value and increase that of the Syrian pound. But even then, they were unable to raise more than $500 million USD—less than what was needed to save the lira.

An anti-corruption campaign ensued, along with a pursuit of businessmen with suspicious wealth. Big files were opened both for leading businessmen and current officials. Speaking in an interview in October 2019, Assad said: “Anybody who wasted funds is required to restore them. We want the funds back before people are referred to a judiciary.”

On December 23, the Syrian government seized the property of several top businessmen, Makhlouf included, all charged with tax evasion and illegal profit during the war years.

Wagner messages

This April, harsh winds came blowing from Moscow, where nothing is published by accident and where every word has a meaning. Several articles appeared in mainstream media, including those affiliated with the Wagner Group, criticizing Assad. The campaign came shortly after a visit by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, during which he conveyed "harsh messages" from President Vladimir Putin, regarding the need for Damascus to adhere to the military agreements signed between Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Idlib.

The campaign also came amid Russian criticism of Damascus' failure to comply with Russian, Israeli and American understandings over Syria, and Moscow's desire to restrict Iran's role in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian experts and state-run media continued to say that Assad was the only legitimate president of Syria.

Campaign and appearance

In mid-April 2020, Makhlouf’s company Milkman was framed in an illegal operation trying to smuggle hashish into Libya, via Egypt. Makhlouf snapped that this was part of a conspiracy aimed at tarnishing his name, saying that he had nothing to do with the smuggling business.

On April 27, the Telecommunications Authority announced that SyriaTel was under obligation to pay 233 billion SP ($178.5 million) in delayed income tax, with interest, to the Ministry of Finance Ministry by no later than May 5. Makhlouf responded by setting up a Facebook page first coming out with a written statement praising the charitable work of al-Boustan, then with the first 15-minute online video on April 30.

Makhlouf appealed to Assad to save SyriaTel. “We do not evade taxes and nor we mess with this country,” he said. “We pay taxes and share revenue with the government.” Although insisting that the Finance Ministry’s claims were unjust, Makhlouf said that he would pay it, but only in installments, conditioning that the money goes to the poor. “I will abide by what I have been instructed. I respect your order and am obliged to fulfill it. In order for the company and its work to continue, and for its customers not to be affected by a cut of service, I'm hopeful that you issue an order to schedule (payment) in a satisfactory manner, so that the company does not collapse." But he then said: "I am very tired of the existing accusations, which always portray me as a wrongdoer and a bad person."

On May 1, the Telecommunications Authority replied to Makhlouf without mentioning him by name, saying that the amount due was to the government, reminding that there was no tampering whatsoever with government revenue. The very next day, several of Makhlouf’s top managers were taken from their homes by the security services.

One day after the selective arrests, Makhlouf came out with another video on May 3, reflecting a diplomatic approach with much calculation put into it. In the video, he did his best to come across as an ordinary citizen, in terms of what he was wearing and where he was seated in front of a fireplace. He was also very careful about what words he used when addressing Assad, describing him as a “safety vault.” Makhlouf said that he understands that major risks were on the horizon, but that he could no longer remain silent in front of the “injustice” that was being imposed upon him by the security services. “Those services which I had subsidized for years; who can imagine that they would arrest the employees of Rami Makhlouf.”

“Today, the pressures began in an unacceptable manner ... and the security services began arresting the employees working for me. Has anyone expected the security services to storm the company headquarters of Rami Makhlouf which he once supported and sponsored during the war?” he wondered in the ten-minute video.

"Today, I am asked to stay away from companies and obey the orders ... and pressure has begun to arrest employees and managers," said Rami, who is believed to be in Yafour, near Damascus. He pointed out that he had received threats "either to give up or all his employees would be imprisoned."

The “firewood message” he sent in which he spoke in the name of the “poor” and the “loyalists” the regime used against “others were met by an extended arrest campaign that reached coastal areas. Financially, the communications authority responded by adhering to paying the said amount.

On Saturday, military units deployed near his palace in the Yafour area in the Damascus countryside. The next day, Makhlouf posted a very religious message on his Facebook page. He said “the injustice” against him has reached an “intolerable level."



Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.