The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
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The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)

Syrian billionaire Rami Makhlouf came out with two Facebook videos on April 30 and May 3, loaded with symbolism on a political, economic and social level. Within Syria and beyond, the 51-year old businessman raised eyebrows in terms of form, content, timing and historical context of what he was saying.

Across a running time of 25 minutes, Makhlouf did not try to deny or underplay the prominent economic role that he played in Syria over the past quarter century. Western media often described him as “the richest man in Syria” while back home in Damascus, but few could put a face to the name as he seldom went out in public. Unlike other sons of prominent figures in the Syrian government, he was always confined to his office, away from the media. When then did Rami Makhlouf change so suddenly to appear in two online videos within less than a week, championing the poor while appealing to the president—his cousin—to right the wrongs of the present system?

The rise

It all began with Mohammad Makhlouf, the father of Rami and brother of Anisa, wife of President Hafez al-Assad. As the president’s in-law for three solid decades, Mohammad Makhlouf played a pivotal role in the Syrian economy from 1970 to 2000. From his position as manager of the state-run Tabac de Regie, he sponsored major deals, especially in the oil sector, throughout the 1980s. While Hafez al-Assad served on the military and political sectors, Makhould took charge of economics, becoming its godfather.

Rami and his generation started their careers as partners with prominent businessmen in the private sector, moving on to lead that sector and take over its main firms.

Rami started with a company called RAMAC, handling duty free shops at Syria’s border crossings and Damascus International Airport. In conjunction with the death of Hafez al-Assad and the transfer of power to his son Bashar in July 2000, Rami turned to the promising telecommunications sector. After extensive negotiations, SyriaTel emerged, along with a rival company called MTN, obtaining a BOT license in 2001. For two entire decades the two companies monopolized the telecommunications sector along with its massive revenue. Those who criticized that monopoly, like ex-parliamentarian Riad Seif were either silenced or jailed, accused of crossing “red-lines.”

From SyriaTel Makhlouf expanded his empire, taking businesses in oil and gas, banking, tourism and trade. That came hand-in-hand with the post-2000 period of economic openness. Experts argued that this policy reduced the size of the Syrian middle class, concentrating wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. That monopoly seems to have caused the regime’s grassroots support to erode, snapping the social contract that had existed since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970. Some believe that among the many reasons who Syrians rose in 2011 was to protest the increase in Makhlouf’s wealth.

The first test

Some called him the “exclusive agent for Syria.” Others envied him, wanting shares in the cake that he was devouring. Opponents were highly critical, demanding a different future for Syria, on both a political and economic level. When the chance arose to reform the economy, through the signing of a partnership agreement with the EU, Makhlouf stood as a prime opponent, fearing that it would break his monopoly and diminish his influence.

This was his first test and in light of the mounting criticism, he left for the United Arab Emirates in 2004. Subsequently, and according to former economic official who spoke to me: “That year was the best for Syria in terms of foreign investment.” With Makhlouf gone, many were willing to step in.

He met the test silently and sought invest in the UAE without any fuss. He eventually returned to Syria after the wave of political pressure that mounted after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. New realities made it mandatory for him to return to Damascus and ward off the international pressure that was being exerted to blame Syria for the murder. Makhlouf’s comeback coincided with what was described back then as the “Beirutization of Damascus” or opening up a series of banks, universities and retail shops that would create a Lebanon in Syria, compensating for what was lost in the economic crisis.

After the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Makhlouf and his partners set up “Sham Holding Co” with the aim of institutionalizing his massive expansionism in Syria. By 2006, Makhlouf was controlling around 7% of Syria’s GDP, said the former official, “but his role in economic decision-making was much greater than that.”

When the protests erupted in 2011, banners and slogans were raised mentioning Makhlouf by name, asking Bashar al-Assad to restrict his role and hold him accountable for amassing wealth at the state’s expense. Opponents claimed that Makhlouf lobbied his cousin to strike with an iron fist, even influencing the content of his speech in parliament that March.

Makhlouf also met with several western officials, including US ambassador Robert Ford and French ambassador Eric Chevalier. Relations with the west were not new, given that the Makhlouf family, Rami and his brother Mohammad, had even hosted John Kerry during one of his visits to Damascus when serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Congress.

In mid-2011, Rami did the most unusual thing. First, he gave an interview to Anthony Shadid of The New York Times, saying: “There will be no stability in Israel if there is no stability in Syria.” Secondly, he called for a press conference in Damascus, saying that he was going to retire and donate all his property to charity. Many saw that PR stunt as a last-minute effort to contain the peaceful demonstrations, saying that Makhlouf never really retired. On the contrary, he set up his own militia, called al-Boustan, tasked with fighting alongside Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah forces.

Little brother

Rami's younger brother, Colonel Hafez Makhlouf was then serving as a senior security official and played an important role in crushing the protests offering “security advice” to Bashar.

Yet by 2014, Colonel Makhlouf was suddenly removed from his post. He subsequently left for Russia where he remained briefly before receiving permission to return to Syria, albeit as a private citizen with no role in the security services. He continues to divide his time between Damascus, Moscow and Kiev. The exact reasons for his dismissal are not known, although some believe that it carries a connection to Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group that has sent mercenaries to fight along the Syrian Army.

They suspect that Makhlouf was trying to carve out a greater security role for himself in coordination with the Russians. He reportedly also accepted a reshuffle of sectarian quotes in the political system, thus expanding the powers of the Sunni prime minister and reducing those of the Alawite president. What is confirmed is that the regime believed “he was in contact with foreign powers without having permission from the president”.

New players

In 2015, Makhlouf transferred the SyriaTel license into an official contract with the state-run Telecommunications Authority, instead of a BOT as it had been since 2001. Days earlier Russia Today quoted a Syrian economist as saying that amending the contract both with SyriaTel and MTN had resulted in a loss of $482 billion USD, which ought to have gone to the state treasury.

Between 201-2020 new factors emerged. On the one hand, Makhlouf continued to play his backdoor role in the Syrian economy. He did not end his financial support for al-Boustan, bankrolling families of martyrs and the wounded with monthly salaries, especially in the coastal villages. He also provided support for the so-called “poverty belts” around Damascus, in addition to supporting the army, security apparatus and other state institutions. Among his beneficiaries was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, an old political party in which the Makhlouf family had taken great pride and to which Makhlouf himself was affiliated.

Yet new business figures were emerging—fast, marking the steady decline of Makhlouf’s influence and visibility. Among them were the Qaterji brothers, Wassim Qattan and Samer al-Foz, who bought Makhlouf’s shares at the Four Seasons Hotel. Their work focused on importing oil derivatives from Iran and concluding deals for oil transport from areas under control of the US and its Kurdish allies, east of the Euphrates River.

A new generation of younger businessmen started to take on all important contracts, like Muhiddine Muhannad Dabbagh and Yasar Ibrahim, the most important of which was for a third GSM operator, affiliated with an Iranian firm that is connected to the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And there was the “Smart Card” that controls the daily purchases of all citizens, ranging from oil and gasoline to bread.

Most of the new businessmen were Sunnis. In his second online appearance Makhlouf spoke about “others” controlling the scene in Syria, a reference that might be to the abovementioned names. Accused of being warlords, the EU and US placed many of them on its sanction list, which already included Makhlouf.

Dismantling of networks

In August 2019, Assad started a crackdown on Makhlouf’s network of companies. He started with al-Boustan, which was disbanded although the monthly salary of its militiamen stood at an impressive $350 USD, double that of a regular soldier in the Syrian army.

Then came dissolving of Makhlouf’s “Syrian Social Nationalist Party”. And in late 2019, Makhlouf was accused of failing to support the local currency, which was depreciating fast against the US dollar. The Central Bank of Syria asked big businesspeople to pitch in flooding the market with American dollars in order to depreciate its value and increase that of the Syrian pound. But even then, they were unable to raise more than $500 million USD—less than what was needed to save the lira.

An anti-corruption campaign ensued, along with a pursuit of businessmen with suspicious wealth. Big files were opened both for leading businessmen and current officials. Speaking in an interview in October 2019, Assad said: “Anybody who wasted funds is required to restore them. We want the funds back before people are referred to a judiciary.”

On December 23, the Syrian government seized the property of several top businessmen, Makhlouf included, all charged with tax evasion and illegal profit during the war years.

Wagner messages

This April, harsh winds came blowing from Moscow, where nothing is published by accident and where every word has a meaning. Several articles appeared in mainstream media, including those affiliated with the Wagner Group, criticizing Assad. The campaign came shortly after a visit by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, during which he conveyed "harsh messages" from President Vladimir Putin, regarding the need for Damascus to adhere to the military agreements signed between Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Idlib.

The campaign also came amid Russian criticism of Damascus' failure to comply with Russian, Israeli and American understandings over Syria, and Moscow's desire to restrict Iran's role in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian experts and state-run media continued to say that Assad was the only legitimate president of Syria.

Campaign and appearance

In mid-April 2020, Makhlouf’s company Milkman was framed in an illegal operation trying to smuggle hashish into Libya, via Egypt. Makhlouf snapped that this was part of a conspiracy aimed at tarnishing his name, saying that he had nothing to do with the smuggling business.

On April 27, the Telecommunications Authority announced that SyriaTel was under obligation to pay 233 billion SP ($178.5 million) in delayed income tax, with interest, to the Ministry of Finance Ministry by no later than May 5. Makhlouf responded by setting up a Facebook page first coming out with a written statement praising the charitable work of al-Boustan, then with the first 15-minute online video on April 30.

Makhlouf appealed to Assad to save SyriaTel. “We do not evade taxes and nor we mess with this country,” he said. “We pay taxes and share revenue with the government.” Although insisting that the Finance Ministry’s claims were unjust, Makhlouf said that he would pay it, but only in installments, conditioning that the money goes to the poor. “I will abide by what I have been instructed. I respect your order and am obliged to fulfill it. In order for the company and its work to continue, and for its customers not to be affected by a cut of service, I'm hopeful that you issue an order to schedule (payment) in a satisfactory manner, so that the company does not collapse." But he then said: "I am very tired of the existing accusations, which always portray me as a wrongdoer and a bad person."

On May 1, the Telecommunications Authority replied to Makhlouf without mentioning him by name, saying that the amount due was to the government, reminding that there was no tampering whatsoever with government revenue. The very next day, several of Makhlouf’s top managers were taken from their homes by the security services.

One day after the selective arrests, Makhlouf came out with another video on May 3, reflecting a diplomatic approach with much calculation put into it. In the video, he did his best to come across as an ordinary citizen, in terms of what he was wearing and where he was seated in front of a fireplace. He was also very careful about what words he used when addressing Assad, describing him as a “safety vault.” Makhlouf said that he understands that major risks were on the horizon, but that he could no longer remain silent in front of the “injustice” that was being imposed upon him by the security services. “Those services which I had subsidized for years; who can imagine that they would arrest the employees of Rami Makhlouf.”

“Today, the pressures began in an unacceptable manner ... and the security services began arresting the employees working for me. Has anyone expected the security services to storm the company headquarters of Rami Makhlouf which he once supported and sponsored during the war?” he wondered in the ten-minute video.

"Today, I am asked to stay away from companies and obey the orders ... and pressure has begun to arrest employees and managers," said Rami, who is believed to be in Yafour, near Damascus. He pointed out that he had received threats "either to give up or all his employees would be imprisoned."

The “firewood message” he sent in which he spoke in the name of the “poor” and the “loyalists” the regime used against “others were met by an extended arrest campaign that reached coastal areas. Financially, the communications authority responded by adhering to paying the said amount.

On Saturday, military units deployed near his palace in the Yafour area in the Damascus countryside. The next day, Makhlouf posted a very religious message on his Facebook page. He said “the injustice” against him has reached an “intolerable level."



Sudan’s Day Laborers Struggle to Survive as War Devastates Livelihoods

Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)
Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)
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Sudan’s Day Laborers Struggle to Survive as War Devastates Livelihoods

Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)
Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)

In Khartoum, where life is struggling to regain its rhythm after years of war, many doors remain closed to day laborers who once lived on each day's earnings.

A day without work can leave a family without food, a child without money for school or a patient forced to stop treatment because medicine is out of reach.

On sidewalks, in markets and at workshops, day laborers search for any job to get them through the day. More people are competing for fewer jobs, while rising prices and a weakening Sudanese pound erode their wages.

As the gap between earnings and living costs widens, many face a stark choice: accept less pay or go home empty-handed.

Compounding burdens

Labor unionist Abdullah Youssef says the vast majority of workers "lost their jobs because of war, displacement and homelessness." Daily work available before the war is now scarce.

Most workers support families with five or six children at different stages of schooling, he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Economic hardship has pushed some families into debt. Some people have been jailed for failing to meet their financial obligations.

For day laborers, a wage is measured not just in hours worked but in the needs of an entire family. With food and service prices climbing, their earnings have lost much of their purchasing power before they reach home.

Babiker Khalifa, a day laborer and father of three, says the war "destroyed the economy." His family gets by mainly on small meals of fava beans and lentils. Meat, fruit and vegetables are beyond their reach much of the time.

His children need money each day for school, but there is not enough food at home to meet their needs, he told Asharq Al-Awsat. On some nights, they "cry from hunger."

Babiker al-Taher faces much the same hardship. He fled to Gedaref after the war broke out, then returned to Khartoum to find even harsher economic conditions.

"Sometimes we eat, and other times we don't," he said of his family, which includes four children. Rising prices and inflation have sharply cut the real value of a day laborer's pay.

With more people seeking work, laborers often have to accept lower wages to avoid returning to their families empty-handed, he said.

“We need a miracle”

Even tradespeople and craftspeople still in work face shrinking purchasing power and rising living and production costs.

Abdul Karim Ibrahim, a tailor supporting two sons and two daughters, says his daily earnings no longer meet his family's needs.

The economic situation "needs a miracle," he said. Food is now unaffordable for many families, and medical treatment adds to the burden.

Young barber Othman Ali says rising prices and a weakening currency have left his income insufficient for basic needs.

Long power outages and disruptions to the banking apps his customers use for transfers also make it harder to collect payments.

The war forced Ali to leave secondary school and work to help support his large family. He is part of a generation whose education has paid a direct price for the conflict.

The war is no longer the only source of pressure on citizens, Youssef said. Higher levies and fees, a higher exchange rate used to calculate customs duties and bans on some imported goods have compounded the strain and widened the gap in markets, he said.

He called for higher wages and better conditions for pensioners. Some employees receive very little pay, while some retirees receive sums that do not reflect their years of service, he said.

Youssef urged the government to act quickly to help workers and their families. The persistent gap between wages and prices is leaving millions of families facing severe hardship, he said.

“The most vulnerable”

Day laborers are among those hardest hit by Sudan's war, economist Mohammed al-Nayer said. Halted construction and declining craft activity have stripped large numbers of their livelihoods.

"These groups face extremely difficult living conditions amid lost job opportunities and unprecedented increases in the prices of goods and services, alongside a decline in the national currency's value and rising inflation, unemployment and poverty," he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A comprehensive reconstruction program could employ large numbers of day laborers in construction and related activities, he said. But they remain among the hardest hit as their sources of income remain disrupted.

Al-Nayer said the state must fulfill its responsibility to protect vulnerable and poor people. He called for a comprehensive social protection program to address current economic challenges and support those most affected by the war.

These accounts echo International Labor Organization warnings about the war's deep impact on Sudan's labor market: lost jobs, shrinking economic activity and disrupted livelihoods. Workers in the informal economy are among the most vulnerable.


Olive Trees in S. Lebanon Under Israeli Fire: Deprivation of Harvest Seasons Erodes Village Memory

Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Olive Trees in S. Lebanon Under Israeli Fire: Deprivation of Harvest Seasons Erodes Village Memory

Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

The killing of a retired Lebanese Army chief warrant officer by Israeli tank fire in Yater has underscored the perilous reality for southern farmers. Targeted while inspecting his home and olive grove, his death has turned this year's harvest season into a stark symbol of the dangers facing those attempting to reach their land.

The incident comes as residents of border villages continue to be deprived of their harvests for nearly three years. It also coincides with a lawsuit filed in France accusing the Israeli military of uprooting around 600 ancient olive trees in Zawtar al-Sharqiyah. Local officials warn of economic and social repercussions that extend far beyond the loss of crops.

Volunteers from Lebanon's northernmost province of Akkar and the city of Sidon take part in an olive-picking initiative in the southern Lebanese village of Jibshit near Nabatieh on October 11, 2026, in a show of solidarity with Southern Lebanon and its farmers. (Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / AFP)

Targeted While Inspecting His Land

The Lebanese Army announced on Sunday the death of retired Chief Warrant Officer Ali Abdel Hassan Sweidan after being directly targeted by Israeli tank fire while inspecting his property in Yater in the Bint Jbeil district.

The army said a military unit supervised the recovery of his body after contact with him was lost. The municipality of Yater stated that he had been checking on his home and olive grove on the outskirts of the town when he came under fire from the direction of Sarbine, warning residents against approaching unsafe areas.

The incident once again highlights the obstacles facing farmers during a season when families traditionally head to their groves to gather their harvests, as access to parts of agricultural land has become fraught with ongoing security risks.

600 Trees at the Center of a Lawsuit

In Paris, a 37-year-old French businessman of Lebanese origin filed a complaint against unknown persons on September 22, accusing the Israeli military of uprooting roughly 600 olive trees from his family's land in Zawtar al-Sharqiyah.

According to his lawyers, cited by Agence France Presse (AFP), some of the trees are approximately 500 years old, while the family has cultivated the land for about 250 years.

The complaint includes allegations of theft, destruction, and damage to property as potential war crimes. The complainant suspects that the trees were transported to Israel, though this has not been established judicially. He stated that his family home was destroyed in an Israeli strike in April, before the trees were uprooted following Israeli control of the area.

Volunteers from Lebanon's northernmost province of Akkar and the city of Sidon sort olives during an olive-picking initiative in the southern Lebanese village of Jibshit near Nabatieh on October 11, 2026, in a show of solidarity with Southern Lebanon and its farmers. (Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / AFP)

Half the Fields Out of Reach

Hanna Al-Amil, head of the municipality of Rmeish, told Asharq Al-Awsat that since the beginning of the war nearly three years ago, residents have been deprived of access to a large part of their olive fields “because most of them lie along the border, where security conditions do not permit locals to reach them and harvest their crops.”

“Even today, we do not know whether we will be able to harvest olives this year, especially since the season has not yet started and security risks continue to prevent access to the land."

He explained that roughly three-quarters of Rmeish's territory lies along the border and that more than 50 percent of its olive groves have remained unharvested for the past three years.
This deprives families of a basic source of income, he added.

Al-Amil stressed that agricultural losses are not limited to olives but also affect tobacco cultivation, the town's primary agricultural activity. "This year's tobacco production reached only about 60 percent of pre-war levels, meaning families have lost a significant portion of the income on which they relied."

A Memory Shared by Families and Generations

Mohammad Ismail, head of the municipality of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the town's olive groves are “more than just trees or a source of income. They are heritage, history, and the memories of generations. They embrace the hills and fields, shade the alleys of Zawtar, and provide cool breezes that ease the summer heat."

He noted that olive trees also provide heating wood for many residents.

According to Ismail, the olive harvest is an annual occasion that brings entire families together. "Not merely to gather the crop, but to renew their connection to the land and to the ancestors who planted and cared for these trees, keeping a shared memory alive across generations."

"Today, the occupier seeks to strip us of our spirit and sever our connection to history, our ancestors, and life itself. It seeks to erase the traces of life from our hearts and minds and wipe away its fragrance from our memory,” he said.

"What is happening is not merely the uprooting of trees. It is the uprooting of hearts from chests and an attempt to erase the people's memory and their bond with the land,” he added.

Olive Trees as Part of Southern Identity

Ibrahim Sweidan, deputy head of the municipality of Yater, told Asharq Al-Awsat that "olive groves have become part of the identity of southern Lebanon. For southerners, the olive tree is not merely a tree but part of who they are and their attachment to the land."

A Lebanese farmer shows harvested olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

He said the strongest evidence of that attachment is the return of residents to their villages and homes despite difficult security conditions and their determination to remain on their land.

According to Sweidan, attacks on agricultural land, public facilities, and homes all form part of the same pattern: "A strategy aimed at undermining the foundations that allow people to remain in their villages and weakening everything that connects southerners to their land and identity."


Al-Haddad Predicted an 80-Day Israeli War... Saad Called for It to End

Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
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Al-Haddad Predicted an 80-Day Israeli War... Saad Called for It to End

Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)

Details and behind-the-scenes accounts of the October 7, 2023, attack continue to emerge day by day, although many secrets were buried with those who planned the attack and whom Israel pursued and ultimately killed. They include Yahya Sinwar, the former head of Hamas’s political bureau; his brother Mohammed, one of the most prominent commanders of the Qassam Brigades; the brigades’ commander-in-chief, Mohammed Deif; and other figures.

Last July, Israeli intelligence agencies disclosed the contents of a letter they claimed belonged to Sinwar, reportedly seized from Hamas premises in Gaza. In it, he allegedly anticipated a major Israeli response to the attack, including the possibility of using nuclear weapons to strike Gaza. New Palestinian information is now emerging about the planning behind the attack and expectations of Israel’s response.

Yahya Sinwar in an archive photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011. (AP)

Ezzedine Al-Haddad

Two Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ezzedine al-Haddad, the commander of the Qassam Brigades who assumed responsibility for the brigades after the assassinations of Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar, had predicted in a message sent on the first day of the war that it would last only 80 days, after which an agreement would be reached to exchange prisoners and secure Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

According to one source, al-Haddad, who was among the planners and overseers of the attack, had assigned defensive tasks to certain field commanders, instructing them not to exceed specific limits during their participation in the assault on the morning of October 7. However, the sudden collapse of the Gaza Division prompted Qassam fighters to expand their incursion and reach areas that the brigade leadership had not expected them to reach inside the Israeli communities surrounding Gaza. The leadership had overseen the operation from several command centers.

The source said some units had been tasked with advancing deep into Israeli territory and disrupting Israeli forces, while others had been assigned limited objectives before withdrawing to take up defensive positions later. However, the plan did not unfold as intended in several respects because of the collapse of Israeli defenses.

Another source noted that the deaths of numerous field commanders during clashes or in the intense Israeli bombardment in the attack’s opening hours undermined the defensive plan prepared for parts of Gaza Governorate, where al-Haddad was then responsible for a brigade.

The source said al-Haddad was one of the figures who had the greatest influence on the execution of the October 7 attack. He had overseen efforts to increase production of the Yasin 105 launcher for defensive as well as offensive operations. He also authorized field commanders to launch the operation just hours before it began. They had not been briefed on the plan or informed about the attack in advance. During the operation, he had urged them to capture as many Israelis as possible to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

A Hamas banner bearing the slogan “We Are the Flood... We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages. (File photo: AFP)

​​​​​​​The Defensive Plan

The source explained that al-Haddad was responsible for defending Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip. He led the defensive plan alongside field commanders and did not leave the northern part of the territory after Israel separated it from central and southern Gaza. He continued moving among his fighters at the most advanced positions where clashes with Israeli forces were taking place, while also focusing on protecting Israeli hostages.

Assessments within the Hamas and Qassam Brigades leadership that the war could last several months reflected a more optimistic expectation of Israel’s response, given that the group held hostages. However, observers believe these assessments failed to account for the scale of the events, particularly after Israel felt that its security and national pride had been wounded and that it had been humiliated. This prompted Israel to seek revenge by every means available and to continue the war to this day.

A third source said the collapse of the defensive plan forced al-Haddad to find replacements quickly among the leadership. However, the limited experience of some of them led the Qassam commander to adopt a strategy of launching surprise attacks while allowing Israeli forces to advance deep into areas where fighters had set up ambushes. The aim was to inflict unexpected casualties on the Israeli military and focus on capturing soldiers to undermine their morale.

One aspect al-Haddad appears to have failed to anticipate in his defensive plan for northern Gaza was Israel’s ability to reach certain military positions and weapons, missile, and drone storage facilities quickly.

At the same time, the sources believe that al-Haddad and prominent field commanders succeeded in thwarting what became known as the “Generals’ Plan.” The plan aimed to carry out a very large-scale military operation in northern Gaza after separating it from the center and south of the Strip. It involved coordinated attacks by air, land, and sea; taking control of hospitals, shelters, and other facilities; killing, wounding, and arresting hundreds of people and transferring them into Israel; and displacing residents to the southern part of the Strip.

However, after more than 107 days, the plan had failed, and Israel withdrew from those areas amid fierce surprise attacks that killed dozens of Israeli troops.

Raed Saad

Another revelation from behind the scenes of the war concerns divisions within Hamas and the Qassam Brigades leadership over ceasefire proposals. According to one source, prominent Qassam Brigades commander and military council member Raed Saad called in the early months of the war for efforts to end the fighting at any cost.

According to several sources, Saad was among the leaders taken by surprise by the October 7 attack and did not know when it would be carried out, despite being one of the commanders who had helped develop the plan. Israel calls the plan “Jericho Wall,” based on intelligence it had obtained years earlier. Saad was then responsible for operations and had drawn up the plan in 2016. Its implementation was postponed several times over the following years.

According to the first source, Saad sent a written message to the military council leadership during the first four months of the war, urging it to reach an agreement and accept a ceasefire. He stressed that continuing the war did not serve Hamas or the Qassam Brigades, particularly given the high number of fatalities and the possibility that the toll would rise over time.

However, Israel’s repeated rejection of proposals and insistence on continuing the war sidelined those voices, and the fighting continued, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The source added that Saad oversaw numerous areas of responsibility and tasks during the war that strengthened the Qassam Brigades’ ability to withstand the fighting. He continued supporting field commanders in combat and remained in close and regular contact with al-Haddad and other leaders to determine military operations, confront Israeli forces, and keep Israeli hostages in a way that could help secure a prisoner-exchange deal.