Exclusive – Retroactive, Current and Future Injustices in Syria

Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
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Exclusive – Retroactive, Current and Future Injustices in Syria

Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)

Nine years of war in Syria have left three forms of injustice: retroactive, current and future. Among its manifestations was the spike in economic losses to over half a trillion dollars, destruction of 40 percent of the country’s infrastructure and slide of 86 percent of the population of 20 million in poverty.

New figures have revealed that victims of the conflict have reached 700,000 or double United Nations estimates. These figures are of the injustices of the past. The future injustice lies in the fact that three million Syrian children, inside the country and abroad, are out of schools.

Global ranking

Syria has been described by the United Nations as the greatest humanitarian disaster since World War II, and the data attests to this. It was ranked 180 out of 189 in the human development index and its lies dead last in protecting children. It ranks 174 out of 180 in freedom of the press.

Triple injustice

These are some of the findings reached by the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) in a report, entitled “Justice to Transcend Conflict”, that provides multidimensional analyses of the impact of the armed conflict in Syria between 2011 and 2019, examining the country’s socio-economic situation and institutional performance. The report should serve as a reference to UN agencies and Arab and foreign governments on the conflict.

“The conflict has created three types of injustices: the retroactive injustice, which refers to the destruction and deterioration of the tangible and intangible wealth of the country that have accumulated through centuries; the current injustice, which represents the production of injustice now, as the conflict shifted the integrated and productive economic and social activities towards the destructive one; and future injustice, as the subjugating powers institutionalizing conflict-centered institutions, relations and economy. These powers build the foundations of injustice in the future to be added to grievances that created during the conflict,” said the report.

Economic injustice

The conflict had led to the emergence of different, fragmented economies within the “fractured state”, said the report. “The economic foundations were transformed into a self-sustaining cycle of violence in which much of the capital stock was destroyed or reallocated to conflict-related activities.”

“The total accumulated economic loss during the conflict by the end of 2019 is projected to reach 530.1 billion USD, compared to the counterfactual scenario, which is equivalent to 9.7 times of GDP of 2010 at constant prices. The total loss consists of GDP loss equal to 420.9 billion USD, the increase in military expenditure is equal to 37.8 billion USD, the capital stock damaged or lost which is equal 64.6 billion USD, and the informal production of the oil and gas is projected to reach 9.9 billion USD by the end of 2019,” it added.

“Public subsidies have witnessed a consistent decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 13.1 percent in 2014. Due to the price liberalization, the subsidies dropped sharply to 5.1 percent in 2015 and 4.9 percent in 2019. As a result, the public budget deficit with off-budget subsidies dropped from 23.6 percent in 2013 to 8.8 percent in 2019.”

Three years ago, Russian officials said the cost of rebuilding Syria may reach 400 billion dollars, while the International Monetary Fund put the figure at 300 billion. Since then, studies on Syria ceased as the international community’s attention to the conflict waned even though the violence did not.

Since Russia’s intervention in the conflict in late 2015, regime forces, with Moscow and Tehran’s backing, managed to recapture vast territories from the opposition. Prior to the intervention it held 10 percent of territory, while now it holds 64 percent. Twenty-six percent lies under Kurdish control, backed by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, and ten percent is held by Turkey-backed factions.

These various “zones of influence” are somewhat stable, but suffer the same economic problems. The Syrian pound has steadily lost its value against the dollar, starting from 2011. It originally traded at 46 pounds to the dollar and now trades at 1,700 to the dollar. Unemployment has also soared. At the beginning of the conflict, 5.184 million people had jobs, but that number has since dropped to 3.058 million.

Human injustice

Syria’s population rose 0.9 percent in 2018 and 1.1 percent in 2019 to reach 19.584 million people. The conflict has led to the displacement of 5.6 million people to Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and other countries. As of August 2019, the internally displaced are estimates at 6.14 million, the highest such figure in the world.

The recent military operations in Idlib have led to the displacement of over a million people towards the Turkish border. Northwestern Syria is home to 3 million civilians, have of whom were displaced at least once before from other areas. Over 3.6 million Syrians in Turkey receive protection, but the Syrian refugees in other countries are suffering. Lebanon, host to 500,000 Syrians, had relentlessly called for their return home and it has taken effective measures to stem their flow into its territories.

Syrians inside their own country are also suffering. Poverty reached its peak at 89.4 percent at the end of 2016 and it has since dropped to 86 percent in 2019. The stifling economic crisis in Lebanon has only exacerbated the economic situation in Syria. The coronavirus has only compounded suffering, as has the European Union’s extension of sanctions against the country. The country is in store for even more hardships as the United States moves to implement the Caesar Act in mid-June.

Priority for military deal

The continuation of the conflict has largely affected the fiscal policies adopted by the government. These policies still prioritize military expenditure and have resulted in the reallocation of available resources from public sector activities and services. The government has aimed to increase its revenue by imposing different fees and taxes, in addition to liberalizing and removing subsidies from some goods, particularly oil derivatives, said the report.

Iran has stated that it spent 20 to 30 billion dollars to back the regime in the past nine years. Russia has called for economic and sovereign compensation for its military contribution.

Development expenditure decreased severely from 7.3 percent of GDP in 2011 to 2.3 and 2.9 percent in 2015 and 2019 respectively. This is because the majority of development expenditure has been reallocated to military expenditure.

During the period 2011-2019, public expenditure dropped substantially from 28.9 percent of GDP in 2011 to 17.6 percent in 2015 and 13.3 percent in 2019. Current expenditure fell from 21.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to 15.3 and 10.5 percent in 2015 and 2019 respectively.

Public subsidies have witnessed a consistent decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 4.9 percent of current GDP in 2019. The overall deficit with the military expenditure decreased from 40 percent of current GDP in 2013 to 23.7 percent in 2016, increasing again to 33.5 percent in 2018, and dropping to 26 percent in 2019

Foreign debt

Fiscal policies funded the enormous deficit through foreign and domestic public debt which creates a substantial burden for future generations. The total public debt increased from 30 percent of GDP in 2010 to 208 percent in 2019. This increase was driven mainly by the external public debt that increased from 7 percent of the current GDP in 2010, to 127 percent in 2016, and finally to 116 percent in 2019.

Domestic debt increased from 17 percent in 2010, to 109 percent in 2014, decreased to 59 percent in 2017, and increased again to reach 93 percent in 2019. Domestic debt also caused a substantial increase in inflation rates.

As the loans have been spent on current expenditure and conflict-related activities, more loans will be needed in the post-conflict era driving higher public debt and perpetuating and exacerbating injustice for future generations, said the report.

Lost generation

The Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. “Almost half of Syria’s children are not in school, becoming a generation that has missed out enrolled on education which will have far-reaching future consequences. The quality of education has also deteriorated substantially,” it said.

“The continuation of the conflict has led to the creation of separate and isolated regions controlled by different powers that imposed their own vision and objectives on the community. This was reflected in the implementation of different educational curriculums and methods that deepen the state of fragmentation and invest in identity politics. These methods differ according to the dominant actor.”

A UN report said 5,427 children were killed and 3,739 wounded in 2019. Nine hundred of the victims were killed in northwestern Syria. A total of 4,619 have been recruited to fight. UNICEF said 6 million Syrian children have been born since 2011. One million were born in neighboring countries, while 7.5 million need aid, including 5 million inside Syria.

700,000 victims

“The increase in mortality among different population groups is one of the most catastrophic impacts of the conflict,” said the report. It revealed a rise in the crude death rate from 4.4 per thousand in 2010 to 10.9 per thousand in 2014. The projections for 2016-2019 reflect a consistent decline, with crude death rates reduced to 9.9 per thousand in 2017 and 7.0 per thousand in 2019.

The projected conflict-related deaths until 2019 is approximately 570,000 deaths, while the projected indirect conflict related death is approximately 102,000, it said.

Kidnapping and forced disappearance represent exceptionally tragic consequences of the ways in which war actors have chosen to assert their power and control over Syrian communities, it added.

Institutional injustice

“The Human Status Index showed the enormous collapse in institutional performance and the deadly struggle between fighting political actors. Throughout the conflict, decision-making processes have been fragmented and internationalized, as multiple internal and external actors engaged in setting contradicting priorities and mechanisms for each of the involved actors,” said the report.

“The different forms of institutions were conflict-centered and adopted extreme strategies to detrimentally affect human beings, social relations, and resources, as well as to subordinate communities.”

“Although the intensity of battles has declined during 2017-2019, the rule of law, participation, accountability aspects of governance continued to deteriorate.

“There are major contradictions between the five internal actors including civil society. The priorities of justice, freedom, transparency, participatory and democracy are at the bottom of the priority list for those in power, which reflects the nature of the conflict centered actors. Only civil society ranked justice, freedom and democracy as top priorities.”

“The organic relations between political actors and new private elite have been deepened and transformed wealth (that which has not been destroyed) to their own benefits in an unprecedented forced redistribution of tangible and intangible capital. Therefore, enormous injustices were created between the political actors and the new private elite on one hand, and the surviving private sector, employees, unemployed, displaced, and poor people, among others.”

Negligible implementation

The report continued: “The global governance system failed to protect civilians in Syria and to activate humanitarian international law and/or effectively enhance the prospect of a just and sustainable settlement.”

“The application of international law during the Syrian conflict has been negligible, which has impeded the alleviation of civilian suffering and set the grounds for a prolonged conflict,” it warned. “The global power struggle has a direct effect on the intractability of the Syrian conflict. This struggle represented in the approaches of the permanent five members of the Security Council in addressing the Syrian war and the impacts thereof. The struggle is reflected in contradicted priorities and policies including political and military interventions, sanctions, and economic and humanitarian support, with substantial involvement of conflicting regional actors.”

The report “suggests the Human Status Framework as a comprehensive, evidence-based approach to analyze the impact and dynamics of the conflict from the justice lens. The institutional, social, and economic diagnoses of the conflict identify injustice as a core root of the conflict, and perpetuation and creation of new and existing injustice as a key outcome of the conflict.”

The report suggested alternative approaches to start the transcending process of conflict, based on the political economy analysis of the key active powers and dynamics of the conflict, such as dismantling conflict economy and achieving justice to children.



From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
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From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.


Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.


The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.