Exclusive – Retroactive, Current and Future Injustices in Syria

Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
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Exclusive – Retroactive, Current and Future Injustices in Syria

Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)

Nine years of war in Syria have left three forms of injustice: retroactive, current and future. Among its manifestations was the spike in economic losses to over half a trillion dollars, destruction of 40 percent of the country’s infrastructure and slide of 86 percent of the population of 20 million in poverty.

New figures have revealed that victims of the conflict have reached 700,000 or double United Nations estimates. These figures are of the injustices of the past. The future injustice lies in the fact that three million Syrian children, inside the country and abroad, are out of schools.

Global ranking

Syria has been described by the United Nations as the greatest humanitarian disaster since World War II, and the data attests to this. It was ranked 180 out of 189 in the human development index and its lies dead last in protecting children. It ranks 174 out of 180 in freedom of the press.

Triple injustice

These are some of the findings reached by the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) in a report, entitled “Justice to Transcend Conflict”, that provides multidimensional analyses of the impact of the armed conflict in Syria between 2011 and 2019, examining the country’s socio-economic situation and institutional performance. The report should serve as a reference to UN agencies and Arab and foreign governments on the conflict.

“The conflict has created three types of injustices: the retroactive injustice, which refers to the destruction and deterioration of the tangible and intangible wealth of the country that have accumulated through centuries; the current injustice, which represents the production of injustice now, as the conflict shifted the integrated and productive economic and social activities towards the destructive one; and future injustice, as the subjugating powers institutionalizing conflict-centered institutions, relations and economy. These powers build the foundations of injustice in the future to be added to grievances that created during the conflict,” said the report.

Economic injustice

The conflict had led to the emergence of different, fragmented economies within the “fractured state”, said the report. “The economic foundations were transformed into a self-sustaining cycle of violence in which much of the capital stock was destroyed or reallocated to conflict-related activities.”

“The total accumulated economic loss during the conflict by the end of 2019 is projected to reach 530.1 billion USD, compared to the counterfactual scenario, which is equivalent to 9.7 times of GDP of 2010 at constant prices. The total loss consists of GDP loss equal to 420.9 billion USD, the increase in military expenditure is equal to 37.8 billion USD, the capital stock damaged or lost which is equal 64.6 billion USD, and the informal production of the oil and gas is projected to reach 9.9 billion USD by the end of 2019,” it added.

“Public subsidies have witnessed a consistent decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 13.1 percent in 2014. Due to the price liberalization, the subsidies dropped sharply to 5.1 percent in 2015 and 4.9 percent in 2019. As a result, the public budget deficit with off-budget subsidies dropped from 23.6 percent in 2013 to 8.8 percent in 2019.”

Three years ago, Russian officials said the cost of rebuilding Syria may reach 400 billion dollars, while the International Monetary Fund put the figure at 300 billion. Since then, studies on Syria ceased as the international community’s attention to the conflict waned even though the violence did not.

Since Russia’s intervention in the conflict in late 2015, regime forces, with Moscow and Tehran’s backing, managed to recapture vast territories from the opposition. Prior to the intervention it held 10 percent of territory, while now it holds 64 percent. Twenty-six percent lies under Kurdish control, backed by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, and ten percent is held by Turkey-backed factions.

These various “zones of influence” are somewhat stable, but suffer the same economic problems. The Syrian pound has steadily lost its value against the dollar, starting from 2011. It originally traded at 46 pounds to the dollar and now trades at 1,700 to the dollar. Unemployment has also soared. At the beginning of the conflict, 5.184 million people had jobs, but that number has since dropped to 3.058 million.

Human injustice

Syria’s population rose 0.9 percent in 2018 and 1.1 percent in 2019 to reach 19.584 million people. The conflict has led to the displacement of 5.6 million people to Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and other countries. As of August 2019, the internally displaced are estimates at 6.14 million, the highest such figure in the world.

The recent military operations in Idlib have led to the displacement of over a million people towards the Turkish border. Northwestern Syria is home to 3 million civilians, have of whom were displaced at least once before from other areas. Over 3.6 million Syrians in Turkey receive protection, but the Syrian refugees in other countries are suffering. Lebanon, host to 500,000 Syrians, had relentlessly called for their return home and it has taken effective measures to stem their flow into its territories.

Syrians inside their own country are also suffering. Poverty reached its peak at 89.4 percent at the end of 2016 and it has since dropped to 86 percent in 2019. The stifling economic crisis in Lebanon has only exacerbated the economic situation in Syria. The coronavirus has only compounded suffering, as has the European Union’s extension of sanctions against the country. The country is in store for even more hardships as the United States moves to implement the Caesar Act in mid-June.

Priority for military deal

The continuation of the conflict has largely affected the fiscal policies adopted by the government. These policies still prioritize military expenditure and have resulted in the reallocation of available resources from public sector activities and services. The government has aimed to increase its revenue by imposing different fees and taxes, in addition to liberalizing and removing subsidies from some goods, particularly oil derivatives, said the report.

Iran has stated that it spent 20 to 30 billion dollars to back the regime in the past nine years. Russia has called for economic and sovereign compensation for its military contribution.

Development expenditure decreased severely from 7.3 percent of GDP in 2011 to 2.3 and 2.9 percent in 2015 and 2019 respectively. This is because the majority of development expenditure has been reallocated to military expenditure.

During the period 2011-2019, public expenditure dropped substantially from 28.9 percent of GDP in 2011 to 17.6 percent in 2015 and 13.3 percent in 2019. Current expenditure fell from 21.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to 15.3 and 10.5 percent in 2015 and 2019 respectively.

Public subsidies have witnessed a consistent decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 4.9 percent of current GDP in 2019. The overall deficit with the military expenditure decreased from 40 percent of current GDP in 2013 to 23.7 percent in 2016, increasing again to 33.5 percent in 2018, and dropping to 26 percent in 2019

Foreign debt

Fiscal policies funded the enormous deficit through foreign and domestic public debt which creates a substantial burden for future generations. The total public debt increased from 30 percent of GDP in 2010 to 208 percent in 2019. This increase was driven mainly by the external public debt that increased from 7 percent of the current GDP in 2010, to 127 percent in 2016, and finally to 116 percent in 2019.

Domestic debt increased from 17 percent in 2010, to 109 percent in 2014, decreased to 59 percent in 2017, and increased again to reach 93 percent in 2019. Domestic debt also caused a substantial increase in inflation rates.

As the loans have been spent on current expenditure and conflict-related activities, more loans will be needed in the post-conflict era driving higher public debt and perpetuating and exacerbating injustice for future generations, said the report.

Lost generation

The Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. “Almost half of Syria’s children are not in school, becoming a generation that has missed out enrolled on education which will have far-reaching future consequences. The quality of education has also deteriorated substantially,” it said.

“The continuation of the conflict has led to the creation of separate and isolated regions controlled by different powers that imposed their own vision and objectives on the community. This was reflected in the implementation of different educational curriculums and methods that deepen the state of fragmentation and invest in identity politics. These methods differ according to the dominant actor.”

A UN report said 5,427 children were killed and 3,739 wounded in 2019. Nine hundred of the victims were killed in northwestern Syria. A total of 4,619 have been recruited to fight. UNICEF said 6 million Syrian children have been born since 2011. One million were born in neighboring countries, while 7.5 million need aid, including 5 million inside Syria.

700,000 victims

“The increase in mortality among different population groups is one of the most catastrophic impacts of the conflict,” said the report. It revealed a rise in the crude death rate from 4.4 per thousand in 2010 to 10.9 per thousand in 2014. The projections for 2016-2019 reflect a consistent decline, with crude death rates reduced to 9.9 per thousand in 2017 and 7.0 per thousand in 2019.

The projected conflict-related deaths until 2019 is approximately 570,000 deaths, while the projected indirect conflict related death is approximately 102,000, it said.

Kidnapping and forced disappearance represent exceptionally tragic consequences of the ways in which war actors have chosen to assert their power and control over Syrian communities, it added.

Institutional injustice

“The Human Status Index showed the enormous collapse in institutional performance and the deadly struggle between fighting political actors. Throughout the conflict, decision-making processes have been fragmented and internationalized, as multiple internal and external actors engaged in setting contradicting priorities and mechanisms for each of the involved actors,” said the report.

“The different forms of institutions were conflict-centered and adopted extreme strategies to detrimentally affect human beings, social relations, and resources, as well as to subordinate communities.”

“Although the intensity of battles has declined during 2017-2019, the rule of law, participation, accountability aspects of governance continued to deteriorate.

“There are major contradictions between the five internal actors including civil society. The priorities of justice, freedom, transparency, participatory and democracy are at the bottom of the priority list for those in power, which reflects the nature of the conflict centered actors. Only civil society ranked justice, freedom and democracy as top priorities.”

“The organic relations between political actors and new private elite have been deepened and transformed wealth (that which has not been destroyed) to their own benefits in an unprecedented forced redistribution of tangible and intangible capital. Therefore, enormous injustices were created between the political actors and the new private elite on one hand, and the surviving private sector, employees, unemployed, displaced, and poor people, among others.”

Negligible implementation

The report continued: “The global governance system failed to protect civilians in Syria and to activate humanitarian international law and/or effectively enhance the prospect of a just and sustainable settlement.”

“The application of international law during the Syrian conflict has been negligible, which has impeded the alleviation of civilian suffering and set the grounds for a prolonged conflict,” it warned. “The global power struggle has a direct effect on the intractability of the Syrian conflict. This struggle represented in the approaches of the permanent five members of the Security Council in addressing the Syrian war and the impacts thereof. The struggle is reflected in contradicted priorities and policies including political and military interventions, sanctions, and economic and humanitarian support, with substantial involvement of conflicting regional actors.”

The report “suggests the Human Status Framework as a comprehensive, evidence-based approach to analyze the impact and dynamics of the conflict from the justice lens. The institutional, social, and economic diagnoses of the conflict identify injustice as a core root of the conflict, and perpetuation and creation of new and existing injustice as a key outcome of the conflict.”

The report suggested alternative approaches to start the transcending process of conflict, based on the political economy analysis of the key active powers and dynamics of the conflict, such as dismantling conflict economy and achieving justice to children.



Lebanon Becomes an Alternate Arena for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards after Assad’s Fall

A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)
A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)
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Lebanon Becomes an Alternate Arena for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards after Assad’s Fall

A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)
A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)

A multi-layered structure run by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards is taking shape in Lebanon, spanning Lebanese and Palestinian arms across intertwined security, military, and political roles.

The model echoes Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024, raising fears that Lebanon is shifting from a traditional battleground into a more complex hub for managing conflict and influence.

As signs of this overlap grow, Israel Defense Forces Radio said on Monday that an attempted assassination on Sunday in a Beirut apartment targeted a member of the “Palestine Corps,” linked to the Revolutionary Guards’ external arm, the Quds Force.

Israel has previously said it killed several Iranian figures in Lebanon, including two strikes on “central commanders in the Lebanon Corps,” affiliated with the Quds Force and operating in Beirut. One strike hit the Ramada Hotel in Raouche.

On March 11, the Israeli military said it targeted Hisham Abdel Karim Yassin, describing him as “a senior commander in Hezbollah’s communications unit, and in the Palestine Corps of the Quds Force.”

A Palestinian source in Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat the Iran-linked structure resembles a parent body branching into multiple formations, with the Quds Force at its core. Local and Palestinian arms operate under different names for organizational and media purposes.

The structure extends beyond the Shiite base tied to Hezbollah, incorporating groups from other communities, including Sunni elements integrated into parallel formations similar to the Resistance Brigades, alongside carefully organized Palestinian frameworks.

“The Palestinian cover is essential,” the source said, adding that the aim is to avoid portraying Hezbollah as acting alone, instead projecting a broader alliance of Palestinian and Islamic factions to boost legitimacy and reduce Hezbollah’s domestic isolation.

Concealment

Names such as “Lebanon Corps” and “Palestine Corps” reflect composition, and are not arbitrary, the source said. The Lebanon Corps refers to Lebanese members from outside the Shiite community, while the Palestine Corps includes fighters from Palestinian factions, both Islamist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and non-Islamist factions.

The labels also serve as concealment tools, adopted after older structures were exposed, allowing networks to reorganize and evade monitoring.

With Iran’s reduced ability to use Syria as before, in terms of movement and deployment, the base of operations was moved to Lebanon, the source said.

Lebanon is now used as an alternative arena in practice, an advanced platform for managing confrontation, not just a support front. Its geography next to Israel, its complex environment offering multiple Lebanese, Palestinian, and Sunni covers, and an existing military structure all support this shift.

The change has moved the role from logistical support in Syria to direct operational management from inside Lebanon. The country is now treated as “the most sensitive and valuable geography in this axis,” both for confrontation with Israel and as a pivot for escalation or negotiations.

Multiple structures, unified command

Political writer Ali al-Amine said Iran-linked structures in Lebanon span multiple levels and labels but converge under the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly through the Quds Force.

Some groups are directly tied to the Quds Force, while others operate under a Palestinian banner, often composed of Palestinian members, each with its own role and title.

“These individuals are organizationally linked to the Revolutionary Guards, but are not necessarily Iranian,” he said. “They can be Lebanese or Palestinian, while their direct leadership reference lies within the Guards, not local frameworks.”

He added that some figures classified within Hezbollah are in fact closer organizationally to the Revolutionary Guards, highlighting overlap between Lebanese and Iranian roles.

The Palestine Corps manages ties with Iran-linked Palestinian factions, while the Lebanon Corps handles the Lebanese arena.

“What is known as the Lebanon Corps is not a traditional military force, but an administrative, coordinating and supervisory body directly linked to the Revolutionary Guards, while field execution remains with Hezbollah,” he said.

He added that the Revolutionary Guards have long maintained a direct presence inside Hezbollah through representatives across financial, security, military, and social sectors, ensuring oversight and influence. These figures typically fall under the Quds Force, responsible for operations outside Iran.

Al-Amine said Lebanon has become a primary arena for the Revolutionary Guards after Iran’s loss of the Syrian theater, explaining Tehran’s strong commitment to maintaining its influence.

“Iran will strongly defend this influence, because losing Lebanon would be a strategic blow and would directly affect its regional position,” he said.

He said a key part of the current conflict centers on Iran’s efforts to entrench its influence in Lebanon and prevent its erosion, whether through the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, or affiliated networks, as it seeks to preserve its regional role and leverage.


Majid Khademi: Brief Tenure at Helm of Embattled IRGC Intelligence Ends in Assassination

A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
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Majid Khademi: Brief Tenure at Helm of Embattled IRGC Intelligence Ends in Assassination

A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 

Majid Khademi’s rise to the top of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence apparatus was as abrupt as his fall.

During the 12-day war in June 2025, Khademi was appointed head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization following the killing of his predecessor, Mohammad Kazemi, at a time when Iran’s security establishment was under intense pressure from external strikes, internal unrest and mounting concerns over infiltration.

Less than a year later, on April 6, 2026, Israel announced it had assassinated Khademi in an air strike. The IRGC later confirmed his death.

His killing marked the second time in under a year that the head of one of Iran’s most sensitive intelligence bodies had been eliminated in a targeted strike, underscoring both the exposure of the apparatus and the strain on its ranks.

Khademi, a career security officer, was not among the IRGC’s publicly prominent figures. Unlike commanders known for battlefield roles or political visibility, he emerged from the opaque world of internal protection and counterintelligence, a domain focused on safeguarding the system from within.

His appointment reflected that background and came at a moment when the IRGC was grappling with assassinations, intelligence breaches, and operational setbacks that raised questions about its internal cohesion.

A parallel apparatus

To understand Khademi’s role, it is necessary to situate the body he led within Iran’s broader intelligence architecture. Iran operates two major intelligence services with overlapping mandates.

The Ministry of Intelligence is the state’s official civilian agency, while the IRGC Intelligence Organization has evolved into a powerful parallel structure, particularly since 2009. More closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the ideological core of the system, the IRGC’s intelligence arm operates with a mandate that blends security, political oversight and military intelligence.

Within this ecosystem, the IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization, where Khademi spent much of his career, plays a critical internal role. It is tasked with counterintelligence inside the corps, including preventing leaks, monitoring discipline and loyalty among personnel, and detecting infiltration before it develops into a broader crisis.

In recent years, the IRGC intelligence apparatus has expanded beyond its traditional military remit to include monitoring protests, cyberspace operations, influence campaigns and surveillance of political and social actors, alongside pursuing external adversaries.

This expansion has effectively transformed it into a hybrid political-security institution, requiring its leadership to possess detailed knowledge of the IRGC’s internal networks of loyalty and control. Khademi’s career trajectory, rooted in protection and internal oversight, aligned closely with these demands.

A closed biography

Information about Khademi remains limited, reflecting the nature of his roles. His name appears in various forms in Iranian sources, including Majid Khademi, Majid Khademi Hosseini and Majid Hosseini. He is reported to have been born in the village of Amir Hajilu, in Fasa county in the southern province of Fars. He belonged to an early generation of IRGC cadres who rose through internal security structures, particularly within the protection apparatus.

By at least 2014, Khademi was serving as a deputy to Hossein Taeb, then head of IRGC intelligence. He later held senior positions within the Intelligence Protection Organization. In May 2018, he was appointed head of intelligence protection at the Ministry of Defense.

He returned to the IRGC’s protection apparatus in 2022 as its chief, succeeding Mohammad Kazemi, who had been promoted to lead IRGC intelligence after Taeb’s removal. Following Kazemi’s killing in June 2025, Khademi was elevated to head the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

“Security contamination”: the post-Taeb phase

Khademi’s rise was closely tied to a broader reshuffle within Iran’s security establishment. In 2022, Hossein Taeb was removed from his post after a period marked by a string of security breaches, assassinations, and reported intelligence failures. His replacement, Kazemi, was drawn from the protection apparatus, signaling a shift toward tightening internal control. Khademi’s appointment to head intelligence protection formed part of this restructuring, which also affected other security bodies close to the core of power.

The changes took place amid growing concern among officials over what was described in Iranian discourse as “security contamination”, referring to infiltration, leaks and compromised networks within sensitive institutions. Statements by senior political and security figures indicated that these concerns had moved from theoretical risk to a central element of the security crisis.

Between 2022 and 2025, Khademi oversaw one of the most sensitive portfolios in the IRGC at a time when fears of infiltration were intensifying within the organization itself. Some Iranian analysts associated his rise with the camp of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a senior security figure later appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

While the precise alignments remain unclear, the reshuffle was widely seen as part of an internal rebalancing within the IRGC’s conservative security current. Khademi’s advancement came during a period of shifting trust and authority within the apparatus rather than institutional stability.

His career placed him at the core of the IRGC’s internal control mechanisms, overseeing secrecy, discipline, and loyalty. His tenure at the Ministry of Defense between 2018 and 2022 added another dimension. The ministry sits at the nexus of military industries, sensitive programs and technical infrastructure, as well as the complex relationship between the IRGC, the regular army and other agencies. Its intelligence protection arm is regarded as a key component of Iran’s security system, responsible not only for personnel oversight but also for safeguarding strategic projects and documentation.

During this period, the IRGC, through networks associated with Khademi, consolidated its role in protecting institutions linked to Iran’s nuclear program. This included expanded responsibilities for securing nuclear facilities and affiliated centers, as well as protecting nuclear officials and scientists, an area long targeted by foreign intelligence operations.

His security discourse

Khademi’s public statements offer insight into his approach. In an interview published on February 18, 2026, on the official website of the Supreme Leader’s office, he framed recent unrest in Iran in explicitly security terms. He argued that the disturbances in January were not simply protests driven by economic or social grievances, but rather an organized project involving foreign intelligence services, domestic networks and coordinated mobilization through digital platforms.

He described the events as closer to a “coup attempt” than a protest movement, a characterization consistent with the narrative advanced by Iran’s leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khademi spoke of infiltration at the level of individuals and factions and alleged the involvement of at least 10 foreign intelligence agencies. He outlined what he described as staged phases of unrest, including “cognitive warfare” and digital mobilization.

He cited figures to illustrate the scale of the response by his apparatus, including the summoning of 2,735 individuals, the “advising” of around 13,000 others, and the seizure of 1,173 weapons. Central to his analysis was the role of cyberspace. He linked what he termed “cognitive warfare” to weaknesses in internet governance, which he said created vulnerabilities exploited for organization, mobilization and incitement.

He also referred to a meeting with Ali Khamenei prior to the unrest, saying the leader had stressed the importance of intelligence work and vigilance against infiltration, drawing parallels with the early years following Iran’s 1979 revolution.


Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
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Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)

When senior officials from 40 countries met virtually this week to discuss how to bring shipping traffic back to the Strait of Hormuz, Italy’s foreign minister had a proposal. He urged them to establish a “humanitarian corridor” allowing safe passage for fertilizer and other crucial goods headed to impoverished nations.

The plan, described after the meeting by Italian officials, was one of several competing proposals from Europe and beyond that were meant to prevent the Iran war from causing widespread hunger. But it was not endorsed by the envoys on the call, and the meeting ended with no concrete plan to reopen the strait, militarily or otherwise, reported the New York Times.

European leaders are under pressure from US President Donald Trump to commit military assets, immediately, to end Iran’s blockage of the strait and tame a growing global energy and economic crisis. They have refused to meet his demands by sending warships now. Instead, they are hotly debating what to do to help unclog the vital shipping lane once the war ends.

But they are struggling to rally around a plan of action.

That partly reflects the slow gears of diplomacy in Europe and the sheer number of nations, including Gulf states, that are invested in safeguarding the strait once the war ends. Many nations involved in the talks, including Italy and Germany, have insisted that any international effort be blessed by the United Nations, which could slow action further. Military leaders will take up the issue in discussions next week.

More than anything, the struggle reflects how difficult it could be to actually secure the strait under a fragile peace — for Europe or for anyone else. None of the options available to Europe, the Gulf states and other countries look foolproof, even under the assumption that the major fighting will have stopped.

Naval escorts

French officials, including President Emmanuel Macron, have repeatedly raised the possibility that French naval vessels could help escort merchant ships through the strait after the war ends.

American officials have pushed for Europeans and other allies, like Japan, to escort ships sailing under their own countries’ flags.

Naval escorts are expensive. Also, their air defense systems alone might not be sufficient to stop some types of attacks, like drone strikes, should Iran choose to start firing again.

“What does the world expect, what does Donald Trump expect, from let’s say a handful or two handfuls of European frigates there in the Strait of Hormuz,” Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of Germany said last month, “to achieve what the powerful American Navy cannot manage there alone?”

Sweep for mines

German and Belgian officials, among others, say they are prepared to send minesweepers to clear the strait of explosives after the war.

Western military leaders aren’t convinced that Iran has actually mined the strait, in part because some Iranian ships still pass through it. So while minesweepers might be deployed as part of a naval escort, they might not have much to do.

Help from above

Another option is sending fighter jets and drones to intercept any Iranian air assaults on ships. American officials have pushed Europe to do this.

It is quite expensive and still not guaranteed to work. Iran can attack ships with a single soldier in a speedboat, and if just a few attempts succeed, that could be enough to spook insurers and shipowners out of attempting passage.

Diplomacy

Another option are negotiations and economic leverage to pressure Iran to refrain from future attacks, and deploy a variety of military means to enforce that. This effort would go beyond Europe. On Thursday, the German foreign ministry called on China to use its influence with Iran “constructively” to help end the hostilities.

This option is expensive and still not guaranteed. Negotiations seem to have done little to stop the fighting. But this may be Europe’s best bet, for lack of a better one.

What if none of that works?

Iranian officials said this week that they would continue to control traffic through the strait after the war. They have already made plans to make ships pay tolls for passing through the strait, which is supposed to be an unfettered waterway under international law.

A continued blockage risks global economic disaster. Countries around the world rely on shipments through the strait for fuel and fertilizer, among other necessities.

In some regions, shortages loom. In others, like Europe, high oil, gas and fertilizer prices have raised the specter of spiking inflation and cratering economic growth.

“The big threat right now is stagflation,” said Hanns Koenig, a managing director at Aurora Energy Research, a Berlin consultancy. “You’ve got higher prices, and they strangle the tiny growth we would have seen this year.”

*Jim Tankersley for the New York Times