Exclusive – Retroactive, Current and Future Injustices in Syria

Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
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Exclusive – Retroactive, Current and Future Injustices in Syria

Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)
Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. (Reuters)

Nine years of war in Syria have left three forms of injustice: retroactive, current and future. Among its manifestations was the spike in economic losses to over half a trillion dollars, destruction of 40 percent of the country’s infrastructure and slide of 86 percent of the population of 20 million in poverty.

New figures have revealed that victims of the conflict have reached 700,000 or double United Nations estimates. These figures are of the injustices of the past. The future injustice lies in the fact that three million Syrian children, inside the country and abroad, are out of schools.

Global ranking

Syria has been described by the United Nations as the greatest humanitarian disaster since World War II, and the data attests to this. It was ranked 180 out of 189 in the human development index and its lies dead last in protecting children. It ranks 174 out of 180 in freedom of the press.

Triple injustice

These are some of the findings reached by the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) in a report, entitled “Justice to Transcend Conflict”, that provides multidimensional analyses of the impact of the armed conflict in Syria between 2011 and 2019, examining the country’s socio-economic situation and institutional performance. The report should serve as a reference to UN agencies and Arab and foreign governments on the conflict.

“The conflict has created three types of injustices: the retroactive injustice, which refers to the destruction and deterioration of the tangible and intangible wealth of the country that have accumulated through centuries; the current injustice, which represents the production of injustice now, as the conflict shifted the integrated and productive economic and social activities towards the destructive one; and future injustice, as the subjugating powers institutionalizing conflict-centered institutions, relations and economy. These powers build the foundations of injustice in the future to be added to grievances that created during the conflict,” said the report.

Economic injustice

The conflict had led to the emergence of different, fragmented economies within the “fractured state”, said the report. “The economic foundations were transformed into a self-sustaining cycle of violence in which much of the capital stock was destroyed or reallocated to conflict-related activities.”

“The total accumulated economic loss during the conflict by the end of 2019 is projected to reach 530.1 billion USD, compared to the counterfactual scenario, which is equivalent to 9.7 times of GDP of 2010 at constant prices. The total loss consists of GDP loss equal to 420.9 billion USD, the increase in military expenditure is equal to 37.8 billion USD, the capital stock damaged or lost which is equal 64.6 billion USD, and the informal production of the oil and gas is projected to reach 9.9 billion USD by the end of 2019,” it added.

“Public subsidies have witnessed a consistent decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 13.1 percent in 2014. Due to the price liberalization, the subsidies dropped sharply to 5.1 percent in 2015 and 4.9 percent in 2019. As a result, the public budget deficit with off-budget subsidies dropped from 23.6 percent in 2013 to 8.8 percent in 2019.”

Three years ago, Russian officials said the cost of rebuilding Syria may reach 400 billion dollars, while the International Monetary Fund put the figure at 300 billion. Since then, studies on Syria ceased as the international community’s attention to the conflict waned even though the violence did not.

Since Russia’s intervention in the conflict in late 2015, regime forces, with Moscow and Tehran’s backing, managed to recapture vast territories from the opposition. Prior to the intervention it held 10 percent of territory, while now it holds 64 percent. Twenty-six percent lies under Kurdish control, backed by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, and ten percent is held by Turkey-backed factions.

These various “zones of influence” are somewhat stable, but suffer the same economic problems. The Syrian pound has steadily lost its value against the dollar, starting from 2011. It originally traded at 46 pounds to the dollar and now trades at 1,700 to the dollar. Unemployment has also soared. At the beginning of the conflict, 5.184 million people had jobs, but that number has since dropped to 3.058 million.

Human injustice

Syria’s population rose 0.9 percent in 2018 and 1.1 percent in 2019 to reach 19.584 million people. The conflict has led to the displacement of 5.6 million people to Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and other countries. As of August 2019, the internally displaced are estimates at 6.14 million, the highest such figure in the world.

The recent military operations in Idlib have led to the displacement of over a million people towards the Turkish border. Northwestern Syria is home to 3 million civilians, have of whom were displaced at least once before from other areas. Over 3.6 million Syrians in Turkey receive protection, but the Syrian refugees in other countries are suffering. Lebanon, host to 500,000 Syrians, had relentlessly called for their return home and it has taken effective measures to stem their flow into its territories.

Syrians inside their own country are also suffering. Poverty reached its peak at 89.4 percent at the end of 2016 and it has since dropped to 86 percent in 2019. The stifling economic crisis in Lebanon has only exacerbated the economic situation in Syria. The coronavirus has only compounded suffering, as has the European Union’s extension of sanctions against the country. The country is in store for even more hardships as the United States moves to implement the Caesar Act in mid-June.

Priority for military deal

The continuation of the conflict has largely affected the fiscal policies adopted by the government. These policies still prioritize military expenditure and have resulted in the reallocation of available resources from public sector activities and services. The government has aimed to increase its revenue by imposing different fees and taxes, in addition to liberalizing and removing subsidies from some goods, particularly oil derivatives, said the report.

Iran has stated that it spent 20 to 30 billion dollars to back the regime in the past nine years. Russia has called for economic and sovereign compensation for its military contribution.

Development expenditure decreased severely from 7.3 percent of GDP in 2011 to 2.3 and 2.9 percent in 2015 and 2019 respectively. This is because the majority of development expenditure has been reallocated to military expenditure.

During the period 2011-2019, public expenditure dropped substantially from 28.9 percent of GDP in 2011 to 17.6 percent in 2015 and 13.3 percent in 2019. Current expenditure fell from 21.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to 15.3 and 10.5 percent in 2015 and 2019 respectively.

Public subsidies have witnessed a consistent decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 4.9 percent of current GDP in 2019. The overall deficit with the military expenditure decreased from 40 percent of current GDP in 2013 to 23.7 percent in 2016, increasing again to 33.5 percent in 2018, and dropping to 26 percent in 2019

Foreign debt

Fiscal policies funded the enormous deficit through foreign and domestic public debt which creates a substantial burden for future generations. The total public debt increased from 30 percent of GDP in 2010 to 208 percent in 2019. This increase was driven mainly by the external public debt that increased from 7 percent of the current GDP in 2010, to 127 percent in 2016, and finally to 116 percent in 2019.

Domestic debt increased from 17 percent in 2010, to 109 percent in 2014, decreased to 59 percent in 2017, and increased again to reach 93 percent in 2019. Domestic debt also caused a substantial increase in inflation rates.

As the loans have been spent on current expenditure and conflict-related activities, more loans will be needed in the post-conflict era driving higher public debt and perpetuating and exacerbating injustice for future generations, said the report.

Lost generation

The Syrians continue to lose millions of years in education as 2.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are out of school. “Almost half of Syria’s children are not in school, becoming a generation that has missed out enrolled on education which will have far-reaching future consequences. The quality of education has also deteriorated substantially,” it said.

“The continuation of the conflict has led to the creation of separate and isolated regions controlled by different powers that imposed their own vision and objectives on the community. This was reflected in the implementation of different educational curriculums and methods that deepen the state of fragmentation and invest in identity politics. These methods differ according to the dominant actor.”

A UN report said 5,427 children were killed and 3,739 wounded in 2019. Nine hundred of the victims were killed in northwestern Syria. A total of 4,619 have been recruited to fight. UNICEF said 6 million Syrian children have been born since 2011. One million were born in neighboring countries, while 7.5 million need aid, including 5 million inside Syria.

700,000 victims

“The increase in mortality among different population groups is one of the most catastrophic impacts of the conflict,” said the report. It revealed a rise in the crude death rate from 4.4 per thousand in 2010 to 10.9 per thousand in 2014. The projections for 2016-2019 reflect a consistent decline, with crude death rates reduced to 9.9 per thousand in 2017 and 7.0 per thousand in 2019.

The projected conflict-related deaths until 2019 is approximately 570,000 deaths, while the projected indirect conflict related death is approximately 102,000, it said.

Kidnapping and forced disappearance represent exceptionally tragic consequences of the ways in which war actors have chosen to assert their power and control over Syrian communities, it added.

Institutional injustice

“The Human Status Index showed the enormous collapse in institutional performance and the deadly struggle between fighting political actors. Throughout the conflict, decision-making processes have been fragmented and internationalized, as multiple internal and external actors engaged in setting contradicting priorities and mechanisms for each of the involved actors,” said the report.

“The different forms of institutions were conflict-centered and adopted extreme strategies to detrimentally affect human beings, social relations, and resources, as well as to subordinate communities.”

“Although the intensity of battles has declined during 2017-2019, the rule of law, participation, accountability aspects of governance continued to deteriorate.

“There are major contradictions between the five internal actors including civil society. The priorities of justice, freedom, transparency, participatory and democracy are at the bottom of the priority list for those in power, which reflects the nature of the conflict centered actors. Only civil society ranked justice, freedom and democracy as top priorities.”

“The organic relations between political actors and new private elite have been deepened and transformed wealth (that which has not been destroyed) to their own benefits in an unprecedented forced redistribution of tangible and intangible capital. Therefore, enormous injustices were created between the political actors and the new private elite on one hand, and the surviving private sector, employees, unemployed, displaced, and poor people, among others.”

Negligible implementation

The report continued: “The global governance system failed to protect civilians in Syria and to activate humanitarian international law and/or effectively enhance the prospect of a just and sustainable settlement.”

“The application of international law during the Syrian conflict has been negligible, which has impeded the alleviation of civilian suffering and set the grounds for a prolonged conflict,” it warned. “The global power struggle has a direct effect on the intractability of the Syrian conflict. This struggle represented in the approaches of the permanent five members of the Security Council in addressing the Syrian war and the impacts thereof. The struggle is reflected in contradicted priorities and policies including political and military interventions, sanctions, and economic and humanitarian support, with substantial involvement of conflicting regional actors.”

The report “suggests the Human Status Framework as a comprehensive, evidence-based approach to analyze the impact and dynamics of the conflict from the justice lens. The institutional, social, and economic diagnoses of the conflict identify injustice as a core root of the conflict, and perpetuation and creation of new and existing injustice as a key outcome of the conflict.”

The report suggested alternative approaches to start the transcending process of conflict, based on the political economy analysis of the key active powers and dynamics of the conflict, such as dismantling conflict economy and achieving justice to children.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.