‘Affiliation to Kurdistan’ Poses Predicament to Syrian Kurdish Parties

Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)
Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)
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‘Affiliation to Kurdistan’ Poses Predicament to Syrian Kurdish Parties

Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)
Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)

Posters of prominent Kurdish leaders can be seen at a traditional Kurdish clothes store in Qamishli, in northeastern Syria. Posters of the late Mala Mustafa Barzani, his son former president Masoud Barzani and Abdullah Ocalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, can be seen alongside the banners of various Kurdish organizations from Iraq and Turkey.

Ocalan’s posters are seen at the autonomous region’s institutions that were established by the Syrian Democratic Union Party in early 2014. Barzani posters are seen at the offices and headquarters of the Kurdish national council.

After nearly two months of talks in April and May, the two main Kurdish factions reached, through the sponsorship of US envoy to Syria William Roebuck, a form of political vision. More discussions will continue during future rounds of talks with the aim of reaching a united stance.

The Kurds in Syria, however, appear pessimistic about the possibility of the Kurdish parties being able to “lead them out of the dark tunnel that they have dragged them into.”

A local activist said that the affiliation of Kurdish parties in Syria to Kurdistan have played a role in the success of understandings, but they have negatively impacted the interests of Syria’s Kurds.

She explained that each foreign power has its own “vision, ideology and alliances that are so far removed from the interests and aspirations of Syria’s Kurds.”

If the Kurdish parties in Syria do not abandon their affiliation to Kurdistan, then the intra-Kurdish talks will fail, just like previous ones, she said.

She attributed the successive failures to the “weak political personality” of Syria’s Kurdish officials.

“They must open their eyes and realize the suffering of their people. They must realize that their main problem lies with Damascus, not Baghdad or Ankara,” she stressed.

The “Kurdistan affiliation” predicament is among the pain problems driving a wedge between Syria’s various Kurdish parties.

A resident of Dayrik on the border with Turkey and Iraq said that the affiliation of local Kurdish parties to Kurdistan leaderships in neighboring countries has been “unwavering” for decades.

He doubted that the various parties would be able to reach a comprehensive and final agreement due to their conflicting foreign relations and alliances.

Any agreement would be “limited” and fall short of the people’s expectations, he predicted.

A pharmacist in the town of Amouda shared a different opinion. She said that the affiliation with Kurdistan has had a positive impact on the first round of talks.

She stated that the people are more concerned with economic concerns and developments on the ground than the political talks.



How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.