The Political, Social Roots of the Makhlouf and Assad Families

Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
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The Political, Social Roots of the Makhlouf and Assad Families

Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat

On April 20, Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, the maternal cousin of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, began posting statements and videos on Facebook criticizing the regime. This was striking: in the past decades, it was uncommon to see anyone, whether a businessman, politician, or military commander, daring to criticize the security forces and the regime, directly or indirectly, while living in Syria. So, two questions must be asked: Why did Rami Makhlouf, a wealthy businessman and the president's cousin, rebel? How could one voicing such criticism from Damascus be still free? To answer those two questions, it is important to understand the historic relationship between the Makhlouf family and the Assad family.

Makhlouf himself is known for amassing massive wealth inside and outside the country. According to a former economy official in Syria, his wealth is equivalent to eight percent of Syria's GDP, which is $62 billion.

Economic-Social Context

In his media appearances, Rami Makhlouf tried to appeal to the Alawites by presenting himself as the voice of the Syrian coastal region, especially the poor, religiously-devout, and those loyal to President Bashar al-Assad. This region, a stronghold of the Assad regime, suffered in the nine-year-long war, reportedly incurring more than 100,000 deaths.

In order to understand the historic context, it is important to highlight the Makhlouf family’s history and relationships with others. The Makhlouf family belongs to the al-Haddadin tribe, which is mostly Alawite land-owners in the Syrian coastal region. They controlled villages, similar to other feudal families.

In 1958, the Makhlouf family made the difficult decision of agreeing to marry their young daughter to a young air force pilot named Hafez Al-Assad, who was from a different tribe, al-Kalbiyah, that descended from rural regions. Assad was a member of the military at the time Anisa was studying in a French-managed monastery.

Hafiz and Anisa's marriage would impact Syria's modern history for the next six decades. The Makhlouf family forged close relations with rising military men in the predominantly Alawite countryside, while Hafez al-Assad gained legitimacy among tribes and social circles in his birthplace.

After Assad ascended to the presidency in 1970, Anisa held the title of the first lady even though she never used that title and refrained from appearing in public events. Undoubtedly, this marriage spared the Makhlouf family from extinction, which was the fate of other feudal Alawite families.

One of the key cards that Hafez used to consolidate his power was ending classism. He sought to create alternative social classes composed of farmers and the marginalized who rose to power through the army and security forces. The Duba and Khuli families exemplified that: General 'Ali Duba took charge of the military intelligence, and General Muhammad Khuli commanded the air force. Similarly, Assad became closer to the clerics. The Haydar family, for example, gained influence General 'Ali Haydar was given control over the army's special forces.

Assad rose to power, taking control of the army, security, and political apparatus. His brother-in-law, on the other hand, took control of the economy. Muhammad Makhlouf, Anisa's brother, started at the state-owned tobacco company Regie, and went on to sponsor major business deals, mostly in oil production and exports in the mid-1980s. He became the secret godfather for the economy, among other things. All deals had to pass through Makhlouf, who distributed them among other Alawite and Sunni businessmen in the 1980s and 1990s.

With the generational change in the ruling family and elites, the role of the new generation of official's sons shifted from partnerships in companies to the leadership of the private business sector, especially in the second half of the 1990s. One of the most renowned figures was Rami Makhlouf, an engineer who at the end of the 1990s took over Ramak firm that specialized in duty-free zones at ground ports and airports.

When Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, Muhammad Makhlouf stepped down, allowing for the rise of his older son, Rami, in the business sector. Anisa, Assad's widow, took it upon herself to facilitate and encourage the rise of Rami, her favorite nephew, as she had done previously for her brother.

Rami focused on the promising telecommunication sector. In 2001, the Syrian government granted the company Syriatel and its competitor MTN a build, operate, and transfer permit (BOT), giving them a monopoly over the telecommunication sector and its revenues.

Syriatel's contract formed the foundation from which Makhlouf's diverse businesses and companies expanded. His companies operated in the fields of oil, finances, banking, tourism, and trade, keeping up with the selective economic openness in early 2000.

Some experts believe that this openness shrank the size of the middle class and concentrated wealth in the hands of a small number of people, mainly the Makhlouf family, thus, chipping away at the traditional support base of the regime and the ruling Baath Party and undermining the social contract that prevailed through three decades of Assad reign.

Makhlouf's domination over the Syrian economy reached a level that prompted the United States to impose sanctions against him early, at the beginning of 2008 — three years before the Syrian revolution — as part of the Syria sanctions program that began in 2004.

Political Context

In the 1930s, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) also known as the Syrian Party, expanded from Lebanon to the Syrian coastal region and the Alawite's mountain region. The expansion is mainly because of geographic location, trade, and openness in those regions, which later became a breeding ground for secular parties like the Baath Party and the Communist Party in the second half of the 1940s.

If the Baath Party believes in Arab unity and Arab nationalism, the Syrian Party is known for promoting Syrian nationalism in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. The party never got into power and existed in secrecy for most of its history.

The Makhlouf family, especially Muhammad and his sister Anisa, were closer to the Syrian Party ideology than to the Baath Party. On April 22, 1955, Colonel 'Adnan Al-Maliki, a powerful nationalist military figure, was assassinated in al-Baladi Arena in Damascus by three men, including Badi' al-Makhlouf, Anisa's cousin. The SSNP was held responsible despite denying involvement in the assassination. The head of the government at the time, Sabri al-'Asali, banned the party, prompting a crackdown on its members. Six months later, a military court in Damascus sentenced to death a number of the Syrian Party's members and leaders, which was the biggest blow to Syrian nationalists since Antwan Sa'ada was handed over to the Lebanese authorities and subsequently executed in 1949.

The party remained banned after the Ba'th Party took control of the government from 1963 to 1970. After Assad assumed power, he relaxed the crackdown because of the influence of his wife, Anisa, on him. The party was then allowed to join Parliament indirectly.

In 2000, Bashar Al-Assad assumed power and married Asma al-Akhras. The political history of her family was unknown and she appeared more focused on economy than ideology. Shafiq, the cousin of her father Fawwaz, was an economy professor, and another relative of hers was a businessman in Homs, while she herself worked at JP Morgan. Her father was a renowned cardiologist in London while her mother worked in the Syrian embassy in the British capital.

In 2011, the Syrian Party was allowed to join the Ba'th Party-led Progressive National Front, an alliance of parties in Damascus, as an observer. There was a common belief that Bashar al-Assad was closer to the Syrian Party's ideology because of the influence of his mother and uncle, which helped the party resume its activities and join Parliament.

Rami Makhlouf is described by people who met him as someone with "absolute belief in the ideology of the Syrian Party." Between 2005 and 2019, Makhlouf played the role of a behind-the-scenes leader for the SSNP. He pushed supporters of the party to assume high leadership positions before being elected to Parliament or appointed to the cabinet. Rami also participated in founding a branch for the party in 2011 and formed a militia under the name Eagles of the Whirlwind that is associated with the party. The militia fought alongside government security forces against the opposition factions. The party participated in the 2012 congressional elections with the support of al-Bustan Foundation, a charity through which Makhlouf has been able to channel funds, and won seats in Parliament. It came as no surprise that many of Makhlouf's supporters posted a whirlwind, the logo of the party, on their social media pages after his last appearance.

Declawing

By the mid-2019 and under the regime's nose, Rami accumulated tools and networks that were not available to anyone else: A historical, tribal, and class heritage, a financial and economic empire, a political party aspiring to govern, a charitable foundation, and an armed militia. Separately, new businessmen and warlords emerged, making their wealth from the fighting between 2012 and 2019 and from circumventing the US and European sanctions.

There were concerns about Rami Makhlouf, his apparatuses, his rivals’ increasing ambitions, regional, and international changes, and tension between Russia and Turkey. Last August, a campaign began to dismantle Makhlouf's networks, including banning certain activities by al-Bustan Foundation and disbanding its military wing, which paid fighters $350 a month -- a hefty sum compared to regular soldiers’ salaries.

In October 2019, the appeal court issued a decision to disband the al-Amana Wing of the Syrian Party, which Rami helped create. The decision excluded the Minister of Reconciliation 'Ali Haydar, who is a member of the party, due to his "friendship with Assad," according to a source in Damascus.

On December 19, a series of decisions were made to freeze the assets of Makhlouf, his wife, and his companies, accusing him of tax evasion. On March 17, 2020, the Ministry of Finance seized his assets because of his ties to an oil company.

The measures taken against Rami Makhlouf included arresting senior employees in his companies and organizations, seizing his assets in Syria, prohibiting state institutions from dealing with him for five years, in addition to a travel ban. He also lost all the security and economic privileges that he enjoyed since 1970 as the nephew of the president's wife.

Clearly Makhlouf is banking on his social, political, and economic stocks to protect him. The regime, however, is seeking to disband Makhlouf's networks and declaw him. This equation can change at any moment if a new factor, from the inside or the outside, emerges.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.