For 2nd Straight Day, Syria’s Suweida Protests against Regime, Living Crisis

Protests in Syria's Suweida. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Protests in Syria's Suweida. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

For 2nd Straight Day, Syria’s Suweida Protests against Regime, Living Crisis

Protests in Syria's Suweida. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Protests in Syria's Suweida. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Protests erupted for a second straight day in the southern Syrian province of Suweida on Monday with dozens of people calling for the ouster of President Bashar Assad and denouncing the deteriorating living and economic conditions in the country.

Local sources said the demonstrations also demanded the withdrawal of Iran and Russian forces from Syria and chanted for the overthrow of the ruling regime.

Protests had broken out on Sunday over the collapse of the Syrian pound, with the people blaming Assad and the regime for the crisis.

The Suweida 24 network reported that the regime had sent military and security reinforcements to the province, but activists said they did not intervene to disperse the protest.

After nine years of war, Syria is in the thick of an economic crisis compounded by a coronavirus lockdown and a dollar liquidity crunch in neighboring Lebanon.

The Syrian pound has hit record lows against the dollar amid widespread corruption and leading to a spike in living costs. Authorities have done little to address the crisis, sparking the people’s ire.

Some stores, including pharmacies, have been forced to turn away customers and close due to the fluctuation of prices. The cost of food and medicine has risen four and fivefold in recent days, leaving many families unable to make ends meet.

Analysts said concerns over the June 17 implementation of the US Caesar Act, which aims to sanction foreign persons who assist the Syrian government or help in post-war reconstruction, also contributed to the de facto devaluation.

Abou Ziad, a resident of the western Suweida countryside, said the Syrian pound was trading at 2,600 to the dollar on the black market, its highest rate since the eruption of the conflict.

He said the fluctuation has led to a hike in food goods. Vegetable oil now sells at 3,500 pounds, when it was previously sold at 1,000 pounds. A kilogram of sugar now costs 1,800 pounds, its price tripling from 600 pounds. Milk, meat, poultry, cleaning products and other essential goods have all doubled and tripled in price.

Abou Jihad, a public employee who has four mouths to feed, said the living conditions were “intolerable”.

“Salaries only last three days” with such price hikes, he lamented. “The corrupt people are the ones who are benefitting the most in Syria. They have reaped billions while the people now live in poverty.”

Heiko Wimmen, Syria project director at the conflict tracker Crisis Group, said that with the Caesar Act coming into force, "doing business with Syria will become even more difficult and risky".

Both analysts said the fall from grace of top business tycoon Rami Makhlouf despite being a cousin of the president was also affecting confidence.

"The Makhlouf saga is spooking the rich," Wimmen said, according to AFP.

After the Damascus regime froze assets of the head of the country's largest mobile phone operator and slapped a travel ban on him, the wealthy feel "nobody is safe", he said.

Most of Syria's population lives in poverty, according to the United Nations, and food prices have doubled over the past year.

The UN food agency's Jessica Lawson said any further depreciation risked increasing the cost of imported basic food items such as rice, pasta and lentils.

"These price increases risk pushing even more people into hunger, poverty and food insecurity as Syrians' purchasing power continues to erode," the World Food Program spokeswoman said.



Israeli Army’s Plan to Flood Hamas Tunnels Fails

A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)
A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)
TT

Israeli Army’s Plan to Flood Hamas Tunnels Fails

A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)
A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)

The Israeli media on Saturday renewed talk about the Atlantis system, a significant engineering and technological breakthrough that was supposed to take out the Hamas tunnels and to kill senior Hamas officials, by pumping in seawater at high intensity.

The system was supposed to be the game changer, a new, relatively quick and lethal solution to one of the more complex fronts in the Gaza Strip.

But Israel started by adopting an old and unsuitable plan, continued by ignoring professional advice and the possible danger to the abductees – and ended quietly a few months later, anyone saying whether it achieved anything at all.

Haaretz surveys profiled the Atlantis project – a predictable military failure which no one stopped until it was too late.

“But about half a year after this system was revealed to the public, it turns out that Atlantis is lost; it's no longer in use, and nobody in the army can say what benefit, if any, was gained from this expensive project,” the newspaper wrote.

A Haaretz investigation – based on discussions with a series of different sources, who are closely involved in the development and operation of the system, as well as documents and minutes from closed discussions, in which senior officers and professionals participated– reveals a large number of screw-ups in the way it was handled by the army, and provides a profile of a failure foretold.

For example, it turns out that the system started to operate even before the necessary opinions requested by the army were given; that behind the accelerated activity there was a great deal of pressure imposed from above by the head of Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman; and that it was activated while possibly endangering Israelis who were alive when abducted to the Strip.
“The system was activated in at least one central Hamas tunnel that was clearly used by the organization during various stages of the war,” said a defense source who was deeply involved in project Atlantis. “And it's very likely that there were hostages there who served as a human shield.”

The question of how it happened that a project described by the Israeli Army as a “tie breaker” turned into a steadily growing failure has a complex answer.

One of the main causes is the backdrop, Haaretz said. During the first days of the war, says a defense source, “The achievements on the ground against Hamas officials were insignificant. Most of the Hamas forces, mainly the military arm, entered the tunnels and that created pressure on the senior Israeli Army command.”

That's why, says another source who spoke to Haaretz, Finkelman demanded solutions; ways of striking at Hamas activists in the tunnels. “There was frustration because during those stages the forces didn't really think that we'd start to enter all the tunnels,” recalls the source.

“They also began to realize the dimensions of the tunnels that Military Intelligence didn't know about.”

At that time, the Israeli Army was still learning about the tunnels they encountered in the Strip and their scope hundreds of kilometers.

“The army,” he adds, “found itself on the ground realizing that Hamas was below the ground and it had no solution for removing them from there.”

It was actually the renewal of a contingency plan that was proposed in the ground forces years before Finkelman assumed his position.

At the time the purpose was to deal with a different type of tunnel. Its chances of success in dealing with the tunnels that the army found in the Strip beginning on October 7 were low.

But according to defense sources who spoke to Haaretz, Finkelman gave a green light to taking the old plan and adapting it to the new situation.
After the plan received the necessary permits, the Army turned to the Israel Water Authority for assistance.

The authority hastened to mobilize for the mission and formed two groups of civilian experts in several fields. One group was placed in charge of pumping the water into the tunnels, the second was asked to study the subject of water loss through the walls of a tunnel. Both groups got started.
But the Israeli Army didn't wait for the conclusions, and already at this point they embarked on the next stage.

The Southern Command's 162nd division was chosen as the contractor of the operation, and infrastructure work was assigned to the fighters of the Shayetet 13 naval commandos, which for several weeks became a pipeline unit.

The main goal: joining pipes and deploying them in the combat area.

“For a month and a half the Israeli army neutralized an entire division,” says one of the commanders who took part in the project. “It assigned combat soldiers to plumbing jobs and guarding pipes, throughout the Strip, when it had no idea whether the project had any operational feasibility.”

He said, “The Army had no way of knowing whether the system was working, what had happened in the tunnels, what the situation was of the terrorists inside and whether there were hostages who were harmed as a result of the water. To this moment it isn't clear what damage was caused in the tunnels, if any. They simply don't know anything.”

According to a document issued by the experts on the subject, about three weeks after Atlantis began to operate, “The activation wasn't carried out according to the recommendations of the professionals. The pumping wasn't done according to the combat theory that was developed, no findings were gathered and they didn't take the measurements that were described.”

The experts were angry throughout the period. “There was a disconnect between the sources in the field and the accompanying unit on the one hand and the experts who planned the method of operation on the other,” they said.

And in fact, at that time, say professionals, the military lacked the requisite information and data about the tunnels, certainly not how to flood them in a way that would harm those inside or cause them to flee to the surface.

In the course of the project, the Water Authority investigators had a chance to be exposed to the study prepared by a Hamas activist who served in the tunnel system in the past 10 years. Along with his statement that the tunnels became the main system prepared by the organization for a military confrontation with Israel, he described how they were constructed and the logic behind them.