Nile Dam Dispute Escalates Ahead of UN Security Council Debate

Ethiopia insists on filling the dam reservoir as a first stage in July without regarding Egypt and Sudan’s objections (AFP)
Ethiopia insists on filling the dam reservoir as a first stage in July without regarding Egypt and Sudan’s objections (AFP)
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Nile Dam Dispute Escalates Ahead of UN Security Council Debate

Ethiopia insists on filling the dam reservoir as a first stage in July without regarding Egypt and Sudan’s objections (AFP)
Ethiopia insists on filling the dam reservoir as a first stage in July without regarding Egypt and Sudan’s objections (AFP)

A dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the filling and operation of the $4 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) escalated on Monday.

Cairo threatened “an open and clear procedure,” in case the UN Security Council fails to return Ethiopia to the negotiating table.

Ethiopia, for its part, began filling the dam reservoir unilaterally.

Addis Ababa stressed that “no internal or external force can prevent it from moving on with the filling process early July.”

Egypt referred the issue to the UN Security Council after Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan failed again last week to reach an agreement on the rules for filling and operating the dam.

Ethiopia insists on filling the dam reservoir as a first stage in July, with about five billion cubic meters, without regard to Egypt and Sudan’s objections.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry challenged on Monday Ethiopia to “resume negotiations immediately since it declared abiding by its international obligations not to fill it unilaterally.”

Ethiopian Foreign Minister, for his part, accused Egypt of escaping from negotiations and resorting to the Security Council.

Shoukry affirmed his country has been engaged, in a spirit of good faith, for almost a decade, in innumerable rounds of negotiations on GERD to meet all parties’ interests.

Ethiopia refused to sign a final agreement on the rules of filling and operating the dam earlier this year, under the auspice of the US Treasury and the World Bank.

“The UN Security Council shall shoulder its responsibility to prevent any harm to international peace and security by preventing Ethiopia from taking any unilateral action that negatively affects Egypt’s water rights,” he stressed in a statement.

The FM warned that filling the reservoir without an accord would violate the 2015 declaration of principles governing their talks — and rule out a return to negotiations.

Shoukry affirmed that the Egyptian government has not threatened military action, has sought a political solution and has worked to convince the Egyptian public that Ethiopia has a right to build the dam to meet its development goals.

“Egypt has never, never over the past six years even made an indirect reference to such possibilities.”

Yet, he further noted that if the Security Council fails to bring Ethiopia back into negotiations and the filling begins, Egypt “will find itself in a situation it has to deal with.”

“When that time comes, we will be very vocal and clear in what action we will take,” he stressed.

Starting to fill the reservoir now, he said, would demonstrate “a desire to control the flow of the water and have effective sole determination” of the water that reaches Egypt and Sudan.

He called on the US and other Security Council members, as well as African nations, to help reach a deal that “takes into account the interests of all three countries.”



How Did Iraq Survive ‘Existential Threat More Dangerous than ISIS’?

Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 
Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 
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How Did Iraq Survive ‘Existential Threat More Dangerous than ISIS’?

Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 
Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 

Diplomatic sources in Baghdad revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Iraqi authorities were deeply concerned about sliding into the Israeli-Iranian war, which they considered “an existential threat to Iraq even more dangerous than that posed by ISIS when it overran a third of the country’s territory.”

The sources explained that “ISIS was a foreign body that inevitably had to be expelled by the Iraqi entity, especially given the international and regional support Baghdad enjoyed in confronting it... but the war (with Israel) threatened Iraq’s unity.”

They described this “existential threat” as follows:

-When the war broke out, Baghdad received messages from Israel, conveyed via Azerbaijan and other channels, stating that Israel would carry out “harsh and painful” strikes in response to any attacks launched against it from Iraqi territory. The messages held the Iraqi authorities responsible for any such attacks originating from their soil.

-Washington shifted from the language of prior advice to direct warnings, highlighting the grave consequences that could result from any attacks carried out by Iran-aligned factions.

-Iraqi authorities feared what they described as a “disaster scenario”: that Iraqi factions would launch attacks on Israel, prompting Israel to retaliate with a wave of assassinations similar to those it conducted against Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon or Iranian generals and scientists at the start of the war.

-The sources noted that delivering painful blows to these factions would inevitably inflame the Shiite street, potentially pushing the religious authority to take a strong stance. At that point, the crisis could take on the character of a Shiite confrontation with Israel.

-This scenario raised fears that other Iraqi components would then blame the Shiite component for dragging Iraq into a war that could have been avoided. In such circumstances, the divergence in choices between the Shiite and Sunni communities could resurface, reviving the threat to Iraq’s unity.

-Another risk was the possibility that the Kurds would declare that the Iraqi government was acting as if it only represented one component, and that the country was exhausted by wars, prompting the Kurdish region to prefer distancing itself from Baghdad to avoid being drawn into unwanted conflicts.

-Mohammed Shia Al Sudani’s government acted with a mix of firmness and prudence. It informed the factions it would not tolerate any attempt to drag the country into a conflict threatening its unity, while on the other hand keeping its channels open with regional and international powers, especially the US.

-Iraqi authorities also benefited from the position of Iranian authorities, who did not encourage the factions to engage in the war but instead urged them to remain calm. Some observers believed that Iran did not want to risk its relations with Iraq after losing Syria.

-Another significant factor was the factions’ realization that the war exceeded their capabilities, especially in light of what Hezbollah faced in Lebanon and the Israeli penetrations inside Iran itself, which demonstrated that Israel possessed precise intelligence on hostile organizations and was able to reach its targets thanks to its technological superiority and these infiltrations.

-The sources indicated that despite all the pressure and efforts, “rogue groups” tried to prepare three attacks, but the authorities succeeded in thwarting them before they were carried out.

The sources estimated that Iran suffered a deep wound because Israel moved the battle onto Iranian soil and encouraged the US to target its nuclear facilities. They did not rule out another round of fighting “if Iran does not make the necessary concessions on the nuclear issue.”