Khartoum Tightens Security ahead of June 30 Protests

Demonstrators wave their national flag as they attend a protest demanding President Omar Al-Bashir to step down, outside Defense Ministry in Khartoum, Sudan April 10, 2019. (Reuters)
Demonstrators wave their national flag as they attend a protest demanding President Omar Al-Bashir to step down, outside Defense Ministry in Khartoum, Sudan April 10, 2019. (Reuters)
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Khartoum Tightens Security ahead of June 30 Protests

Demonstrators wave their national flag as they attend a protest demanding President Omar Al-Bashir to step down, outside Defense Ministry in Khartoum, Sudan April 10, 2019. (Reuters)
Demonstrators wave their national flag as they attend a protest demanding President Omar Al-Bashir to step down, outside Defense Ministry in Khartoum, Sudan April 10, 2019. (Reuters)

Sudanese authorities have imposed strict security measures in preparation for protests planned by followers of the former regime and Islamists to commemorate the 1989 coup as the revolutionary forces are also planning a rally on the same day.

The Khartoum State Security Committee, chaired by the state’s designated governor, Youssef Adam al-Dai, announced the development of a tight security plan, and tightened coordination between all security and regular agencies to deal decisively with any violence.

For June 29 and 30, bridges and highways will be closed across the country’s provinces without exception.

“We have had information about the plans of the saboteurs and the intruders, who are planning to drag the celebrations into chaos,” al-Dai said in a statement.

Al-Dai said that the State Security Committee will not allow the eruption of violence, calling on everyone to cooperate with the competent authorities to ensure the success of the security plan.

Emergency security measures also include the closure of markets, commercial and service shops, to protect them from saboteurs, according to al-Dai’s statement.

Meanwhile, authorities announced the tightening of the health ban designed to curb the spread of the coronavirus and accordingly issued a decision to freeze the issuance of new permits until further notice.

Al-Dai said that authorities will freeze the issuance of new passes until further notice, while they have begun issuing permits for doctors, merchants and journalists to enable them to roam freely in light of the health restriction imposed to prevent the spread of the pandemic.

He stressed that the government intends to strictly implement the health ban and fully comply with the health requirements for coronavirus prevention.

Al-Dai’s statement appealed to protesters and citizens to cooperate with security services in maintaining the peacefulness of the protests, not to encroach on government buildings and citizens’ properties and to stay away from military sites and areas.



Yemen Law Criminalizes Houthi Activities, Opens Door to Domestic and International Prosecution

 A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB
A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB
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Yemen Law Criminalizes Houthi Activities, Opens Door to Domestic and International Prosecution

 A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB
A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB

Yemen's government has moved beyond designating the Houthi group a terrorist organization to establishing a broad legal framework aimed at criminalizing its activities and prosecuting its leaders, financiers and affiliated entities.

The legislation brings the group's financing, recruitment and arms supply networks, as well as attacks on civilians and international shipping, within the scope of criminal accountability. It also gives authorities legal tools to trace assets and funds both inside Yemen and abroad.

On Wednesday, Rashad al-Alimi, Chairman of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council, issued Law No. 1 of 2026 on the designation of the Houthi group as a terrorist organization and the criminalization of its activities and financing, following approval by the Cabinet and Parliament.

The legislation puts the terrorist designation into effect across the group's political, military, security and administrative structures, establishing a series of criminal, financial and administrative measures alongside mechanisms for international judicial cooperation.

The law goes beyond criminalizing direct military actions to encompass the organizational, economic and media structures operating on the group's behalf. It establishes individual and institutional responsibility according to the nature of their roles and proven connections, while introducing legal safeguards to prevent the designation from imposing collective liability on civilians or legitimate activities in Houthi-controlled areas.

Under Article 4, the law designates the Houthi group, which calls itself Ansar Allah, a terrorist organization in all its organizational structures and formations, including individuals and groups.

The designation extends to affiliated entities, including political, military, security and administrative leadership, as well as partisan, civil, cultural, social, media and economic organizations, where organizational links to the group have been established.

The legislation extends beyond the official names and front organizations the Houthis may use to conduct their activities or reorganize their structures.

An entity is considered affiliated with the group if evidence establishes that the Houthis created, manage or exercise direct or indirect organizational control over it, or that it operates in their name or on their behalf as part of their organizational structure.

However, the law places an important restriction on the scope of liability. It states that the designation does not constitute a conviction of any particular individual or eliminate the requirement to prove the elements of an alleged offense.

Nor does the designation automatically extend to individuals or entities merely because they maintain commercial or social relationships with the group or its members, or reside in areas under its control.

The law therefore distinguishes between proven organizational affiliation and legitimate civil and economic dealings. Decisions to list affiliated entities, along with measures taken against them, are subject to objections and appeals before the competent courts.

Severe Penalties

The legislation defines a broad range of acts as terrorist offenses, including using armed force to seize state authority or undermine constitutional institutions, besieging cities and villages, starving populations, targeting civilians, public facilities and private property, planting landmines, and attacking or disrupting international shipping.

Penalties for these offenses range from 20 to 30 years in prison to the death penalty. Under the law, the death penalty applies when offenses specified in Articles 5 through 10 result in death or permanent disability.

Criminal liability is not limited to actions carried out on the ground. The law also criminalizes membership in or joining the Houthi group, prescribing prison sentences of 10 to 15 years.

Those exercising effective leadership within the group face the death penalty, whether they hold a publicly declared leadership position or exercise significant authority over issuing orders, managing resources, supervising personnel or making organizational decisions.

The legislation also prohibits providing, collecting or making available funds and economic resources with knowledge that they will be used to finance the group. Violations are punishable by death or imprisonment for 15 to 25 years.

Criminalized activities also include supplying or smuggling weapons, military equipment and dual-use materials, facilitating access to such items, and providing logistical support or intelligence. These offenses can carry the death penalty.

In relation to recruitment, the law criminalizes recruiting, training, arming and enrolling individuals in Houthi military and security formations, prescribing the death penalty.

It provides for particularly severe treatment of cases involving child recruitment, coercion, threats or deception, as well as the exploitation of schools, educational and religious institutions, summer centers and care facilities for recruitment and military or security training.

The legislation includes specific protections for children, defining a child as anyone under the age of 18.

It provides safeguards against their recruitment, training, arming or use in military and security activities, while prioritizing the rehabilitation and reintegration of children who have been exploited and ensuring they are not held to the same standards of criminal responsibility as adults.

Cutting Off Funding and Reversing Confiscations

Disrupting the group's sources of financing is a central pillar of the legislation, which goes beyond criminalizing financial support to target entities established or reconstituted to represent the Houthis or provide legal, political, financial or media cover for the continuation of their organizational activities.

The law also criminalizes providing premises, facilities, equipment and services to the group and its affiliates.

It prohibits circumventing asset seizure and freezing orders by transferring, selling or concealing assets, changing their ownership or allowing third parties to benefit from them with the intention of obstructing enforcement.

To implement these measures, the legislation provides for the establishment of a permanent technical unit within the Office of the Prosecutor General to oversee the terrorist designation and related lists.

The unit will include representatives from the Public Prosecution, the ministries of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Industry and Trade, the Central Bank of Yemen, the Central State Security Apparatus and the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Its responsibilities will include gathering information, verifying sources, examining organizational ties and command-and-control relationships, preparing files on individuals and entities proposed for terrorist listing, and submitting recommendations to the Prosecutor General.

The Prosecutor General will issue reasoned listing decisions after reviewing the files, while the relevant authorities will implement financial measures, including freezing funds and assets proven to be linked to designated individuals and entities.

These measures cover assets held directly or indirectly or controlled by the beneficial owner, while safeguarding the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

The legislation draws a clear distinction between freezing and confiscation. Permanent confiscation requires a final court ruling, and the inclusion of an individual or entity on a terrorist list does not, by itself, result in the confiscation of their assets.

At the same time, the law invalidates the legal, financial and administrative effects of rulings issued by the Houthis against state leaders, political parties, opposition figures, activists, journalists and human rights advocates, including the confiscation of their funds and property.

The provisions also cover amendments the group has introduced to laws, educational curricula and institutions, as well as confiscation orders issued under the authority of the so-called "judicial custodian."

The law requires the return of funds, property and rights to the state or their rightful owners where ownership is established, while allowing claims for compensation before the competent courts.

Protecting Trade and Humanitarian Aid

In a country where millions of people depend on the movement of goods and humanitarian assistance, the legislation dedicates a separate chapter to protecting economic activity and humanitarian operations.

It establishes restrictions on the application of measures that could harm civilians or disrupt access to essential supplies.

The law states that engaging in legitimate commercial, industrial, agricultural or service activities, including transporting food, medicine and fuel, does not in itself constitute a crime or evidence of financing or cooperating with the Houthis, even when such activities take place in areas under the group's control.

It requires the government, central bank and relevant authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure the continued flow of essential goods, facilitate humanitarian assistance and prevent legal measures from harming civilians or legitimate economic activities.

The legislation also exempts neutral humanitarian, medical and relief operations conducted by the United Nations and its agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and licensed international and local organizations.

It emphasizes that providing food, medical treatment or humanitarian assistance to people in need does not constitute financing the group merely because the recipients reside in Houthi-controlled areas.

However, these exemptions do not provide immunity for activities used as a cover to finance the group or supply it with prohibited support. Criminal liability remains applicable where the elements of an offense are established.

International Prosecution

The legislation also expands the scope of cooperation with judicial, security and financial authorities outside Yemen.

It directs the Public Prosecution and relevant agencies, in coordination with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior, to pursue legal action against suspects and convicted individuals residing abroad.

This includes requesting their arrest and extradition and seeking enforcement of relevant judicial rulings and orders.

International cooperation will encompass the exchange of information and evidence, requests for legal and judicial assistance, and coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), foreign law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities.

It also provides for requests to trace, seize, freeze, confiscate or recover funds and assets located outside Yemen in accordance with applicable legal procedures.

The law further requires the government to activate the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and relevant international treaties to cut off the group's sources of financing and prevent it from obtaining weapons.

On the political front, the legislation stipulates that no future political settlement may grant criminal immunity to Houthi leaders or members implicated in crimes and serious violations.

However, it explicitly excludes authorized official negotiations and communications conducted for the purposes of peace, ceasefires, prisoner exchanges and addressing humanitarian issues from criminalization.


Lebanon Steps Up Action Against Hezbollah Without Moving Toward Direct Confrontation

Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026.  (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026. (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
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Lebanon Steps Up Action Against Hezbollah Without Moving Toward Direct Confrontation

Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026.  (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026. (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)

Three recent security operations in Lebanon have raised significant questions about the nature of the targets involved and the areas where the operations took place, bringing renewed attention to the issue of placing all weapons under state control.

The developments have also raised questions about whether Lebanese authorities have begun changing their approach toward Hezbollah amid mounting domestic and international pressure to implement government decisions on the group's weapons.

The operations included the seizure of a shipment of explosives belonging to Hezbollah at an Internal Security Forces checkpoint in Dahr al-Baidar in early October, the arrest of five Hezbollah members carrying maps and written plans in the northern Bsharri area, and an army raid on a weapons and ammunition warehouse in Musharrafieh, in Beirut's southern suburbs.

Although differing in scope, all three operations represent a departure, to varying degrees, from the authorities' traditional approach to dealing with Hezbollah, its members, its weapons and areas under its influence.

The ongoing judicial proceedings against Hezbollah members in the Dahr al-Baidar explosives case and the Bsharri case are considered unprecedented in the history of relations between the Lebanese authorities and the group.

Hezbollah had long enjoyed political, security, military and judicial protection, with successive governments classifying its activities as acts of "resistance."

While these developments may suggest the beginning of a new phase of tighter security measures against Hezbollah, several officials and experts familiar with the security situation say they are not yet sufficient to indicate a fundamental shift in state policy.

They point to the absence of a clear official decision to pursue and arrest Hezbollah members for their affiliation with its military wing, or to launch systematic operations targeting the group's weapons depots beyond the area south of the Litani River.

Limited Measures

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Hisham Jaber, director of the Middle East Center for Strategic Studies, said the government had wasted considerable time implementing its decision to establish exclusive state control over weapons.

He argued that, unable to enforce its decisions concerning Hezbollah, the government was seeking a way to contain domestic and international pressure while saving face through limited measures targeting the group.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Jaber said the current actions fall short of a broad security operation or a genuine change in how the authorities deal with Hezbollah.

Instead, he described them as limited measures intended to demonstrate that the state is taking action and implementing its decisions without entering into a direct confrontation with the group.

Jaber dismissed concerns that implementing government decisions would necessarily push Lebanon toward civil war, arguing that there was little reason to fear such a conflict as long as the army remained cohesive and capable of fulfilling its responsibilities.

However, he warned of what he described as Israeli attempts to fuel internal strife, suggesting that the coming period could witness security incidents and assassinations.

He also interpreted campaigns targeting Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal as attempts to undermine his position and pressure him into leaving office, potentially leading to his dismissal.

Government Decisions

The Lebanese government has adopted a series of decisions aimed at placing all weapons under the exclusive control of the state and its legitimate military and security institutions.

Among the most significant was an August 5, 2025, decision instructing the army to prepare a phased plan to withdraw unauthorized weapons and place them under state control.

The government subsequently approved and welcomed the plan on September 5 of the same year.

On March 2, 2026, the government went further, announcing a ban on all Hezbollah military and security activities, declaring them illegal and demanding that the group surrender its weapons to the state and restrict its activities to politics.

The government also instructed the army and security agencies to take the necessary measures to prevent unauthorized military or security activities and pursue violators.

'Individual Initiatives'

Security and defense researcher and writer Dr. Riad Kahwaji said the government and relevant security agencies had failed to implement any of these decisions.

He argued that all the recent incidents had occurred by chance rather than as part of an organized security operation or comprehensive plan.

He also said there had been no systematic raids on Hezbollah weapons depots or storage facilities outside the area south of the Litani River.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Kahwaji said the government decisions remained largely unimplemented because President Joseph Aoun and Army Commander General Haykal were unwilling to proceed with their enforcement, citing the need to preserve civil peace and avoid internal confrontation.

He pointed out that the arrest of the five Hezbollah members in Bsharri and the interception of the explosives shipment at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint were carried out by Internal Security Forces personnel rather than through a centrally coordinated security operation backed by a clear political decision to pursue Hezbollah members.

Kahwaji argued that the incidents highlighted the considerable freedom of movement and protection Hezbollah had traditionally enjoyed, allowing its members to operate and travel throughout Lebanon without significant restrictions.

He concluded that what had been uncovered so far was merely the tip of the iceberg, suggesting that numerous other security-related cases had yet to be exposed or investigated.


Israel Fortifies Defenses Against ‘Swarms of Hezbollah Drones’

An Israeli soldier gestures as a tank moves onto a truck to depart from the site, on the Israeli side of the border with Lebanon. (Reuters file)
An Israeli soldier gestures as a tank moves onto a truck to depart from the site, on the Israeli side of the border with Lebanon. (Reuters file)
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Israel Fortifies Defenses Against ‘Swarms of Hezbollah Drones’

An Israeli soldier gestures as a tank moves onto a truck to depart from the site, on the Israeli side of the border with Lebanon. (Reuters file)
An Israeli soldier gestures as a tank moves onto a truck to depart from the site, on the Israeli side of the border with Lebanon. (Reuters file)

Israel is reinforcing military positions against potential Hezbollah attacks involving dozens or even hundreds of drones, fueling debate over whether the preparations reflect genuine alarm over a cheap, hard-to-counter weapon or are laying the groundwork for a major offensive against Lebanon.

The competing assessments come amid diplomatic efforts to determine the future of security arrangements in southern Lebanon as the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) comes to an end.

Radars, protective nets and a costly threat

Israel's Maariv reported Tuesday that the military was preparing for simultaneous drone attacks by deploying early-warning radars developed by Israel Aerospace Industries, installing thousands of square meters of protective netting over military positions, fortifications and vehicles, and bolstering sniper and air defense capabilities.

The measures are not entirely new. Israeli media reported in May that the military had received about 158,000 square meters of protective netting.

Israeli media, citing military assessments, said Hezbollah still possessed thousands of explosive drones and about 10,000 rockets and projectiles, while training drone operators and extending their operational range.

But the estimates remain independently unverified and do not establish whether Hezbollah can launch hundreds of drones simultaneously.

A report on Monday by the Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project said the Israeli estimates could not be verified and found no clear signs of an imminent attack on Israel.

Small drones pose a particular challenge because they can strike troops and vehicles at a fraction of the cost of the systems deployed to intercept them.

Reuters documented Hezbollah's use of fiber-optic-guided drones in May. Unlike conventional drones, their communications are difficult to disrupt through radio jamming, though they remain vulnerable to detection and physical interception.

A study by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) found that first-person-view (FPV) drones accounted for about 21% of Hezbollah's attacks inside Lebanon between March and July 2026, compared with 24% involving one-way attack drones. The categories may overlap.

The figures shed light on Hezbollah's battlefield tactics, but offer little indication of how much of its arsenal remains intact.

Genuine concern

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Khalil al-Gemayel, a former commander of the southern military region, said Israel's reinforced defenses reflected mounting concern over Hezbollah's drones, but were no proof of an imminent attack.

"Militarily, these preparations reflect growing Israeli concern about the drone threat, particularly one-way attack drones and fiber-optic-guided drones," he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Israel has yet to develop a system capable of providing complete protection, he noted.

"Drones allow Hezbollah to challenge Israel's air and technological superiority in a relatively low-cost war of attrition, potentially threatening troops, equipment and even northern Israeli settlements, and possibly areas farther away, despite the security buffer zone," he said, but that "does not necessarily mean Israel has confirmed intelligence about an imminent attack."

Gemayel said Israel was drawing lessons from previous confrontations that exposed the limits of technological superiority in protecting ground forces. It was also preparing for possible regional escalation, particularly if fighting between Iran and the United States resumed and Israel became involved.

On Hezbollah's military strength, Gemayel said the party has been rebuilding some of its capabilities, particularly its drone arsenal, while reorganizing command-and-control units to operate more independently under electronic jamming.

Seizures of rockets and explosives being smuggled across borders or moved inside Lebanon suggested attempts to rearm, he said, but were "not sufficient on their own to conclude that Hezbollah has fully restored its former capabilities."

Hezbollah had probably recovered some of its military strength, he added, though the size of its arsenal, its readiness and its ability to mount large-scale coordinated operations remained unclear.

Gemayel identified three potential triggers for renewed fighting: another Israel-Iran confrontation drawing in Hezbollah; a major battlefield incident or miscalculation; or an expansion of Israeli operations deeper into Lebanon, including strikes on Hezbollah leaders.

Both sides were preparing for war without making it inevitable, as a clear political and security settlement remained elusive.

Preparing the public for war

Retired Brigadier General Khaled Hamadeh offered a sharply different assessment, arguing that Israel was deliberately inflating the drone threat to prepare its public for another war.

Israel's warnings amounted to "deliberate exaggeration aimed at preparing Israeli public opinion for the possibility of another confrontation, rather than necessarily reflecting a military assessment of an imminent threat," he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

"Everything Israel puts out is intended to promote the next war," he said. "In my opinion, the Israelis will carry out a major military operation after their government is formed."

Hamadeh dismissed Hezbollah's remaining drone capabilities as insufficient to change the balance of power or deter a large-scale Israeli offensive.

"What does it mean if Hezbollah launches 100 drones? And if Israel carries out three days of airstrikes on Beirut's southern suburbs, what can Hezbollah do?" he asked.

He also does not expect a government led by Gadi Eisenkot to alter Israel's military approach. "Eisenkot would be no different from Benjamin Netanyahu when it comes to military dealings with Lebanon," he said.

Hamadeh linked his assessment to a visit by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz and diplomatic activity in Beirut, describing them as "something resembling a final warning to the Lebanese authorities."

"Israel is not waiting for Hezbollah to carry out an operation," he said, adding that Hezbollah itself was unlikely to act while awaiting developments involving Iran and the wider region.