Would Biden Rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal?

Biden giving a speech in March 2020 | AP/ Matt Rourke
Biden giving a speech in March 2020 | AP/ Matt Rourke
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Would Biden Rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal?

Biden giving a speech in March 2020 | AP/ Matt Rourke
Biden giving a speech in March 2020 | AP/ Matt Rourke

With Biden having established a significant lead over Trump in the polls, many in the Middle East have been asking themselves how the former would deal with Iran, especially the Arab states that are threatened by Iran, and face problems that diplomacy has failed to solve.

In the latest opinion poll released by CNN, 53% of those polled said that they would vote for Biden in November, while only 41% said that they would vote for Trump. Trump is trying to mount a comeback, but it seems unlikely that he will manage the kind of significant achievement, neither domestically nor globally, needed to dramatically alter the numbers and overturn Biden’s lead, which is dramatic indeed.

Joe Biden supported the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration signed with Iran in 2015, and his position on sanctions raises many questions. Last April, he and several Democrats called for the easing of sanctions to allow Iran to obtain medical aid that would help it confront the coronavirus epidemic. He also criticized the cancellation of the nuclear agreement in 2018, which made him the preferred candidate in American circles that support a comprehensive settlement with Iran.

Nevertheless, it seems that two issues must be brought to our attention when assessing Biden's position on Iran in general. First, internally, the administration that will enter the White House next November, whether Republican or Democrat, will be faced with massive pressing challenges. These problems begin with the country’s catastrophic economic situation, with unprecedented unemployment rates resulting from the epidemic and its implications on the economy that was almost totally paralyzed. They extend to include the growing ethnic and class divisions between whites and blacks, rich and the poor and all other social and economic identities.

It goes without saying that the axis of American politics has been shifting away from external issues to domestic policies since the end of the Cold War at the latest. Voters' interest in foreign policy has significantly diminished, as some speculate about a "return to isolationism", a tendency that prevailed in the United States before the Second World War. Long overdue solutions to deep domestic issues will take precedence, as foreign policy will be of secondary importance to the administration.

Second, Biden’s position on Iran is nuanced, which contrasts with the current administration’s approach of total hostility. The American media’s "reference" for this divergence in approach is a television interview given by Biden’s foreign policy advisor Antony Blinken. In it, he declares that the United States, with Biden as president, would return to the nuclear agreement provided that Iran accepts to abide by it first and that Washington, with its partners, develops a stronger and longer-term agreement to monitor any Iranian activity that the West may deem unacceptable, while admitting that things have changed since the Trump administration withdrew from it and that complex new negotiations are called for. Another Biden adviser, Jake Sullivan, believes that both those who supported and opposed withdrawing from the agreement underestimated the efficacy of the new sanctions imposed on Iran by Trump, noting that they are “very effective sanctions, in the narrow sense of the word.”

Thus, the statements and declarations made by the Biden campaign have been contradictory and paint a complex picture that is very different from the widespread simplification that a Biden presidency would lead to the immediate lifting of sanctions and a return to the old agreement. The situation in the region and Iran has changed profoundly since 2018, due to the sanctions and the changing region’s political climate, to say nothing about the Iranian regime itself and the disputes concerning Ali Khamenei’s successor and the citizens’ restlessness.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.