Turkish General who Discovered Qatar’s Funding of Extremists, ISIS Oil Smuggling is Executed

A member of the Iraqi security forces walks past a mural bearing the ISIS logo outside Mosul in March 2017. (AFP)
A member of the Iraqi security forces walks past a mural bearing the ISIS logo outside Mosul in March 2017. (AFP)
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Turkish General who Discovered Qatar’s Funding of Extremists, ISIS Oil Smuggling is Executed

A member of the Iraqi security forces walks past a mural bearing the ISIS logo outside Mosul in March 2017. (AFP)
A member of the Iraqi security forces walks past a mural bearing the ISIS logo outside Mosul in March 2017. (AFP)

A senior officer who discovered the funneling of illicit Qatari funding for extremists in Syria through Turkey was executed at the orders of a general-turned-war profiteer, who was identified as working with Turkish intelligence to deepen the conflict in Syria, reported Nordic Monitor.

The bombshell revelation was made by Col. Fırat Alakuş, who worked in the Special Forces Command’s (Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı, or ÖKK) intelligence section, at a court hearing whose transcript was obtained by Nordic Monitor.

“Testifying under oath at the Ankara 17th High Criminal Court in the Turkish capital on March 20, 2019, Alakuş revealed that Lt. Gen. Zekai Aksakallı, in charge of the ÖKK at the time, ordered the assassination of Brig. Gen. Semih Terzi because Terzi discovered that Aksakallı was working secretly with MIT in running illegal and clandestine operations in Syria for personal gain while dragging Turkey deeper into the Syrian civil war,” it said.

“[Terzi] knew how much of the funding delivered [to Turkey] by Qatar for the purpose of purchasing weapons and ammunition for the opposition was actually used for that and how much of it was actually used by public officials, how much was embezzled,” Alakuş said.

He further noted that the Qatari case was only one example of how funds were misdirected and that there were other countries whose funds were also misappropriated after their transfer to Turkey.

He added that Terzi knew all the dirty dealings of Turkish intelligence and about a gang in the military led by Aksakallı that was outside the chain of command and lacking authorization from the top brass at the General Staff, said Nordic Monitor.

He maintained that this was the backstory and the actual reason why Aksakallı gave multiple orders for the execution of Terzi, who was summoned to Ankara from a border province on the pretext of providing security at headquarters against a terrorist threat in the Turkish capital.

Alakuş, who was in a position to have knowledge of secret dealings as head of the ÖKK intelligence unit, made other claims as well.

“[Terzi] was aware of who in the government was involved in an oil-smuggling operation from Syria, how the profits were shared and what activities they were involved in,” the colonel said.

He added Terzi was also aware of the activities of some government officials who brought senior leaders of armed radical groups for medical treatment to Turkey under the guise of moderate Free Syrian Army troops and how much money they received in bribes for services rendered, a breach of Turkish law.

Alakuş is a veteran officer who served as head of the intelligence and counterintelligence bureau of the Special Forces Command between 2014 and 2016, said Nordic Monitor. He was assigned to work on a team that was set up against ISIS in Iraq from December 2015 and served six months there.

On June 8, he was appointed commander of the 3rd Contingent within the 2nd Special Forces Brigade in Ankara. Among his responsibilities were protecting the top brass, organizing a rapid response to immediate and emerging terror threats and deploying snipers and troops for special missions.

According to Alakuş’s testimony, Terzi was assigned to work on the Syria file by the General Staff, and he knew all the details of the operations the Turkish government had been conducting across the border.

He was in charge of a military base code named ÖKİ-2, located in Turkey’s southeastern border province of Kilis. The operations in Iraq were run from another base, ÖKİ-1, under the commander of Halil Soysal at the time. The base is situated in the district of Silopi in Turkey’s southeastern Şırnak province, which has a border with both Syria and Iraq.

“Now, Semih Terzi was targeted because of his intimate knowledge of affairs relating to Syria, Your Honor. What is this information? If you want, I can expand on it, some of which is critical,” Alakuş explained during a hearing.

He went on to say that Terzi knew how much arms and ammunition were provided to various terrorist groups in Syria under the pretext of assisting the Free Syrian Army. “[Terzi] was aware of which pubic officials were assisting in arms smuggling to Syria and for what purpose,” he stated, according to Nordic Monitor.

“[Terzi’s murder] had to do with a trap devised by Zekai Aksakallı, who did not want such facts to come out into the open,” Alakuş testified.

According to Alakuş, Terzi also knew a lot about what was going on in Iraq. He said the brigadier general had intimate knowledge of hostage negotiations with ISIS that were conducted by MIT in order to free Turkish hostages taken when ISIS occupied the Turkish Consulate in Mosul.

He said some of the money given to ISIS by Turkey was actually pocketed by a Turkish official who used the embezzled funds to purchase some two dozen apartments in Ankara. He did not name the official in his testimony.

“Semih Terzi knew very well how the oil taken from ISIS [in Syria] was rerouted [to Turkey] through Iraq’s [Kurdistan] Regional Government with the help of a prominent local politician [in Kurdistan] and with the cooperation of [Turkish] public officials and using the capabilities of a [Turkish] government agency and how much commission was taken,” Alakuş explained.

During a coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, Terzi was invited to Ankara by Aksakallı despite a flight ban imposed by the General Staff, and Terzi’s flight was allowed to take off from Silopi with special permission. In the meantime, Aksakallı ordered a noncommissioned officer named Ömer Halisdemir, an aide to the lieutenant general, to kill Terzi when he arrived at Special Forces Command headquarters.

Halisdemir shot and wounded Terzi as he was about to enter to the headquarters. Terzi was taken to the Gülhane Military Medical Academy (GATA) but did not survive the gunshot wounds.

On June 20, 2019 Alakuş was convicted and sentenced to aggravated life on coup plotting charges based on dubious evidence. Aksakallı, who gave a direct order to Alakuş to go to the General Staff, was not even named as a suspect in the case because he played a role in executing the false flag coup bid in cooperation with the Turkish intelligence agency. He was later rewarded with a promotion to lieutenant general in 2016. He was commander of a Turkish military operation in Syria in August 2016. He was assigned as commander of the 2nd Army Corps and retired in July 2020.



A Call for Peace in Türkiye: What’s in It for Key Actors?

A Syrian Kurdish woman waves a flag bearing a picture of the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Abdullah Ocalan, as people gather in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria to listen to a message from the jailed leader on February 27, 2025. (AFP)
A Syrian Kurdish woman waves a flag bearing a picture of the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Abdullah Ocalan, as people gather in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria to listen to a message from the jailed leader on February 27, 2025. (AFP)
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A Call for Peace in Türkiye: What’s in It for Key Actors?

A Syrian Kurdish woman waves a flag bearing a picture of the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Abdullah Ocalan, as people gather in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria to listen to a message from the jailed leader on February 27, 2025. (AFP)
A Syrian Kurdish woman waves a flag bearing a picture of the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Abdullah Ocalan, as people gather in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria to listen to a message from the jailed leader on February 27, 2025. (AFP)

Türkiye’s 40-year battle against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) could be nearing an end after its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called on the militant group on Thursday to lay down its arms and disband. Ocalan's statement, announced by the opposition pro-Kurdish DEM party that held three recent meetings with the PKK leader at his island prison, comes four months after the idea was first raised by a political ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

There was no immediate response to Ocalan's appeal from the PKK commanders' headquarters in the mountains of northern Iraq.

WHAT'S IN IT FOR ERDOGAN?

Ending the insurgency would be a major achievement for Türkiye’s president after past efforts failed to resolve a conflict in which more than 40,000 people have died since 1984. Erdogan has called it "one of the last obstacles blocking the goal of a great and powerful Türkiye".

Though it remains unclear whether a ceasefire or peace deal could ultimately emerge, Ocalan's call may also boost Erdogan's own political prospects. In order to extend his rule beyond 2028, when his last term as president ends, he would need the support of an opposition party, perhaps DEM, in order to amend the constitution or bring about early elections.

He could also capitalize on military gains against the PKK in mountainous northern Iraq, where it is based, and in Syria, where the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in December has led to the establishment of a strongly pro-Türkiye leadership in Damascus. Ocalan's call could prompt the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria to expel members of the PKK-aligned People's Protection Units (YPG), as Ankara has demanded.

ANY RISKS?

There are risks for Erdogan in resurrecting Ocalan, a figure reviled by most Turks, including supporters of his ruling AK Party (AKP).

Mehmet Guner, head of the Martyrs' Families Association for Turkish troops, told Reuters he was "extremely unhappy and very angry" that the government backed Ocalan's public call. "For 40 years, this country has fought against terrorism, sacrificing thousands of martyrs and veterans... We absolutely do not find it appropriate to negotiate with the leader of the terrorists in this manner," he said.

On the Kurdish side, if PKK fighters refuse to heed Ocalan's call and violence continues or even worsens, the distrust that many Turkish Kurds already have for Erdogan could deepen.

WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE KURDS?

The pro-Kurdish political movement, the target of a years-long judicial crackdown, will hope Ocalan's call eventually translates into democratic reforms and greater cultural and language rights for Kurds. A peace deal could also ease social tensions generally across Türkiye, and boost the under-developed economy of its mainly Kurdish southeast. Shortly after one of DEM's meetings with Ocalan in December, Ankara announced a $14 billion regional development plan for the southeast.

"Many Kurds simply do not trust the Turkish state. Any meaningful disarmament process would require concrete steps from Ankara - such as guarantees of political and cultural rights for Kurds - before, not after, a peace deal is made," said Gareth Jenkins, an Istanbul-based political analyst.

If DEM continues to cooperate with Erdogan's AKP - reversing years of fierce opposition - it could also seek to have reinstated the many elected mayors that Turkish authorities have removed from positions and replaced with pro-government officials.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SYRIA?

The Syrian Kurdish SDF, a key US ally, is still battling Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian forces in the border regions. If SDF commander Mazloum Abdi can filter YPG members from his group, the Kurdish forces could more easily join Syria's newly-forming security structure, centralizing and stabilizing the country as it emerges from 13 years of civil war.

"The YPG will likely heed Ocalan if he asks them to play nice with Türkiye, even if some leaders in Qandil (the PKK headquarters in Iraq) advise the group to do otherwise," said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US-TURKISH TIES?

While the United States deems the PKK terrorists, it has been allied with the YPG's umbrella group in the fight against ISIS in Syria. Türkiye has sharply criticized this US stance as a betrayal of a NATO ally.

Steps toward ending the PKK insurgency could "remove the PKK thorn from US-Turkish relations and pave the way for their anticipated reset under the second Trump administration," Cagaptay said.

"Removing the PKK from Syria's political landscape would pave the way for Türkiye to cooperate with Washington and the Syrian Kurds on many issues beneficial to US interests, such as containing the ISIS, rebuilding the country, and establishing stable Turkish ties with different Syrian groups," he said.