How Does the Lebanon Disaster Impact Syria?

An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
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How Does the Lebanon Disaster Impact Syria?

An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)

The impact of the Beirut blast on Damascus will not be limited to direct losses, such as victims and material damage to Syrians living in Lebanon, but it will reach the political, economic and military spheres.

As the debris and dust began to settle over the scene of massive devastation at Beirut port and the surrounding areas, Lebanese officials again began to bring up the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon whose numbers exceed 1 million. Many have again called on them to return to their homes, holding them responsible for Lebanon’s crises or using them as negotiations pawns with western countries. Some officials have threatened to allow them to migrate to Europe should the situation in Lebanon deteriorate further. All this while they have neglected to mention that Syrian workers had immediately headed to the blast site soon after the explosion to help in rescuing the wounded and removing the rubble.

Some Lebanese officials have even linked the ammonium nitrate, which was stored at the port and that caused the blast, to Syria. They claimed that it was being stored there ahead of transporting it to armed factions in Syria. Others said they were going to be transported to regime forces and their allies to be used in their military operations. Both claims have a common factor: The stockpile was being kept in the Lebanese port to be used in the nine-year Syrian conflict - a war that every Lebanese side has exploited to further their own interests.

In both Damascus and Beirut, some parties believe that the blast may open doors that have been shut. They said the explosion would force sides that are advocating Damascus’ economic and political isolation to open new paths with the regime from the humanitarian angle. The first signs of such a move came to light when the Syrian presidency announced that President Bashar Assad had contacted his Lebanese counterpart Michel Aoun to stress Syria’s support for “fraternal Lebanon and its resistant people. We are confident that you can overcome the impact of this tragic development and embark on reconstruction as soon as possible.”

After this message of compassion, it was clear that there are hopes that the Lebanese catastrophe could be exploited to reach a breakthrough with European and western powers over sanctions imposed on Damascus and the diplomatic and political isolation is its facing.

There is also another opportunity to be exploited: With Beirut port out of service, the search is now on for an alternative that would be used for Syria and Lebanon’s reconstruction. Syria’s Latakia port could be one possibility. How? It is the only crossing on the Turkish border that is used to deliver humanitarian aid to northern Syria. Beirut port was used to deliver relief to Damascus. With it now out of the picture, other crossings that can handle large shipments are being considered. The United Nations had declared soon after the Beirut blast that the development will negatively affect aid to Syria.

Some parties are pushing for Latakia to serve as the alternative. The port is located near a Russian military base that is being eyed by an Iranian company. There is no doubt that Moscow will push for a Syrian port to act as an alternative in an attempt to reach a breakthrough in the wall of Syria’s isolation.

Such a move will complicate western efforts that want to support Lebanon in wake of the catastrophe, while also avoiding the normalization of relations between Beirut and Damascus. New tensions over this file are on the horizon between regional and international forces.

As for military repercussions, calls for calm in the fighting in Syria may arise in wake of the Beirut blast. On the other hand, some sides may take advantage of countries’ preoccupation with Lebanon to settle scores in Syria. However, this all depends on just how much the blast affected Hezbollah. Some parties are attempting to use the disaster to apply more pressure on the party. The movement was already under pressure from the stifling Lebanese economic crisis and the response to Israel’s assassination of one of its members in Damascus. Now it is coming under more pressure.

In all likelihood the party will now be preoccupied in the near and not so distant future with the Beirut blast and the upcoming international tribunal indictment over the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Some parties believe that these developments may prompt Hezbollah to reassess its calculations in Syria. Others believe that Russian pressure on the party will come into play in compliance with American and Israeli demands to have it withdraw its members from the Golan Heights, Daraa and Sweida in southern Syria.

Furthermore, some western analysts believe that Israel may exploit the new equation in Lebanon to increase its attacks against Iranian positions in Syria to avoid any strategic entrenchment on its northern front as the November 3 American elections draw near. All of this could lead matters to spiral out of control of the hands of major players who can contain the developments in Syria and Lebanon.



Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
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Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s proposal for Hezbollah fighters to be merged with the army has been met with skepticism and provided fodder for political debate.

Aoun had suggested that the members be merged into the military the same way militia members, who were active during the 1975-90 civil war, were merged into the army.

The proposal has not been widely welcomed given the army’s inability to accommodate so many new members for various reasons. Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat dismissed the proposal as a “consolation prize for Hezbollah in exchange for it to lay down its weapons to the state.”

They stressed that it would be impossible for members of an ideological group, who have received ideological training, to be part of the army.

Aoun, the former commander of the army, said it wouldn’t be possible to form a new military unit for the Hezbollah members, so they should instead join the army and sit for training, similar to the training former militants sat for at the end of the civil war.

Member of the Lebanese Forces’ parliamentary bloc MP Ghayath Yazbeck said the army simply cannot accommodate 100,000 Hezbollah fighters.

“Even if Hezbollah had 25,000 fighters, it would be impossible to merge them into the army, whose wages are being paid through foreign assistance,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Moreover, Lebanon needs a national defense strategy that should be drafted by the military with the president and government, he went on to say. The strategy does not stipulate how many members of the army and security forces are needed to protect Lebanon.

“Once the borders are demarcated and the reasons for the war are removed, we can embark on a political solution in Lebanon and ultimately, the current number of officers and soldiers will be enough,” Yazbeck said.

Former Lebanese officer and expert in security and military affairs Khaled Hamadeh said Aoun is trying to appease Hezbollah with his proposal and persuade it to lay down its arms in line with the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement was negotiated with Hezbollah ally parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, so it has the party’s approval.

There are several obstacles to Hezbollah members being merged into the army, Hamadeh said.

“Yes, the Lebanese state had succeeded in stopping the civil war and making hundreds of militia fighters join the army and security forces. But we cannot compare that situation to the one we now have with Hezbollah,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

At the end of the civil war, militias leaders signed and recognized the national pact and announced the dissolution of the militias. They then voluntarily handed over their arms to the state and became part of the political process, he explained.

Today, Iran-backed Hezbollah does not acknowledge the ceasefire agreement and has not agreed to turn over its weapons, he noted. The party does not even recognize that it is part of the political process and that its military wing has been destroyed by Israel, so the idea of merging with the army is “out of place.”

Yazbeck also noted Hezbollah’s ideology, saying it was the “greatest obstacle to its fighters’ merging with the army.”

“The party views Lebanon as a geographic extension of Iran. This ideology still stands, and was demonstrated with Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s declaration that the party will not disarm and that it is not concerned with talk about the state’s monopoly over arms,” he added.

Hamadeh echoed these remarks, saying that the civil war militias were Lebanese and took their orders from their Lebanese leaders. They chose to lay down their weapons and abide by Lebanese laws and the country's constitution.

As for Hezbollah, its takes orders from Iran and “has played dangerous military or security roles inside Lebanon and beyond,” he continued.

“Hezbollah has not declared its disengagement from Tehran. It has not declared that it will transform itself into a local political party and that it will dissolve its military wing. Once it does so, then we can talk about accommodating its fighters in the military,” stressed Hamadeh.

“How can we reconcile between a military group that follows the Wilayet al-Faqih ideology (...) and another that works under the constitution and according to democratic mechanisms?” he wondered.

Moreover, he asked: “Was the experience of merging the militias into the state’s civil and security agencies so successful that we should even be repeating it?”

Yazbeck noted that civil war militants were not really merged with the army as some would like to claim.

He explained that those who joined the security and military institutions were in a fact close to the Syrian regime, which was controlling Lebanon at the time.

“The fighters who were fighting for state sovereignty and who confronted Syrian occupation were persecuted and thrown in jail, so many were forced to flee Lebanon,” he revealed.

Furthermore, the level of discipline showed by the army does not apply to Hezbollah fighters. “Militias simply do not gel with army and the army does not gel with them either,” he stated.

Ultimately, said Hamadeh, whatever happens, Hezbollah must first hand over its weapons to the state. “Only then can its members choose to sit for assessments to enter state administrations – placing them on equal footing as other Lebanese citizens,” he added.

Hezbollah members are not isolated from society, and they must be merged, however, proposing their merger in an attempt to persuade them to lay down their arms will ultimately fail, he said.

Above all else, the party must first recognize the state and its right to monopoly over arms and decisions of war and peace, he urged.