How Does the Lebanon Disaster Impact Syria?

An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
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How Does the Lebanon Disaster Impact Syria?

An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)

The impact of the Beirut blast on Damascus will not be limited to direct losses, such as victims and material damage to Syrians living in Lebanon, but it will reach the political, economic and military spheres.

As the debris and dust began to settle over the scene of massive devastation at Beirut port and the surrounding areas, Lebanese officials again began to bring up the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon whose numbers exceed 1 million. Many have again called on them to return to their homes, holding them responsible for Lebanon’s crises or using them as negotiations pawns with western countries. Some officials have threatened to allow them to migrate to Europe should the situation in Lebanon deteriorate further. All this while they have neglected to mention that Syrian workers had immediately headed to the blast site soon after the explosion to help in rescuing the wounded and removing the rubble.

Some Lebanese officials have even linked the ammonium nitrate, which was stored at the port and that caused the blast, to Syria. They claimed that it was being stored there ahead of transporting it to armed factions in Syria. Others said they were going to be transported to regime forces and their allies to be used in their military operations. Both claims have a common factor: The stockpile was being kept in the Lebanese port to be used in the nine-year Syrian conflict - a war that every Lebanese side has exploited to further their own interests.

In both Damascus and Beirut, some parties believe that the blast may open doors that have been shut. They said the explosion would force sides that are advocating Damascus’ economic and political isolation to open new paths with the regime from the humanitarian angle. The first signs of such a move came to light when the Syrian presidency announced that President Bashar Assad had contacted his Lebanese counterpart Michel Aoun to stress Syria’s support for “fraternal Lebanon and its resistant people. We are confident that you can overcome the impact of this tragic development and embark on reconstruction as soon as possible.”

After this message of compassion, it was clear that there are hopes that the Lebanese catastrophe could be exploited to reach a breakthrough with European and western powers over sanctions imposed on Damascus and the diplomatic and political isolation is its facing.

There is also another opportunity to be exploited: With Beirut port out of service, the search is now on for an alternative that would be used for Syria and Lebanon’s reconstruction. Syria’s Latakia port could be one possibility. How? It is the only crossing on the Turkish border that is used to deliver humanitarian aid to northern Syria. Beirut port was used to deliver relief to Damascus. With it now out of the picture, other crossings that can handle large shipments are being considered. The United Nations had declared soon after the Beirut blast that the development will negatively affect aid to Syria.

Some parties are pushing for Latakia to serve as the alternative. The port is located near a Russian military base that is being eyed by an Iranian company. There is no doubt that Moscow will push for a Syrian port to act as an alternative in an attempt to reach a breakthrough in the wall of Syria’s isolation.

Such a move will complicate western efforts that want to support Lebanon in wake of the catastrophe, while also avoiding the normalization of relations between Beirut and Damascus. New tensions over this file are on the horizon between regional and international forces.

As for military repercussions, calls for calm in the fighting in Syria may arise in wake of the Beirut blast. On the other hand, some sides may take advantage of countries’ preoccupation with Lebanon to settle scores in Syria. However, this all depends on just how much the blast affected Hezbollah. Some parties are attempting to use the disaster to apply more pressure on the party. The movement was already under pressure from the stifling Lebanese economic crisis and the response to Israel’s assassination of one of its members in Damascus. Now it is coming under more pressure.

In all likelihood the party will now be preoccupied in the near and not so distant future with the Beirut blast and the upcoming international tribunal indictment over the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Some parties believe that these developments may prompt Hezbollah to reassess its calculations in Syria. Others believe that Russian pressure on the party will come into play in compliance with American and Israeli demands to have it withdraw its members from the Golan Heights, Daraa and Sweida in southern Syria.

Furthermore, some western analysts believe that Israel may exploit the new equation in Lebanon to increase its attacks against Iranian positions in Syria to avoid any strategic entrenchment on its northern front as the November 3 American elections draw near. All of this could lead matters to spiral out of control of the hands of major players who can contain the developments in Syria and Lebanon.



Kurdish-Turkish Settlement: Shaping a New Middle East

Tulay Hatimogulları speaks at a press conference. Asharq Al-Awsat file photo
Tulay Hatimogulları speaks at a press conference. Asharq Al-Awsat file photo
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Kurdish-Turkish Settlement: Shaping a New Middle East

Tulay Hatimogulları speaks at a press conference. Asharq Al-Awsat file photo
Tulay Hatimogulları speaks at a press conference. Asharq Al-Awsat file photo

A string of pivotal developments in recent months has forged new and unprecedented dynamics - mainly related to the Kurdish cause - across the region.

The collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8 shifted the calculations of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), pushing them to break their isolation from Iraqi Kurdish factions.

Simultaneously, an overture by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, who called for the disarmament of his group, opened communication channels between Türkiye’s Kurds and their counterparts in Iraq and Syria.

At the heart of this political transformation is Tulay Hatimogulları, co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). A leftist Turkish politician of Arab Alawite origin, she embodies the complex identities of the Levant and its interconnected communities.

With her modest charisma and approachable style, Hatimogulları rarely turns down a request for a photo or a chat from her Kurdish supporters. An Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent met her in Diyarbakir—known to Kurds as Amed—shortly after her arrival from Ankara.

She was quick to tell them, in fluent Arabic, that she hails from Iskenderun, a region that was part of the autonomous Syrian district of Alexandretta under French control from 1921 until its controversial annexation by Türkiye in 1939, following a disputed referendum and the displacement of many of its original inhabitants.

Hatimogulları comes from a family of Arab Alawites who remained in the area. Today, she stands out as one of the few Turkish politicians capable of mediating between Ankara and the PKK at what many view as a potentially historic moment.

On February 27, Ocalan, who is serving a life sentence in the island prison of İmralı in the Sea of Marmara, issued a call for the PKK to lay down its arms and disband. His message was relayed by DEM party representatives who met him in prison. Ocalan was captured by Turkish special forces in Kenya in February 1999, and since then, most PKK fighters have been based in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq.

Ocalan’s call came after a statement last October by Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Türkiye’s parliament. Bahçeli proposed a deal to free Ocalan in exchange for the PKK’s cessation of its insurgency.

Hatimogulları, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, explained that “with the PKK’s announcement of plans to hold a disarmament conference, it is essential that military operations and airstrikes cease. Additionally, the necessary technical and logistical infrastructure must be established to enable direct communication between Ocalan and the PKK.”

The potential developments between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ocalan could have significant repercussions across the Middle East, with signs of these effects already beginning to emerge.

Both Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, sent representatives to attend Nowruz celebrations in Amed (Diyarbakir).

During their visit, they met with officials from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (HDP). In turn, the HDP sent representatives to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in February to discuss the peace initiative. There, they held talks with officials from the Barzani-led KDP and the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), BafelTalabani.