How Does the Lebanon Disaster Impact Syria?

An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
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How Does the Lebanon Disaster Impact Syria?

An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)
An aerial view of ruined structures at the port, damaged by an explosion a day earlier, on August 5, 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. (Getty Images)

The impact of the Beirut blast on Damascus will not be limited to direct losses, such as victims and material damage to Syrians living in Lebanon, but it will reach the political, economic and military spheres.

As the debris and dust began to settle over the scene of massive devastation at Beirut port and the surrounding areas, Lebanese officials again began to bring up the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon whose numbers exceed 1 million. Many have again called on them to return to their homes, holding them responsible for Lebanon’s crises or using them as negotiations pawns with western countries. Some officials have threatened to allow them to migrate to Europe should the situation in Lebanon deteriorate further. All this while they have neglected to mention that Syrian workers had immediately headed to the blast site soon after the explosion to help in rescuing the wounded and removing the rubble.

Some Lebanese officials have even linked the ammonium nitrate, which was stored at the port and that caused the blast, to Syria. They claimed that it was being stored there ahead of transporting it to armed factions in Syria. Others said they were going to be transported to regime forces and their allies to be used in their military operations. Both claims have a common factor: The stockpile was being kept in the Lebanese port to be used in the nine-year Syrian conflict - a war that every Lebanese side has exploited to further their own interests.

In both Damascus and Beirut, some parties believe that the blast may open doors that have been shut. They said the explosion would force sides that are advocating Damascus’ economic and political isolation to open new paths with the regime from the humanitarian angle. The first signs of such a move came to light when the Syrian presidency announced that President Bashar Assad had contacted his Lebanese counterpart Michel Aoun to stress Syria’s support for “fraternal Lebanon and its resistant people. We are confident that you can overcome the impact of this tragic development and embark on reconstruction as soon as possible.”

After this message of compassion, it was clear that there are hopes that the Lebanese catastrophe could be exploited to reach a breakthrough with European and western powers over sanctions imposed on Damascus and the diplomatic and political isolation is its facing.

There is also another opportunity to be exploited: With Beirut port out of service, the search is now on for an alternative that would be used for Syria and Lebanon’s reconstruction. Syria’s Latakia port could be one possibility. How? It is the only crossing on the Turkish border that is used to deliver humanitarian aid to northern Syria. Beirut port was used to deliver relief to Damascus. With it now out of the picture, other crossings that can handle large shipments are being considered. The United Nations had declared soon after the Beirut blast that the development will negatively affect aid to Syria.

Some parties are pushing for Latakia to serve as the alternative. The port is located near a Russian military base that is being eyed by an Iranian company. There is no doubt that Moscow will push for a Syrian port to act as an alternative in an attempt to reach a breakthrough in the wall of Syria’s isolation.

Such a move will complicate western efforts that want to support Lebanon in wake of the catastrophe, while also avoiding the normalization of relations between Beirut and Damascus. New tensions over this file are on the horizon between regional and international forces.

As for military repercussions, calls for calm in the fighting in Syria may arise in wake of the Beirut blast. On the other hand, some sides may take advantage of countries’ preoccupation with Lebanon to settle scores in Syria. However, this all depends on just how much the blast affected Hezbollah. Some parties are attempting to use the disaster to apply more pressure on the party. The movement was already under pressure from the stifling Lebanese economic crisis and the response to Israel’s assassination of one of its members in Damascus. Now it is coming under more pressure.

In all likelihood the party will now be preoccupied in the near and not so distant future with the Beirut blast and the upcoming international tribunal indictment over the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Some parties believe that these developments may prompt Hezbollah to reassess its calculations in Syria. Others believe that Russian pressure on the party will come into play in compliance with American and Israeli demands to have it withdraw its members from the Golan Heights, Daraa and Sweida in southern Syria.

Furthermore, some western analysts believe that Israel may exploit the new equation in Lebanon to increase its attacks against Iranian positions in Syria to avoid any strategic entrenchment on its northern front as the November 3 American elections draw near. All of this could lead matters to spiral out of control of the hands of major players who can contain the developments in Syria and Lebanon.



Why Türkiye is So Influential in Post-Assad Syria

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, left, sits with Ahmad Al-Sharaa during their meeting in Damascus, Syria, Sunday, Dec. 22, 2024. (AP file photo)
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, left, sits with Ahmad Al-Sharaa during their meeting in Damascus, Syria, Sunday, Dec. 22, 2024. (AP file photo)
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Why Türkiye is So Influential in Post-Assad Syria

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, left, sits with Ahmad Al-Sharaa during their meeting in Damascus, Syria, Sunday, Dec. 22, 2024. (AP file photo)
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, left, sits with Ahmad Al-Sharaa during their meeting in Damascus, Syria, Sunday, Dec. 22, 2024. (AP file photo)

Türkiye has emerged as one of the most influential power brokers in Syria after the opposition factions toppled Bashar al-Assad last month, ending his family's brutal five-decade rule.
NATO member Türkiye is now in a position to influence its neighbor's future diplomatically, economically and militarily.
Here are details of Türkiye's connections with Syria and how it hopes to use its influence there.
WHY IS TURKIYE IMPORTANT?
Türkiye, which shares a 911 km (566-mile) border with Syria, was the main backer of the opposition groups fighting under the banner of the Syrian National Army during the 13-year uprising against Assad. It cut diplomatic ties with Damascus in 2012.
It is the biggest host of Syrians who fled the civil war, taking in some 3 million people, and is the main entry-point for aid.
Since 2016, Türkiye, with its Syrian allies, has mounted several cross-border military campaigns against Kurdish militants based in Syria's northeast that it sees as a threat to its national security.
Syria's new administration, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is friendly towards Ankara.
WHAT DOES TURKIYE WANT?
With its strong ties to Syria's new leadership, Türkiye stands to benefit from intensified trade and cooperation in areas including reconstruction, energy and defense.
Assad's fall has presented Ankara with a window of opportunity to try to end the presence of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) along its borders.
Ankara views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 and is deemed a terrorist group by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union.
The YPG militia spearheads the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance, which is the United States' main local partner in the fight against Islamic State and controls swathes of territory in the northeast.
Washington's longtime support of the Kurdish factions has been a source of tension with Ankara, but Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has said he believes incoming US president Donald Trump will take a different approach.
Trump has not said publicly what his plans might be but has said that he thinks "Türkiye is going to hold the key to Syria."
Syria's de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who heads HTS, has said he does not want Syria becoming a platform for the PKK to launch attacks against Türkiye.
As the opposition factions led by Sharaa took control of Damascus last month, fighting flared between Turkish-backed and Kurdish-led forces in the northeast.
The SDF has shown flexibility regarding some of Türkiye’s demands, telling Reuters last month that its foreign fighters, including PKK members, would leave Syria if Ankara agrees to a ceasefire.
Intensive talks are underway to try to resolve the conflict in the region.
WHAT HAS TURKIYE SAID AND DONE?
Türkiye’s intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, was in Damascus days after Assad was ousted, and its top diplomat, Fidan, was the first foreign minister to visit. Türkiye was also the first nation to reopen its embassy.
Fidan has said that Türkiye is proud to have been "on the right side of history" in Syria but has no desire to "dominate" it.
Türkiye has promised to support Syria's reconstruction, offering to help rebuild infrastructure, draft a new constitution, supply electricity and resume flights.
It hopes Syrians it is hosting will start returning home but has said it will not force them to leave.
Türkiye has also called repeatedly for the YPG to be disbanded, while warning of a new military offensive if authorities in Damascus do not address the issue. Its officials have met repeatedly with US and Syrian counterparts about the issue.
The SDF has said it would be willing to integrate with Syria's defense ministry, but only as "a military bloc".