Lebanon’s Centenary: Reshaping a Country that Can Protect its Remaining Residents

The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.
The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.
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Lebanon’s Centenary: Reshaping a Country that Can Protect its Remaining Residents

The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.
The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.

Every article, history book and documentary about the formation of Greater Lebanon is accompanied by the image of General Henri Gouraud at Beirut’s famed Pine Residence on September 1, 1920. The representative of the French Government in the Middle East is photographed seated next to Maronite Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek to his right and Grand Mufti of Beirut Sheikh Mustafa Naja to his left.

The celebration was the culmination of a long arduous journey by the Maronites in wading through the Eastern Question that had plagued the West throughout the 19th century. Hoayek, the sect’s most prominent leader at the time, demanded that the new Lebanon include Maronites and other sects.

Today the story of how Greater Lebanon was formed seems to belong to a different world as the current Lebanon seems to have preserved very little of its roots. The story of how the map of the new Lebanon was drawn up by joining various provinces (and rejecting others due to sectarian issues) is irrelevant. Irrelevant now are the stories of exiled Lebanese in France and Egypt (such as Beshara al-Khoury, Michel Chiha and Youssef al-Sawada), who worked to reap as much independence from the French and British alike, and steer Lebanon as far away from Prince Faisal’s government in Damascus.

The reconciliation conferences and peace treaties that were held to divide the Ottoman Empire and opting for French mandate over Faisal’s rule are limited to history books because they are contentious issues that the Lebanese, to this very day, are still divided over. Some have speculated over the possible alternatives at the time to the Greater Lebanon, such as remaining part of the Arab Kingdom that Faisal tried to set up in Syria.

Necessity demanded that Hoayek accept to include new provinces to the Lebanon Mutasarrifate. It was said that fears of a repeat of the 1915 famine, which was sparked by the Turks – according to the official Lebanese story – and that is blamed on the Allies who imposed a siege of the empire’s ports – according to the Turkish story, forced the patriarch to include the Bekaa Valley in the new Lebanon. The Bekaa would be seen as the new bread basket for the new country. The inclusion of the North and South each had their own stories for becoming part of Greater Lebanon.

History after geography
After completing its geography, Greater Lebanon needed economic jobs and an independent history that sets it apart from the rest of former Ottoman territories. It was no wonder that the majority of Lebanon’s Phoenician history was “discovered” by Christian Lebanese writers during the French mandate. They believed that relying on French strength and culture in a country that was marching towards independence was unacceptable. It was therefore, pressing to “suggest” a different history to the former Ottoman state. They sought a history several thousands of years old that predates Christianity and Islam – a history that the people can relate to and steers them away as much as possible from the ethnic groups that surround them in the region.

These words do not support Arab nationalist and Baathist claims that Lebanon is an “artificial entity” or a “historic mistake” that is destined to return to its natural fold in the imaginary greater Syria. Everyone must keep in mind that all the countries of the Arab Mashriq, or eastern part of the Arab world, were drawn up by minor French and British colonial officers. This is the case of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The crises in this region and the fragmentation of these states are but a late confirmation of the artificial nature of these countries and the instability among its people. Lebanon set itself apart from the region with its semi-democratic system and ability to maintain its identity.

Lebanon’s ability to survive was first based on its history of relations with the West, whether cultural, religious or economic, or through the sectarian civil wars that began in the mid-19th century. The Christians in the Chouf area at the time shed their clan mentality and transformed into a self-aware group under the patronage of the Maronite Patriarchate. Without having to go into the endless debates over Christian “uniqueness” or their political and cultural superiority over their Druze and Muslim neighbors, we must say that the Christian issue found its place among western powers. These powers did not hesitate to benefit from them as they sought to divide the Ottoman Empire.

This story is not enough to justify the Maronites’ political, economic and cultural hegemony over the new Lebanon. It needs a united fabric that unites all people under common goals and values. Instead of writing the histories of regions, sects and Ottoman states, attempts were made to write a national history. The Phoenicians were cited because they built a great naval empire and set up colonies along the coasts of Iberia and Africa. They also created the alphabet. However, the state of affairs along the Lebanese coast in the early 20th century told a different story. They told stories of protests in the mountains and resisting invaders. This is where we can speak of Christian-Druze partnership.

The relations between the mountainous region and coast began to emerge. During the French mandate, the coast was the center of the Lebanese entity. The Muslim merchants who dotted the coast sought refuge in the mountains to escape oppression. They returned to the coast, not to escape sectarian war massacres, but to resume their historic role as global merchants.

After the independence in 1943, the history had to be expanded to include Lebanese who did not leave the coast. Historians, such as Fouad Ephrem Boustany, artists and intellectuals from all fields played a major role in promoting the image of a Lebanon that is open to the world and its surroundings. A Lebanon that embraces a wide moderate political leadership that avoids animosity with any foreign power, except when it comes to defending its nation. It was understood that such a leadership must remain in the hands of the Christians because they were most sophisticated and similar to western culture, and because they were a minority in a sea of Muslims who, according to official accounts, have not abandoned their plan for a united Arab nation.

Here we can cite a number of developments that prove or contradict this view, such as the 1958 limited civil war or the developments of 1969, leading up the clashes between the Lebanese army and Palestinian fighters, with whom the Lebanese Muslims and leftists sided. The 1975-90 civil war ultimately destroyed the old Lebanese state and only ended with the Taef Accord that established a new pact between the Lebanese.

Economy
The Lebanese economy was shaped according to the political powers that emerged during and after the French mandate. It was based on trade, a modern banking system and services, such as tourism and higher education. This system reaped huge benefits at a time when Arab nations were embroiled with their own internal disputes and as the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged. The system’s weakness did not lie in impoverishing the Lebanese society or deepening class divide, especially as politicians sought to take advantage of regional conflicts by attracting foreign capital and Arab oil that began to flow in the 1950s. At the same time, Lebanon preferred to steer clear of the Arab-Israeli conflict, opting for an unofficial neutral position.

This Lebanese example, however, failed to notice that borders could not keep out regional and international crises. The settlement that ended the 1958 “revolt” crumbled before the 1967 war that radically changed the region. The war allowed the armed Palestinian resistance – and the Arab exploitation of this movement – to seep into the fragile Lebanese equation. The Palestinian presence sped up the collapse of the 1943 example, which was already showing cracks. The political and economic systems could no longer meet the demands of the new segments of Lebanese people who were discovering what the state was depriving them of: schools, hospitals and peace amid the late 1960s Israeli attacks against armed Palestinian groups.

Lebanese writers at the time noted a predicament: If Lebanon became increasingly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will be the weakest link among the Arab countries and will expose itself to destruction. If the left demanded social justice and equality between the people, then the risk of civil war, which can only be sectarian and destroy all of society, will increase. This contradiction remains to this day.

Collapse and rise?
The three decades that followed the end of the civil war in 1990 can be described as repeated attempts of building that took place in the 1920s. They relied on the same economy and culture amid an altered political equation that was imposed by regional and demographic realities. The Christians were no longer “first among equals”, but the Syrian regime’s hegemony was imposed on them and they were treated the same way as a society under occupation. They were forced to become followers and were marginalized. The Christians have not yet forgotten that the Syrians allowed the Muslims, who also took part in humiliating them, to occupy political, economic and cultural posts that were reserved for them before the war.

The collapse of the world the Christians had grown accustomed to, the change in the West’s priorities and the disappearance of the traditional right culture that they relied on in promoting their cultural superiority rendered a failure attempts by their largest movement to restore their former positions. As a consequence, some sought to align themselves with the very force that was at the core of the alliance that defeated them. This was demonstrated in the alignment with the power that emerged as the most powerful in the equation that has ruled Lebanon since the 2005 Syrian troop withdrawal.

This process accelerated the fragmentation that emerged with the end of Lebanon’s economic world in a region whose countries have topped it in fields it used to excel at. Lebanon was no longer a port, university, bank or nightclub. After the Arab revolts and wars, it was no longer a postbox for warring parties or an arena for tensions that have found vaster areas for open conflict. The rampant corruption of every aspect of life in Lebanon is but a sign of the country’s loss of the high standing it enjoyed in the past. It is now controlled by sectarian leaders who are experts at looting public funds at an even greater scale before and during the civil war.

These practices ultimately led to the collapse of the Lebanese state in 2019-20 and its transformation of a failed country where only instruments of violence, internal oppression and sectarianism remain. The state is now limited to preserving itself out of fear of any change in the political system that would dash the “achievements and victories” and “restore the rights of Christians” that some sides of the new alliance drone about.

This has become part of the daily rhetoric in Lebanon. The country is now marking its first centennial as it experiences a low that it had never reached throughout a century that was rife with wars, turbulence and ordeals. Is this really the end of this entity?

The situation in Lebanon is completely bleak and it is scrambling to find a way out of its plight. The people persevere as demonstrated by the millions who are still on this land and finding salvation on their own. These people will not die. They may not have a bright future any time soon without resolving sectarian political problems and disputes over representation in rule and building a new economy. Who are the social powers that have an interest in ending the sectarian equation that has granted a large segment of Lebanese, for long decades, protection from real or illusory dangers posed by other sects?

The October 17, 2019 revolution did not come up with the desired answer. The movements that followed the August 4 Beirut port blast have been met with the stubborn authority that can still stir sectarian sentiments and mobilize its blind followers.

Does this all mean that the story of Lebanon has come to an end? If yes, what is the entity that the people who call themselves Lebanese live in? At any rate, the process of recreating another Lebanon is one that the Lebanese are pinning their hopes on. Some difficult lessons appear necessary, not for the uncaring world or for a message that won’t lead anywhere, but for the Lebanese and their right to live like the other peoples of the world, nothing more.



US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)

The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations ended in Washington on Friday with the signing of a framework agreement that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said could help lay the foundation for “lasting peace and security” between the two countries.

At a ceremony where the flags of the United States, Lebanon and Israel stood side by side, Rubio announced a framework agreement between the sovereign government of Lebanon and the government of Israel, mediated and supported by Washington.

The US-sponsored talks shifted the discussion from a ceasefire to a field-based model under which Israel would gradually withdraw from areas it occupies in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would then take control of those areas and prevent the return of Hezbollah’s military presence.

Behind closed doors, and despite talk from Tehran and its allies about “victories” and “resistance,” leaks from negotiating rooms in Washington and Switzerland point to a different picture: firm US pressure, Israeli efforts to secure substantial security gains, and Iranian concessions that could reshape Tehran’s regional influence from Beirut to Baghdad.

Before the agreement was announced, Rubio said Israel and Lebanon had made progress and were close to a “declaration of intentions.” Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the talks focused on security measures needed to restore stability and extend state authority to Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders. Israeli and Lebanese officials, however, denied US claims that Israel had withdrawn from part of the “buffer zone” as a goodwill gesture.

What emerged on Friday was an initial understanding on direction, not an agreement on implementation. The talks therefore appear to mark the start of a new political and security track rather than the end of the current military phase.

The Lebanese track has also become connected, though not fully merged, with US negotiations with Iran. Washington insists Lebanon’s future is being discussed with its government, while also holding Tehran responsible for restraining Hezbollah and ending its funding and armament. The round has thus become part of a broader test of a regional order that did not exist before the war.

Israeli military APCs parked in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon, Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

Army deployment

The main outcome was preliminary acceptance of “pilot zones.” The plan calls for selecting a defined area from which Israeli forces would withdraw after Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is removed. Lebanese Army units would then deploy and secure the area before the model is repeated elsewhere.

The formula combines Lebanon’s demand for withdrawal and restored sovereignty with Israel’s demand that evacuated territory not become a platform for Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities.

But Rubio’s phrase “commitment of intentions” also reveals the limits of the achievement. It signals agreement on the broad goal, not on maps, timetables or monitoring rules.

Disagreement also remains over the location of the first zone: whether it begins north of the Litani River, as Lebanese information suggests, or inside the buffer zone established by Israel.

Another unresolved question is whether withdrawal would be part of a comprehensive roadmap or decided case by case according to Israeli security assessments.

The confusion over withdrawal underscored that these questions remain unsettled.

A US official said Israel had pulled forces from part of the area without specifying where. An Israeli security official noted that the army had not withdrawn, while a senior Lebanese official stressed that Beirut knew nothing about such a step.

This may mean Washington announced Israeli political approval before implementation, or that a limited redeployment took place that Israel does not consider a withdrawal and that Lebanon has no information about.

Either way, Washington appears to be trying to prevent the talks from collapsing under the pressure of skirmishes and strikes.

Southern Lebanon remains, in practice, a war zone for tens of thousands of displaced residents unable to return because of Israeli forces or widespread destruction. The success of the agreement will be measured by whether it produces the first clear, documented handover of land to the Lebanese army.

A security wall in northern Israel on the border with Lebanon , Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

‘Pilot zones’

The plan means different things to each side. For Lebanon, a pilot zone should be the first step toward full Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes and assassinations, the return of residents, and the deployment of the state up to the international border.

For Israel, it is a test of the Lebanese army’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, control supply routes and prevent the group’s fighters from returning under civilian cover.

Israel is therefore insisting on a “zone-by-zone” approach. It does not want to commit in advance to a comprehensive withdrawal before seeing the results of the first phase.

It is also linking any pullback to Hezbollah’s disarmament, or at least to clearing the relevant area of military infrastructure and weapons capable of threatening northern Israeli communities.

Beirut fears the plan could yield another form of the occupation: withdrawal from secondary positions while Israel keeps a narrower security strip.

This leaves a central question unanswered: what does Hezbollah’s disarmament actually mean? Does the first phase only require removing weapons and fighters from areas where the state deploys, or does it include Hezbollah’s arsenal across Lebanon? Which weapons come first: precision and long-range missiles, drones, air defenses, anti-tank missiles, tunnels or command centers?

Nothing announced so far proves there is a final agreement on the type of weapons to be collected or the timetable.

Washington appears to be trying to break the problem into stages: first establishing areas free of military presence, then moving to heavy and strategic weapons, while leaving small arms and organizational structures to a longer Lebanese process.

Israel fears this approach will give Hezbollah time to regroup. Lebanon fears a domestic confrontation the army cannot contain.

The US guarantee

This is where the US guarantee becomes essential. The model requires a verification mechanism that determines who decides an area is weapons-free, how violations are monitored, what happens if Hezbollah tries to return, and what limits are placed on Israel’s right to act.

Without agreement on these rules, every violation could become a pretext for renewed Israeli strikes, and every strike could trigger a return to fighting.

Separating Lebanon from Iran’s influence

At first glance, US policy toward Lebanon appears dual-track. Rubio says Lebanon-Israel negotiations are separate from talks with Iran because Lebanon is a sovereign state with a government Washington deals with directly.

In parallel, Vice President JD Vance is leading talks with Tehran that include ending the fighting in Lebanon, while President Donald Trump has threatened to strike Iran again if it fails to stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble.”

Rubio’s track identifies the legitimate decision-maker: the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah. Vance’s track deals with the actor capable of obstructing the US efforts.

In that sense, Washington is negotiating Lebanon’s future with Beirut, while negotiating with Tehran over support for the force that could derail any arrangement. It is using Iran’s need to stabilize the ceasefire and ease sanctions to pressure it on Hezbollah without granting it guardianship over Lebanon.

Trump’s warnings are therefore more than just threats. They shift responsibility for Hezbollah’s actions to its sponsor, Iran, suggesting that continued violence in Lebanon could carry a direct cost for Tehran.

The strategy is risky. Including Lebanon in a US-Iran understanding could allow Tehran to claim that any Israeli withdrawal resulted from its pressure, not from the Lebanese track.

It also raises fears in Beirut and Tel Aviv that Lebanese security details could become bargaining chips in talks over the nuclear file, sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why Rubio insists publicly on separation, even as he acknowledges that Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah cannot be ignored.

Washington may be unable to separate the two tracks completely, but it is trying to prevent their political merger.

Its success depends on using Iranian influence to restrain Hezbollah without turning Iran into a partner in shaping the Lebanese state or its arrangements with Israel.

Israeli tank maneuvers as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy drive between destroyed houses in the south Lebanon village of Mais al-Jabal, as seen from the Israeli side of the border in the upper Galilee, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Israeli concerns

Israel’s concern is that a US-Iran understanding could save Hezbollah from the consequences of the war. Israeli officials fear Washington’s priority may shift from dismantling the group and reducing Iranian influence to simply preserving a ceasefire and preventing conflict, while pressuring Israel to withdraw before durable security guarantees are in place.

Israel therefore is insisting on freedom to act against what it sees as rearmament or imminent threats and has not offered an unconditional commitment to return to the border. The buffer zone has become both a negotiating card and a security guarantee. Giving it up without disarmament would expose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to domestic criticism.

The Lebanese army, meanwhile, faces a test that goes beyond entering territory vacated by Israel. It must prove it can remain there, control it, prevent Hezbollah’s return, deal with weapons depots and tunnels, and avoid being dragged into civil strife.

It also needs manpower, equipment, funding and political cover, all of which remain uncertain, especially amid widespread destruction and the need to protect returning residents and secure the border.

The United States is studying training for Lebanese units and ways to verify their readiness and reliability. Reports have suggested a possible role for US Central Command, or CENTCOM, in supervision or monitoring, but no final announcement has clarified whether CENTCOM would directly vet personnel or limit itself to support and coordination.

Analysts say the deeper problem is that army deployment is not the same as disarmament.

The army may be able to control a specific area after an Israeli withdrawal if it receives enough support. But dismantling Hezbollah’s network across Lebanon requires a national political decision, a gradual mechanism, guarantees for the Shiite community and steps to prevent Iran from rebuilding funding and weapons channels.

If Washington burdens the army with more than it can carry, the model may turn from a test of state sovereignty into a test that exposes the limits of the state.


Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 
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Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 

Iran is portraying the outcome of the current war as a “victory” that forced Israel to consider withdrawal. That narrative was reinforced by a warning from Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, who said Israel would either withdraw voluntarily or “flee in defeat”, a clear attempt to present the negotiating process as the result of the resilience of Tehran’s regional axis.

While Qaani’s remarks are unmistakably mobilizing rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences and Iran’s regional allies, one fact cannot be overlooked: Tehran succeeded in making a ceasefire in Lebanon part of its understandings with Washington. Despite the military blows it has sustained, Iran has preserved both its political system and a key regional bargaining chip.

Measured against the concessions, Tehran has been forced to accept, however, the picture looks different. Lebanon is engaged in direct negotiations with Israel over the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the disarmament of Hezbollah, Iran’s most prominent regional ally. Washington has also publicly held Iran responsible for Hezbollah’s actions, while Iran-aligned factions in Iraq are facing pressure to integrate into state institutions or reduce their independent armed presence. At the same time, negotiations over sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program have become linked, to some extent, to Tehran’s ability to rein in its regional network.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, former US ambassador James Jeffrey argues that failing to achieve maximum objectives does not amount to an Iranian victory. In his view, the conflicts since 2023 have weakened Iran’s capabilities, eroded its network of proxies, and strengthened Washington’s position. That assessment remains open to debate, however, given that Hezbollah has not disappeared, Iraqi armed factions have not been disarmed, and Iran has demonstrated an ability to use the Strait of Hormuz and other regional flashpoints to compel direct negotiations.

It may therefore be more accurate to say the region is entering a transitional phase rather than witnessing the definitive end of Iran’s regional axis. Tehran appears to be shifting from reliance on large, openly organized groups with extensive arsenals to smaller, more clandestine networks, or accepting the formal integration of some factions into state institutions while preserving its influence within them.

The success of the Lebanese model will therefore carry significance far beyond Lebanon itself. If Israel withdraws, the Lebanese Army deploys, and Hezbollah is prevented from re-establishing its presence, it would set a precedent for placing arms exclusively in the hands of the state. Only then could it be said that the fifth round of negotiations marked the beginning of a new phase for Lebanon and the wider region. If, however, withdrawal remains stalled or Hezbollah returns to evacuated areas, the fifth round will amount to little more than another negotiated truce.


Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
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Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Older buildings, substandard construction and geography left many neighborhoods in Venezuela vulnerable to strong earthquakes like the ones that struck the country this week.

Engineers and other experts said the back-to-back earthquakes on Wednesday were among the most intense to hit the country in more than a century, leveling buildings and leaving more than 900 dead with the number expected to rise. Videos and satellite imagery from the disaster zone reviewed by The Associated Press reveal scores of multistory buildings had collapsed.

Microsoft’s AI for Good Lab analyzed satellite imagery of Catia La Mar in La Guaira state, one of the hardest hit cities along the Caribbean coast. Using AI-based damage assessment models, Microsoft determined that about a third of the city's nearly 30,000 structures were damaged.

Among the factors that left so many structures at risk: Some housing complexes in northern Venezuela were constructed quickly during recent oil booms, and builders may not have adhered to best practices that mitigate the risks of serious seismic activity, according to experts.

Engineers said that older housing erected in the 1950s and 1960s — before modern earthquake standards were adopted — may not have been retrofitted to survive such violent shaking. And many buildings were constructed on geography and soft soils that compound the danger of the earthquakes, the experts said.

Tall buildings and older concrete contributed to damage David Cocke, a structural engineer in California and former president of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, said that a combination of soft soils, tall towers and older concrete structures contributed to the widespread damage, particularly when buildings pancaked, or collapsed floor-by-floor.

“They just don’t have the more modern reinforcing steel connections that we put in those kinds of buildings today,” said Cocke.

Since the 1970s, engineers have known that concrete buildings are particularly susceptible to earthquakes and seek to reinforce new construction with steel. While many rich nations have forced property owners to retrofit or tear down dangerous buildings, many poorer or middle income countries have lagged in enforcing upgrades as they battled more immediate woes.

“Some of the more advanced countries like Japan and New Zealand and the US have made those changes, but some of the other countries have not,” Cocke said. “It’s a very typical kind of construction all over the world.”

‘Soft stories’ and soft soil played a role

Other experts noted that a number of buildings that collapsed also had non-structural walls comprised of heavy bricks, or they had “soft stories" in which their ground floors consisted of garages or similar open spaces. Such construction increases the risk of pancaking, they said.

“Soft stories are a huge problem everywhere in the world,” said Eduardo Miranda, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University. “And in Venezuela, they are particularly prevalent, and if you combine softer soils with a soft story, buildings can collapse.”

Marcos Ferreira, a geophysicist and researcher at the Geological Survey of Brazil, said the destruction in Venezuela was compounded by the back-to-back quakes, known as a doublet. A similar incident took place in Türkiye and Syria in 2023, killing almost 60,000 people.

“It is as if I am screaming and then someone starts screaming, too," Ferreira said. “That amplifies the vibration and adds to the potential hazard.”

Newer buildings also collapsed

Venezuelan government officials took steps following a deadly 1967 quake to update building codes. But it is unclear how many buildings were retrofitted to comply with those rules.

In late 1999, former President Hugo Chávez’s first year in office, floods and landslides destroyed housing, including in coastal northern Venezuela. The government went on a building spree to replace the demolished structures and to house so many displaced people, said Juan Carlos Vielma, a Venezuelan civil engineer who is head of academic affairs of the civil engineering school at Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile.

Some of the newer buildings appear to also have collapsed.

“Something that leaves me perplexed is the fact that, among the collapsed buildings, more than one was recently designed and built in accordance with current standards,” Vielma said. “We need to embark on a process not only of reconstruction, but also of reviewing the applicable standards, since something might have gone wrong within our engineering processes, too.”