Lebanon’s Centenary: Reshaping a Country that Can Protect its Remaining Residents

The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.
The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.
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Lebanon’s Centenary: Reshaping a Country that Can Protect its Remaining Residents

The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.
The ceremony marking the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon in Beirut in 1920.

Every article, history book and documentary about the formation of Greater Lebanon is accompanied by the image of General Henri Gouraud at Beirut’s famed Pine Residence on September 1, 1920. The representative of the French Government in the Middle East is photographed seated next to Maronite Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek to his right and Grand Mufti of Beirut Sheikh Mustafa Naja to his left.

The celebration was the culmination of a long arduous journey by the Maronites in wading through the Eastern Question that had plagued the West throughout the 19th century. Hoayek, the sect’s most prominent leader at the time, demanded that the new Lebanon include Maronites and other sects.

Today the story of how Greater Lebanon was formed seems to belong to a different world as the current Lebanon seems to have preserved very little of its roots. The story of how the map of the new Lebanon was drawn up by joining various provinces (and rejecting others due to sectarian issues) is irrelevant. Irrelevant now are the stories of exiled Lebanese in France and Egypt (such as Beshara al-Khoury, Michel Chiha and Youssef al-Sawada), who worked to reap as much independence from the French and British alike, and steer Lebanon as far away from Prince Faisal’s government in Damascus.

The reconciliation conferences and peace treaties that were held to divide the Ottoman Empire and opting for French mandate over Faisal’s rule are limited to history books because they are contentious issues that the Lebanese, to this very day, are still divided over. Some have speculated over the possible alternatives at the time to the Greater Lebanon, such as remaining part of the Arab Kingdom that Faisal tried to set up in Syria.

Necessity demanded that Hoayek accept to include new provinces to the Lebanon Mutasarrifate. It was said that fears of a repeat of the 1915 famine, which was sparked by the Turks – according to the official Lebanese story – and that is blamed on the Allies who imposed a siege of the empire’s ports – according to the Turkish story, forced the patriarch to include the Bekaa Valley in the new Lebanon. The Bekaa would be seen as the new bread basket for the new country. The inclusion of the North and South each had their own stories for becoming part of Greater Lebanon.

History after geography
After completing its geography, Greater Lebanon needed economic jobs and an independent history that sets it apart from the rest of former Ottoman territories. It was no wonder that the majority of Lebanon’s Phoenician history was “discovered” by Christian Lebanese writers during the French mandate. They believed that relying on French strength and culture in a country that was marching towards independence was unacceptable. It was therefore, pressing to “suggest” a different history to the former Ottoman state. They sought a history several thousands of years old that predates Christianity and Islam – a history that the people can relate to and steers them away as much as possible from the ethnic groups that surround them in the region.

These words do not support Arab nationalist and Baathist claims that Lebanon is an “artificial entity” or a “historic mistake” that is destined to return to its natural fold in the imaginary greater Syria. Everyone must keep in mind that all the countries of the Arab Mashriq, or eastern part of the Arab world, were drawn up by minor French and British colonial officers. This is the case of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The crises in this region and the fragmentation of these states are but a late confirmation of the artificial nature of these countries and the instability among its people. Lebanon set itself apart from the region with its semi-democratic system and ability to maintain its identity.

Lebanon’s ability to survive was first based on its history of relations with the West, whether cultural, religious or economic, or through the sectarian civil wars that began in the mid-19th century. The Christians in the Chouf area at the time shed their clan mentality and transformed into a self-aware group under the patronage of the Maronite Patriarchate. Without having to go into the endless debates over Christian “uniqueness” or their political and cultural superiority over their Druze and Muslim neighbors, we must say that the Christian issue found its place among western powers. These powers did not hesitate to benefit from them as they sought to divide the Ottoman Empire.

This story is not enough to justify the Maronites’ political, economic and cultural hegemony over the new Lebanon. It needs a united fabric that unites all people under common goals and values. Instead of writing the histories of regions, sects and Ottoman states, attempts were made to write a national history. The Phoenicians were cited because they built a great naval empire and set up colonies along the coasts of Iberia and Africa. They also created the alphabet. However, the state of affairs along the Lebanese coast in the early 20th century told a different story. They told stories of protests in the mountains and resisting invaders. This is where we can speak of Christian-Druze partnership.

The relations between the mountainous region and coast began to emerge. During the French mandate, the coast was the center of the Lebanese entity. The Muslim merchants who dotted the coast sought refuge in the mountains to escape oppression. They returned to the coast, not to escape sectarian war massacres, but to resume their historic role as global merchants.

After the independence in 1943, the history had to be expanded to include Lebanese who did not leave the coast. Historians, such as Fouad Ephrem Boustany, artists and intellectuals from all fields played a major role in promoting the image of a Lebanon that is open to the world and its surroundings. A Lebanon that embraces a wide moderate political leadership that avoids animosity with any foreign power, except when it comes to defending its nation. It was understood that such a leadership must remain in the hands of the Christians because they were most sophisticated and similar to western culture, and because they were a minority in a sea of Muslims who, according to official accounts, have not abandoned their plan for a united Arab nation.

Here we can cite a number of developments that prove or contradict this view, such as the 1958 limited civil war or the developments of 1969, leading up the clashes between the Lebanese army and Palestinian fighters, with whom the Lebanese Muslims and leftists sided. The 1975-90 civil war ultimately destroyed the old Lebanese state and only ended with the Taef Accord that established a new pact between the Lebanese.

Economy
The Lebanese economy was shaped according to the political powers that emerged during and after the French mandate. It was based on trade, a modern banking system and services, such as tourism and higher education. This system reaped huge benefits at a time when Arab nations were embroiled with their own internal disputes and as the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged. The system’s weakness did not lie in impoverishing the Lebanese society or deepening class divide, especially as politicians sought to take advantage of regional conflicts by attracting foreign capital and Arab oil that began to flow in the 1950s. At the same time, Lebanon preferred to steer clear of the Arab-Israeli conflict, opting for an unofficial neutral position.

This Lebanese example, however, failed to notice that borders could not keep out regional and international crises. The settlement that ended the 1958 “revolt” crumbled before the 1967 war that radically changed the region. The war allowed the armed Palestinian resistance – and the Arab exploitation of this movement – to seep into the fragile Lebanese equation. The Palestinian presence sped up the collapse of the 1943 example, which was already showing cracks. The political and economic systems could no longer meet the demands of the new segments of Lebanese people who were discovering what the state was depriving them of: schools, hospitals and peace amid the late 1960s Israeli attacks against armed Palestinian groups.

Lebanese writers at the time noted a predicament: If Lebanon became increasingly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will be the weakest link among the Arab countries and will expose itself to destruction. If the left demanded social justice and equality between the people, then the risk of civil war, which can only be sectarian and destroy all of society, will increase. This contradiction remains to this day.

Collapse and rise?
The three decades that followed the end of the civil war in 1990 can be described as repeated attempts of building that took place in the 1920s. They relied on the same economy and culture amid an altered political equation that was imposed by regional and demographic realities. The Christians were no longer “first among equals”, but the Syrian regime’s hegemony was imposed on them and they were treated the same way as a society under occupation. They were forced to become followers and were marginalized. The Christians have not yet forgotten that the Syrians allowed the Muslims, who also took part in humiliating them, to occupy political, economic and cultural posts that were reserved for them before the war.

The collapse of the world the Christians had grown accustomed to, the change in the West’s priorities and the disappearance of the traditional right culture that they relied on in promoting their cultural superiority rendered a failure attempts by their largest movement to restore their former positions. As a consequence, some sought to align themselves with the very force that was at the core of the alliance that defeated them. This was demonstrated in the alignment with the power that emerged as the most powerful in the equation that has ruled Lebanon since the 2005 Syrian troop withdrawal.

This process accelerated the fragmentation that emerged with the end of Lebanon’s economic world in a region whose countries have topped it in fields it used to excel at. Lebanon was no longer a port, university, bank or nightclub. After the Arab revolts and wars, it was no longer a postbox for warring parties or an arena for tensions that have found vaster areas for open conflict. The rampant corruption of every aspect of life in Lebanon is but a sign of the country’s loss of the high standing it enjoyed in the past. It is now controlled by sectarian leaders who are experts at looting public funds at an even greater scale before and during the civil war.

These practices ultimately led to the collapse of the Lebanese state in 2019-20 and its transformation of a failed country where only instruments of violence, internal oppression and sectarianism remain. The state is now limited to preserving itself out of fear of any change in the political system that would dash the “achievements and victories” and “restore the rights of Christians” that some sides of the new alliance drone about.

This has become part of the daily rhetoric in Lebanon. The country is now marking its first centennial as it experiences a low that it had never reached throughout a century that was rife with wars, turbulence and ordeals. Is this really the end of this entity?

The situation in Lebanon is completely bleak and it is scrambling to find a way out of its plight. The people persevere as demonstrated by the millions who are still on this land and finding salvation on their own. These people will not die. They may not have a bright future any time soon without resolving sectarian political problems and disputes over representation in rule and building a new economy. Who are the social powers that have an interest in ending the sectarian equation that has granted a large segment of Lebanese, for long decades, protection from real or illusory dangers posed by other sects?

The October 17, 2019 revolution did not come up with the desired answer. The movements that followed the August 4 Beirut port blast have been met with the stubborn authority that can still stir sectarian sentiments and mobilize its blind followers.

Does this all mean that the story of Lebanon has come to an end? If yes, what is the entity that the people who call themselves Lebanese live in? At any rate, the process of recreating another Lebanon is one that the Lebanese are pinning their hopes on. Some difficult lessons appear necessary, not for the uncaring world or for a message that won’t lead anywhere, but for the Lebanese and their right to live like the other peoples of the world, nothing more.



The Secret Courage of Australia’s Bondi Shooting Hero, One Year On

Ahmed al-Ahmed, who helped tackle and disarm one of the attacker during the Bondi terror attack, recalls the events of the day during an interview with AFP in Sydney on November 20, 2026, ahead of the first anniversary of the attack. (AFP)
Ahmed al-Ahmed, who helped tackle and disarm one of the attacker during the Bondi terror attack, recalls the events of the day during an interview with AFP in Sydney on November 20, 2026, ahead of the first anniversary of the attack. (AFP)
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The Secret Courage of Australia’s Bondi Shooting Hero, One Year On

Ahmed al-Ahmed, who helped tackle and disarm one of the attacker during the Bondi terror attack, recalls the events of the day during an interview with AFP in Sydney on November 20, 2026, ahead of the first anniversary of the attack. (AFP)
Ahmed al-Ahmed, who helped tackle and disarm one of the attacker during the Bondi terror attack, recalls the events of the day during an interview with AFP in Sydney on November 20, 2026, ahead of the first anniversary of the attack. (AFP)

A man who heroically tackled a gunman at a Jewish festival on Bondi Beach said his wounds still ache as he issued a plea for unity almost a year after Australia's worst mass shooting in decades.

Fruit seller Ahmed al-Ahmed, who was born in Syria and moved to Australia in 2006, was visiting the Sydney beach with his cousin on a Sunday afternoon last December when he heard shots ring out.

He rushed to tackle one of the gunmen as they fired round after round into a crowd of men, women and children.

"I didn't think about it," he told AFP.

"Because to save people's lives, there's no need to think, when you hear the kids and the women and old people and men and everyone asking for help."

"Every human has a secret courage in his heart. It comes in the time when needed, when it's asked.

"I heard people asking, and I did it."

Fifteen people were killed and dozens were wounded on December 14, 2025, as crowds gathered at the world-famous beach to celebrate Hanukkah.

An elderly woman also died this month from complications linked to her wounds.

Ahmed's actions have been credited with stopping many more from dying after video of his act of bravery taken by a bystander went viral.

The father of two was lauded as a "true Australian hero" by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and a fundraising campaign raised millions of dollars.

But Ahmed said much of the initial fame passed him by -- he was too focused on recovering from the devastating wounds he suffered.

- Face to face with a killer -

Tackling the gunman and wrestling the rifle from his hands, Ahmed said he found himself face to face with the killer -- a memory that still haunts him "day by day, night by night".

"He was thinking he's a god, and no one can touch him," he said.

In that moment Ahmed was aiming the gun at the shooter.

"I asked him: 'leave, leave'," he said.

"I don't wanna shoot."

The shooter retreated, leaving Ahmed to take cover behind a tree, where he came under fire.

"I start feeling my whole clothes get wet, you know, similar like someone taking a bucket of blood and threw it on you," he said.

"And then I start feeling: 'Oh, I'm gonna die. Oh my God, my kids, my family, my wife. What's happened?'"

The man he tackled, Sajid Akram, was killed by police at the scene.

His son, Naveed, remains in custody facing a total of 78 charges, including terrorism and murder. He has yet to enter a plea.

Two of the five bullets that struck Ahmed that day are still inside him.

He is on medication for nerve pain and to help him sleep, with the mobility of his left hand still limited.

"I'm still suffering," said Ahmed, who focused his energies on writing a book -- "Light Will Win" -- that was released this month.

He is also setting up a foundation to help women and children trapped in violence, inspired by his own difficult upbringing as the son of a police officer in Syria.

He told AFP he wouldn't do it any differently if he relived that fateful day, despite his wounds.

"I've been chosen. God chose me for that and to lead our community not to be divided," Ahmed said.

- 'We are human beings' -

The Bondi shooting -- one of the worst attacks on Jews worldwide since the October 7 killings by Hamas in Israel -- changed Australia forever.

The ruling Labor Party announced a crackdown on gun ownership and new laws allowing them to ban extremist political groups.

However, Australia has also since seen a surge in support for Pauline Hanson's far-right One Nation party, which has vowed sweeping cuts to immigration, especially from "radical Islamic countries".

For Ahmed -- a Muslim and an immigrant -- such politics have no place in the country he calls home.

"I'm a proud Aussie," he said.

"One Nation -- it's wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong."

"We have to respect each other. We have to care about each other."

"You know, we are human beings. No matter where you come from, no matter what your color, what you are, what's your religion, we have to treat each other with respect, and don't judge and blame others."

"Australia is multicultural."

Equating the actions of the two shooters at Bondi with his religion -- as many have -- is unthinkable for Ahmed.

"This is not a Muslim," he said. "I'm a Muslim, and I put my life in danger."

"I never heard my religion say to kill innocent people. That's not right."

"We are human beings. This is me, Ahmed al-Ahmed."


Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
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Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)

An unprecedented summit between Chinese, US and Russian leaders this week in Shenzhen was light on substance but immensely symbolic, analysts say.

From nuclear weapons to reforming the United Nations and cancelling international arrest warrants, AFP looks at what was announced, its significance and what might come next:

- Substance or hot air? -

The three leaders jointly declared lofty goals to "reduce nuclear risks" and reform the United Nations, as well as commitments to immunity for state officials.

Their "Declaration toward Peace" also said the countries plan to boost oil supply and reaffirmed the importance of "stable energy flows".

The promise of dialogue on nuclear risks and non-proliferation "creates an opening for cooperation despite disagreements over arsenal reductions", said Sun Chenghao, senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.

"Implementation is now the main test," he told AFP.

Progress could be signaled by dates for nuclear talks or the appointment of designated officials.

Beijing previously rebuffed Trump's invitations to nuclear arms talks, arguing the US and Russia should first cut their giant arsenals before it agreed to discuss its smaller stockpiles.

The four-point declaration contains few details on future actions, with Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz calling the meeting a "photo op".

The "fairly sparse" points were "least common denominators" among the leaders, said Ryan Hass at the Brookings Institution.

Trump told reporters he would give a press conference on Friday, where he may provide more details.

- A new Yalta? -

The symbolism of three powerful leaders gathering to discuss global security issues -- including Putin's invasion of Ukraine and Trump's war with Iran -- had raised comparisons to the 1945 Yalta Conference.

Then-leaders of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union met to hash out the post-World War II settlement and re-draw European borders.

Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky and European powers worried Thursday's summit would push for a peace settlement favorable to Moscow without them at the table.

The format "suggests the creation of conditions where Beijing, Moscow, and Washington call the shots for the rest of the world", said Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

But "a functioning 'G3' would require much greater agreement among the three countries and cooperation from many other governments," Tsinghua University's Sun told AFP.

"The Yalta analogy also overlooks today's economic interdependence and the influence of regional actors," he said.

- Should Europe, others worry? -

Other US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan -- which unlike China and Russia are vibrant democracies -- will also have eyed the summit with unease.

"From South Korea's perspective, this inevitably raises questions about whether it can continue to rely on its alliance with the United States," said Lee Jae-mook, a political science professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

"The pillars of South Korea's foreign and security policy that it has long taken for granted are being shaken," Lee told AFP.

Japan, too, may reconsider its relationships with China and the US.

"If China and Russia really draw the United States together, I think Japan will have a huge pressure to... make a better relationship with China," said Tzeng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

However, Tokyo and Washington maintain a bilateral defense pact, so there will likely be "no substantial change" in their ties, he added.

The US has roughly 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan -- whose relations with China are poor -- and 28,500 in South Korea.

Despite the bonhomie between Xi, Trump and Putin displayed in Shenzhen, major strategic differences remain between their countries.

Washington has curbed Beijing's access to US technologies, while Moscow is fighting a Ukraine that still relies in large part on American intelligence.

Diverging national interests between China, the US and Russia means the rest of Asia won't be "overly concerned" yet, according to Dylan Loh of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

The format may not stick, especially after Trump leaves office in two years, he said.

- What next? -

"Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect is the absence of any commitment to reconvene or continue meeting at the leader-level," said Brookings' Hass.

With no follow-up announced, eyes will turn to next month's G20 summit in Miami, where Xi and Trump are due to hold their fourth meeting of the year, and Putin could make his first appearance at the grouping since his war in Ukraine began.

He has been shunned by most Western leaders since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

Still, "there is little chance that such a meeting will be held again", said Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based scholar of international relations.

International Criminal Court (ICC) members -- which exclude the US -- are obliged to detain Putin if he travels to their territory after the court issued a warrant for him for war crimes associated with the Ukraine invasion.

"Putin has been ruled an international criminal by the ICC, and most APEC and G20 members are signatories to the Rome Statute. So, there are few opportunities for the three countries' leaders to convene," said Shen.


Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)

Growing Turkish investment in Egypt is strengthening economic ties between Cairo and Ankara despite ongoing disagreements over a maritime deal between Türkiye and Libya, according to analysts.

The Egyptian government highlighted the expanding Turkish business presence in the country on Wednesday, releasing figures that analysts interpreted as a sign of both sides’ determination to deepen economic cooperation while managing political disputes.

According to the Egyptian Cabinet’s Media Center, Turkish investment has expanded across manufacturing, trade, services and other economic activities in recent years. Turkish companies have contributed around $921.5 million in investment through 1,869 businesses established in Egypt, creating around 43,900 jobs.

Annual Turkish investment inflows surged 393.2% over eight years, reaching $175.1 million in the 2024-2025 fiscal year, compared with $35.5 million in 2016-2017.

The increase came despite a period of strained relations before Cairo and Ankara restored ambassador-level diplomatic ties in 2023.

Bilateral trade rose 44.7%, reaching $6.8 billion in 2025, up from $4.7 billion in 2016, according to the government figures, which highlighted major Turkish projects in the garment and food-processing industries.

Economic interests

Bashir Abdel Fattah, a Türkiye affairs specialist at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the growth in Turkish investment reflects Ankara’s determination to strengthen its strategic partnership with Cairo.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Fattah described economic cooperation as a key component of the rapprochement, adding that Türkiye is seeking to capitalize on investment opportunities in Egypt while broadening the partnership across multiple sectors.

Egypt also provides Turkish companies with access to Arab and African markets through trade arrangements, including the free trade agreement with members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), enabling businesses to manufacture goods in Egypt for export across the continent.

Hani al-Gamal, deputy director of the Tafkir Center for Political Affairs, said that the government figures demonstrate how closely Turkish capital has become integrated into Egypt’s economy, particularly in manufacturing, employment and exports, generating benefits for both countries.

While acknowledging the importance of investment in strengthening bilateral cooperation, al-Gamal cautioned that economic ties alone could not resolve geopolitical disputes.

He attributed the broader improvement in relations to political and regional circumstances that have also facilitated closer military cooperation and notable progress in defense industries.

Military cooperation

Egyptian and Turkish naval forces participated in the Sea of Friendship exercises this month. The Egyptian military described the drills as part of growing cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces, aimed at sharing expertise and strengthening naval coordination.

The exercises took place despite Cairo’s repeated rejection of the Libyan parliament’s ratification in October of a maritime boundary agreement with Ankara.

Egypt and Türkiye have nevertheless continued consultations aimed at reducing regional tensions.

Abdel Fattah identified the separation of contentious political issues from areas of cooperation as a key factor behind the recent improvement in relations.

Disagreements over maritime boundaries and the Libyan crisis have not prevented Cairo and Ankara from developing ties in other sectors, he explained.

He viewed this approach as evidence of political maturity and a shared determination to avoid a return to tensions.

He said that rapprochement and cooperation could build confidence, narrow disagreements and create more favorable conditions for resolving outstanding issues.

Al-Gamal similarly emphasized that translating political rapprochement into tangible economic interests could deepen mutual trust and broaden the foundations of cooperation.