4 Pieces of Advice from Russia to its ‘Difficult Ally’ Syria

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
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4 Pieces of Advice from Russia to its ‘Difficult Ally’ Syria

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)

Weeks ago, an American official remarked that Russian President Vladimir Putin needed to ask himself, that five years since his direct military intervention in Syria, does he want the Syria of 2025 to be the same as Syria of 2020?

There is no doubt that the Russian delegation’s visit to Syria has this question in mind. The delegation carried with it economic promises and diplomatic advice to its “difficult ally” with the hopes of receiving different answers than what some Syrian officials desire.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and intelligence officials’ visit to Syria in early 2012 kicked off the phase of protecting the “allies” in Damascus through diplomatic and economic means. The intervention in late September 2015 paved the way for military intervention to “save the regime” and Damascus. So, yesterday’s “significant visit” is the beginning of the shift from military action towards politics, economy and diplomacy in the heart of Damascus, ultimately paving the way for different solutions in Syria.

Before departing Syria, the Russian delegation leaves behind four pieces of advice to its “difficult ally”:

‘American sword’
The United States has now entered a complicated electoral phase ahead of November’s presidential elections. At the moment, there are no serious indications that American forces will withdraw from northeastern Syria, even if Joe Biden were to win the polls.

From Moscow’s perspective, the upcoming weeks will witness the announcement of new American sanctions as part of the Caesar Act. The last batch had targeted president Bashar Assad, his wife and their son. It also targeted his senior aides and businessmen. The new sanctions will include more businessmen, lawmakers and military officials. The Caesar Act enjoys bipartisan support in the US, meaning they are here to stay for the foreseeable future. Confronting them, therefore, demands coordination between Moscow and Damascus. To that end, it appears that the Russian delegation brought with it attractive financial and economic promises to Damascus in the shape of loans or grants worth billions of dollars that will give the regime some sanctions and economic relief in the near future.

Iranian ‘crescent’
In return for these pledges, Moscow “advised” Damascus of the need to “help us so we can help you” in breaking its diplomatic-political isolation and kicking off the reconstruction process. How? By taking some tangible steps in reorganizing its internal affairs, implementing constitutional reform according to United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 and reassessing its ties with Iran. Damascus is demanded to “decrease its role in the ‘Iranian crescent’” that stretches from Tehran, passing through Baghdad and Damascus, and ending in Beirut. The “crescent” is coming under frequent Israeli strikes with American blessing and Russian silence, reflecting the implementation of the Russian-American agreement that calls for keeping Iran away from southern Syria.

All of this will pave the way for Arab and European countries to “normalize” relations with Syria and help in its reconstruction. In return, Damascus must accept the understandings reached between Moscow and Washington over the regions east of the Euphrates River. It must also accept the understandings reached between Moscow and Ankara over northwestern Syria. In other words, Syria must yield to the strategic understandings reached between Russia and Turkey that go beyond the frontlines in northwestern Syria. Moscow had, after all, received days ahead of Lavrov’s Damascus trip a Turkish delegation to discuss the latest developments in the deal struck with Russia in March.

Decentralization
Moscow recently hosted the signing of an agreement between head of the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Elham Ahmed, and head of the Russia-backed People's Will Party, Qadri Jamil. Lavrov met with Ahmed and Qadri after the agreement was signed.

The deal stipulated that the “new Syria will enjoy a democratic constitution that achieves a modern relationship between decentralization and centralization in main (foreign, defense and economic) affairs.” It also underscored a “fair democratic solution to the Kurdish issue”. Moreover, it stressed that the “Syrian army is the sole national institution with the right to carry arms and that it is barred from meddling in politics.” The SDF must be incorporated in the army, it added.

Lavrov informed Ahmed and Jamil of his complete support of the agreement, saying he will relay its details to officials in Damascus.

New Syria
The “new Syria” addressed in the agreement is one that Russia is keen to achieve through resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee. It is clear, however, that Damascus is not on board to seriously join this venture. During its latest meeting two weeks ago, the government delegation at the committee may have changed its approach, but its goals remain the same. The delegation refused to be referred to as the “government delegation” or “government-backed delegation” Rather, it reneged on a previous agreement, reached with the opposition representatives at the committee, on “procedural regulations”, saying it is an “independent entity”.

Such behavior is only aimed at buying time until after the presidential elections set for mid-2021, because Damascus wants the polls to be held according to the current constitution. It is, therefore, hoping for talks on the constitution to be postponed until after the elections. It is also insisting on holding a referendum on the results of the Constitutional Committee meetings.

UN envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen traveled to Moscow to brief Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on the third round of committee talks, which were attended by a Russian representative, who saw for himself the government delegation’s behavior. Lavrov pledged to address the issue with the “difficult ally”. It is believed that his “advice” would be for Damascus to alter its behavior at the Constitutional Committee meetings and speed up its efforts to reach a breakthrough ahead of the presidential elections.

The coming days and weeks will, therefore, act as a test to see just how much Damascus heeded this “advice” and whether it will prove wrong remarks by a former Russian diplomat, who noted: “Damascus takes everything from us, but advice.”



Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.