Analysis: A Syrian-Libyan Trade-off at The Russian-Turkish Tablehttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2515126/analysis-syrian-libyan-trade-russian-turkish-table
Analysis: A Syrian-Libyan Trade-off at The Russian-Turkish Table
Turkish soldiers walk together during a joint U.S.-Turkey patrol, near Tel Abyad, Syria September 8, 2019. REUTERS/Rodi Said
It is no coincidence that Turkey announced the imminent conclusion of an agreement with Russia on a ceasefire in Libya after the two parties revealed a sudden crisis between them in northwestern Syria. It is not the first time that the two issues are intertwined.
Moscow supports President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the commander of the National Army, Khalifa Haftar, in eastern Libya, and brings them together. Ankara, for its part, backs opposition factions in northern Syria and the Government of National Accord forces in western Libya, and connects their elements together.
Talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan often revolve around these two issues. Each of them reinforces his allies or proxies with arms, ammunition and political support, and then talks about a ceasefire. The Turkish side benefited from the quiet “understandings” in the Syrian north to transfer mercenaries to the Libyan north. The Russian side recruited its mercenaries from southern and eastern Syria to fight in eastern Libya. Since the spring of this year, a thread has become obvious between the battles of Tripoli and Idlib, and later between the Idlib “truce” and the “buffer zone” in Sirte.
Thanks to the Putin-Erdogan agreement at the beginning of March, Idlib witnessed a truce for more than six months, for the first time since 2011. It was believed that Moscow did not respond to Damascus’ demands over Idlib and restore areas in its south in compliance with agreements with Ankara. Rather, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has “praised”, during a press conference with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem in Damascus, the Russian-Turkish understandings because they “expanded” areas of control of the Syrian government forces. The Turkish and Russian armies also began joint maneuvers after their joint patrols in Idlib, to confirm the depth of their understandings.
The US side was convinced that the situation in Idlib had entered a “lengthy stalemate” and that there were no upcoming military developments. Its only concern was to “hunt for the extremists” with "drones" and “ninja swords”.
The people of Idlib were similarly convinced that the situation had stabilized in this way, so they began to prepare for coexistence with the Turkish military, civil and economic infrastructure there.
Two days ago, an unexpected development happened. Military and political talks took place in Ankara between the delegations of the two countries. The Turkish side was surprised by new Russian demands to shrink its presence: Dismantling of observation points located in government-held areas between Hama, Aleppo and Idlib, and withdrawing heavy weapons from points in the south of the Aleppo-Latakia road. In the field, Russian planes stepped up bombing areas in Idlib, while the Russian army halted the patrols with the Turkish side. Russian media also began to warn of “chemical provocative attacks by terrorists in Idlib.”
Russia explained that its demands stemmed from the necessity of adhering to the terms of the Moscow agreement concluded last March, and that the goal was to protect the Hmeimim base and reopen economic channels by operating trade routes.
The Turkish response was no less tenacious: The Ankara delegation reminded its guests of the need to implement an oral agreement between the two parties, which included the “handover” of Manbij and Tal Rifaat in northern Aleppo, meaning that the Russian army expels the Kurdish People’s Protection Units to the east of the Euphrates.
Ankara did not forget to point to the Turkish military deployment on the ground. There are more than 12,000 soldiers in Idlib and its countryside, in addition to thousands of Turkish vehicles and around 60 observation posts, some of which are more like military bases. There are also thousands of Syrian fighters who are undergoing training under the supervision of the Turkish army. And on the border, there are about 50,000 Turkish soldiers, ready to move in if fighting breaks out. There are hundreds of “drones” in the skies over the north.
Ankara wanted to say that there were two options: The first is that a trade-off could take place between the south of the Aleppo-Latakia road with Tal Rifaat and Manbij, as happened in previous bargains, when Syrian government forces with Russian support, restored east of Aleppo and other areas in exchange for the entry of pro-Turkish factions into the areas of the Euphrates Shield areas and the “Olive Branch”, thus allowing Ankara to achieve a “strategic objective ” to dismantle any possible Kurdish-Syrian entity.
The second is a direct military confrontation between the two sides that threatens bilateral relations, military cooperation, and the relationship with NATO, in addition to Libya and other issues.
Suddenly, a third option emerged from the Libyan door. The cease-fire in Idlib is under threat, so is the tripartite Syrian political process of the guarantors of the Astana process.
In Libya, the ceasefire and the activation of the political process are imminent. The statements of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu have indisputably expressed the extent of the interconnection between the two issues.
He said that the military and political meetings with the Russian side were “not very fruitful” with regards to Syria, which threatens the continuity of the ceasefire and calm in Idlib.
“If the ceasefire continues to be violated, the political process will be over,” he emphasized. But on the other hand, he revealed an understanding over Libya.
“We can say that we have come close to an agreement on the criteria for a ceasefire in Libya.”
Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the Statehttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5095277-iran-quarter-century-clash-between-%E2%80%98revolution%E2%80%99-and-state
Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.
Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.
Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.
Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.
Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.
Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)
Khatami and shift in the conflict
The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.
The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.
Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.
Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.
Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)
IRGC and the regional role
The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.
In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.
Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.
In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.
Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)
Nuclear file and internal tensions
The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.
In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.
The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.
Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.
Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.
Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)
Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’
On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.
With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.
On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.
The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.
Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.
The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.
Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)
Patience in handling pressure
In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.
Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.
In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.
Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.
When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.
18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)
Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’
Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.
His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.
Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.
Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.
On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.
Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation
Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.
Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.
Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.
