How King Abdulaziz Established Saudi Arabia’s Independence, Neutrality?

King Abdulaziz at the time was very cautious and aware of the political game played by Westerners, especially Britain. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz at the time was very cautious and aware of the political game played by Westerners, especially Britain. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How King Abdulaziz Established Saudi Arabia’s Independence, Neutrality?

King Abdulaziz at the time was very cautious and aware of the political game played by Westerners, especially Britain. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz at the time was very cautious and aware of the political game played by Westerners, especially Britain. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The period between 1915 and 1927 witnessed conflicts in various parts of the world, most notably the outbreak of the First World War. The Arabian Peninsula, for its part, was experiencing a decisive transitional phase in its history.

During that time, the Peninsula passed through three important stages: The revolution against Turkish subordination in some of its parts, internal wars, and then the unification and stability under the founding king.

In this atmosphere, the Uqair Treaty was signed in 1915 and constituted the first basis for shaping the spirit and nature of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Britain.

Some historians describe it as a treaty of protection and influence, which is similar to other accords concluded by Britain with a number of Gulf States. However, King Abdulaziz at the time was very cautious and aware of the political game played by Westerners, especially Britain.

Fearing the expansion of the conflict of the great powers to the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War, King Abdulaziz wrote to his neighbors, including Mubarak in Kuwait, saying: “I see as the war has occurred, that we meet to deliberate, hoping that we agree on what will save the Arabs from its horrors, or we will ally with one of the countries to protect our rights and promote our interests.”

The Uqair Treaty is not like all other treaties concluded by Britain in the Gulf region. It is neither a protection pact nor an agreement of influence, but rather a treaty of mutual interests between two parties, each of which wants to protect its own interests.

The Treaty Clauses

The first clause included the British government’s recognition of Nejd, Al-Ahsa, Qatif and others (areas that belong to Saudi Arabia now) as “the countries of Ibn Saud and his fathers, and that the ruler nominates whoever succeeds after him, and that the candidate is not opposed to the British government in any way, especially with regard to this treaty.”

This specific item reflected the correct picture of the relationship between King Abdulaziz and Britain, which was based on the British government’s explicit recognition of the nascent state of King Abdulaziz.

The second clause stipulated that if “any attack occurs by a foreign country on the territories of Ibn Saud and his allies without consulting the British government… then Britain shall assist Ibn Saud after consulting with him.”

It is worth noting that King Abdulaziz did not ask for assistance from a foreign country from the date of the conquest of Riyadh in 1902 until the unification of the Saudi state.

In Clause 4, King Abdulaziz pledged not to sell any of the aforementioned regions to a foreign country without the approval of the British government, provided that this does not prejudice the country’s interests.

In the fifth clause, Ibn Saud vowed to secure the freedom of movement and protect pilgrims on their way to the holy sites.

King Abdulaziz pledged, in the sixth clause, not to interfere in other countries’ affairs – a policy that he long sought to advocate.

The seventh and last item includes the commitment of Britain and King Abdulaziz to sign another treaty that further details matters pertaining to the relationship between the two sides.

Saudi Arabia and Britain... After the Treaty

After World War I, Britain was keen to maintain its presence and strength in areas far from the battlefield, especially as it competed with countries that had a strong desire to obtain spheres of influence in the Middle East, such as France, Germany, Russia and other European countries.

During the war, Britain sent Captain Shakespeare to Riyadh, carrying with him recognition of the Saudi State and recalling the “danger of the German influence” and the desire to develop a plan of cooperation with King Abdulaziz on a solid basis.

King Abdulaziz, for his part, believed that the Turks were passing through a critical stage and that supporting them against Britain during the war could make his country lose the opportunity to consolidate its security.

The British policy was working to serve its interests and realized that the Saudi power had become dominant in the Arabian Peninsula. King Abdulaziz, for his part, was aware of the need to forge a treaty that is consistent with the new status of his state and for the world’s major powers to recognize the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Consequently, the Jeddah Treaty was concluded on May 20, 1927, and consisted of 11 articles and 4 annexes. It included the British government’s absolute official recognition of the complete independence of the state of King Abdul Aziz without reservation.



India and Pakistan Don’t Fight Wars Like Other Countries. Here’s Why 

This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)
This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)
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India and Pakistan Don’t Fight Wars Like Other Countries. Here’s Why 

This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)
This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)

India and Pakistan have fought three full-scale wars since they gained independence from Britain in 1947. They’ve also had dozens of skirmishes and conflicts, including one atop a glacier dubbed the coldest and highest-altitude battlefield in the world.

The latest escalation follows a deadly gun attack on tourists that India blames Pakistan for — Islamabad denies any connection. But they don’t fight wars like other countries.

The dominant factor is their nuclear weapons arsenal, a distinct way of deterring major attacks and a guarantee that fighting doesn’t get out of hand, even when the situation is spiraling.

Here’s how — and why — India and Pakistan fight the way they do:

Their nuclear arsenals can destroy each other “Pakistan and India have enough nuclear weapons to wipe the other side out several times over,” says security analyst Syed Mohammed Ali, who is based in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. “Their nuclear weapons create a scenario for mutually assured destruction.”

Both countries have “deliberately developed” the size and range of their stockpile to remind the other about the guarantee of mutually assured destruction, he adds.

Neither country discloses their nuclear capabilities but each is thought to have between 170 and 180 warheads that are short-, long- and medium-range. Both countries have different delivery systems — ways of launching and propelling these weapons to their targets.

The arsenals are a defensive move to prevent and deter further fighting, because “neither side can afford to initiate such a war or hope to achieve anything from it,” Ali says.

It might not look this way to the outsider, but nuclear weapons are a reminder to the other side that they can't take things too far.

But the secrecy around their arsenals means that it's unclear if Pakistan or India can survive a first nuclear strike and retaliate, something called “second-strike capability.”

This capacity stops an opponent from attempting to win a nuclear war through a first strike by preventing aggression that could lead to nuclear escalation.

Without this capability, there is, in theory, nothing to stop one side from launching a warhead at the other.

Kashmir at the crux of the dispute India and Pakistan have each laid claim to Kashmir since 1947, when both gained independence, and border skirmishes have created instability in the region for decades. Each country controls a part of Kashmir, which is divided by a heavily militarized border.

The two archrivals have also fought two of their three wars over Kashmir — a disputed Himalayan region divided between the them where armed insurgents resist Indian rule. Many Muslim Kashmiris support the rebels’ goal of uniting the territory, either under Pakistani rule or as an independent country.

Border flare-ups and militant attacks in India-controlled Kashmir have prompted New Delhi to take an increasingly tough position on Islamabad, accusing it of “terrorism.”

In the latest conflict, India punished Pakistan by hitting what it said were sites used by Pakistan-backed militants linked to a gun massacre last month.

A conventional military imbalance India is one of the biggest defense spenders in the world, with $74.4 billion in 2025, according to the Military Balance report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It’s also one of the world’s largest arms importers.

Pakistan is no slouch, spending $10 billion last year, but it can never match India’s deep pockets. India also has more than double the number of active armed forces personnel than Pakistan does.

While India’s armed forces are traditionally focused on Pakistan, it has another nuclear neighbor to contend with, China, and it is increasingly concerned with maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Those are two factors that Pakistan doesn’t have to consider in its security paradigm.

Pakistan's long and narrow shape, together with the outsized role of the military in foreign policy, makes it easier to move the armed forces around and prioritize defense.

A pattern of escalation and defusing Neither Pakistan or India are in a hurry to announce their military moves against the other and, as seen in the current flare-up of hostilities, it can take a while for confirmation of strikes and retaliation to surface.

But both launch operations into territories and airspace controlled by the other. Sometimes these are intended to damage checkpoints, installations, or sites allegedly used by militants.

They are also aimed at embarrassing or provoking — forcing leaders to bow to public pressure and respond, with the potential for miscalculation.

Many of these activities originate along the Line of Control, which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan. It's largely inaccessible to the media and public, making it hard to independently verify claims of an attack or retaliation.

Such incidents raise international alarm, because both countries have nuclear capabilities, forcing attention back to India and Pakistan and, eventually, their competing claims over Kashmir.

The fear of nuclear war has put the two countries at the top of the agenda, competing with the papal conclave, US President Donald Trump’s policies, and the Sean “Diddy” Combs trial in the news cycle.

No desire for conquest, influence or resources Pakistan and India’s battles and skirmishes are away from the public eye.

Strikes and retaliation are late at night or early in the morning and, with the exception of the drone attacks on Thursday, they mostly take place away from densely populated urban centers. It shows that neither country has the desire to significantly harm the other’s population. Attacks are either described as surgical or limited.

Neither country is motivated by competition for resources. Pakistan has huge mineral wealth, but India isn't interested in these and, while there are stark ideological differences between Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, they don’t seek control or influence over the other.

Other than Kashmir, they have no interest in claiming the other’s territory or exercising dominance.