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Will the Syrian-Israeli Negotiations Resume?

US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP
US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP
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Will the Syrian-Israeli Negotiations Resume?

US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP
US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP

Will the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations resume? Where is Russia and the United States from opening the channels between Tel Aviv and Damascus? What is the required price and the rewards offered? These questions have been raised for a long time, but they have returned intensely to the diplomatic corridors in recent weeks as a widespread belief emerged about the presence of secret negotiations between the two capitals.

There is a reasonable explanation for this belief: modern history showed that whenever Damascus was on the brink of major transformations or isolation, the only “way out” was to resume negotiations, according to the saying: “The road to Washington always passes through Tel Aviv.”

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the features of the new world order started to emerge, President Hafez al-Assad decided to participate in the Madrid Peace Conference at the end of 1991 and then enter into direct negotiations with Israel. Those were led by then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and then-Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa at the beginning of 2000.

Two decades of negotiations were sufficient to spare Damascus the throes of transformations in the region and the world. But Hafez al-Assad passed away in the mid-2000s without signing the peace agreement.

When former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005, Damascus was isolated from its regional and international entourage. All eyes turned to Tel Aviv. In 2008, a secret negotiation channel was opened between the two sides, the Syrian aim of which was to break this state of isolation.

This is what happened. Secret negotiations took place. President Bashar al-Assad was invited to international and Arab conferences, tours, and summits. In the end, the talks sponsored by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan collapsed, and in December 2008 Assad did not agree to direct negotiations.

In this regard, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert quotes former US President George W. Bush as saying: “For me, if you sign an agreement with Assad, it will make me very happy, because I want the Syrian president to know that the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem.”

Damascus is now in the American “isolation ax”. Is repeating previous experiences the only way out?

The first explicit “peaceful signal” came from Damascus. After the signing of the Israeli agreements with the Emirates and Bahrain, Damascus has not issued any official condemnation statement, contrary to its ally, Tehran. It remained silent. Silence here is a political stance. Indeed, the Emirati-Israeli agreement coincided with the arrival of a shipment of UAE humanitarian aid to the Syrian capital.

In fact, this Syrian “peace signal” is based on a pivotal development that took place in mid-2018, when US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, sponsored an agreement guaranteeing the return of the Syrian government forces to the south of the country in exchange for the removal of Iranian fighters from the borders of Jordan and the Golan and the deployment of the UN Disengagement Observer Force.

The security and military arrangements in the Golan are in accordance with the disengagement agreement and UN Resolution 338, Putin said, meaning a return to pre-2011 arrangements.

But talks have recently emerged about a bigger step between Damascus and Tel Aviv, which should include answers to three elements: First, US-Russian sponsorship, as the US mediation alone is no longer sufficient for several reasons, including the Russian presence in Syria and the strong relationship between Moscow and Tel Aviv and Damascus.

Second, the Iranian presence. This file represents an American-Russian-Israeli intersection point. It was previously tested in the 2018 deal and has been a major dossier in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, when Tel Aviv’s interest shifted from convincing Damascus to “normalization” and “normal peace relations” to regional concessions regarding abandoning Tehran and Hezbollah. But is Damascus able/willing to abandon its alliance with Tehran, which is deeply involved in Syria? Can Russia make such a deal? Does the grand bargain include all foreign powers, including the American and Turkish forces? What is the internal political price required from Damascus for such arrangements?

Third, the future of the Golan. Trump had announced his support for Israel’s decision to extend its sovereignty over the Golan. But Damascus considered the decision “void”. Will Russia offer a “magic solution” that combines sovereignty, geopolitical interests, and security arrangements? What is the relationship of such a deal with the US election results and the questions of a “smooth transition” in the White House?

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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)

In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region.

Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak “was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.” He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: “Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.”

The Gaddafi encounter

Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. “When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn’t look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,” Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: “I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?”

Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. “But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.”

Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times.

Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP)

Diplomatic drama in a tent

When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa’s tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. “At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,” Moussa said, “so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.”

Despite Gaddafi’s sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. “He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.”

Gaddafi’s erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. “If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.”

A moment of humor

One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn’t even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. “When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,” Moussa laughed.

Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi’s secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: “You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.” Moussa quipped: “Tell the leader he’s not tearless—he’s payment-less!” Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya’s dues.

Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: “Take it easy, Ali.” That phrase—“Take it easy, Ali”—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. “It revealed Gaddafi’s desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.”

On Hosni Mubarak and the ‘pharaoh’ myth

Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a “pharaoh” as Russians view their “czars,” Moussa was firm: “No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn’t violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn’t revel in bloodshed.”

Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. “Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn’t part of Mubarak’s character to govern through violence. He wasn’t built that way.”

Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP)

The song that stirred controversy

When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang “I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,” it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. “I don’t think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.”

Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa’s name with Mubarak’s. “But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, ‘We’re dancing to this song here!’”

A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein

One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved.

In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. “I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.”

Moussa asked Saddam directly: “Do you possess nuclear weapons?” Saddam answered, “No.” Moussa pressed him again: “Are you absolutely sure?” Saddam repeated, “No.” This made Moussa’s deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. “He probably thought we weren’t going to walk out of there.”

Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: “These people don’t just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?”

Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed.

Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: “Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.”