Syrian File: Moscow, Damascus Disagree Over 10 Contentious Points

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R), Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem (back to camera) attend a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 29, 2015. REUTERS/Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti/Kremlin
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R), Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem (back to camera) attend a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 29, 2015. REUTERS/Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti/Kremlin
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Syrian File: Moscow, Damascus Disagree Over 10 Contentious Points

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R), Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem (back to camera) attend a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 29, 2015. REUTERS/Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti/Kremlin
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R), Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem (back to camera) attend a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 29, 2015. REUTERS/Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti/Kremlin

Many disagreements emerged between Moscow and Damascus on the Syrian file over the past five years. However, public statements, recently issued by official media outlets in the two countries, have shed light on substantial differences that sometimes reached the point of diverging approaches to core matters.

We present below 10 points of contention between the two sides.

1- The “Turning Point”

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad told the Russian Novosti Agency a few days ago: “There are many turning points that I can mention, not one.”

He cited the liberation of many areas in 2013 before the emergence of ISIS and the arrival of the Russian forces in September 2015 when many regions were also liberated.

For his part, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu said on the anniversary of his country’s army intervention at the end of September: “On September 30, 2015, the Federation Council approved the President’s request to use the armed forces in Syria… At that point, the situation in Syria became critical, and there was a risk of the Syrian army defeat, and thus the collapse of the state’s sovereignty…”

2- The duration and reasons of the Russian presence

Assad said: “The term of the agreement regarding the Hmeimim base indicates long-term plans for cooperation.”

“Russia is not a small country. It is a great power, so it has duties, and it is responsible for the whole world, and part of this responsibility is its political and military presence in different regions,” he added.

For his part, Shoygu said: “Before the beginning of the operation, a formation of the Armed Forces was secretly established at the Hmeimim Air Base, consisting of 50 modern and developed war pieces (34 aircraft and 16 helicopters), in addition to the arrival of military units for combat support and special operations.”

3 & 4- War and understandings

Is the war over? “No, definitely not,” Assad said. “As long as there are terrorists occupying some areas of our country and committing all kinds of crimes, assassinations and other crimes, the war is not over.”

As for understandings, he noted: “The Russian-Turkish agreements are not effective. If the Moscow-Ankara agreement had been efficient, we would not have had to carry out attacks recently in many areas of Aleppo and Idlib.”

For his part, Lavrov said: “There is a Russian-Turkish memorandum that is still fully implemented, and patrols on the Aleppo-Latakia road have been stopped for security reasons.”

5 – The solution in Idlib and east of the Euphrates

Assad talked about “launching a popular resistance to confront the American and Turkish occupations.” In mid-November, the Syrian president said: “The US presence in Syria will generate military resistance that will inflict losses on the Americans, and thus will force them to leave.”

Lavrov, for his part, pointed to the US illegal presence in the eastern side of the Euphrates, saying that the Americans were “playing with the Kurds in an irresponsible way.”

6 – Iran and Israel

Is there an Iranian presence in Syria? “We don’t have Iranian forces,” Assad said. “They support Syria. They send military experts and work with our forces on the ground, and they are there with the Syrian army.”

At the beginning of August 2018, Tass Russian news agency quoted the Russian president’s envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, as saying: “The (Hezbollah) and Iranian-backed militias have all withdrawn from there.”

Russia remains silent about the Israeli raids on “Iranian sites.”

7 – The Geneva Process

Assad said: “We have changed the constitution in 2012. And now we are discussing the constitution in the Geneva talks (...). In the end, the Geneva negotiations (sponsored by the United Nations to implement UN Resolution 2254) are a political game, and it is not what most Syrians focus on. The Syrian people do not think about the constitution, and no one talks about it. Their concerns are related to the reforms that we must undertake and the policies that we need to change to ensure that their needs are met. This is what we are focusing on now. ”

Following his meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif in Moscow on September 24, Lavrov said that the troika of the Astana process “is the author of the initiative of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference in Sochi, at the end of which the government and the opposition expressed their commitment to forming the constitutional committee and launching constitutional reform.”

8- The constitution and the elections

Lavrov was quoted as saying that he was “not satisfied with the pace of the commission process.” On the other hand, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said in a press conference with Lavrov in Damascus, on September 7: “There is no timetable for implementing the constitution; it has special importance… and cannot be formulated hastily.”

The two sides, however, have agreed on holding the presidential elections in mid-2021.

9- The Kurdish Administration

During his meeting with two delegations from the Syrian Democratic Council and the Popular Will Party in early September in Moscow following the signing of a memorandum of understanding, Lavrov expressed “his country’s readiness to continue working to create favorable conditions for harmonious coexistence and progress for all religious and ethnic components in Syrian society.”

In response to the MoU, Moallem said: “We do not support any agreement that contradicts the Syrian constitution.” Damascus had rejected a Russian draft of the constitution.

10 – Incentives and sanctions

Damascus and Moscow both reject the US and European sanctions. They also oppose the Syrian Democratic Forces’ control of natural resources and oil in the east of the Euphrates.

A consortium was established to circumvent the sanctions, and Russian companies obtained contracts to invest in oil and gas. But economic cooperation remains far below the Russian military cooperation.

For this purpose, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov visited Damascus on September 7 to enhance cooperation. Borisov said that the two parties have reached agreements to rehabilitate 40 Syrian installations and rebuild energy infrastructure.

He said that the two sides have discussed pushing forward the “roadmap” signed in 2018 to develop economic cooperation.

Syrian Minister of Presidential Affairs Mansour Azzam visited Moscow recently to speed up the signing of the “road map” next December, and to obtain loans and grants worth up to USD three billion.

Observers believe that Moscow did not rush to assist Damascus in solving the fuel and wheat crisis, pending a fresh approach by Syria on political files.



Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
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Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.