Norland Says Withdrawal of Syrians from Western Libya Linked to Wagner’s Presence in East

US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat
US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat
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Norland Says Withdrawal of Syrians from Western Libya Linked to Wagner’s Presence in East

US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat
US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat

US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland defended his country’s policies toward the Libyan conflict, denying that the United States favors one faction over another, and refuting the allegations that Washington was ignoring Turkey’s military intervention in Libya as a way to counter the increased Russian involvement in the country.

In a wide-ranging interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Norland said Libyans have made progress toward a political settlement, adding that they “are tired of war.”

He commended the head of the Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj, for announcing his intent to step down, but said he would like to see him staying in his post for a little bit more time.

The diplomat spoke of his recent visits to Egypt and Turkey where he met with top officials, saying he would “encourage” Cairo and Ankara “to consult directly with each other as a way to avoid miscalculations” on Libya.

Explaining what is meant by his country’s proposal to “demilitarize” the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra, he said that “joint police or civilian security personnel” would remain in those areas. Any remaining armed groups, including Kremlin-linked mercenaries known as the Wagner Group, would only “undermine” confidence building measures between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army.

“There’s unfortunately little doubt that Wagner is acting on behalf of the Russian government, and that their activities help to drive instability in Libya,” he said. “Those who call for the withdrawal of Syrian and other fighters from western Libya, for example, cannot possibly hope to see this happen as long as Wagner continues to build up its presence in the east.”

The Ambassador did not want to take a position on the agreement signed between the GNA and Turkey last year, and said bilateral maritime disputes involving competing claims over territorial waters in the Mediterranean “is a matter for international law and negotiations between the parties themselves.”

“My understanding is that the GNA did what it had to do to survive the LNA offensive,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Below is the full text of the exclusive interview with Norland:

1- Libya seems to be making some kind of progress towards a political settlement now, after the failure of the National Army’s push towards Tripoli, earlier this year. The warring parties are engaged in dialogue in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Switzerland and may be other places too. How optimistic are you now of reaching a breakthrough? What would you say to the Libyans who are engaged in these talks/negotiations? And are you playing any role in helping the Libyans reach a settlement?

Camille, thank you for the question, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about Libya with your readers. I agree with your view. Libyans have made progress toward a political settlement. Several sets of talks in Geneva, Montreux, as well as helpful confidence-building discussions in Egypt and Morocco, have helped set the stage for the upcoming Libyan Political Dialogue Forum or LPDF guided by the UN and now is the time to focus on this process. I know that many Libyans see this as just another conference where politicians talk, and maybe they believe it will fail like previous talks did. Yet there are many things that are different this time around. First of all, people are tired of war: In my many consultations with Libyan leaders, I see that there is a growing consensus on the importance of political dialogue - not military force for resolving the conflict. Similarly, Libyans increasingly want to re-assert Libyan sovereignty and remove armed foreign forces from the country. In addition, the LPDF will be the first edition of talks where participants must declare themselves ineligible for political positions in the new institutions to be created. It’s also worth noting that in the same context, Prime Minister Sarraj has signaled his intention to eventually step down and turn power over to the new executive authority that would be established under the LPDF. That is a courageous and unprecedented step that also sets this moment apart from previous attempts to find a political settlement.

2- You have lately been involved in meetings on Libya with both the Egyptians and Turks. Are you encouraged by what you have been told by these opposing sides, each of which is backing a different party in Libya? Can we assume that you have brokered a ‘Libyan truce’ between the Turks and the Egyptians? What do you expect Cairo and Ankara to do next to push the Libyans towards a deal?

I was encouraged by my consultations with senior officials in Cairo and Ankara earlier this month and in August, in line with Secretary Pompeo’s desire to use American diplomatic tools to help create the conditions that lead to a successful political process for Libya. My consultations suggested the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and other international partners are looking for pragmatic ways to support the LPDF. Such consultations help us understand common interests in finding a peaceful, negotiated settlement to the conflict rather than escalating and further destabilizing Libya and the region. Having said that, I certainly would encourage Egypt and Turkey to consult directly with each other as a way to avoid miscalculations and build cooperation on their common interest in a stable and peaceful Libya.

3- Can you explain to the readers what is meant by your proposal to “demilitarize” the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra? Who will be in charge of these two cities? Does this mean, in addition to the withdrawal of the National Army units, the Russian mercenaries will also have to leave their alleged bases in the Ghardabiya Airbase and al-Jufra airbase? Is this what you are seeking?

As a matter of policy, the United States has consistently called for the departure of all foreign forces including mercenaries and contractor forces from Libya. These armed foreign groups have only further destabilized Libya and escalated the conflict. Wagner, the Kremlin-linked contract company is among those actors. In the near term, what we recommended is a concrete confidence-building measure by demilitarizing Sirte and al-Jufra, likely with joint police or civilian security personnel to remain in those areas. The exact details to operationalize this idea should be negotiated by the Libyans themselves. This could be a concrete first step that facilitates additional steps towards de-escalation. Any remaining armed groups, including Wagner, would only undermine such confidence building measures.

4- Can you expand on the role Russia plays in Libya? The Wagner Group is alleged to have deployed not only mercenary fighters, but also aircrafts and anti-aircraft battery missiles in Libya, an allegation Moscow denies. Is it your understanding that these Russian mercenaries could not have been deployed without an agreement from the highest authorities in Moscow, namely the Kremlin? As a follow up, can you confirm that these mercenaries are still deployed in Libya, including in the oil fields?

As I said earlier, the United States opposes all foreign military involvement in Libya including that of the Wagner Group. As I think you’ve seen, our military, namely AFRICOM has publicly identified Russian military activities and instances when Russia has brought in sophisticated weapons in violation of the arms embargo. There’s unfortunately little doubt that Wagner is acting on behalf of the Russian government, and that their activities help to drive instability in Libya. Those who call for the withdrawal of Syrian and other fighters from western Libya, for example, cannot possibly hope to see this happen as long as Wagner continues to build up its presence in the east.

5- Do you believe that Russia is seeking to establish a base in Libya, and what would that mean, if true?

I don’t claim to know Russian intentions, that is a question for Moscow. What I do know is that Libyans are looking for less rather than more foreign military presence in their country. We share that interest and see the LPDF as the best tool to help Libyans achieve this.

6- Russia has lately complained that it has offered to sit down and talk with you on Libya but you are refusing to do so. Why, if true?

I never refused discussions with Russia. The United States has regular contact with Russia, including on Libya. The Russian government is well informed of our position on the role of Wagner in Libya, and our support for the LPDF. I think there is a current within Russia that is actually supportive of a Libyan political solution and recognizes that Russia can achieve its legitimate interests in Libya, such as promoting Russian businesses and counterterrorism, through political dialogue. The Russian military investment in Libya, however, undermines this position.

7- You have been a subject of constant criticism by your opponents in Libya, who allege that you are leaning towards, or even backing, the Muslim Brotherhood in Western Libya. Those who hold such a view accuse you of ignoring Turkey’s military involvement in Libya, may be as a tool in countering Russia’s involvement. Turkey, according to its opponents, publicly backs the Muslim Brotherhood and hosts Libyan Islamists, some of which your own government used to consider as terrorist. Your critics would also accuse you of allowing the Turks to establish bases in Libya, from which they can threaten Egypt (by the Islamists) and even European states (by an influx of migrants). Can you set the record straight and refute these allegations?

We don’t support any one side in the Libyan conflict. As a pragmatic matter, the Turkish military intervention would likely never have happened had the LNA not engaged Wagner mercenaries in its offensive on Tripoli. Now the challenge is to help all Libyans -- east, west and south -- create the conditions for reclaiming their sovereignty and setting the stage for the departure of all foreign combat forces. The United States is engaged in active diplomacy with all sides, something the White House called 360 diplomatic engagement, in order to support the LPDF. The ongoing escalatory military dynamic is fraught with the risk of miscalculation and new levels of violence. It should be clear to all that renewed hostilities in Libya will not produce a victor, it will only bring more carnage, more criminal activity, more illegal migration and more problems for the average Libyan -- be it a reduction of income, a degradation of medical care, or less electricity. As I said, we oppose all foreign military intervention in Libya and we have zero tolerance for terrorists. A political settlement under the LPDF will open the way to the departure of all foreign forces and can facilitate solving problems that thrive within the instability of the Libyan conflict.

Similarly, militias will need to be disarmed, demobilized or where possible, integrated into the regular military or security services under civilian control. Exactly how that happens is a question for Libyans to decide. That decision process would be most effective under new political institutions in a sovereign Libya following a political settlement under the LPDF.

8- As a follow up to the above, what is your position on the legality of the Turkish treaty with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli regarding oil explorations in the Mediterranean, as well as the security deal too? That deal, as you well know, has been rejected by Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, who claim it encroaches on their waters?

The US does not take a position on bilateral maritime disputes involving competing claims over territorial waters – this is a matter for international law and negotiations between the parties themselves. My understanding is that the GNA did what it had to do to survive the LNA offensive.

9- Has Sarraj explained to you why he has offered to resign by the end of this month? Do you still expect him to do so soon?

Thanks for this question. I just want to commend Prime Minister Sarraj for announcing his intent to step down. His historic decision to step down voluntarily shows that he is willing to put the interests of the Libyan people above his own personal interest, and deserves respect. Regarding the exact timing, I have to acknowledge that at the time of his announcement we expected that he would be able to turn power over to a new executive authority at the end of October. However, due to COVID and other complications in organizing the dialogue, UNSMIL has indicated that the current timing of LPDF meetings will push this into November. So I would hope and expect that he stays on as Prime Minister a little longer, at least until this transfer of power is possible. Having said that it’s clear to me that he has every intention of stepping down.

10- In a briefing you gave a few months ago, you hinted that some in Egypt may have backed the wrong side in Libya, alluding to Haftar. Are the Egyptians still clinging to him, or are they backing different groups now, mainly tribes from eastern Libya? Do the Americans have any contact with Haftar and his National Army now?

The Cairo Declaration, which broadened the political face of the east, and Egypt’s support of the LPDF with important steps such as hosting the Hurghada Security talks are evidence that the Egyptians are invested in the political solution to the Libya conflict rather than a military one. I don’t want to speak for the Egyptians, but in my consultations with senior officials they’ve signaled a pragmatic approach which recognizes that military escalation only destabilizes Libya and potentially threatens the wider region. As a neighbor, this is the exact opposite of what they want to see. So I’ll repeat here my genuine appreciation for Egypt’s concrete steps in support of the LPDF.

On the second part of your question, we do have contact with General Haftar and the LNA, and recognize that they can be part of the solution if they are willing to follow the exclusively political path. It was a good signal from the LNA that oil production was able to resume for the benefit of Libyans. We understand their representatives are taking a constructive approach in the 5+5 talks this week in Geneva. Our outreach to the LNA is part of our wide ranging diplomatic engagement with all sides, and should not be confused with taking sides.

11- Have you witnessed an increase in ISIS or Al-Qaeda’s activities in Libya lately, taking advantage of the fighting between the warring parties of eastern and western Libya?

We know that the conflict has given terrorist groups the space and the opportunity to try to regroup in Libya. Thus far our counter-terrorism efforts have constrained ISIS and Al-Qaeda efforts to reestablish a significant presence. But the threat is still there, and the best way to address this is to ensure that the State of Libya is a fully sovereign and capable partner in the fight against terrorism. Success in the LPDF offers the best guarantee that this will happen.

12- I have to ask you this question: having served in Kabul before, which, in your opinion, is more difficult to resolve the Afghan or the Libyan crisis.

Both conflicts have proven resistant to efforts at peaceful resolution, though the Afghan conflict has now lasted much longer than the Libyan one. Both conflicts have opened up space for extremists and terrorist groups. Both conflicts involve efforts to establish democratic governments in places that have not known this before. Both conflicts feature corruption and entrenched interests opposed to a peaceful resolution. Both conflicts have led to enormous hardships for average citizens. Both conflicts have featured toxic foreign intervention, and in both cases the United States has sought to play a helpful role in support of democracy and human rights, though not without some mistakes along the way. Both Afghanistan and Libya represent potentially lucrative commercial gateways to remote markets. While both Libya and Afghanistan have significant untapped natural resources, Libya has had the advantage of being able to access its natural wealth and put it on the world market before Afghanistan could. This gives Libyans an advantage which we hope will be seized upon through the LPDF. If Libya is able to emerge as a stable and unified country through political dialogue it could be incredibly prosperous.

13 - Is Libya better or worse without Gaddafi? An assessment from a non-Libyan is much appreciated.

Certainly if you read books like Hisham Matar’s “In the Country of Men” you realize the Gaddafi era featured brutality and torture, and the downing of Pan Am 103 was his regime’s work as well. But questions about a country’s leadership should really be answered by the citizens of that country. That is exactly why we are so focused on supporting sovereign Libyan efforts to achieve a lasting end to the conflict and national elections as quickly as possible, through which Libyans can exercise the voice that the Qaddafi dictatorship sought to silence through violence and oppression. In the coming days, Libyans from across the political spectrum, including the so-called “Greens,” will come together peacefully through the LPDF to debate the most critical issues facing the country and forge government institutions that are accountable to the Libyan people. This dialogue stands in powerful contrast with the former regime, where Libyans had no say in how leaders were chosen, no freedom to criticize leaders, and no power to demand accountability. No one can deny that the years since the revolution have been tumultuous, but I believe there is a real opportunity for Libyans to start building a brighter future.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.