Amr Moussa: Mubarak Rejected Extending Abdel-Meguid’s Time in Office

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
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Amr Moussa: Mubarak Rejected Extending Abdel-Meguid’s Time in Office

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

In the second excerpt extracted from the soon-to-be-published biography of former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League”, the veteran Egyptian diplomat recounts the details of how he was assigned to succeed Asmat Abdel-Meguid at the regional Arab organization.

Arab countries, at the time, were conflicted about appointing Moussa, who was still serving as Egypt’s foreign minister in 2001.

In his memoirs, which will soon be released by Dar El-Shorouk, Moussa recounts how Abdel-Meguid expressed to him his desire to remain secretary-general of the Arab League even after completing his term.

Nevertheless, the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak refused Abdel-Meguid’s request saying that the Arab League was “asleep and dying out.”

Also, Moussa talks about how vital Gulf financial support, especially that given by Saudi Arabia, was to revamping the Arab League and granting the organization a more active role in all issues concerning the Arab world.

Four months into his tenure, Moussa was faced with the challenges and the fallout of the September 11 attacks which affected all Arabs and Muslims. Dealing with negative feelings surfacing towards Arabs and Muslims, Moussa’s efforts to manage the situation included making vigorous calls, releasing official statements, meeting with US officials, and organizing a conference entitled “Dialogue of Civilizations: An Exchange not a Clash.”

In the last days of November 2000, then chief of the Arab League Abdel-Meguid phoned Moussa and asked for a meeting to discuss important issues that included the future of his position at the organization.

Moussa agreed to Abdel-Meguid’s request and said he would see him at his office before the end of the week.

In that meeting, Abdel-Meguid expressed worry towards his term in office ending before he had given all he had to offer and suggested if he could be given an additional year or two.

Abdel-Meguid did not ask for renewing his contract for a third full term because he knew that Arab League member states would oppose the idea.

Moussa carried Abdel-Meguid’s proposal to President Mubarak the very same evening of the meeting but was faced by clear-cut rejection.

The senior diplomat even requested if Abdel-Meguid’s time in office could be renewed for a single year as a form of honoring his journey at the Arab League.

“Tell him enough is enough…there are important countries at the Arab League who told me that the organization is completely sleeping and will die,” Mubarak told Moussa, confirming that there will be no renewal for Abdel-Meguid.

Two days later, Moussa informed Abdel-Meguid of Mubarak’s refusal.

“He was understanding and showed his known calm and never recalled the subject,” Moussa recounts about Abdel-Meguid’s reaction.

Shortly after, Moussa was informed that it was time for Egypt to select its candidate for chief of the Arab League.

“One winter morning at the end of the year 2000, while I was sitting at a round table in my office at the foreign ministry reading a report, enjoying the winter sun, the presidential phone rang,” said Moussa.

“The presidential secretary for information, Ambassador Majed Abdel-Fattah, was the one speaking. He started by saying that the president was requesting that the minister provides him with one or more names of nominees suited for becoming the next secretary-general of the Arab League,” he added.

Mubarak’s Message

Abdel-Fattah went on to express that many, including the president, believed that Moussa was the right man for the job.

“I realized that it (the call) was a message from President Mubarak right away,” Moussa explained, adding that his response was accepting the offer.

“Egypt announced the news of my candidacy to succeed Abdel-Meguid officially on February 15, 2001.”

“This caused a great uproar in Egypt, as well as in a large number of Arab and even international capitals. I think Washington and Tel Aviv were very happy with the news.”

Moussa goes on to say that some Arab countries opposed his candidacy because staying at the helm of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry was more effective and more beneficial in serving higher Arab interests.

Saudi and Gulf Support

Then Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal conveyed the Kingdom’s support for Moussa whether he is Egypt’s foreign minister or the chief of the Arab League.

Moussa was told that he will receive all the needed support.

“I recall discussing with Prince Saud the financial standing of the Arab League which was edging on bankruptcy, and the need to back me as the new chief in a way that enabled me to reform the joint Arab action organization,” Moussa added.

Prince Saud, for his part, voiced his support and promised to take the matter to then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz.

“In my view, I believed that the Arab League can be reformed if it was run by a modern administration and if sufficient funds were made available to give the organization’s employees a sense of security,” Moussa said about his strategy to reinvigorate the organization’s work.

“Indeed, I toured Gulf countries and received promises from high-level officials that the necessary funds will be made available in the form of special support for the Arab League,” he added, noting that he was ensured full-control over how the incoming money was to be spent.

“They trusted the new administration at the Arab League and its ability to move joint Arab action forward,” Moussa noted.

Day One at the Arab League Headquarters

“At 9:30 am on May 16, 2001, I left my house to find the Arab League’s secretary-general designated car waiting for me. The vehicle was old and worn out. What caught my eye was that the Arab League flag was raised over the car,” Moussa recalled.

“I asked the guard to remove the flag; there was no need to roam the streets of Cairo in a car with the Arab League flag fluttering over it. Close to 10:00 am I arrived at the Arab League’s headquarters.”

Accompanied by Ambassador Samir Saif el-Yazal, a “good” executive figure that was hand-picked by Moussa to help in supervising financial and administrative affairs at the Arab League, Moussa headed to the office of the Arab League secretary-general on the first floor.

“First I sat in the office salon, appalled by the lights on the whole floor being dimmed and the paintwork on the walls being outdated! I told el-Yazal that this sight must change immediately.”

Moussa then ordered el-Yazal to open windows, paint the walls with light colors, and make the lighting bright so as not to encourage sleep.

Outraged by the cluttered job done on connecting phone cables at the office, Moussa summoned the manager of the administrative affairs and demanded that an overhaul takes place before the end of the week.

Slowly but surely, things began changing.

In terms of developing Arab League headquarters, the Kingdom of Morocco offered to develop one of the rundown halls, and China developed a second hall as a gift to Moussa.

Moussa also ordered a dramatic shift in the arrangement of how delegations are seated, introducing a fresh environment to representatives.

Arab League Teams

“My conviction was firm that there would be no development for the system of joint Arab action without first improving the human cadre working at the Arab League and its affiliated institutions. I started meeting with workers in groups, each group consisting of five or six members, to sort out those I could count on,” Moussa said about his early efforts to reform the Arab League.

During the first two months of meetings with employees, Moussa chose about 30 individuals from whom the Arab League can invest and rely on.

“I began assigning them tasks and found that their education was superior and that they were ready to develop and work. They were no less qualified than the workers of any other organization ... they just needed guidance and confidence,” said Moussa.

Published in special agreement with Dar Al Shorouk - all rights reserved.



Lebanon War... Why is it Difficult for Netanyahu and Nasrallah to Back Down?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters
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Lebanon War... Why is it Difficult for Netanyahu and Nasrallah to Back Down?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters

Informed sources in Beirut told Asharq Al-Awsat that any diplomatic efforts to stop the ongoing war between Israel and Lebanon would face the obstacle of the main parties to the conflict — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah — finding it difficult to back down.

Why is Netanyahu refusing to back down?

The sources noted that the war in Lebanon has achieved for Netanyahu what he could not accomplish in Gaza. They summarized it as follows:

- Netanyahu framed the war with a unifying message that has gained consensus across the Israeli political spectrum: the return of the northern residents who were displaced after Hezbollah launched cross-border attacks following the Oct. 7 attacks in Gaza. This means that the Israeli military operations enjoy broad political and public backing.

- Netanyahu began the war by striking Hezbollah’s communication networks, inflicting unprecedented losses on the group and sidelining around 1,500 of its members from the battlefield.

- He dealt a near-fatal blow to the leadership of the Radwan Forces, the elite military wing of Hezbollah, managing to eliminate prominent figures, some of whom were listed as US targets due to attacks that occurred in Beirut four decades ago.

- Netanyahu can claim that Hezbollah initiated the war and that Israel’s only demand is the return of northern residents and ensuring their safety.

- Thus, it seems difficult for Netanyahu to back down from the demand of returning the displaced, which practically means disengaging the Lebanese front from the Gaza front.

Why is Nasrallah refusing to back down?

The sources pointed to the following reasons:

- It is hard for Nasrallah to accept a setback in a war that he initiated.

- He also finds it difficult to accept disengagement after Hezbollah has suffered unprecedented losses, unlike anything it faced in its previous confrontations with Israel, including the 2006 war.

- Accepting a setback would signal that Iran is not willing to take concrete steps to confront Israel.

- If Hezbollah agrees to disengage from Gaza without a ceasefire there, many would view the cross-border attacks launched by the party in support of the Palestinian enclave as a reckless gamble.

- A setback for Hezbollah would demoralize the Axis of Resistance and have a ripple effect on Gaza itself.

- Agreeing to a ceasefire without securing even "limited gains" would reinforce the perception that Nasrallah launched a war that most Lebanese reject, and that Hezbollah bears responsibility for the resulting losses.