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Amr Moussa: We Convinced Saddam Hussein to Bring Back Int’l Inspectors, But US Already Decided to Go to War

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein | Asharq Al-Awsat
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein | Asharq Al-Awsat
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Amr Moussa: We Convinced Saddam Hussein to Bring Back Int’l Inspectors, But US Already Decided to Go to War

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein | Asharq Al-Awsat
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein | Asharq Al-Awsat

For the third episode of excerpts obtained from the upcoming biography of the Arab League’s ex-chief Amr Moussa, which will soon be released by Dar El-Shorouk, Asharq Al-Awsat goes over efforts spent by the Egyptian veteran diplomat in the Iraq file.

In his biography, “The Years of the Arab League”, Moussa dedicates two whole chapters to recount events building up to the US invasion of Iraq.

He talks about his attempts alongside late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to avert a US strike on Iraq, the events of the US invasion of Iraq, and his efforts in the post-2003 political process.

Moussa goes into great detail about his meeting with Hussein, who he said was “a frightening man with soft hands.” He recalls using a serious tone when speaking to the then Iraqi leader.

“Some said it was the fiercest tone an Arab official ever used with Saddam Hussein,” reminds Moussa.

The former secretary-general of the Arab League says that his efforts with then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan did not come to fruition because Washington had already decided to go to war.

According to the memoir, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, at the time, described Hussein as a “deceiver and a liar,” and accused him of deluding Moussa and Annan.

“One of the first issues I had to immediately deal with after assuming the Secretary-General office at the Arab League was Iraqi-UN negotiations on inspections for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) being put on ice,” says Moussa.

At the time, the US was claiming that Iraq either already owns or is seeking to develop WMDs, especially nukes.

Early November 2001, Moussa made his first visit to the UN in his capacity as chief of the Arab League. He was there to attend the UN General Assembly sessions that were rescheduled from September to November because of the September 11 attacks.

Moussa remembers speaking to Annan and telling him that it was “unfitting” for his legacy as UN chief for a war to break out between the US and Iraq under his leadership.

He also complains to Annan about the lack of “apparent effort to prevent an imminent war on Iraq that the US wants and seeks.”

Annan then replies restlessly: “I'm trying my best, but Saddam Hussein is stubborn, and you know him better than me.”

“We must give Iraq a chance to dodge the war for which Washington is preparing. I will visit the Iraqi president next January. I want a message from you that I can convey to him on resolving the situation on resuming the work of international (WMDs) inspectors,” Moussa proposes.

“I am confident that when I tell him (Hussein) that I am bearing a clear message from the UN secretary-general calling for mobilizing on the issue of arms inspections, he will respond positively,” he adds.

Annan agrees with Moussa and moves forward on the proposal.

Later on, Moussa makes arrangements with then Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri regarding his visit to Iraq.

“My plane landed in Baghdad on the morning of January 18, 2002. I found Sabri greeting me. He was one of the professional foreign ministers that I had respect for, but Saddam's dictatorship and unilateralism severely limited his margins of maneuver and action,” Moussa explains.

His meeting with the Iraqi dictator was scheduled for the next day.

Moussa, accompanied by an Arab League delegation, was taken by a convoy to one of the presidential prestigious guest houses.

Each of Ahmed ben Helli, deputy secretary-general of the Arab League, Hussein Hassouna, the head of the Arab League mission at the UN, and Ambassador Hisham Badr, were present with Moussa.

The following day, Moussa was escorted by Iraqi military officer and Hussein's personal secretary Abid Hamid Mahmud.

Moussa hopped in the passenger seat of a beige Toyota driven by Mahmud. They drove to a humble yet beautiful palace located in the Radwaniya area, southwest Baghdad.

There, Moussa regrouped with Helli, Hassouna, and Badr who were waiting for him at the hall entrance, where they would all meet Hussein.

“As soon as I entered, the Iraqi president moved from his seat to greet me,” Moussa narrates, adding that he made sure to keep a serious atmosphere going on between him and Hussein. The two shared a dry, yet firm, handshake.

Moussa recalls being struck by how soft Hussein’s hands were; something you wouldn’t expect from a man with such a frightening reputation.

Hussein then kicked off the two-hour and 15-minute meeting by praising Moussa for his nationalist stances.

Moussa says he reiterated to Hussein what he had already told his senior aides. This included a complaint about the low engagement of Iraqi delegations at the Arab League.

Delivering Annan’s message, Moussa also blamed Hussein for his unfavorable dealings with UN experts tasked with leading WMDs inspections in Iraq.

Moussa warned Hussein that Iraq was losing the sympathy of two major organizations, the Arab League and the UN.

The following conversation then took place:

Moussa: Mr. President, allow me to ask you a question: Do you have nuclear weapons that you are afraid of getting inspected?

Hussein: Iraq does not have nuclear weapons, and I have said so repeatedly.

Moussa: Mr. President, allow me to ask you again the question: Do you have nuclear weapons that you are afraid of getting inspected?

Taken by Moussa’s sharp tone, Hussein repeated: No ... we don't have nuclear weapons.

Moussa: So why do you mind the presence of international inspectors so long that Iraq is not afraid of anything?

Hussein: Because there is something we fear.

Moussa: And what is that?

Hussein: All inspectors that are sent to us are CIA agents.

Moussa: What if we ensure that they are not CIA and are working for the UN? We can stress the international organization sends inspectors with integrity and impartiality. I can confirm this through a process of negotiations between you and the UN, particularly Kofi Annan.

Hussein: I accept that, and take your word for it; because you are a respectable Arab man.

Moussa: Are you okay with me passing this along to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan?

Hussein: Yes, I agree.

Informing Arabs and Annan About the Visit’s Outcomes

In the day following his meeting with Hussein, Moussa flew to Cairo and held a meeting with permanent representatives at the Arab League, briefing them on the outcomes of his talks with the Iraqi leader.

The review took place on the evening of January 20, 2002.

On the same day, Moussa contacted the royal Jordanian palace and requested a meeting with King Abdullah II, who was chairing the Arab summit at the time. He wanted to fill the Jordanian leader in on the details of his discussions with Hussein.

Also, Moussa phoned then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Maher, and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal.

Next morning, Moussa informed Kuwait on what he had agreed on with Hussein regarding the fate of the Kuwaitis, who had gone missing or had been detained in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The Arab League chief then agreed with Kuwaiti authorities to carry out a swift visit to Kuwait on January 22, 2002.

“I went to Kuwait and met with Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad and a number of officials. The general atmosphere was that the brothers in Kuwait were not comfortable with my visit to Iraq,” Moussa recounts.

He evokes how he explained to the Kuwaiti side that he couldn't disregard Iraq as a member of the Arab League, regardless of the anger harbored over the events of 1990.

Moussa also says he conveyed the Arab League’s interest in finding an Arab solution to the impending threat facing the stability of the Arab world.

Published in special agreement with Dar Al Shorouk - all rights reserved.

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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.