Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

In this fifth episode of excerpts from the new book by former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League,” Asharq Al-Awsat reviews the efforts deployed to solve the crisis in Sudan.

Moussa’s biography, which will soon be published by Dar El-Shorouk, dedicates two chapters of 44 pages to the Sudanese crisis. The first chapter talks about the dispute between northern and southern Sudan that ended with the secession of the South, while the second is devoted to the political and humanitarian crisis that the Darfur region experienced as of March 2003.

Amr Moussa reveals that the leader of the SPLM, John Garang, told him that he wanted to be the president of all of Sudan, asking: “What is the value of being the leader of a poor, weak and closed country in southern Sudan?”

He explains that he asked the leaders of Sudan to “work to entice southerners into unity, but they considered separation an inevitable fate.” He also considered that the peace agreement with the SPLM was an inspiration for all the rebel movements across all Sudanese regions.

Moussa narrates: “Sudan, and its merciless issues and conflicts, was one of my most important concerns since the beginning of my career in Egyptian diplomacy. This exceptional interest in Sudan was reinforced during my ten years as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt…”

The South Sudan Case

Moussa says that several factors have combined to create and fuel the conflict between the south and the north: ethnic and religious pluralism, the struggle over resources, and the distribution of shares.

Other factors include the policy of marginalization, which the central Sudanese governments have adopted towards all parties, and the failure of these successive governments to promote the values of citizenship.

Moussa also points to the role of the British colonialism in nurturing separatism and entrenching it among the people of southern Sudan, by strengthening the role of missionaries and the policy of weakening Arab culture, replacing northern employees, and preventing northern merchants from reaching the south.

The Arab League secretary-general recounts: “On July 20, 2002, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed the Machakos Protocol in Kenya, which the Arab League accepted at the time after the Sudanese government signed it… The agreement included two documents: the first provides for the extension of the existing armistice until the end of March 2003, and the second covers a number of points that the two sides have accepted in principle, and they relate to the sharing of power and wealth, but without acknowledging any decisive position regarding them. The two parties agreed to abolish the application of Islamic law in areas inhabited by non-Muslims and to hold a referendum in the south on secession or unity after a six-year transitional period.”

Moussa says that after consulting with the concerned Arab governments, he specified the efforts of the Arab League regarding the conflict between North and South Sudan. Those were divided into two segments: advancing the peace process and the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM and supporting development and reconstruction in war-stricken areas.

“I had earlier received at the League’s headquarters in Cairo in March 2002, the leader of the popular movement, John Garang, who expressed unitary tendencies and demanded the Arab League’s support. I built on that fruitful meeting and sent an Arab mission headed by Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department of the Arab League, in April 2003 to the southern city of Rumbek, the headquarters of the Popular Movement in Southern Sudan. It was the first Arab mission to visit that region, to affirm the commitment of the Arab League and its institutions to actively contribute to the development of South Sudan and the areas affected by war, and to make unity an attractive voluntary option.”

Moussa stops to describe his relationship with Garang, with whom he had a “special agreement.”

“I met with him several times after his first visit to Egypt in 1997. His position has evolved gradually… from the struggle to achieve the secession of the South to the fight for equal rights among all Sudanese in all parts of the country, within the framework of the slogan he raised, which is the “New Sudan” that embraces all ethnicities and religions. Perhaps this development in the position of the SPLM leader was one of the reasons that contributed to his unfortunate disappearance from the Sudanese political scene.”

The former Arab League secretary-general continues: “Garang used to tell me in every meeting that brought us together: “What is the value of being the leader or president of the poor, weak, small and closed country of Southern Sudan?”

I applauded and supported that approach, but his vision was not welcomed by any of the Sudanese political actors, whether Africans, Arabs or Westerners, and even the leaders of the (northern) Sudan. But I think that if Garang could achieve a new beginning on the basis of the “New Sudan” with the opportunity to run for the presidency, events may have taken a completely different course, as this would have shaped different dynamics that none of the parties wanted to create.”

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

“At the invitation of the Kenyan government, on January 9, 2005, I participated with many Arab and African leaders in the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Nairobi. The agreement provided for a permanent ceasefire and the establishment of a 6-year transitional period during which the North and South would cooperate in governing the country. Garang was assigned the responsibilities of the Sudanese First Vice President. The agreement also stipulated the sharing of oil revenues, and the right of the SPLM and its southern allies to form a government for the south to fully manage its affairs for a period of 6 years, which ends with the votes of the people of the south and the oil-rich Abyei region in a referendum on January 9, 2011 on the secession or unity.”

Moussa recounts: “Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt’s foreign minister at the time, was sitting next to me during the loud signing ceremony at Naivasha Stadium in Nairobi. During the ceremony, I drifted away. I thought that things were definitely moving towards the secession of the south. Aboul Gheit seemed to have the same thoughts. He cut short my distraction by telling me: I can tell you that by signing this agreement, the matter will end up in division.”

Moussa asserts that great work was achieved through the coordination meetings held by the Arab League to promote a joint Arab action to make the unity of Sudan an attractive option. Arab funds, specialized Arab organizations, and unions of Arab ministerial councils participated in these meetings.

“The Arab League has made concrete efforts and played active roles to help reach a comprehensive peaceful solution to the Sudanese crisis. However, the performance of the Arab system has suffered and still suffers from a clear gap between decision-making and implementation. The Beirut summit decided to establish the Arab Fund for the Development of South Sudan with financial contributions from Arab countries, but this fund did not receive any significant contributions. The League Council also adopted a resolution calling on the member-states to address Sudan’s Arab debts in order to enable the country to face the challenges of building peace and unity, but this did not happen either.”

The referendum on secession

“A referendum took place in southern Sudan and the people chose the secession. In fact, in my Egyptian capacity, and as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, I was against the division of Sudan. I spoke at length about this with (former President Omar) Al-Bashir, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Othman Al-Mirghani, and others, encouraging the rejection of partition and calling for non-tolerance to the plans of separation.”

The political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur

“My assumptions on the signing of the Machakos Agreement between the Sudanese government and the separatist Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on July 20, 2002… proved to be true. This agreement was an inspiration for the rebel movements in Darfur, which saw that fighting alone is what brings the Bashir regime to the negotiating table.”

Moussa says that the conflict in Darfur began to heat up until the situation reached the point that led to a great human tragedy. That was in March 2003, when rebels revolted against al-Bashir, claiming they were marginalized. Two armed groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, declared their rebellion and attacked the city of Al-Fashir, the center of North Darfur State, destroying 7 aircraft at the city’s airport.

The former Arab League secretary-general recounts that the government has responded with the same strategy that the successive governments have adopted since the era of Sadiq al-Mahdi in the 1980s: mobilizing Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, who are known for their ferocity, to combat the rebels.

“Talking about the Darfur crisis and the factors that lead to it, it is necessary to point to the marginalization of the entire region by the central government and the lack of development projects and basic services such as education, health, etc.,” Moussa says.

The escalating developments in Darfur as of March 2003 attracted global interest. Criticism against the Sudanese government began to increase. On March 4, 2004, the High Commissioner for Refugees announced that atrocities were being committed in the Darfur region and demanded the government to urgently open the door to dialogue with the rebels.

A fact-finding mission dispatched by the Arab League

Moussa recounts that he assigned Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department at the Arab League, to preside over a fact-finding mission that would investigate the reality of the situation in the region. It was the first international mission of its kind to go to Darfur, and its mission included a visit to Sudan, from April 29 to May 15, 2004.

According to the senior Arab official, the mission was able to prove massive violations of human rights on both sides of the conflict, but completely ruled out genocide or ethnic cleansing. The same position was expressed by Alpha Oumar Konare, then-President of the African Union.

“The truth is that these moves on the part of the Arab League were able to open doors for discussion and then for an understanding with the government of Sudan on the importance of the role of the League and the wide scope of its movement,” he asserts.

“This has allowed freedom of movement on the part of the League, further coordination with the African Union, and more movement on the ground in Darfur, starting with an official visit, the first by the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the region.”

Six weeks into a ceasefire that halted the war between Israel and Hezbollah, many displaced Lebanese whose homes were destroyed in the fighting want to rebuild — but reconstruction and compensation are slow in coming, The Associated Press reported.
Large swaths of southern and eastern Lebanon, as well as Beirut’s southern suburbs, lie in ruins, tens of thousands of houses reduced to rubble in Israeli airstrikes. The World Bank estimated in a report in November — before the ceasefire later that month — that losses to Lebanon's infrastructure amount to some $3.4 billion.
In the south, residents of dozens of villages along the Lebanon-Israel border can't go back because Israeli soldiers are still there. Under the US-negotiated ceasefire deal, Israeli forces are supposed to withdraw by Jan. 26 but there are doubts they will.
Other terms of the deal are also uncertain — after Hezbollah's withdrawal, the Lebanese army is to step in and dismantle the militants' combat positions in the south. Israeli officials have complained the Lebanese troops are not moving in fast enough — to which they say the Israeli troops need to get out first.
Reconstruction prospects — and who will foot the bill — remain unclear.
In 2006, after the monthlong Israel-Hezbollah war, Hezbollah financed much of the $2.8 billion reconstruction with ally Iran's support.
The Lebanese militant group has said it would do so again and has begun making some payments. But Hezbollah, which is also a powerful political party, has suffered significant losses in this latest war and for its part, Iran is now mired in a crippling economic crisis.
The cash-strapped and long paralyzed Lebanese government is in little position to help and international donors may be stretched by the post-war needs in the Gaza Strip and neighboring Syria.
Many Lebanese say they are waiting for Hezbollah's promised compensation. Others say they received some money from the group — much less than the cost of the damage to their homes.
Manal, a 53-year-old mother of four from the southern village of Marjayoun has been displaced with her family for over a year, since Hezbollah began firing rockets into Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, in support of its ally Hamas in Gaza.
Israel responded with shelling and airstrikes in southern Lebanon. In July, Manal's family heard that their home was destroyed. The family has now sought compensation from Hezbollah.
“We haven’t received any money yet,” said Manal, giving only her first name for fear of reprisals. “Maybe our turn hasn’t arrived."
On a recent day in southern Beirut, where airstrikes had hit just 100 meters (yards) away from his home, Mohammad watched as an excavator cleared debris, dust swirling in the air.
He said his father went to Hezbollah officials and got $2,500 — not enough to cover $4,000 worth of damage to their home.
“Dad took the money and left, thinking it was pointless to argue,” said Mohammad, who also gave only his first name for fear of repercussions. He said his uncle was offered only $194 for a similarly damaged home.
When the uncle complained, Mohammad said, Hezbollah asked him, “We sacrificed our blood, what did you do in the war?”
Others, however, say Hezbollah has compensated them fairly.
Abdallah Skaiki, whose home — also in southern Beirut — was completely destroyed, said he received $14,000 from Qard Al-Hasan, a Hezbollah-linked microfinance institution.
Hussein Khaireddine, director of Jihad Binaa, the construction arm of Hezbollah, said the group is doing as much as it can. Its teams have surveyed over 80% of damaged houses across Lebanon, he said.
“We have begun compensating families,” he said. “We have also started providing payments for a year’s rent and compensations for furniture.”
Khaireddin said their payments include $8,000 for furniture and $6,000 for a year’s rent for those living in Beirut. Those who are staying elsewhere get $4,000 in money for rent.
Blueprints for each house are being prepared, he said, declining to elaborate on reconstruction plans.
“We are not waiting for the government," he added. “But of course, we urge the state to act."
There is little the government can do.
The World Bank's report from mid-November said Lebanon's infrastructure and economic losses from the war amount to $8.5 billion. And that estimate doesn't take into account the last month of the war, Deputy Prime Minister Saadi Chami told The Associated Press.
“The government does not have the financial resources for reconstruction,” he said bluntly.
The World Bank said 99,209 housing units were damaged — and 18% of them were completely destroyed. In southern Beirut suburbs alone, satellite analysis by Lebanon’s National Center for Natural Hazards and Early Warning identified 353 buildings completely destroyed and over 6,000 homes damaged.
Lebanese officials have appealed to the international community for funding. The government is working with the World Bank to get an updated damage assessment and hopes to set up a multi-donor trust fund.
The World Bank is also exploring an “emergency project for Lebanon,” focused on targeted assistance for areas most in need, Chami said, though no concrete plan has yet emerged.
“If the World Bank gets involved, it will hopefully encourage the international community to donate money,” Chami said.
Ali Daamoush, a Hezbollah official, said earlier this month that the group has mobilized 145 reconstruction teams, which include 1,250 engineers, 300 data analysts and hundreds of auditors — many apparently volunteers.
The compensations paid so far have come from “the Iranian people,” Daamoush said, without specifying if the money was from Iran's government or private donors.
Jana, a 29-year-old architect, is volunteering with Hezbollah teams to survey the damage to her hometown of Nabatiyeh in southern Lebanon. Much of the city is destroyed, including an Ottoman-era market. Her father’s warehouse was hit by airstrikes, and all the medical supplies stored there were consumed by a fire.
Hezbollah officials "told us not to promise people or discuss reconstruction because there is no clear plan or funding for it yet,” she told the AP. She did not give her last name because she wasn't authorized to talk about Hezbollah's actions.

Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan