Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
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Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang

In this fifth episode of excerpts from the new book by former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League,” Asharq Al-Awsat reviews the efforts deployed to solve the crisis in Sudan.

Moussa’s biography, which will soon be published by Dar El-Shorouk, dedicates two chapters of 44 pages to the Sudanese crisis. The first chapter talks about the dispute between northern and southern Sudan that ended with the secession of the South, while the second is devoted to the political and humanitarian crisis that the Darfur region experienced as of March 2003.

Amr Moussa reveals that the leader of the SPLM, John Garang, told him that he wanted to be the president of all of Sudan, asking: “What is the value of being the leader of a poor, weak and closed country in southern Sudan?”

He explains that he asked the leaders of Sudan to “work to entice southerners into unity, but they considered separation an inevitable fate.” He also considered that the peace agreement with the SPLM was an inspiration for all the rebel movements across all Sudanese regions.

Moussa narrates: “Sudan, and its merciless issues and conflicts, was one of my most important concerns since the beginning of my career in Egyptian diplomacy. This exceptional interest in Sudan was reinforced during my ten years as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt…”

The South Sudan Case

Moussa says that several factors have combined to create and fuel the conflict between the south and the north: ethnic and religious pluralism, the struggle over resources, and the distribution of shares.

Other factors include the policy of marginalization, which the central Sudanese governments have adopted towards all parties, and the failure of these successive governments to promote the values of citizenship.

Moussa also points to the role of the British colonialism in nurturing separatism and entrenching it among the people of southern Sudan, by strengthening the role of missionaries and the policy of weakening Arab culture, replacing northern employees, and preventing northern merchants from reaching the south.

The Arab League secretary-general recounts: “On July 20, 2002, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed the Machakos Protocol in Kenya, which the Arab League accepted at the time after the Sudanese government signed it… The agreement included two documents: the first provides for the extension of the existing armistice until the end of March 2003, and the second covers a number of points that the two sides have accepted in principle, and they relate to the sharing of power and wealth, but without acknowledging any decisive position regarding them. The two parties agreed to abolish the application of Islamic law in areas inhabited by non-Muslims and to hold a referendum in the south on secession or unity after a six-year transitional period.”

Moussa says that after consulting with the concerned Arab governments, he specified the efforts of the Arab League regarding the conflict between North and South Sudan. Those were divided into two segments: advancing the peace process and the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM and supporting development and reconstruction in war-stricken areas.

“I had earlier received at the League’s headquarters in Cairo in March 2002, the leader of the popular movement, John Garang, who expressed unitary tendencies and demanded the Arab League’s support. I built on that fruitful meeting and sent an Arab mission headed by Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department of the Arab League, in April 2003 to the southern city of Rumbek, the headquarters of the Popular Movement in Southern Sudan. It was the first Arab mission to visit that region, to affirm the commitment of the Arab League and its institutions to actively contribute to the development of South Sudan and the areas affected by war, and to make unity an attractive voluntary option.”

Moussa stops to describe his relationship with Garang, with whom he had a “special agreement.”

“I met with him several times after his first visit to Egypt in 1997. His position has evolved gradually… from the struggle to achieve the secession of the South to the fight for equal rights among all Sudanese in all parts of the country, within the framework of the slogan he raised, which is the “New Sudan” that embraces all ethnicities and religions. Perhaps this development in the position of the SPLM leader was one of the reasons that contributed to his unfortunate disappearance from the Sudanese political scene.”

The former Arab League secretary-general continues: “Garang used to tell me in every meeting that brought us together: “What is the value of being the leader or president of the poor, weak, small and closed country of Southern Sudan?”

I applauded and supported that approach, but his vision was not welcomed by any of the Sudanese political actors, whether Africans, Arabs or Westerners, and even the leaders of the (northern) Sudan. But I think that if Garang could achieve a new beginning on the basis of the “New Sudan” with the opportunity to run for the presidency, events may have taken a completely different course, as this would have shaped different dynamics that none of the parties wanted to create.”

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

“At the invitation of the Kenyan government, on January 9, 2005, I participated with many Arab and African leaders in the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Nairobi. The agreement provided for a permanent ceasefire and the establishment of a 6-year transitional period during which the North and South would cooperate in governing the country. Garang was assigned the responsibilities of the Sudanese First Vice President. The agreement also stipulated the sharing of oil revenues, and the right of the SPLM and its southern allies to form a government for the south to fully manage its affairs for a period of 6 years, which ends with the votes of the people of the south and the oil-rich Abyei region in a referendum on January 9, 2011 on the secession or unity.”

Moussa recounts: “Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt’s foreign minister at the time, was sitting next to me during the loud signing ceremony at Naivasha Stadium in Nairobi. During the ceremony, I drifted away. I thought that things were definitely moving towards the secession of the south. Aboul Gheit seemed to have the same thoughts. He cut short my distraction by telling me: I can tell you that by signing this agreement, the matter will end up in division.”

Moussa asserts that great work was achieved through the coordination meetings held by the Arab League to promote a joint Arab action to make the unity of Sudan an attractive option. Arab funds, specialized Arab organizations, and unions of Arab ministerial councils participated in these meetings.

“The Arab League has made concrete efforts and played active roles to help reach a comprehensive peaceful solution to the Sudanese crisis. However, the performance of the Arab system has suffered and still suffers from a clear gap between decision-making and implementation. The Beirut summit decided to establish the Arab Fund for the Development of South Sudan with financial contributions from Arab countries, but this fund did not receive any significant contributions. The League Council also adopted a resolution calling on the member-states to address Sudan’s Arab debts in order to enable the country to face the challenges of building peace and unity, but this did not happen either.”

The referendum on secession

“A referendum took place in southern Sudan and the people chose the secession. In fact, in my Egyptian capacity, and as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, I was against the division of Sudan. I spoke at length about this with (former President Omar) Al-Bashir, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Othman Al-Mirghani, and others, encouraging the rejection of partition and calling for non-tolerance to the plans of separation.”

The political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur

“My assumptions on the signing of the Machakos Agreement between the Sudanese government and the separatist Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on July 20, 2002… proved to be true. This agreement was an inspiration for the rebel movements in Darfur, which saw that fighting alone is what brings the Bashir regime to the negotiating table.”

Moussa says that the conflict in Darfur began to heat up until the situation reached the point that led to a great human tragedy. That was in March 2003, when rebels revolted against al-Bashir, claiming they were marginalized. Two armed groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, declared their rebellion and attacked the city of Al-Fashir, the center of North Darfur State, destroying 7 aircraft at the city’s airport.

The former Arab League secretary-general recounts that the government has responded with the same strategy that the successive governments have adopted since the era of Sadiq al-Mahdi in the 1980s: mobilizing Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, who are known for their ferocity, to combat the rebels.

“Talking about the Darfur crisis and the factors that lead to it, it is necessary to point to the marginalization of the entire region by the central government and the lack of development projects and basic services such as education, health, etc.,” Moussa says.

The escalating developments in Darfur as of March 2003 attracted global interest. Criticism against the Sudanese government began to increase. On March 4, 2004, the High Commissioner for Refugees announced that atrocities were being committed in the Darfur region and demanded the government to urgently open the door to dialogue with the rebels.

A fact-finding mission dispatched by the Arab League

Moussa recounts that he assigned Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department at the Arab League, to preside over a fact-finding mission that would investigate the reality of the situation in the region. It was the first international mission of its kind to go to Darfur, and its mission included a visit to Sudan, from April 29 to May 15, 2004.

According to the senior Arab official, the mission was able to prove massive violations of human rights on both sides of the conflict, but completely ruled out genocide or ethnic cleansing. The same position was expressed by Alpha Oumar Konare, then-President of the African Union.

“The truth is that these moves on the part of the Arab League were able to open doors for discussion and then for an understanding with the government of Sudan on the importance of the role of the League and the wide scope of its movement,” he asserts.

“This has allowed freedom of movement on the part of the League, further coordination with the African Union, and more movement on the ground in Darfur, starting with an official visit, the first by the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the region.”

With a special agreement with Dar El-Shorouk. All rights reserved.



Win the Vote but Still Lose? Behold America’s Electoral College

Voters head into a polling location to cast their ballots on the last day of early voting for the 2024 election on November 1, 2024 in Atlanta, Georgia. (Getty Images/AFP)
Voters head into a polling location to cast their ballots on the last day of early voting for the 2024 election on November 1, 2024 in Atlanta, Georgia. (Getty Images/AFP)
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Win the Vote but Still Lose? Behold America’s Electoral College

Voters head into a polling location to cast their ballots on the last day of early voting for the 2024 election on November 1, 2024 in Atlanta, Georgia. (Getty Images/AFP)
Voters head into a polling location to cast their ballots on the last day of early voting for the 2024 election on November 1, 2024 in Atlanta, Georgia. (Getty Images/AFP)

When political outsider Donald Trump defied polls and expectations to defeat Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election, he described the victory as "beautiful."

Not everyone saw it that way -- considering that Democrat Clinton had received nearly three million more votes nationally than her Republican rival. Non-Americans were particularly perplexed that the second-highest vote-getter would be the one crowned president.

But Trump had done what the US system requires: win enough individual states, sometimes by very narrow margins, to surpass the 270 Electoral College votes necessary to win the White House.

Now, on the eve of the 2024 election showdown between Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris, the rules of this enigmatic and, to some, outmoded, system is coming back into focus.

- Why an Electoral College? -

The 538 members of the US Electoral College gather in their state's respective capitals after the quadrennial presidential election to designate the winner.

A presidential candidate must obtain an absolute majority of the "electors" -- or 270 of the 538 -- to win.

The system originated with the US Constitution in 1787, establishing the rules for indirect, single-round presidential elections.

The country's Founding Fathers saw the system as a compromise between direct presidential elections with universal suffrage, and an election by members of Congress -- an approach rejected as insufficiently democratic.

Because many states predictably lean Republican or Democratic, presidential candidates focus heavily on the handful of "swing" states on which the election will likely turn -- nearly ignoring some large states such as left-leaning California and right-leaning Texas.

Over the years, hundreds of amendments have been proposed to Congress in efforts to modify or abolish the Electoral College. None has succeeded.

Trump's 2016 victory rekindled the debate. And if the 2024 race is the nail-biter that most polls predict, the Electoral College will surely return to the spotlight.

- Who are the 538 electors? -

Most are local elected officials or party leaders, but their names do not appear on ballots.

Each state has as many electors as it has members in the US House of Representatives (a number dependent on the state's population), plus the Senate (two in every state, regardless of size).

California, for example, has 54 electors; Texas has 40; and sparsely populated Alaska, Delaware, Vermont and Wyoming have only three each.

The US capital city, Washington, also gets three electors, despite having no voting members in Congress.

The Constitution leaves it to states to decide how their electors' votes should be cast. In every state but two (Nebraska and Maine, which award some electors by congressional district), the candidate winning the most votes theoretically is allotted all that state's electors.

- Controversial institution -

In November 2016, Trump won 306 electoral votes, well more than the 270 needed.

The extraordinary situation of losing the popular vote but winning the White House was not unprecedented.

Five presidents have risen to the office this way, the first being John Quincy Adams in 1824.

More recently, the 2000 election resulted in an epic Florida entanglement between Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore.

Gore won nearly 500,000 more votes nationwide, but when Florida -- ultimately following a US Supreme Court intervention -- was awarded to Bush, it pushed his Electoral College total to 271 and a hair's-breadth victory.

- True vote or simple formality? -

Nothing in the Constitution obliges electors to vote one way or another.

If some states required them to respect the popular vote and they failed to do so, they were subjected to a simple fine. But in July 2020, the Supreme Court ruled that states could impose punishments on such "faithless electors."

To date, faithless electors have never determined a US election outcome.

- Electoral College schedule -

Electors will gather in their state capitals on December 17 and cast votes for president and vice president. US law states they "meet and cast their vote on the first Tuesday after the second Wednesday in December."

On January 6, 2025, Congress will convene to certify the winner -- a nervously watched event this cycle, four years after a mob of Trump supporters attacked the US Capitol attempting to block certification.

But there is a difference. Last time, it was Republican vice president Mike Pence who, as president of the Senate, was responsible for overseeing the certification. Defying heavy pressure from Trump and the mob, he certified Biden's victory.

This time, the president of the Senate -- overseeing what normally would be the pro forma certification -- will be none other than today's vice president: Kamala Harris.

On January 20, the new president is to be sworn in.