Amr Moussa: Gaddafi Believed He Would Survive Arab Spring Uprisings, Predicted Mubarak’s Fall

Former Arab League chief Amr Moussa and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi at the Sirte Summit in 2010
Former Arab League chief Amr Moussa and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi at the Sirte Summit in 2010
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Amr Moussa: Gaddafi Believed He Would Survive Arab Spring Uprisings, Predicted Mubarak’s Fall

Former Arab League chief Amr Moussa and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi at the Sirte Summit in 2010
Former Arab League chief Amr Moussa and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi at the Sirte Summit in 2010

The sixth episode in the series of excerpts obtained from the upcoming biography of former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa – to be published by Dar El-Shorouk and edited and documented by Khaled Abu Bakr – recounts how the events of the Libyan revolution unfolded in February 2011. Over the span of 50 pages, Moussa talks about how the Libyan uprising had pulled the rug from under Muammar Gaddafi’s feet and focuses on the Arab decision to protect Libyans from the Libyan leader’s wrath and violence.

The veteran Egyptian diplomat tells the story of how Gaddafi, after the ouster of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, predicted that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak would be next to fall. Even though Gaddafi got it right on Mubarak’s removal, he was mistaken about his future and his ability to survive the revolution rising against him. Following Libyan regime strikes against the cities of Benghazi and Tobruk, the Arab League suspended the participation of Libya’s permanent representatives in meetings and slapped an air travel ban on the North African country.

Moussa, in “The Years of the Arab League”, explains that the move was taken to protect civilians from regime airstrikes.

As of mid-December 2010, fast-tracked developments and uprisings started to take the Arab world by storm. Overnight, Tunisia’s Ben Ali was exiled to Saudi Arabia. This was in the aftermath of the streets and squares of Tunisia being flooded with angry youth demanding political openness and social justice. A few days later, the January 25 revolution in Egypt forced Mubarak to step down in February 2011.

Nestled between Tunisia and Egypt, Libya was next in line to be swept by protests and demands for a system overhaul. Gaddafi, who had predicted Mubarak’s downfall, lacked the perception and depth needed to recognize that his rule too was going to be brought to an end. The Libyan leader, who had ruled for over four decades, believed that he had what it took to survive the revolutions.

A swift peek of the map would have sufficed to realize that Libya was wedged between two major rebellions, one in Tunisia and the other in Egypt. As of February 15, 2011, all eyes turned to Libya, where demonstrations against Gaddafi's rule broke out for the first time in Benghazi and quickly spread to other cities, including the capital, Tripoli. Moussa recounts that his heart skipped a beat over the developments in Libya.

“You can imagine the reaction of any Arab regime to demonstrations calling for it to leave, but not the Gaddafi regime,” he explains.

Noting that heightened tensions weighed down Gaddafi’s relations with various Western countries, Moussa added that he was apprehensive about the regime’s reaction to events in Libya. As protests grew more ferocious, so did Gaddafi’s repression of the people.

On February 22, 2011, Gaddafi gave a divisive speech in which he claimed to be a “revolutionary leader forever” and a Bedouin warrior who brought glory to all Libyans. He said that he wasn’t a president for him to resign and that Libya’s image before the world was being marred because of the recent events. Gaddafi also hinted at resorting to force when needed. The speech provoked strong global reactions. International bodies and major countries, one after the other, came out in condemnation of both it and the violence used by the Libyan authorities to suppress demonstrations.

The Arab League’s Response

Following Gaddafi’s speech, reports of increased human losses and regime forces attacking demonstrators in Benghazi and Tobruk flooded the media. Faced with rapid developments, Moussa says he summoned permanent representatives at the Arab League to convene an emergency meeting on the evening of February 22, the day Gaddafi spoke. He recalls that the meeting was held at the level of permanent representatives and not ministers because of the time it would take for the latter to arrive in Cairo.

Developments were happening at an accelerated rate, and the situation did not allow for the time needed for Arab League ministers to assemble at the organization’s headquarters. “We must not be late in our reaction.

Incoming reports are predicting the fall of many more victims both from Libyans and Arabs residing in Libya, especially Egyptians and Tunisians, who are at risk after Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (Gaddafi’s son) accused them of supporting the demonstrators against his father’s rule,” Moussa said in his opening remarks at the meeting. He went on to tell attendees that the Arab League must send out a call urging for reason to prevail. Moussa concluded the meeting by issuing a multipoint resolution which condemned crimes committed against peaceful protesters in Libyan cities, including Tripoli, and suspended Libya’s participation at meetings held by the Arab League or its affiliated agencies until Libyan authorities answer to the demands of the people in a way that guarantees their security and stability. This was the first time in the history of the Arab League that the organization bars the delegations of a member state from participating in meetings over “negative internal conditions”.

“I thought that this represented an important development in the Arab multilateral organization, and it was also an important message, if Col. Gaddafi accepted it, so the Arab League, and I personally, could rely on it in a political movement that might contribute to preventing the deterioration of the situation in Libya,” Moussa recounts.

Foreign Ministers of Arab League member states then convened their 135th session on March 2, 2011. The dangerous developments in Libya were the center of the meeting. The ministers backed previously approved decisions by permanent representatives and added a new clause on promoting deliberations for finding effective ways to ensure the safety and security of Libyans. They confirmed that Arab states can’t stand idle while the brotherly people of Libya suffer bloodshed and agreed to impose an air ban. Each of the Arab League and the African Union cooperated to implement the ban.

Calling For an Air Ban

The Arab League marking Libya as a no-fly zone to protect civilians stirred widespread controversy. In his memoir, Moussa recalls that the first call for imposing an air ban on Libya was made at the 118th session held by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers on March 10, 2011.

In a statement issued after their meeting in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, GCC foreign ministers called on the Arab League to take measures to stop the bloodshed in Libya and to initiate contacts with the National Council formed by the opposition. They denounced the crimes committed against civilians and called on the Arab League to shoulder responsibility to take the necessary measures to defuse rifts, achieve the aspirations of the Libyan people, and take the necessary measures to do that, including calling on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians.

The GCC continued its pressure campaign to endorse a no-fly zone on Libya. On March 12, 2011, an emergency ministerial meeting was held at the Arab League. In his biography, Moussa sheds a special light on the meeting, saying that it was important for readers to know what happened. First, Moussa explains that the extraordinary meeting was split into three sessions.

The first session, held at 2:30 pm, was open to the public and was short to a 15 min speech delivered by Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi, who chaired the meeting.

A closed-door session followed at exactly 2:45 pm. Moussa was the first to speak. His speech was followed by statements delivered by Arab League foreign ministers and representatives from Qatar, Algeria, the UAE, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt.

Towards the ending of the meeting, Moussa remembers emphasizing to attendees that the proposed no-fly zone on Libya was not indefinite. He also spoke of four core principles the Arab League was endorsing.

Those principles were:

1. Calling for a clear legal framework for any decision to establish a no-fly zone in Libya to protect civilians, that is, the necessity for there to be a Security Council resolution that clearly reflects the will of the international community-- Because the air embargo is not a combat measure, but rather a preventive measure to prevent more blood from being spilled.

2. The decision to establish an air ban shall not affect civil aviation traffic; Because there are many countries, such as Egypt, that are taking the necessary measures to evacuate their nationals from Libya.

3. Ensuring respect for principles of state sovereignty and maintaining non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. Any decision issued by the UN Security Council regarding the air embargo in Libya should not affect the sovereignty of any country other than Libya, whether from neighboring countries or elsewhere.

4. Preserving Libya's territorial integrity. Establishing any no-fly zone must not effectively divide Libya. The purposes of establishing a no-fly zone, its geographical scope, its working conditions, and its duration must be clearly defined.

In special agreement with Dar El Shorouk - all rights reserved.



New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster 

People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
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New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster 

People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in December 2024 created major political, security and economic changes in Lebanon. Beirut also rid itself of what remained of Damascus’ influence - after Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005 following 30 years of military and political hegemony - through Assad’s allies, namely Hezbollah.

With the ouster Assad, Lebanon became free to make its political decisions away from the influence of Damascus and its allies. Lebanon and Syria can establish mutual official relations, secure their shared border and improve the trade exchange between them.

Tehran-Beirut route severed

Head of Lebanon’s Saydet al-Jabal Gathering, former MP Fares Souaid told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Lebanon has changed. The most important thing that happened was that the new Syria severed the Tehran-Beirut route that used to supply Hezbollah with all of its security, military and financial means.”

Now, the party has to resort to smuggling to get what it needs, he added. “That option is not secured by military units working for Iran, forcing Hezbollah to approach the new situation in Lebanon with a lot more pragmatism than before.”

He said the party has been forced to take a “humble” approach to “critical issues.”

“We saw how Hezbollah did not quit the government even though it objected to cabinet decisions, especially the one related to imposing state monopoly over arms,” he explained. The decision effectively calls on Hezbollah to disarm.

The party was unable to take any steps to counter the decision because the “real route that has been feeding it has been cut,” Souaid stressed.

Developments, past and present, have shown that anything negative or positive taking place in Syria will impact Lebanon, he went on to say. “If Syria is well, then Lebanon is well.”

He said Lebanon still believes that Syria under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has a promising future and relations between Beirut and Damascus will also be promising.

The relations are already on the right track with the establishment of joint security and military committees sponsored by Saudi Arabia, he remarked. Efforts have already been exerted to secure the shared border between them ahead of demarcation starting from the Shebaa Farms.

Such coordination between Lebanese and Syrian security and military agencies “never happened under Assad rule. So, this is a new development for both countries,” he revealed.

Treaties with Syria

The neighbors currently appeared focused on reshaping their relations in a way that preserves their mutual interests. Souaid acknowledged, however, that pending complex issues remain.

He underlined the need to annul all political, security and economic treaties that were signed during Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon.

Lebanon has appointed an ambassador to Damascus, while the latter has yet to name an envoy to Beirut, he noted.

He also said that the Syrians are prioritizing resolving the issue of Syrian detainees held in Lebanese jails.

The issue is a “black mark” in the relations between the two countries. Lebanon’s justice minister must resolve this file so that it does not complicate efforts to forge good ties, Souaid urged.

Pending files

Lebanon has been perceived as dealing “coolly” with Syria’s insistence on resolving the detainee file.

Some Lebanese officials have for years also complained about Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the burden they have on the state. An informed security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that with Assad’s collapse, this issue was no longer a “major crisis”.

It revealed that half of the Syrian refugees who were in Arsal and the northern Akkar region in Lebanon have returned to their home country. This has been felt by the drop in the numbers of Syrian laborers in Lebanon.

The shared border is another issue of pressing concern for the neighbors.

After Assad’s ouster, Lebanon’s northern and eastern borders are no longer open to the regime’s allies and outlaws, especially drug and other smugglers.

The source said: “The most important achievement on the security level has been curbing the smuggling of weapons from Syria to Lebanon and money from Lebanon to Syria.”

“Captagon factories along both sides of the border have also been destroyed, leading to the dismantling of drug smuggling networks and culminating in the arrest of Lebanon’s most wanted drug smuggler, Noah Zeiter, who was seeking refuge in Syria before Assad’s ouster,” added the source.


A ‘New Syria’ Becomes the Clearest Example of Israel’s Hostility Toward Its Neighbors

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the buffer zone with Syria on Nov. 19, accompanied by senior defense, foreign affairs, and security officials. (Government Press Office)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the buffer zone with Syria on Nov. 19, accompanied by senior defense, foreign affairs, and security officials. (Government Press Office)
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A ‘New Syria’ Becomes the Clearest Example of Israel’s Hostility Toward Its Neighbors

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the buffer zone with Syria on Nov. 19, accompanied by senior defense, foreign affairs, and security officials. (Government Press Office)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the buffer zone with Syria on Nov. 19, accompanied by senior defense, foreign affairs, and security officials. (Government Press Office)

On a rainy November night in 2025, as Ramallah groaned under an Israeli military assault just meters from the presidential compound, a senior Palestinian official smiled bitterly. “I don’t want to talk about Palestine,” he said. “Nor do I wish to repeat slogans about Israel being a colonial state without borders. What I want to talk about now is Syria.”

For this official, Syria has become the starkest proof that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only rejects any genuine peace, but also appears unwilling to tolerate neighboring states at all.

He argued that this is evident even after the new political leadership in Damascus declared openly that it sought neither war nor hostility with Israel. Yet Israel, he said, has continued to violate Syrian sovereignty with increasingly blunt military operations.

The official’s point was simple: Israel’s hostility, in his view, is not confined to Palestinians. “If Hamas launched a war on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and Hezbollah started firing its own strikes, and the Houthis joined Iran’s so-called ‘support front,’ Syria did the opposite: it stayed out of the picture, and even more than that.”

‘No threat to Israel’

After coming to power, Syria’s new leadership declared that it posed “no threat to any neighboring state, including Israel.”

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 cost Iran one of its most important strategic hubs in the region - Syria. This should have created common ground for Syrian-Israeli understandings, the official noted.

“I fear the Israelis have forgotten these facts, especially now that Syrian territory is no longer a playground for Iranian militias,” the Palestinian official said.

The United States, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan offered to mediate talks and expressed readiness to broker security arrangements ensuring a stable border. Even when Israel grumbled about indirect contacts, Damascus agreed to direct meetings. Six rounds were held between Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer.

According to Israeli sources, Damascus signaled significant flexibility: it was prepared to negotiate a comprehensive peace treaty in exchange for the return of all territory lost in 1967 and 2024, while also showing openness to interim proposals, such as leasing the Golan Heights to Israel for up to 15 years or reverting to 1974 security understandings.

Those same sources also claimed Syria was willing to join the Abraham Accords, effectively extending an unprecedented hand of peace to Israel.

Raids and ground incursions

Israel’s response, however, took a different direction. Since December 2024, before Damascus could stabilize its new order, Israel carried out roughly 500 airstrikes on Syrian military airports and bases, destroying an estimated 85 percent of Syria’s defensive capabilities.

Israeli forces seized around 450 square kilometers of territory, from Mount Hermon’s summit to parts of Daraa province, penetrating up to 20 kilometers inside Syria and establishing nine military sites.

Israel also inflamed internal tensions under the claim of “protecting Druze allies,” despite long-standing accusations of discrimination against Druze citizens inside Israel itself.

Israeli officials questioned the new Syrian leadership’s intentions by invoking old links to the Al-Nusra Front, even though Israeli field hospitals in Safed, Haifa, and Tel Aviv had, in past years, treated numerous Nusra fighters.

Who can restrain Netanyahu?

In recent days, Israeli reports claimed US President Donald Trump “rebuked” Israel and Netanyahu over their approach to the new Syria, urging a strategic shift.

Responding, reportedly, to appeals from Saudi Arabia and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Trump appears inclined to pursue a constructive course with Damascus.

Many now believe the White House is the only actor capable of restraining Netanyahu’s Syria policy.

But until any real change appears on the ground, analysts continue to ask: What message is Israel sending to its region through its handling of Syria?


Four Iranian Narratives on the Collapse of the ‘Resistance’ in Syria  

Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
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Four Iranian Narratives on the Collapse of the ‘Resistance’ in Syria  

Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)

One hundred and ninety-two days separated the last meeting between Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Syria’s ousted President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran from the moment the Syrian regime fell to the opposition in December 2024.

That interval was no footnote in the Syrian war. It became a sharp mirror inside Tehran, reflecting the magnitude of the wager Iran’s leadership had placed on Assad, and the limits of its ability to anticipate the trajectory of the conflict and shifts in the regional balance of power.

At that meeting, Khamenei laid out the essence of his “Syrian doctrine” amid changing realities across the “Axis of Resistance.” Syria, he argued, was no ordinary state but one with a “special place” because its identity, in his view, stemmed from its role in this axis.

Since “resistance is Syria’s defining identity and must be preserved,” he addressed Assad not as a political ally but as a partner in that identity. He praised Assad for once saying that “the cost of resistance is lower than the cost of compromise” and that “whenever we retreat, the other side advances.” Thus, Khamenei reaffirmed his full - if belated – gamble on the regime’s survival, even as signs of collapse were unmistakable on the ground.

Less than seven months later, the regime would fall. Assad’s collapse would yield several Iranian narratives: the Supreme Leader’s, the Revolutionary Guard’s, the diplomatic narrative, and a fourth voiced from within the system itself, one that raised blunt questions about the price of Iran’s Syrian gamble.

Khamenei’s narrative

In his first speech after Assad’s fall, Khamenei offered a hard-edged explanation: the event, he said, was the product of a “joint American-Zionist plot,” aided by neighboring states. He spoke of factors that he claimed prevented Iran from providing the necessary support, including Israeli and US strikes inside Syria and the closure of air and land corridors to Iranian supplies.

He concluded that the decisive flaw lay within Syria itself, where the “spirit of resistance” had eroded in state institutions.

He stressed that the regime’s fall did not mean the fall of the idea of “resistance,” predicting that “patriotic Syrian youth” would one day revive it in a new form.

This narrative rejects the notion of strategic defeat: for Khamenei, what happened is not the end of the struggle, but a harsh phase in a longer one.

Revolutionary Guard’s narrative

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adopted a language closer to national security logic than pure ideology, though it drew from the same lexicon. In 2013, cleric Mehdi Taeb, head of the IRGC’s Ammar Headquarters think tank, framed the equation starkly: “Syria is our 35th province... If the enemy attacks Syria or Khuzestan, our priority is to keep Syria.”

With that shocking sentence, Syria was elevated to the level of Iranian strategic geography, sometimes above parts of Iran itself.

Late General Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force, became the chief architect of this approach: confronting threats abroad by building multinational militia networks and using the “protection of shrines” as a mobilizing slogan that fused ideology with national security calculations.

A month after Assad’s fall, at a memorial for Soleimani, Khamenei reaffirmed this school of thought, linking the defense of shrines in Damascus and Iraq to the defense of “Iran as a sanctuary,” aiming to bind various fronts into a single cross-border security-sectarian struggle.

After the Syrian regime’s collapse, this narrative preserved its core: success or failure is not defined by who sits in Damascus, but by whether the IRGC’s influence networks remain intact and whether Iran still has access to Syrian depth.

Full withdrawal would amount, in this logic, to admitting that the “35th province” had slipped from the map, so the IRGC will continue to search for any possible foothold.

Diplomatic narrative

Iran’s diplomatic apparatus sought to tell a softer story. Weeks before the fall, Khamenei dispatched his adviser Ali Larijani to Damascus and Beirut with reassuring messages for Assad and other allies, publicly asserting that events in Syria and Lebanon “directly concern Iran’s national security.”

Days later, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Damascus just six days before the collapse, even posing with shawarma in a downtown restaurant to signal “normalcy” and dismiss talk of impending downfall as “psychological warfare.”

It was the peak of the gap between diplomatic messaging and a disintegrating reality.

Afterward, the Foreign Ministry adopted a defensive formula: Iran had “responded to the request of an allied government”, but “cannot decide on behalf of peoples.” Thus, responsibility was shifted toward Syrian internal failures and the external “conspiracy” often invoked by Khamenei.

This narrative treats Syria as one file among many, not an existential arena as seen by the IRGC and the Leader.

‘Open account’ narrative

The fourth narrative emerged, unexpectedly, from within the establishment itself. For the first time, semi-public acknowledgments surfaced that the economic return on Iran’s Syrian adventure was nearly nil and that the political-security “investment” had resulted in something resembling a net loss.

In 2020, former member of the Iranian parliamentary national security and foreign policy committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh revealed that Tehran had spent “$20-30 billion” in Syria, insisting: “This is the people’s money and must be recovered.”

Five years later, he returned with a more bitter charge: Syria’s debts to Iran were effectively settled through “land without oil, cow farms without cows, and empty promises.”

This view is no outlier. Over a decade, Iranian protest slogans increasingly linked “Gaza, Lebanon, Syria” with bread, fuel, and economic hardship at home.

With Assad gone, critics more easily argue that Iran spent tens of billions and paid a human cost among its fighters and proxies, only to end up with almost no influence in Damascus.

For decision-makers, this narrative becomes domestic pressure against any large-scale return to Syria.

Four scenarios for Tehran

Taken together, these narratives reveal a deep contradiction: the IRGC and Khamenei refuse to concede that Iran “lost Syria,” treating the episode as one phase in a longer struggle. Meanwhile, the diplomatic and economic narratives acknowledge, implicitly, that the previous intervention model is no longer sustainable.

Four broad scenarios emerge. The first is a return through proxies, closest to the IRGC’s logic: Iran would rebuild influence from the ground up through militias - old or newly recruited - to pressure any future authority in Damascus.

The second is regional repositioning without Syria, in which Iran shifts resources to arenas where it still holds leverage, including Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza, while limiting its role in Syria to preventing hostile entrenchment.

The third is a “gray” re-entry: a gradual, negotiated, non-confrontational return through localized deals or modest economic and security projects, allowing Tehran to claim continued presence without the cost of backing a single ruler.

The fourth is institutionalizing the loss: Iran accepts Syria’s departure from its strategic depth, but repackages the outcome within a narrative of “conspiracy and steadfastness,” using it to tighten internal control while maintaining symbolic presence through shrine rhetoric and minimal diplomacy.

Across all scenarios, one fact remains. Syria, which was once described as more vital than Khuzestan and the “distinct identity of resistance”, is no longer what it was before December 8, 2024 when the regime collapsed.

Tehran can invoke time, the IRGC can search for openings, diplomats can polish their statements, and critics can lament “land without oil.” But one question looms over every debate in Iran: Can Tehran afford a second Syrian-sized gamble after emerging from the first still trying to convince itself that the “resistance factor” remains standing, even as its Syrian pillar has broken?