In Birthplace of Tunisia's Revolution, Few Jobs and Little Hope

The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)
The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)
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In Birthplace of Tunisia's Revolution, Few Jobs and Little Hope

The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)
The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)

Khouloud Rhimi sits sipping a latte with friends in Sidi Bouzid, ground zero of the Tunisian uprising, and laments 10 years of disappointment and economic woes.

The town, which helped trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world, now has a swimming pool, a plush new cafe where young men and women mingle, enjoying the complementary wifi, and freedom of speech.

But Rhimi, 25, is unimpressed. "There are no jobs in Sidi Bouzid," she said.

It was unemployment, along with alleged police harassment, that prompted street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi to set himself alight outside a nearby government building on December 17, 2010.

The act proved a tipping point for Tunisia's long-marginalized interior.

Within weeks, vast demonstrations had spread to the capital and swept long-time ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power, setting off a domino-like string of revolts across the Middle East and North Africa.

Tunisia has been praised for its democratic transition with its first free and fair parliamentary elections in 2011 and presidential poll in 2014.

But many in Sidi Bouzid say life in the past decade has become worse.

"Lots of people we know have tried to get to Europe," said Rhimi.

"Some have died at sea. Other people have set themselves on fire. Some people can't afford to eat."

Rhimi completed a professional diploma in computer science in 2015.

But in a region where some jobs -- in factories, clothes shops or agriculture, for example -- pay just 150 dinars (46 euros) a month, it took her four years to save start-up funds for a small restaurant.

When she approached banks and micro-credit lenders for more, she was rejected.

"There are so many conditions. They make it really difficult to get a loan," she said.

"I started my project, but after six months I closed it down. I've been unemployed ever since," added Rhimi, currently an unpaid volunteer with civil society groups who continues to apply for public sector jobs.

Investors flee
Her story is a far cry from Rachid Fetini's early career.

In 1990, two decades before the revolution, he returned from studying in France and established his first textile factory.

"I had no experience in the world of business," he said. "But in one month I managed to set up a factory with 50 workers. After a year and a half, I had 300 staff."

By the eve of the uprising, Fetini was a major employer with 500 staff.

But "after the revolution, bit by bit, all my clients fled Sidi Bouzid," he said. "They were afraid."

Fetini bemoaned media coverage of the region as being perennially on strike, "which is not true at all."

But he also blamed the lack of laws and government strategies to boost investment, as well as Tunisia's clunky, politicized bureaucracy.

"There's a fratricidal struggle between political parties, which means that even local officials can't take decisions," he said.

"Nobody dares sign a document without having political cover... just in case."

The coronavirus pandemic dealt another crushing blow to his business.

Today, his factory near the town center sits empty, rows of sewing machines idle in the dusty light.

Across town in an industrial zone, Fetini walks among the dark concrete columns of an abandoned building site, set to be a pharmaceuticals factory.

Like Rhimi's restaurant, the project was suspended because the banks would not lend to the owner, an associate of Fetini.

"Their demands and the guarantees they ask for are endless," Fetini said.

Many investments "are blocked... for lack of finance, or because of certain lobbies who don't want such-and-such a factory to be created."

State projects blocked
A huge, empty plot of land on the fertile plain outside Sidi Bouzid vividly illustrates the problem.

Surrounded by prickly pears and olive groves, this is the site of Somaproc, a processing hub to help the region's struggling farmers tackle a key barrier -- access to markets.

It will include vegetable and livestock markets, an abattoir and a research facility, strategically located near major roads to other Tunisian towns, ports and coastal cities including the capital.

Set to employ 1,200 people and benefit some 130,000, the state-backed project has secured millions of euros in foreign funding and the support of Tunisian President Qais Saied.

But eight years since it was conceived, nothing has been built.

Director Lotfi Hamdi listed legal and administrative obstacles and described a complex web of government bodies involved.

"The project was designed in 2012," he said. "Sadly, there have been a lot of delays."

'Deep crisis'
The Covid-19 pandemic has brought even more economic misery to Tunisia.

Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, the country's ninth head of government since the revolution, announced in early November a record budget deficit of 14 percent of GDP.

"Our country has never experienced such a deep crisis," he said.

Unemployment in the country was just over 15 percent in May, the most recent figure available, according to the INS national statistics office.

But despite the economic setbacks and other difficulties they have faced, some in Sidi Bouzid still praise the uprising's achievements.

"The revolution was more than necessary, and well overdue," said Hayet Amami, the regional head of an association for unemployed graduates.

Today, "you're free to do activism, in political parties, in society and in unions."

Since 2011, many young Tunisians have been elected to both local and national authorities, in part thanks to a post-revolution quota system.

And despite the hardships, there are visible changes in Sidi Bouzid -- including the cafe where Rhimi sat with her friends.

Roads have been fixed and government buildings refurbished.

But for Rhimi's friend Hanin Kadri, also an activist, those changes mean little when jobs are scarce and state institutions riddled with corruption.

"Sure, they did up the municipality building and the governorate," she said.

"But that's not what we had a revolution for."

Rhimi is more emphatic.

"As far as I'm concerned, the revolution didn't bring me anything," she said.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.