Russia, US Wage Early Silent Battle over Syria Presidential Elections

Bashar Assad and his wife Asma at a polling station in Damascus on July 19. (AFP)
Bashar Assad and his wife Asma at a polling station in Damascus on July 19. (AFP)
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Russia, US Wage Early Silent Battle over Syria Presidential Elections

Bashar Assad and his wife Asma at a polling station in Damascus on July 19. (AFP)
Bashar Assad and his wife Asma at a polling station in Damascus on July 19. (AFP)

The upcoming Syrian presidential elections will be the scene of an “early silent battle” between Russia and its allies on the one side and the United States and its partners on the other. The elections will be the first to be held after Russia cemented its military presence in the war-torn country and during the first months of Joe Biden’s term as US president. They will also be held amid the significant field developments and the drawing of borders of the three “areas of influence” in Syria. Significantly, they are also being held amid a crippling economic crisis, western economic sanctions and Syria’s political and diplomatic isolation.

Clear message
Moscow, along with Damascus and Tehran, wants to hold the elections according to the current 2012 constitution and without any reforms that would be introduced in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254. Russia sees the elections as an opportunity to “open a new chapter” with regional and international forces and make them contend with the status quo and the “legitimate government”.

The Syrian Constitutional Committee has held four rounds of talks in Geneva and is set to meet again in late January to discuss the constitution. Other rounds had tackled “national principles”. Damascus has, however, sent a clear message that constitutional reform will not take place before the presidential elections, which are scheduled for mid-2021. Moscow has also backed it with a clearer message that “there is no timeframe” for constitutional reform and that the “elections are a sovereign Syrian affair.”

This means that the no constitutional reform will take place before the end of Bashar Assad’s term in mid-July. The elections will therefore, go ahead according to the 2012 constitution that grants wide privileges to the president, effectively paving the way for Assad’s third term in office.

The constitution also stipulates that any presidential candidate should have resided in Syria for ten consecutive years before running and they should garner the approval of 35 lawmakers.

The National Progressive Front, which includes a coalition of parties led by the ruling Baath, had won 183 out of the 250-seat parliament in the July elections earlier this year, meaning it controls who will run for president.

For Damascus, Moscow and Tehran, constitutional reform will be addressed after 2021, or rather when Assad wins a new seven-year term in office. He is expected to implement reform during the next parliamentary elections, set for 2024, unless he decides to hold them earlier.

A point of contention between Moscow and Damascus is the former’s desire for more candidates to run in the elections. Russia has been gradually testing the waters with various opposition candidates to that end. However, it will face obstacles in this regard, including the reluctance of central figures to run in a “sham election”. Other obstacles are the stipulation that the candidate should have lived in Syria for ten years and the support of 35 MPs.

Moscow’s intentions were clear when a Russian reporter asked Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during his visit to Damascus in September if the ten-year condition would be annulled. Damascus, however, stood firm. Late Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said at the time: “The presidential elections will be held on time. As for annulling the ten-year residency condition, that is for the higher electoral commission. In principle, anyone who meets the conditions is eligible to run in the elections.”

Conditions to run in elections are, however, a constitutional affair, not one for the higher electoral commission

Tehran has backed Moallem’s statements. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif had in recent days stated that the “Syrian government is legitimate and very cooperative in the political process and constitutional reform.” Moscow, meanwhile, is still searching for the mechanisms to transform the upcoming elections into the beginning of a new chapter of how the West and region deal with Damascus. It is hoping that the new phase would “end Syria’s isolation and pave the way for reconstruction and normalization of political and diplomatic relations.” Key to this is amending the 2012 constitution to “add color” to the elections.

Calm consultations
Western countries, meanwhile, are holding calm consultations away from the media to take a united stand on how to deal with the elections. The US wants to “ignore” the polls as it did the parliamentary ones when it stated that it “will not recognize any elections that are not held according to resolution 2254.” The resolution calls for holding elections under the supervision of the UN and participation of Syrians, including those displaced abroad. Washington’s allies are meanwhile divided, with some wanting to ignore the polls, others proposing supporting an opposition candidate and others suggesting setting clear UN-approved standards to recognize any election.

Some countries have tried to persuade UN envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, to declare a position on the elections. He said that the elections are beyond his jurisdiction that are outlined in resolution 2254. He instead appointed an “elections advisor”, prompting a proposal for the declaration of standards and principles so that the elections can be recognized. The UN will be tasked with announcing them.

France had drafted a “non-paper” that sets the special standards of the polls. The document, a copy of which was obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, said: “Should the elections be free, transparent and neutral, and should they be held in a safe environment whereby all segments of Syrian society, including refugees abroad, take part without impediment, then the upcoming polls can effectively and truly cement stable legitimate institutions in the country.” These institutions are an “integral part of the broader political process in line with resolution 2254.” The elections can also be part of the permanent settlement for the conflict.

The omission of any of these conditions is an opportunity for the Assad regime to restore its false legitimacy in the post-conflict phase and deter refugees abroad from even thinking about returning home.

Strict conditions
The document, therefore, set strict conditions for the West to accept the elections. They are:

1- Cementing trust on the ground with the aim of preparing safe and impartial conditions during and after the elections. This will ensure that the electoral process is credible and the people’s rights are guaranteed.

2- Providing strong guarantees that refugees and the displaced will take part in the vote. Some 12 million refugees are displaced in Syria and abroad, so it is very important that they have their voice heard in the elections and that they even be allowed to run.

3- Providing the legal ground for holding electoral reform, including reforming articles 84 and 85 of the constitution and forming an independent UN-supervised panel to review electoral nominations.

4- UN supervision of the elections would provide strict impartiality in the electoral process. To that end, the organization must oversee the entire process, starting with reforming the electoral law, designating electoral roles, the voting, ballot stations and suitable electoral infrastructure.

Western countries did not recognize parliamentary elections held in Syria in 2012, 2016 and 2020 and the presidential elections in 2014. Washington is meanwhile, maintaining its sanctions according to the Caesar Act and is continuing to exert pressure to keep Damascus in political and diplomatic isolation until it begins to implement resolution 2254 and have Iran pull out its militias from Syria among other demands.

Background
The upcoming elections will be the 18th since 1932. The first elections ever held in Syria were the most diverse even though they were held under French mandate. Over 60 nominees ran for president, making them the largest field of candidates to ever run for the presidential elections in any country.

Syrian historians do not give much weight to the 1932 elections because they were held under French rule. They do however, highlight the 1955 elections that witnessed a race between Shukri al-Quwatli and Khalid al-Azm. All other elections after that were either referendums or uncontested affairs.

The diversity and competition of the 1932 race showed just how promising the nascent democracy in Syria was in the early 1930s. It showed just how much it could have prospered were it not for military coups and countercoups that began to plague the country from 1949.



25 Years of Unanswered Questions in Iraq

A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
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25 Years of Unanswered Questions in Iraq

A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)

People in Iraq often wonder dejectedly: What if Saddam Hussein were alive and ruling the country today? Many will reply with fantastical answers, but Saddam’s era would have responded: Iraq is isolated, either by siege or by a war that he launched or was being waged against him.

Many people cast doubt on whether actual change has been achieved in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. The invasion ousted the Baath version of Iraq and Saddam was executed in December 2006, leaving questions to pile up over the years with no one having any answers.

After a quarter century, Iraq is accumulating questions. It casts them aside and forges ahead without addressing them. At best, it reviews itself and returns to that moment in April 2003 when the US launched its invasion. Or it asks new questions about the 2005 civil war, the armed alternatives that emerged in 2007, how ISIS swept through the country in 2014, or the wave of protests that erupted in 2019. It also asks new questions about Iran’s influence in the country that has persisted for decades.

The questions are many and none of the Iraqis have answered them.

A US marine wraps the American flag around the head of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad. (Reuters file)

Saddam and the alternative

The September 11, 2001, attacks shook the United States and the entire world. They struck fear in Baghdad. Saddam had that year claimed that he had written a book, “The Fortified Castle”, about an Iraqi soldier who is captured by Iran. He manages to escape and return to Iraq to “fortify the castle”.

The terrifying Saddam and the terrified Iraqis have long spun tales about escaping to and from Iraq. It is a journey between the question and the non-answers. That year, when Baghdad was accused of being complicit in the 9/11 attacks, Saddam’s son Uday was “elected” member of the Baath party’s leadership council. The move sparked debate about possible change in Iraq. Bashar al-Assad had a year earlier inherited the presidency of Syria and its Baath party from his father Hafez.

The US invaded Iraq two years later and a new Iraq was born. Twenty-five years later, the country is still not fully grown up. Twenty-one years ago, on April 9, 2003, a US marine wrapped the head of a Saddam statue in Baghdad with an American flag. The Iraqis asked: why didn’t you leave us this iconic image, but instead of an American flag, used an Iraqi one?

Baghdad’s question and Washington’s answer

As the Iraqis observe the developments unfold in Syris with the ouster of Bashar from power, they can’t help but ask how this rapid “change” could have been possible without US tanks and weapons. Why are the Syrians insisting on celebrating “freedom” every day? They are also astonished at the Syrians who scramble to greet Abu Mohammed al-Golani, who has not yet managed to put this image behind him and fully assume his original identity of Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Iraqis wonder how the Syrians are managing this transition so far without a bloodbath.

They ask these questions because the Iraqis view and judge the world based on their own memories. They keep asking questions and await answers from others instead of themselves.

The Iraqis recall how in August 2003, after four months of US occupation, that the Jordanian embassy and United Nations offices were attacked, leaving several staff dead, including head of the UN mission Sergio de Mello. The Americans arrested Ali Hassan al-Majid, or “chemical Ali”, Saddam’s cousin, and 125 people were killed in a bombing in al-Najaf, including Shiite cleric Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim.

During that bloody month, the Iraqis asked questions about security, forgetting about Saddam’s alternative, democracy and the promised western model. Later, the facts would answer that the question of security was a means to escape questions about transitional justice.

Sergio de Mello (r) and Paul Bremmer (second right) attend the inaugural meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad on July 13, 2003. (Getty Images)

The question of civil war

Paul Bremer, the American ruler of Iraq, once escorted four opposition figures to Saddam’s prison cell. They flooded him with questions. Adnan al-Pachachi, a veteran diplomat, asked: “Why did you invade Kuwait?” Adel Abdul Mahdi, a former prime minister, asked: “Why did you kill the Kurds in the Anfal massacre?” Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a former national security adviser, asked: “Why did you kill your Baath comrades?” Ahmed al-Halabi simply insulted the former president. Saddam recoiled and then just smiled.

Saddam’s opponents left the prison cell with answers that should have helped them in running the transitional justice administration, but they failed.

The following year, Washington appointed Ayad Allawi to head the interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) that had limited jurisdiction so that it could be free to wage two fierce battles: one in Najaf against the “Mahdi Army”, headed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the other against armed groups comprised of “resistance fighters” and “extremists” in Fallujah.

The opposition in the IGC got to work that was already prepared by the Americans. They outlined the distribution of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in the country, with historic questions about the majority and minority, and the “oppressed” now assuming rule after the ouster of the “oppressors”.

On the ground, the Ghazaliya neighborhood in western Baghdad with its Shiite and Sunni residents was in store for a bloodbath. On a winter night in 2005, an entire family was massacred and an enfant strangled to death. Soon after, lines drawing the Shiite and Sunni sections of the neighborhood emerged. The popular market became the tense border between the two halves. Two new rival “enemies” traded attacks, claiming several lives.

In Baghdad’s Green Zone, the IGC drew up a draft of the transitional rule. In January 2005, 8 million Iraqis voted for the establishment of a National Assembly.

Meanwhile, different “armies” kept on emerging in Baghdad. The media was filled with the death tolls of bloody relentless sectarian attacks. Checkpoints manned by masked gunmen popped up across the capital.

Those days seemed to answer the question of “who was the alternative to Saddam.” No one needed a concrete answer because the developments spoke for themselves.

Nouri al-Maliki came to power as prime minister in 2006. He famously declared: “I am the state of law” - in both the figurative and literal sense. Iraqis believed he had answers about the “state” and “law”, dismissing the very pointed “I” in his “manifesto”.

Nouri al-Maliki. (Getty Images)

The Maliki question

The American admired Maliki. Then Vice President Dick Cheney had repeatedly declared that he was committed to the establishment of a stable Iraq. Before that however, he had dispatched James Steele - who was once complicit in running dirty wars in El Salvador in the mid-1980s - to Baghdad to confront the “Sunni rebellion”. Steele set up the Shiite “death squads”. Steele was the man in the shadows behind Ahmed Kazim, then interior minister undersecretary, and behind him stood the new warlords.

In 2006, the political process was shaken by the bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra. Questions were asked about the “need” to draw up new maps. Shiite high authority Ali al-Sistani said in February 2007 that the Sunnis were not involved in the attack. In July 2013, Maliki denied an American accusation that Tehran was behind it.

In those days, Maliki’s ego was growing ever bigger, and Steele’s death squads were rapidly growing greater in numbers.

The Iran and ISIS questions

Maliki tried to save himself as one city after another fell into the hands of ISIS. On June 9, 2014, as ISIS was waging battles in Mosul, Maliki met with senior Sunni tribal elders based on advice he had not heeded earlier and which could have averted the current disaster.

It was said that he made reluctant pledges to them and a third of Iraq later fell in ISIS’ hands. Sistani later issued a fatwa for “jihad” against the group, which later turned out not be aimed at saving the premier.

Maliki left the scene and Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, took over. Successive prime ministers would know from then on what it is like to be shackled by Tehran’s pressure as IRGC officials made regular visits to their offices.

Soleimani reaped what Steele sowed. By 2017, armed factions were the dominant force in Iraq. Running in their orbit were other factions that took turns in “rebelling” against the government or agreeing with its choices.

Today, and after 14 years, Iran has consolidated what can be described as the “resistance playground” in Iraq that is teeming with armed factions and massive budgets.

Protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in October 2019. (AFP)

The October question

The Iraqis were unable to answer the ISIS question and the armed factions claimed “victory” against the group. Many ignored Sistani’s “answer” about whether the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) was there to protect Iraq or just its Shiites.

Exhausted Iraqis asked: “What next?”

Next came Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government in October 2018. It was weighed down by unanswered questions and a year later, thousands of youths took to the streets to protest the state of affairs in Iraq, specifically the dominance of armed groups.

They were met with live bullets. Many were abducted and others were silenced. Abdul Mehdi acquitted the killers, saying instead that a “fifth column” had carried out the bloody crackdown on protesters.

After he left office, some Iraqi politicians were brave enough to tell the truth, dismissing former PM’s acquittal and pinning blame on the factions.

Sistani called for PMF members to quit their partisan affiliations. His demand was left unheeded. Mustafa al-Qadhimi became prime minister in May 2020. He left office months later, also failing in resolving the issue of the PMF and armed factions.

By 2022, everyone had left the scene, but Iran remained, claiming the Iraqi crown for itself, controlling everything from its finances to its weapons.

Question about post-Assad Syria

On December 8, Syria’s Bashar fled the country. Everyone in Iraq is asking what happens next. The whole system in Iraq is at a loss: Do we wait for how Tehran will deal with Ahmed al-Sharaa, or do we ask Abu Mohammed al-Golani about his memories in Iraq?

The Iraqi people’s memories are what’s ruling the country, more so than the constitution, political parties and civil society because they are burdened with questions they don’t want to answer.

And yet they ask: What if we weren’t part of the “Axis of Resistance”? Iraq’s history would reply that it has long been part of axes, or either awaiting a war or taking part in them.