Threats to Maritime Navigation Prompt Saudi Boosting of Regional Alliances

The commander of the Saudi Royal Navy floats the first corvette from the Sarawat project in 2019(SPA)
The commander of the Saudi Royal Navy floats the first corvette from the Sarawat project in 2019(SPA)
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Threats to Maritime Navigation Prompt Saudi Boosting of Regional Alliances

The commander of the Saudi Royal Navy floats the first corvette from the Sarawat project in 2019(SPA)
The commander of the Saudi Royal Navy floats the first corvette from the Sarawat project in 2019(SPA)

Need for more international cooperation and coordination to deter threats facing the safety of waterways in the Arab region is increasing, especially for countries bordering exposed maritime corridors.

Safeguarding maritime navigation is geopolitically vital for the global economy.

Saudi Arabia, for example, oversees two important maritime routes in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, with its coasts stretching for about 3,400 kilometers and its kingdom including 1,300 islands.

This has prompted the Saudi Defense Ministry to make building high combat capabilities for its military forces part and parcel of its strategy to meet regional challenges and threats.

The Kingdom has also strengthened its naval military capabilities through implementing qualitative projects that included signing deals for ships and aircraft and participating in naval drills with various other countries.

More so, political and military alliances were formed to protect maritime navigation.

It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia, which has one of the world’s largest military budgets, is looking to localize some 50% of its military spending by 2030.

Maritime navigation in the Arab Gulf has come under frequent attacks, mostly staged by Iranian proxies.

Iran-backed Houthi militias have been responsible for numerous terrorist hits that threatened navigation in Red Sea waters.

Houthis rely heavily on planting Iran-made naval mines.

The Saudi-led Arab Coalition has said it has found and destroyed five Iranian-made “Sadaf” naval mines during the past 24 hours, according to a statement published on Monday.

The coalition said it has seen an increase in the Houthi militia’s activity in planting naval mines in the southern parts of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait in recent weeks.

There is an estimated 160 arbitrarily planted naval mines threatening Yemeni waters at the moment.

Houthis also use remote-controlled explosive vessels to threaten trade ships and civilian institutions in the Red Sea.

Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) Commander Vice Adm. Fahad Abdullah Al-Ghofaily, speaking at a recent event in Riyadh, recounted attacks that targeted three oil tankers and over three commercial ships sailing the region’s waters.

Commenting on finding solutions for those threats, writer and political researcher Abdullah al-Junaid argues that the source of danger must be first defined and the partial political cover given to some regional players, such as Iran and Turkey, must be lifted.

On the political and military alliances and blocs, Junaid noted that the maritime leadership of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is one of the regional examples of political and military alliances formed to secure navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

It was established to safeguard navigation based on common interests and the stability of energy markets.

The Peninsula Shield Force, which is the military arm of the GCC, must be viewed from the scope of future challenges it will meet, added Junaid.

Threats facing Saudi Arabia also prompted the formation of naval military alliances designed to raise readiness levels, enhance maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, and protect vital and strategic interests.

Early in 2020, the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was created as a mechanism for improving the security of regional waterways. This new Arab-African alliance has eight members: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Jordan and Yemen.

In November 2019, a multinational maritime security initiative, Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel, composed of Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the UK, Albania and the United States, was also established with the aim to protect commercial vessels in the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and Bab Al-Mandeb.

As for the steps Saudi Arabia has taken to modernize its naval forces, the kingdom witnessed in July 2018 the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) signing a contract with Spanish shipbuilding company Navantia to build five Avante 2200 corvettes for the RSNF.

The deal is set to be completed by 2022. In addition to the Avante 2200 corvettes, the contract includes setting out a plan for the creation of a naval construction center in Saudi Arabia. According to SAMI the agreement would “localize more than 60 percent of ships combat systems works,” including installation and integration in the Saudi market.

Riyadh has sought partnerships in the past few years with international suppliers to boost its domestic manufacturing capacity.

Regarding the localization of military manufactures, Saudi Arabia has succeeded in establishing joint cooperation with French builder CMN for the production and export of 39 HSI32 Inceptors.

The vessels are among the most modern speedboats and will contribute to raising combat readiness of the maritime units and help protect the strategic interests of the kingdom.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.