The ‘Impossible’ Relationship and History of Disputes between Lebanon’s Aoun, Jumblatthttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2761451/%E2%80%98impossible%E2%80%99-relationship-and-history-disputes-between-lebanon%E2%80%99s-aoun-jumblatt
The ‘Impossible’ Relationship and History of Disputes between Lebanon’s Aoun, Jumblatt
President Aoun meets with PSP leader Jumblatt at the presidential palace in May 2020. (NNA)
The relationship between two of Lebanon’s most influential leaders, head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Jumblatt and President Michel Aoun, has always been fraught with tensions and a lack of “chemistry”.
The tensions go back to when Aoun served as army commander during the 1975-90 civil war and peaked ahead of his return to Lebanon from exile in 2005. They have continued to be strained with meetings between Aoun and Jumblatt far and few between ever since 2005.
Ties between Aoun and other Lebanese parties are not any better, but the way in which the Druze leader has chosen to wage his confrontation with the founder of the Free Patriotic Movement has set him apart from the rest. Jumblatt even went so far as to demand that Aoun be ousted as president, before retracting his statement, not for political reasons, but for practical ones, such as the sectarian Lebanese system and the cover provided by Hezbollah to the president – the Iran-backed party’s key Christian ally.
Just two days ago when commenting on Aoun and the FPM – which is now headed by the president’s son-in-law Jebran Bassil - Jumblatt openly declared “I don’t like them and they don’t like me.”
The statement sparked renewed accusations between MPs from Jumblatt and Aoun’s camp.
Impending ‘tsunami’
Going back in history, Jumblatt openly opposed Aoun’s heading of the army and a military cabinet in 1988, even deeming it a declaration of war. Aoun would soon after be exiled to France, during which he and Jumblatt witnessed a brief period of rapprochement.
That was later blown up when Jumblatt warned of an impending “tsunami” when Aoun announced that he would return to Lebanon in 2005. That would mark the beginning of a new phase of ebbs and flows in their relations.
The ties were often strained, with a few attempts at reconciliation and some brief meetings between the two leaders.
The cool relations were reflected in the very few meetings the Druze leader and Aoun have held over the years. They have been limited to official occasions and attempts at maintaining calm between Druze and Christian areas. In fact they can be listed in a short paragraph: Aoun met Jumblatt in al-Chouf in 2010 and took part in a mass service in Deir al-Qamar in 2017 to mark the 16th anniversary of the Mount Lebanon reconciliation. Jumblatt then paid a visit to Aoun at his Beiteddine summer residence and the president then repaid the visit by meeting him at his Mokhtara residence.
This last meeting was only held in wake of the 2019 Qabr Shmoun incident that witnessed clashes between Druze and Christians and threatened to ignite civil strife in the country.
Jumblatt last met Aoun at the presidential palace in May in an attempt to address “differences”, said the PSP leader at the time.
Every time they met, the two officials would talk about reconciliation and calm. But whenever Lebanon approaches a significant political development tensions would boil over again and the digging up of war acts would come up, casting doubt on the possibility that the two leaders would ever truly reconcile.
‘Policy of spite’
Each side of the divide has their own view of the dispute and each accuses the other of corruption.
The PSP believes that Aoun’s term and policies have led Lebanon to its current state of collapse, while the FPM says that Jumblatt is being so critical because he no longer enjoys the role of kingmaker at parliament.
PSP MP Hadi Abou al-Hassan told Asharq Al-Awsat that Aoun and the FPM object to criticism against their performance during the president’s term.
Calamities befell Lebanon ever since Aoun headed the military government and launched his “elimination war” and “war of liberation” in 1988-90, he charged. Both wars cost hundreds of lives and allowed Syria to tighten its grip over Lebanon.
He then returned from exile after striking a deal under the table with the Syrian regime and allied himself with Hezbollah in order to become president, reneging on all of his previous statements and stances.
“We have seen nothing but setbacks, missteps, crises and losses on all levels from him,” said Abou al-Hassan.
“Despite all of this, they (the FPM) claim to pursue reform and accuse everyone of corruption, while they are the most corrupt figures. The problem lies in the policy of spite that they adopt. They say one thing and do the other. This is what caused all attempts at reconciliation and rapprochement between the FPM and PSP to fail,” he stressed, criticizing the movement for questioning the sincerity of the Mount Lebanon reconciliation.
On the other side of the divide, FPM MP George Atallah said the PSP is attacking Aoun and the movement because of the political crisis Jumblatt is enduring.
He rejected all accusations of corruption directed at the president.
“At every turn they verbally attack and defame us because of the current political situation the PSP is going through after Jumblatt lost the influential position he had occupied for years,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“The parliamentary elections returned him to his natural size and he fears being prosecuted for his actions throughout those years,” he added, accusing Jumblatt of corruption.
Abou al-Hassan acknowledged that other forces besides the FPM have led Lebanon to the dire situation it is in right now, “but the movement, its allies and the president are in control and they have seized main ministries.” This includes the energy ministry that they have controlled for ten years and accounts for half of the country’s debts.
As for how long the confrontation between the PSP and FPM will end, Abou al-Hassan said: “We are not keen on pursuing futile disputes, but we cannot remain silent over what is taking place.”
“Reason demands that the president alter his course of action, otherwise be confronted with the need to change this team, starting with him,” he explained. “We realize how difficult this is due to sectarian reasons and the cover Hezbollah provides him.”
Atallah rejects such demands, saying those dreaming of the toppling of the president are “deluded”.
“Our policy will not change because it is based on the firm vision of breaking the entrenched system that the PSP is a part of,” he stated.
Marwan Hamadeh to Asharq Al-Awsat: Rifaat Assad Mocked His Brother, Called for Partition of Lebanon, Syriahttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5112712-marwan-hamadeh-asharq-al-awsat-rifaat-assad-mocked-his-brother-called-partition
Marwan Hamadeh to Asharq Al-Awsat: Rifaat Assad Mocked His Brother, Called for Partition of Lebanon, Syria
Marwan Hamadeh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Aasharq Al-Awsat)
Hafez al-Assad did not settle for ruling Syria with an iron grip—he also sought to control Lebanon, and he got his way.
Throughout the 1980s, there was frequent talk of a second power center in Syria, represented by Rifaat al-Assad, the president’s brother and rival.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese lawmaker and minister Marwan Hamadeh recounts how Rifaat advocated for dividing Syria and Lebanon into sectarian mini-states and shifting alliances from the Soviet Union to the United States and Israel.
“Rifaat was ultimately exiled, but he remained untouchable. They let him leave, taking with him a trove of secrets and betrayals—betrayals against everyone, including his own brother, Hafez. Didn’t he attempt a power grab in 1983?”
“He took advantage of Hafez al-Assad’s illness and hospitalization, deploying tanks and his forces. He commanded a faction much like the sectarian and ideological militias that function as parallel armies,” said Hamadeh when asked about Rifaat.
“Dealing with Hafez al-Assad was inevitable—Lebanon shares borders with both Syria and Israel, and Syria was our gateway to the Arab world. We went to Hafez, but we never imagined we would encounter Rifaat, the man widely believed—along with Air Force Intelligence chief Mohammed al-Khouly—to have orchestrated the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt,” he added.
President Hafez al-Assad and his brother Rifaat in January 1984. (AFP file)
‘You look so much like your father’
“One day in 1983, Rifaat invited us to dinner at a villa in Eastern Mezzeh, not far from the notorious Mezzeh prison. Walid Jumblatt (son of Kamal Jumblatt) and I were stunned. How could we accept the invitation? And how could we refuse? At the time, we were in exile in Damascus during the Mountain War against the Lebanese Forces. As the saying goes, it was an offer we couldn’t refuse. We decided to go but remained extremely cautious,” Hamadeh recounted.
“The atmosphere felt more like a tavern than a formal gathering. Rifaat was heavily intoxicated but spoke freely, rambling without pause. We were eager for the evening to end when he suddenly said, ‘I have some advice for you.’”
According to Hamadeh, Rifaat proceeded and said: “You’re aligning yourselves with my brother, Hafez. That means you’re on the side of the Soviets, against America, and fighting Israel through the national resistance. But why bother? Go strike a deal with the Maronites—give them part of Mount Lebanon, take the southern part for yourselves, and establish your own state. My brother is a fool. We Alawites have the best region—mountains, coastline. We’ll set up our own state there, without all this nonsense. We’ll reconcile with the Americans, sign a peace deal with Israel, and move forward.”
After Rifaat concluded his statement, Hamadeh and Walid nudged each other under the table.
“We knew better than to react—positively or negatively. In Damascus, whether you were in a villa or a hotel, you could be certain that everything was recorded, every word monitored. We said nothing. We finished dinner and left, unharmed—or so we believed. I doubt Rifaat managed to extract anything from us, and I don’t think Hafez’s security services got anything either,” Hamadeh remarked.
Forty days after Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination in 1977, Walid traveled to Damascus to meet Hafez al-Assad, who reportedly told him, “You look so much like your father.”
When asked if the account was true, Hamadeh confirmed.
“The massacre that followed Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination, which targeted Christian civilians in the Chouf, also struck Christian Jumblatt supporters—those who considered themselves leftist or came from families aligned with the Jumblatt camp in the historic Druze rivalry between the Jumblatt and Yazbaki factions. Walid was furious when he realized the killings had reached these communities. He rushed from village to village alongside the Druze spiritual leader, trying to stop the bloodshed. It deeply affected him. He felt he had not only inherited his father’s murder but had also walked into a conspiracy designed to drive an irreversible wedge between the Druze and Christians,” recalled Hamadeh.
“Investigations later revealed the identities of the Syrian operatives behind the assassination. A respected judge from Sidon, Hassan al-Qawas, conducted a thorough probe—his findings remain locked away in Walid Jumblatt’s personal safe and in Lebanon’s Justice Palace, but no action was ever taken against the killers,” he added.
‘Larger conspiracy’
As per Hamadeh, the inquiry found that four Syrian intelligence officers hijacked a Christian man’s car. He escaped and reached Baakline, where he revealed the assassins’ escape route. They had fled toward Jdeideh, in the outskirts of Beirut.
The operation was carried out by Syrian intelligence under the command of Maj. Ibrahim Hweiji, who reported to al-Khouly. The details of the murder became clear.
Walid then gathered his party members and senior Druze clerics, telling them: “I know who killed my father. You know that I know. And I know that you know.”
But he warned them that a larger conspiracy was at play—one aimed at driving the Arab presence out of Mount Lebanon and dismantling the Druze stronghold, either by forcing them into exile in southern Syria’s Jabal al-Arab or pushing them into the sea.
“I cannot let this happen,” Walid told them. “I will go to Syria—it is our only Arab gateway, the only Arab route. I will not turn to Israel, and I refuse to be cast into the sea,” he added.
When he arrived in Damascus, Hafez received him with remarkable courtesy—whether genuine or laced with deception was unclear. The Syrian leader feigned surprise at what had happened, distancing himself from the crime even though it was carried out by his own men.
“You look so much like your father,” Hafez told Walid, before offering reassurances about the fate of the Druze in Mount Lebanon, describing them as the guardians of Arab frontiers since the Crusades.
This initial dialogue opened a narrow pathway for cooperation, which later expanded, particularly after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
In the battles for Beirut, Walid’s forces fought alongside remnants of the Syrian army—specifically the 82nd Brigade, led by Gen. Mohammed Halal, a Sunni officer from Daraa—who, despite limited manpower, resisted the Israeli advance alongside Amal Movement fighters.
Bashar al-Assad and Walid Jumblatt. (AFP file)
‘No chemistry’
Hamadeh touched on the fraught relationship between Walid Jumblatt and Hafez’s successor, Bashar al-Assad, and said:
“The first open rejection of Bashar’s policies by Walid led to a major crisis in 2000. Syria, under Bashar’s leadership and through Lebanese intelligence, launched an all-out electoral war against us—and against Rafik al-Hariri in Beirut. They incited opposition against him, but we won all the seats in Mount Lebanon, and Hariri secured a sweeping victory in Beirut.”
At the same time, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon.
“Hezbollah realized that Israel was looking to cut its losses and decided to pull out,” Hamadeh said.
“Among Christians, discussions soon followed, leading to the issuance of the Maronite bishops' statement. Their position aligned with ours: if the enemy (Israel) had withdrawn, then the brother (Syria) should also reconsider its presence. The Christian clergy explicitly called for a Syrian military withdrawal. We, on the other hand, took a more measured stance, urging a reduction in Syria’s presence. In parliament, Walid called for a Syrian redeployment,” he added.
This triggered an immediate backlash. Assem Kanso, a former colleague and then-secretary of Lebanon’s Baath Party, accused Walid of treason and called for his execution.
“That was the first major crisis of Bashar’s rule, right at the start of his presidency,” Hamadeh said.
“Frankly, I can say that relations between Walid and Bashar were never good. From their very first meeting, there was simply no chemistry between them,” explained Hamadeh.
“We always knew that Hafez al-Assad was behind decisions involving assassinations and kidnappings. At An-Nahar, we were well aware of the abduction of Michel Abu Jaoudeh.”
“But Hafez’s son, Bashar, was a different story—closed off, detached. He brought his wife from London, projected a modern image, and claimed to be the champion of the internet in the Middle East. Yet within three months, he couldn’t tolerate the cafes and clubs he had allowed to open in Damascus. Do you remember what happened to the intellectuals? He briefly opened the door for them, then slammed it shut. Many ended up in Seydnaya and Tadmur prisons.”
“There was never any chemistry between Bashar and Walid,” Hamadeh reiterated.
Lahoud’s extension
“Bashar began tightening the screws on us, and we started looking for a way out. In 2003, he forced Rafik al-Hariri to reshuffle the government, removing some of his key allies. He then tried to push us out as well, but neither Hariri nor Walid gave in. We remained in the cabinet that oversaw the 2004 presidential election. At the time, Hariri had famously declared, ‘I would cut off my hand before extending Emile Lahoud’s term.’ Walid shared the same conviction.”
“We spoke with Bashar, who tried to offer reassurances, but we knew he was orchestrating Lahoud’s extension. There were figures with strong ties to Syria, though not necessarily to Bashar—people like Jean Obeid, who had broad Arab and international acceptance, particularly in the Gulf. But Bashar refused to consider anyone other than Lahoud.”
“Tensions escalated significantly at that point, coinciding with a rare alignment between the US and France on expelling Syria from Lebanon.”
“Resolution 1559 was the product of a US-French understanding, and Michel Aoun had played a role in its preparation before striking a deal with the Syrians to secure his return from exile and eventually become president,” said Hamadeh.
“In February 2004, I traveled to Brussels as acting foreign minister. At the time, we had suspended executions to maintain our standing with Europe, which opposed the death penalty. I gave assurances to that effect—an agreement that remains in place today. After leaving a Lebanon-Europe conference, the Dutch foreign minister, who chaired the meeting, told me: ‘You have succeeded this time as a good lawyer for a losing case.’”
“I had promised that we would not amend the constitution regarding capital punishment, a move that sparked controversy back home. We held annual conferences with Europe—one economic, which I had organized in November, and another political, attended by foreign ministers. I stepped in for Jean Obeid, who told me he was planning an African tour and wanted to avoid embarrassment, as the Syria issue would be raised in the conference.”
“The Dutch minister then delivered a stark message: ‘You got through this year, but next year, there will be only one item on the agenda: Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon.’”
Rafik al-Hariri (C), Walid Jumblatt (L) and Nabih Berri.
‘Break Lebanon over your head’
“The decision had already been made between the Americans and their allies—before Rafik al-Hariri even knew about it. When he did, he seemed encouraged, believing it meant Emile Lahoud’s term would not be extended and that Lebanon could shift away from Syria’s grip, particularly as Hezbollah’s growing military and security presence was becoming intolerable.”
“That August, Hariri, [parliament Speaker] Nabih Berri, and Walid Jumblatt were summoned to Damascus. Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustum Ghazaleh visited them, informing them that President Bashar al-Assad expected them at a meeting the next morning at 9 a.m.”
“Jumblatt refused outright. Berri agreed to go. Hariri hesitated, but Ghazaleh pressed him, insisting that as Lebanon’s prime minister, his presence was mandatory,” said Hamadeh. “When Ghazaleh made another attempt to persuade Jumblatt, his response was unequivocal: ‘I will not go.’”
“The meeting between Hariri and Assad reportedly lasted just 10 minutes, with Hariri standing the entire time. According to reports, Assad bluntly told him: ‘You want to change Lebanon’s face. You want to impose a president. You want to force us out. I will break Lebanon over your head, over Walid Jumblatt’s head, and over Jacques Chirac’s head.’”
Hariri returned to Walid Jumblatt’s residence in Clemenceau, Beirut, where Hamadeh was waiting alongside MP Bassem al-Sabaa. He recounted what had transpired with Bashar.
According to Hamadeh, Jumblatt told him: “You voted for Lahoud’s extension because they would have killed you otherwise.”
Hariri responded: “And you?”
Jumblatt replied: “I’m going to the mountains to save myself.”
That’s exactly what happened. Hariri, however, could not come to terms with the situation.
“We—the three Progressive Socialist Party ministers and Fares Boueiz—resigned instead of voting. Jean Obeid, meanwhile, did not attend, but in the end, they forced him to be counted as present. He refused to go, yet they ordered Cabinet Secretary-General Suheil Bouji to record his attendance,” said Hamadeh.
“Hariri ultimately gave in and attended the extension session, where he cast his vote in favor. A list of 29 MPs who rejected Lahoud’s extension was published—an honor roll of dissent,” he added.
“From that list, they picked me. In October 2004, I was targeted in an assassination attempt. Three-and-a-half months later, Hariri was assassinated.”
“On February 14, 2005, I was at An-Nahar newspaper, meeting European Ambassador Patrick Renaud. I still remember his name vividly because of what happened next. We heard a massive explosion—a real tremor. Initially, we thought it might have been an arms depot detonating.”
“We immediately started calling Clemenceau, where Jumblatt was, and Qoreitem, Hariri’s residence. By then, Jumblatt had already rushed to the American University Hospital,” recounted Hamadeh.
“You ask if I was targeted because of my close ties to both men? Without a doubt. Perhaps the goal was to eliminate me ahead of the elections—to ensure I would not run. Maybe they thought: this one can be dealt with. They had a candidate lined up against me, but he always lost. That time, however, there was no election—I won unopposed because of the assassination attempt.”
Syrian withdrawal
Hamadeh’s friendship with Hariri and his unique position allowed him to mediate whenever tensions arose with Walid Jumblatt—whether over economic policies that Walid disagreed with or other matters.
“I always stepped in to reconcile them, preserving and strengthening their alliance,” said Hamadeh. “Over 15 to 20 years, their relationship evolved into a genuine friendship. They stood together on everything—from security and economic policies to building hospitals. It was a true partnership, and I was one of its guardians,” he remembered.
“After Hariri’s assassination, Walid wept for him—and perhaps for Lebanon as well. He feared Syria’s grip would tighten, with a Syrian-backed president in Lahoud and a government under Omar Karami, handpicked by Damascus,” said Hamadeh.
The March 14 mass protest—sparked by Hariri’s killing—was a revelation for Walid. He realized that the momentum created by Hariri’s blood would ultimately force Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon.
“Yet, Walid was also wary. He knew that politics is a cycle of ebb and flow—that the victory could eventually turn against us. Our immediate goal was to remove Lahoud from the presidency, and Walid was eager to push him out,” added Hamadeh.
“However, when Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir opposed the move, insisting the president should serve out his term, we had to adjust our course. This led us to commit a serious mistake—the 2005 Quadripartite Agreement with Hezbollah,” he added.
When asked if he accused the Syrian regime of attempting to assassinate him, Hamadeh said: “And Hezbollah as well. I have the indictment right here on my desk, detailing everything.”
He alleged that all assassination operations were led by a unit commanded by Hezbollah member Imad Mughniyeh, but the actual executor was Mustafa Badreddine, known by the alias Sami Issa.
“Badreddine lived in Jounieh under a Christian name. He owned a jewelry shop, had a yacht, and moved within the city’s elite circles, surrounded by wealthy acquaintances.”
Among the operatives, he pointed to Salim Jamil Ayyash, who was convicted in absentia for Hariri’s assassination.
“The others are dead—Imad Mughniyeh was killed early on, and Badreddine was assassinated later. Under international law, they can no longer be pursued,” said Hamadeh.
He emphasized that while Syria facilitated the assassinations, the decision and execution originated in Tehran and ended in Hezbollah’s stronghold of Haret Hreik in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Rafik al-Hariri (L) and Marwan Hamadeh seated at parliament. (Courtesy of Marwan Hamadeh)
Arab Syria
When asked about his feelings upon arriving in Damascus and finding interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa sitting in the chair once occupied by both Bashar and Hafez al-Assad, Hamadeh reflected:
“The whole trip stirred emotions. Crossing from the Al-Masnaa border to Jdeidet Yabous, not through military checkpoints or Syrian intelligence, felt different. The road was clear, with no scrutiny, and there were no statues or inscriptions declaring 'Assad forever' along the way. All the military barracks were either destroyed or abandoned. As you approach Damascus, you feel like you’re stepping back into the times of the Umayyads and Abbasids, returning to the heart of Arab Syria.”
He continued, describing the route to the presidential palace: “It reminded me that Hariri was the one who built this palace, funded by Saudi Arabia. But today, you arrive at the palace and find no guards until you reach the gates. Upon entering, you're welcomed by a young man exuding wisdom, calm, and rationality. He may not act on everything he says, but you feel his clear vision.”
Reflecting on al-Sharaa’s character, Hamadeh noted: “I found in al-Sharaa a blend of revolutionary spirit and leadership. He wants to quickly shift Syria from an era of factions to a republic, from the time of divisions to the time of the state. Syria is still fragmented, with issues like the Kurdish and Druze concerns that we raised, but thankfully, progress is being made. He’s cautious about the Alawites, fearing reprisals from his own people, but insists, ‘We have nothing against the Alawites.’ A significant portion of them opposed the Assad regime.”
He added that al-Sharaa believed that the people of Damascus, and Syria more broadly, should not be blamed for events that transpired over 1,400 years ago. He saw the situation as a political accident, the weight of which has been unfairly placed on entire communities, even to this day.
As he reflected on the tension between Syria and Iran, Hamadeh also recalled how al-Sharaa's forces rapidly swept through the country in a lightening campaign that ousted Assad in December.
“I asked how they managed to travel from Aleppo to Damascus in just three days. He explained, ‘We didn’t breach military borders. The people opened the roads for us. The people of Hama and Homs welcomed us, their only concern was to avoid further bloodshed.’ They started by freeing prisoners, allowing people to breathe before they liberated government buildings or military establishments like the Ministry of Defense,” said Hamadeh.
“This was very reminiscent of what happened when Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated, with some blaming the Christian community, even though it was the Syrian regime behind the murder,” he added.
When asked about his surprise that Syria was now free of Iranian influence, Hamadeh said: “What surprised me was that Syria is now in the hands of its people, without a security state. The former security apparatus would target anyone, even those with minimal connections to the Assad regime. That was al-Sharaa's main concern—ensuring this didn’t happen. There are still employees from the Assad era who remain today.”
Optimism
He was then asked about his feelings when conducting the interview at An-Nahar newspaper’s building, a publication with a long history of clashes with the Assad regime. Hamadeh said: “Our newspaper was bombed, occupied, and its editor-in-chief Michel Abu Ghida was kidnapped. He was later freed with the help of Yasser Arafat and Kamal Jumblatt through mediation with Hafez al-Assad and Hikmat al-Shihabi. They tried to assassinate Gebran Tueni when he was still young. They came back, occupied our office, seized the archives, and took the entire newspaper’s records. For almost 20 days, we, along with other media outlets, were in a state of siege. From that point, we were all in the same cage.”
Hamadeh continued, recounting the tragic story: “The rest of the story is well known. They assassinated journalist and writer Samir Kassir, then they killed Tueni. We tried to send him abroad for safety, but he refused. They also attempted to bankrupt the newspaper. Hariri had a stake in An-Nahar, and they pressured him to sell it. Assad himself personally imposed this. We didn’t have the funds to buy his shares, but Hariri crafted a deal, delaying the payment until after the election of a new president, with the understanding that Lahoud wouldn’t be re-elected and that Lebanon would finally be free from Syrian pressure. But that never happened. After Hariri’s assassination, the deal was torn up.”
When asked about the election of Gen. Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president and the formation of a government led by Nawaf Salam, Hamadeh expressed optimism for Lebanon’s future.
“The opportunity came before they were chosen. It arose from their profiles—one preserved the army, and the other preserved his dignity and knowledge. They brought forward a Lebanese movement that wasn’t originally coordinated, but it translated into a popular wave,” he remarked. “We’ve returned to the Arab fold. As soon as the new president was elected, we knew we had emerged from the cage into the embrace of the Arab world. This marks the difference between the Assad regime and the systems they used to attack, which have proven to be more progressive than them.”
