Biden Advised to Hold Negotiations with Preconditions with Assad

Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) talk with members of US forces in Darbasiya, Syria. (Reuters)
Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) talk with members of US forces in Darbasiya, Syria. (Reuters)
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Biden Advised to Hold Negotiations with Preconditions with Assad

Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) talk with members of US forces in Darbasiya, Syria. (Reuters)
Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) talk with members of US forces in Darbasiya, Syria. (Reuters)

Before US President Joe Biden could complete his “Syria team”, Washington was bombarded by demands during its transitional period to opt for a new approach to tackle the war-torn country. Among them is a phased approach with Damascus based on negotiations with president Bashar Assad.

Kurdish romance
So far, among the appointments to the team is Brett McGurk, who has been selected as coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council. McGurk was previously described by Ankara as the new Lawrence of Arabia due to his sympathy with the Kurds in their plight against Turkey. In fact, one of the main reasons that prompted his resignation from the previous administration was Donald Trump’s “abandonment” of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces – Washington’s key ally in the fight against ISIS – when he declared that he was pulling out American troops from Syria.

McGurk will be joined by Zahra Bell, who was in charge of facilitating inter-Kurdish Syrian dialogue to boost stability in the region, which boasts some 500 American soldiers, who in turn support 100,000 SDF fighters. The SDF controls a fourth of Syria’s territory and about 80 percent of its resources, making it a valuable asset for Washington in negotiations with Moscow, Tehran, Damascus and Ankara.

Questions remain over who will be named US special representative for Syria to succeed James Jeffery and Joel Rayburn. Questions have also been raised as to whether the Syria file will be handled by the National Security Council or whether the Secretary of State will adopt a more hands-on approach, like the one taken by Mike Pompeo and his team. Pompeo advocated the “maximum pressure” economic, political and military policy against Damascus and pushed for its continued political Arab and western isolation.

On the margin
There appears to be consensus that the Syrian conflict will not be high on Biden’s list of priorities. The new administration appears to be focused on the strained ties with Russia and efforts to return to the Iran nuclear deal.

Even though Syria will likely to remain on the margin, numerous articles, researches and studies have been published, suggesting a new American approach to the conflict. Former US Ambassador to Damascus Robert Ford was among the first to declare that the US policy in Syria had “failed” in achieving it declared goals. Writing to Foreign Policy, he said that it has only succeeded in the fight against ISIS. He suggested that Washington cooperate with Russia and Turkey in Syria even though those two countries often go it alone in tackling several issues in the conflict.

Meanwhile, Lebanese, Syrian and western figures appealed to Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron to lift sanctions against Damascus. In a letter to the two leaders, they urged them to adopt a new approach.

Former US ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, meanwhile, sprung a surprise by calling for a new American approach in Syria. The official is known for being one of Assad’s fiercest critics, so his article, with Hrair Balian, in Responsible Statescraft raised a few eyebrows when he noted that the Biden administration “has an opportunity to re-evaluate US policy on Syria, prioritizing diplomacy to advance our interests.”

“One of us (Feltman) has been known for years as a strong critic of Syrian president Bashar Assad and Syria’s domestic and external policies. The other (Balian) has been a strong critic of the notion that pressure alone will change what we consider to be problematic behavior,” they added.

Two options
“Our policy differences, especially regarding Assad remain strong, making our joint recommendation that much more significant. Indeed, we agree that, with the exception of confronting the ISIS threat in northeast Syria, US policy since 2011 has failed to produce positive results – and that a pivot is necessary,” they said.

“US interests in Syria include eliminating the threat posed by terrorist groups, preventing the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, and alleviating the suffering of millions of civilians whose lives have been shattered by the combination of war, repression, corruption and sanctions,” they added.

“Current US policy — centered on isolating and sanctioning Syria — has succeeded in crippling the country’s already war-ravaged economy, but it has failed to produce behavioral change … Instead, these policies contributed to Syria’s deepening reliance on Russia and Iran,” they remarked.

“The United States is now confronted with a choice between the current approach, which has succeeded only in contributing to a festering failed state, or a reconceived diplomatic process that aims to develop a detailed framework for engaging the Syrian government on a limited set of concrete and verifiable steps, which, if implemented, will be matched by targeted assistance and sanctions adjustments from the United States and EU,” they stressed.

The Carter Center provided a framework for a phased approach to the conflict. It is based on interviews with US, European, Russian and UN officials, analysts at think tanks and universities, and Syrians from across the country’s multiple political divides. It suggested that Washington exempt efforts to combat COVID-19 in Syria from its sanctions. It also proposed facilitating the rebuilding of civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools, and the gradual easing of American and European sanctions on condition that these steps should not be taken before Damascus makes tangible steps from its end.

Damascus is required to release detained political detainees, ensure the safe and dignified return of refugees to their homes, protect civilians and ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to all regions. It must eliminate all of its chemical weapons arsenal in line with the 2013 agreement, carry out political and security reforms, including demonstrate goodwill at the Geneva talks, and adopt decentralized governance.

No gift to Damascus
Supporters of this approach believe that the majority of countries have years ago abandoned their demand for Assad to step down. And yet, these countries have continued to adopt their policy of pressure and isolation that has failed to achieve any reform.

“The escalating economic crisis, coupled with rising concern over the current trajectory in Syria, may present an opportunity to test an alternative, more pragmatic approach. This would defer resolution of the most contentious issues while focusing instead on a more limited set of reforms in return for reconstruction assistance and sanctions relief. The aim would be to stabilize the current situation in Syria and build some forward momentum for a larger diplomatic process to end the warm” said the report.

“For US and European policymakers, the Syrian government’s human rights record and its close alignment with geopolitical adversaries Russia and Iran make engagement politically hazardous, especially without evidence that it would lead to meaningful concessions. By comparison, continuing to isolate Syria is commonly perceived as a low-cost, low-risk strategy that avoids rewarding the government for crimes committed over the course of the war,” it added.

“The current diplomatic approach is leading nowhere, or worse. While conditions may not yet be in place for productive negotiations, the August 2020 visit by two senior US officials to Damascus to obtain the release of US citizens held in Syria has at least opened the door to explore new avenues for dialogue, possibly on broader issues,” it noted.

Critics of the new approach say that it lacks geopolitical depth, especially in regards to the Iranian and Turkish presence in Syria.



Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.