Putin’s Envoy, Syria’s Assad Hold ‘Secret Meeting’ on Political, Military Arrangements

Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
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Putin’s Envoy, Syria’s Assad Hold ‘Secret Meeting’ on Political, Military Arrangements

Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)

The Kremlin's special envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, who frequently travels Damascus, carried out a secret visit to the Syrian capital at the end of last week. Accompanied by “senior generals”, he met with president Bashar Assad, but why didn’t Moscow announce such a trip?

The obvious reason was because the Syrian Constitutional Committee was meeting in Geneva and because Damascus and Moscow are still trying to bridge the divide between them. The deeper reason has to do with the understandings in the Idlib province and ensuring that they hold amid the deteriorating military situation in southern and northeastern Syria. It is imperative that the ceasefire hold with the arrival of Joe Biden to the White House and as Syria prepares to hold presidential elections in July. Russia strongly supports the elections and wants it to serve as a turning point for Damascus’ ties with other countries.

Converging views
After meeting Assad in Damascus, Lavrentiev headed to Geneva to follow up on the Constitutional Committee talks. He also met with the “guarantors” of the Astana process and United Nations envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen.

The guarantors – Russia, Iran and Turkey – appeared to be on the same page regarding the developments in war-torn country. Their assessment of the Constitutional Committee talks was the same, with the three countries emphasizing the need that they continue despite the slow pace of work and failure to reach a breakthrough. They stressed the need to commit to this “political accomplishment”, refusing to set a timeframe for it to complete its work. The process, they said, is a purely “Syrian affair led by Syrian figures.”

Before their meeting, the guarantors assessed the results of the fifth round of the five-day constitutional talks, which amounted to a “cultural seminar” and not political negotiations, which are their main purpose.

The government delegation continued to stall by demanding “more discussions and preparations” before beginning to “draft the constitution.” It sought more talks on sovereignty, Syria’s borders, national symbols, Arabism, a secular state, decentralized governance and a stance on “Turkish and American occupation.”

Head of the opposition delegation, which lost its Moscow and Cairo platform representatives, had traveled to Geneva with the conviction that talks would get underway over the drafting of the principles of the constitution and reaching an agreement on the work mechanisms of the future committee talks.

Pedersen watched the disputes unfold, relaying his observations to the guarantors. At the end of the committee talks, he frankly spoke to the media about his disappointment with their failure to make any progress. The envoy, who is known for choosing his words well, was on the verge of openly blaming the government for the failure. Both delegations submitted documents with their proposals, with the government representative rejecting the opposition’s suggestions, to the envoy’s dismay.

Significantly, Pedersen did not set a meeting for the next round of committee talks. Rather, he opted to omit the date in an effort to exert some pressure on Moscow and Damascus to reach a “complete deal” that includes a date for the next round, work mechanisms, the drafting of the constitution and coordinating stances between the government and opposition delegations.

Military arrangements
Lavrentiev, meanwhile, was observing the gap widen between Syrian parties and the rapprochement between the three guarantors. He is aware that France is seeking to declare the failure of the Constitutional Committee and that the Biden administration is pushing for achieving political legitimacy to its Kurdish allies. He is also aware of the pressure being exerted on Pedersen to explore new options to implement UN Security Council resolution 2254. Damascus was supposed to play a more cooperative role, at least on the surface, which prompted his visit to the Syrian capital. The trip, however, was also related to developments on the ground and gains sought by the Russian army.

The frontlines remain unchanged in Idlib due to the understandings between Moscow and Ankara, but three fronts are heating up in other parts of Syria: Daraa, Sweida and al-Hasakeh.

In the western Daraa region, generals at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase attempted to mediate between the local negotiations committee and the Fourth Armored Division, of Bashar’s brother Maher, to reach an understanding that would avert a military operation against Tafas. Talks have stalled and deadlines have ended to reach an understanding in a region that is subject to the 2018 American-Russian agreements, with Israeli approval. These agreements were drafted by officials from the Barack Obama administration, and who are now part of Biden’s administration.

The predominantly Druze region of Sweida, meanwhile, is no stranger to tensions. This is the first time however that its grievances are so openly laid bare. Reports have said that head of the military security branch, Louay al-Ali, had insulted Druze spiritual leader Bahjat al-Hajri. Other reports said that Hajri had demanded an “official apology” and Ali’s dismissal. Another significant report said that Hajri and Bashar Assad had also held talks. That report was not officially announced, but pro-Damascus media confirmed that “Assad had inquired about Sheikh Hajri’s health, underscoring national unity.” He was also quoted as saying that the “offender only represents himself.” Ali was later allegedly sacked and replaced by Ayman Mohammed.

None of these developments were officially declared. Local sources in Sweida said that these issues go beyond the province’s borders. They explained that Damascus’ seeming “leniency and exposure of the tensions was prompted by Russia in an effort to win over the residents and factions of Sweida and steer them away from Iran and Hezbollah’s influence.” Tehran and the party are trying to impose their presence in the area, which diplomats believe will harm the greater picture in terms of relations between Washington, Moscow and Tel Aviv in their approach towards Iran.

In the northern Hasakeh region, tensions are high between the forces of the Kurdish autonomous administration and the regime. The Kurdish forces have surrounded Damascus’ troops in the “security zone” in Hasakeh, prompting the regime to retaliate by surrounding Kurds in Aleppo and Qamishli.

The Russian officers in Hmeimim again intervened to contain the tensions. They achieved some breakthroughs by persuading both sides to carry out a prisoner swap. However, tensions continue to persist. Taking in the broader picture, the situation in Hasakeh will weigh on relations between Moscow, Washington and Ankara. The situation does not bode well for Turkey because Biden has appointed officials to his administration who sympathize with the Kurds, have been hurt by Russia and are suspicious of Ankara.

Western officials believe that the abovementioned issues were on the table during the Syrian-Russian talks. Some were addressed during Lavrentiev’s visit. Damascus, meanwhile, continues to escalate its rhetoric against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and western sanctions as it prepares to hold the presidential elections in the summer. At the same time, it is mending relations with its “old allies”, demonstrated in Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad’s telephone talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, and the condemnation of the “illegal economic sanctions.”



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.