Putin’s Envoy, Syria’s Assad Hold ‘Secret Meeting’ on Political, Military Arrangements

Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
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Putin’s Envoy, Syria’s Assad Hold ‘Secret Meeting’ on Political, Military Arrangements

Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)

The Kremlin's special envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, who frequently travels Damascus, carried out a secret visit to the Syrian capital at the end of last week. Accompanied by “senior generals”, he met with president Bashar Assad, but why didn’t Moscow announce such a trip?

The obvious reason was because the Syrian Constitutional Committee was meeting in Geneva and because Damascus and Moscow are still trying to bridge the divide between them. The deeper reason has to do with the understandings in the Idlib province and ensuring that they hold amid the deteriorating military situation in southern and northeastern Syria. It is imperative that the ceasefire hold with the arrival of Joe Biden to the White House and as Syria prepares to hold presidential elections in July. Russia strongly supports the elections and wants it to serve as a turning point for Damascus’ ties with other countries.

Converging views
After meeting Assad in Damascus, Lavrentiev headed to Geneva to follow up on the Constitutional Committee talks. He also met with the “guarantors” of the Astana process and United Nations envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen.

The guarantors – Russia, Iran and Turkey – appeared to be on the same page regarding the developments in war-torn country. Their assessment of the Constitutional Committee talks was the same, with the three countries emphasizing the need that they continue despite the slow pace of work and failure to reach a breakthrough. They stressed the need to commit to this “political accomplishment”, refusing to set a timeframe for it to complete its work. The process, they said, is a purely “Syrian affair led by Syrian figures.”

Before their meeting, the guarantors assessed the results of the fifth round of the five-day constitutional talks, which amounted to a “cultural seminar” and not political negotiations, which are their main purpose.

The government delegation continued to stall by demanding “more discussions and preparations” before beginning to “draft the constitution.” It sought more talks on sovereignty, Syria’s borders, national symbols, Arabism, a secular state, decentralized governance and a stance on “Turkish and American occupation.”

Head of the opposition delegation, which lost its Moscow and Cairo platform representatives, had traveled to Geneva with the conviction that talks would get underway over the drafting of the principles of the constitution and reaching an agreement on the work mechanisms of the future committee talks.

Pedersen watched the disputes unfold, relaying his observations to the guarantors. At the end of the committee talks, he frankly spoke to the media about his disappointment with their failure to make any progress. The envoy, who is known for choosing his words well, was on the verge of openly blaming the government for the failure. Both delegations submitted documents with their proposals, with the government representative rejecting the opposition’s suggestions, to the envoy’s dismay.

Significantly, Pedersen did not set a meeting for the next round of committee talks. Rather, he opted to omit the date in an effort to exert some pressure on Moscow and Damascus to reach a “complete deal” that includes a date for the next round, work mechanisms, the drafting of the constitution and coordinating stances between the government and opposition delegations.

Military arrangements
Lavrentiev, meanwhile, was observing the gap widen between Syrian parties and the rapprochement between the three guarantors. He is aware that France is seeking to declare the failure of the Constitutional Committee and that the Biden administration is pushing for achieving political legitimacy to its Kurdish allies. He is also aware of the pressure being exerted on Pedersen to explore new options to implement UN Security Council resolution 2254. Damascus was supposed to play a more cooperative role, at least on the surface, which prompted his visit to the Syrian capital. The trip, however, was also related to developments on the ground and gains sought by the Russian army.

The frontlines remain unchanged in Idlib due to the understandings between Moscow and Ankara, but three fronts are heating up in other parts of Syria: Daraa, Sweida and al-Hasakeh.

In the western Daraa region, generals at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase attempted to mediate between the local negotiations committee and the Fourth Armored Division, of Bashar’s brother Maher, to reach an understanding that would avert a military operation against Tafas. Talks have stalled and deadlines have ended to reach an understanding in a region that is subject to the 2018 American-Russian agreements, with Israeli approval. These agreements were drafted by officials from the Barack Obama administration, and who are now part of Biden’s administration.

The predominantly Druze region of Sweida, meanwhile, is no stranger to tensions. This is the first time however that its grievances are so openly laid bare. Reports have said that head of the military security branch, Louay al-Ali, had insulted Druze spiritual leader Bahjat al-Hajri. Other reports said that Hajri had demanded an “official apology” and Ali’s dismissal. Another significant report said that Hajri and Bashar Assad had also held talks. That report was not officially announced, but pro-Damascus media confirmed that “Assad had inquired about Sheikh Hajri’s health, underscoring national unity.” He was also quoted as saying that the “offender only represents himself.” Ali was later allegedly sacked and replaced by Ayman Mohammed.

None of these developments were officially declared. Local sources in Sweida said that these issues go beyond the province’s borders. They explained that Damascus’ seeming “leniency and exposure of the tensions was prompted by Russia in an effort to win over the residents and factions of Sweida and steer them away from Iran and Hezbollah’s influence.” Tehran and the party are trying to impose their presence in the area, which diplomats believe will harm the greater picture in terms of relations between Washington, Moscow and Tel Aviv in their approach towards Iran.

In the northern Hasakeh region, tensions are high between the forces of the Kurdish autonomous administration and the regime. The Kurdish forces have surrounded Damascus’ troops in the “security zone” in Hasakeh, prompting the regime to retaliate by surrounding Kurds in Aleppo and Qamishli.

The Russian officers in Hmeimim again intervened to contain the tensions. They achieved some breakthroughs by persuading both sides to carry out a prisoner swap. However, tensions continue to persist. Taking in the broader picture, the situation in Hasakeh will weigh on relations between Moscow, Washington and Ankara. The situation does not bode well for Turkey because Biden has appointed officials to his administration who sympathize with the Kurds, have been hurt by Russia and are suspicious of Ankara.

Western officials believe that the abovementioned issues were on the table during the Syrian-Russian talks. Some were addressed during Lavrentiev’s visit. Damascus, meanwhile, continues to escalate its rhetoric against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and western sanctions as it prepares to hold the presidential elections in the summer. At the same time, it is mending relations with its “old allies”, demonstrated in Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad’s telephone talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, and the condemnation of the “illegal economic sanctions.”



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.