Aoun’s FPM Acknowledges its Failure to Build State, Fight Corruption in Lebanonhttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2790121/aoun%E2%80%99s-fpm-acknowledges-its-failure-build-state-fight-corruption-lebanon
Aoun’s FPM Acknowledges its Failure to Build State, Fight Corruption in Lebanon
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (L) with Michel Aoun during a news conference in a church in Beirut, Lebanon February 6, 2006. (Reuters)
The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in Lebanon acknowledged the failure of its project to build a state and fight corruption.
It made the declaration on the 15th anniversary of its signing of an understanding with Hezbollah that led to the election of FPM founder Michel Aoun as president in 2016
Differences between the FPM, which is now headed by Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil, and the Iran-backed Hezbollah are nothing new. Supporters of either camp have often expressed their criticism on social media, with even FPM MPs and officials joining in.
Such criticism mounted after the United State slapped sanctions last year on Bassil over his ties to Hezbollah and involvement in corruption.
In a statement on Saturday, the FPM political council said the understanding with Hezbollah “helped ward off strife and division in Lebanon and protect it against foreign aggression” from Israel and terrorist groups.
The understanding, however, “did not succeed in building a state and establishing the rule of law,” it continued.
“Developing the understanding in a way that brings new hope to the Lebanese people is a condition for its survival. The understanding will be void if the signatories do not succeed in the battle to build a state,” it remarked.
FPM MP George Atallah said the statement echoes remarks Bassil had made about a month ago. Similar remarks were also made by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah.
Atallah told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The understanding yielded many results, but Hezbollah could not join us in state-building affairs and approving laws on combating corruption.”
He attributed this to the party’s alliance to its fellow Shiite Amal movement.
Fighting corruption and the building of a state are as important to the FPM as the resistance against Israel, said the MP. He revealed that Bassil and Nasrallah had twice met in the past three months to discuss pending issues and concerns.
On whether unfulfilled objectives can be met in the future, he said: “The conviction is there, but the problem lies in the application.”
The MP refused to link any revision of the understanding to the American sanctions on Bassil, while also dismissing claims that the agreement was on the verge of failure.
“We are seeking to improve, develop and even expand it to include other parties,” he revealed.
Hezbollah MP Walid Sukkarieh said the problem between the party and FPM lies elsewhere, specifically in sectarian representation and fears over Christian rights.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The situation in Lebanon may have prevented the implementation of some issues, but the two camps are fully aligned over the vision of building a state based on national unity.”
Differences between them will not lead to the failure of the understanding, he said, suggesting instead that it could be developed.
The FPM, he explained, is concerned about the fair representation of sects in public positions. The Taif Accord limits this representation to the positions of president, prime minister and parliament speaker, while the movement is seeking to apply it to all public posts given that Muslims outnumber Christians.
The FPM fears that the imbalance may later infringe on equality.
Is a New Showdown Looming Between al-Sadr and the Coordination Framework in Iraq?https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5292280-new-showdown-looming-between-al-sadr-and-coordination-framework-iraq
Is a New Showdown Looming Between al-Sadr and the Coordination Framework in Iraq?
Sadrist Movement leader Moqtada al-Sadr. (Reuters file)
The decision by influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist Movement, to break his prolonged silence and publicly back Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s anti-corruption campaign appears to mark a turning point in Iraq’s political landscape.
It raises the prospect of a direct confrontation with the ruling Coordination Framework, after years in which rivalry between the two sides was largely confined to electoral politics and political maneuvering rather than open confrontation.
The first notable response came from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition, who defended the Framework as a political project that had “proven its success.” His remarks were widely interpreted as an attempt to contain mounting pressure on the ruling Shiite alliance that has varying ties to Iran.
The developments come amid signs of growing divisions within the Framework, which emerged after the 2021 elections as an alternative to the Shiite alliances that had dominated Iraqi politics since 2005.
Al-Sadr’s silence
After the 2021 elections, al-Sadr sought to form a “national majority government” with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani, and a Sunni alliance headed by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi.
The effort collapsed because of the so-called “blocking third,” which prevented the election of a president by the constitutionally required majority and prolonged Iraq’s political deadlock.
In the summer of 2022, al-Sadr withdrew his lawmakers from parliament and announced his departure from political life, declaring that he refused to “participate with the corrupt in any form.”
He also said he would not take part in elections “while the corrupt remain,” urging his supporters to preserve their political and grassroots organization in preparation for a future stage should circumstances change.
Since then, al-Sadr has boycotted every subsequent election, including the most recent one, despite repeated calls — including from rivals within the Framework — to return to politics.
Anti-corruption campaign reshapes the landscape
The political equation shifted with al-Zaidi’s recent anti-corruption campaign, which reached its peak with the arrest of 21 political and parliamentary figures in the operation dubbed “Dawn Strike.”
The campaign gained further momentum after investigating judge Diaa Jaafar revealed that part of the embezzled funds had been used to finance election campaigns, raising broader questions about the integrity of the most recent elections and the influence of political money on their outcome.
Observers said these developments have given al-Sadr political ground that aligns with the position he adopted after leaving parliament: refusing to participate in what he considers a political system tainted by corruption.
Settlement or political realignment?
Al-Zaidi became prime minister after the Coordination Framework failed to agree on a candidate from within its own ranks.
After former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani was effectively ruled out for a second term and al-Maliki’s candidacy faltered amid domestic and international objections, specifically from the US, political factions turned to a figure from outside Iraq’s traditional political class.
A businessman in his 40s, al-Zaidi is widely seen as an acceptable choice for Washington, while Iran has reacted with unusual caution, reflecting what many observers see as a decline in its influence in Iraq compared with previous years.
His early decisions attracted attention, including his announcement not to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which was attended by several Coordination Framework leaders and an official Iraqi delegation headed by President Nizar Amidi.
He has also pledged to strengthen ties with the United States and is expected to visit Washington in July.
Domestically, al-Zaidi has vowed to press ahead with mostly pro-Iran disarming armed factions, giving them until September to surrender their weapons, an issue successive Iraqi governments have failed to resolve because of its political and security complexities.
Al-Sadr breaks his silence
The turning point came when al-Sadr fully endorsed the anti-corruption campaign, describing al-Zaidi as a “soldier of reform.” The move went beyond political support, giving the government broad popular backing.
Pro-government demonstrations followed, while Sadrist leaders began openly supporting the campaign after months of silence awaiting al-Sadr’s instructions.
Observers viewed this as the first broad political and popular alignment against Iraq’s ruling establishment since 2003, particularly because the anti-corruption campaign has targeted figures associated with influential factions within the Coordination Framework.
The political stakes are heightened by the fact that al-Zaidi’s priorities — combating corruption and bringing all weapons under state control — overlap with those of US President Donald Trump’s administration toward Iraq.
Analysts said this creates a convergence of interests between Washington and the Sadrist Movement, despite their fundamental differences on other issues.
Pressure mounts on the Coordination Framework
The convergence does not amount to a direct political alliance between al-Sadr and the US administration. However, it gives al-Zaidi’s government support from two actors traditionally viewed as standing on opposite sides of Iraq’s political divide, thereby increasing pressure on the Coordination Framework.
In response, al-Maliki defended the alliance in a post on X, saying it had served as “the incubator of the national political process” and that its success was reflected in its role in forming three successive governments.
“There is no reason to abandon a project that has proven successful,” he wrote, adding that the Coordination Framework “will remain as it was founded, preserving its principles, identity and founders,” while arguing that any reform should be limited to improving its mechanisms and performance, without altering the essence of the project.
Israeli Military Says Killed Armed Militant in South Lebanonhttps://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5292233-israeli-military-says-killed-armed-militant-south-lebanon
This picture taken from a position in the Upper Galilee in northern Israel shows Israeli army tanks positioned along the Israel-Lebanon border, on July 1, 2026. (Photo by Jack GUEZ / AFP) /
Israeli Military Says Killed Armed Militant in South Lebanon
This picture taken from a position in the Upper Galilee in northern Israel shows Israeli army tanks positioned along the Israel-Lebanon border, on July 1, 2026. (Photo by Jack GUEZ / AFP) /
The Israeli military said on Saturday that it killed an armed militant in the "security zone" under its control in south Lebanon.
The military said in a statement on Saturday that Israeli soldiers “identified an armed terrorist operating inside the Security Zone, in the Majdal Zoun area in southern Lebanon," adding that troops "opened fire at the terrorist" and, after conducting "extensive searches", then "eliminated" him.
Lebanon's state-run National News Agency (NNA) said an Israeli helicopter carried out "a broad sweep operation on the outskirts" of Majdal Zoun and launched five missiles towards the village, without specifying a target or immediately reporting casualties.
The NNA also reported on Saturday that an Israeli strike on the village of Mansouri wounded one person, and reported Israeli artillery shelling elsewhere.
Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war on March 2 with rocket fire at Israel to avenge the killing of Iran's supreme leader in US-Israeli strikes days earlier.
Israel responded with heavy airstrikes and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, where its troops still occupy swathes of territory near the border.
At the end of June, Lebanon and Israel agreed to a US-backed framework aiming to pave the way for a permanent end to hostilities.
Why Is Hamas Once Again Displaying Its Flags and Threatening a 'New October 7'?https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5292065-why-hamas-once-again-displaying-its-flags-and-threatening-new-october-7
Palestinian Hamas militants stand guard on the day of the release of Keith Siegel, a US-Israeli dual national hostage held in Gaza since the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Gaza City, February 1, 2025. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem
Why Is Hamas Once Again Displaying Its Flags and Threatening a 'New October 7'?
Palestinian Hamas militants stand guard on the day of the release of Keith Siegel, a US-Israeli dual national hostage held in Gaza since the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Gaza City, February 1, 2025. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem
The reappearance of Hamas flags and those of its military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, during the funeral of a field commander killed by Israel after he was targeted while walking was no coincidence. Rather, it was part of a coordinated effort that surprised many observers after a prolonged period during which the movement had refrained from such displays.
The funeral was held for Walid Haniyeh, a field commander in the Al-Qassam Brigades and a relative of former Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated by Israel in Tehran in July 2024. It coincided with June 26, the day activists had called for mass protests against Hamas over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. The movement paid close attention to the planned mobilization and worked extensively to thwart it, believing that "suspicious" actors were behind it, before the protests ultimately failed to attract significant participation.
Palestinians carry the body of Mohammad Odeh, a commander in the military wing of Hamas, during his funeral in Gaza City on May 27, 2026 (AFP)
Following that funeral, Hamas continued displaying its flags at the funerals of members killed by Israel. Al-Qassam Brigades flags also reappeared, armed men attended the ceremonies, and participants chanted slogans including, "Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews... October 7 will return." The displays drew the attention of Israeli media, which launched a fresh campaign of incitement against Hamas and the Gaza Strip.
The last time Hamas flags and armed members appeared publicly was during the handover of Israeli hostages under the second prisoner exchange agreement, which began in January 2025, before Israel resumed its military campaign in March of the same year. Israeli forces later used those events to identify Hamas leaders and members who were subsequently killed in a series of targeted assassinations and military operations.
With the scenes recurring recently, particularly as Israeli military operations continue on a smaller scale despite the declared ceasefire in October 2025, Asharq Al-Awsat asked four Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip about the reasons behind the return of flags, armed participants, and the draping of victims' bodies in Hamas and Al-Qassam Brigades flags. All four said the movement's leadership in Gaza had taken a decision, which was circulated across all areas, to resume displaying flags and chanting what they described as "jihadist" slogans at the funerals of members killed by Israel.
Hamas police officers stand guard, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, October 11, 2025. REUTERS/Stringer
According to the four sources, each of whom spoke separately, the decision was intended to reaffirm the Hamas leadership's position that the movement remains present and strong, and cannot be defeated through military force or through any Israeli or US plans that bypass an agreement with Hamas over the future of the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian issue as a whole.
One source said one of the reasons behind the move was the calls for what became known as the June 26 public protests. According to the source, Hamas leaders believed there were attempts to create widespread unrest inside Gaza, and wanted the funeral of Walid Haniyeh, held hours before the planned demonstrations, to show that the movement remained strong and cohesive. The other three sources neither confirmed nor denied that account.
All four sources said the armed men appearing at recent funerals were relatives and friends of those killed, some of whom belong to Hamas, and that their participation was neither officially organized nor coordinated.
Regarding threats of repeating October 7 and other slogans described as "jihadist," the sources said such chants are largely spontaneous in their wording. However, an internal directive circulated among officials responsible for organizing local events, including funerals, instructed them to ensure that slogans emphasized the role of the "resistance" and conveyed that it remains active and present, just as it was before the war.
FILE PHOTO: Palestinian Hamas militants stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. REUTERS/Hatem Khaled/File Photo
Some observers believe the move could provoke Israel and provide it with further justification for escalating military operations in Gaza. Hamas supporters inside and outside the enclave have called for an end to the display of flags and the chanting of such slogans, arguing that Israeli media had exploited them to intensify its campaign of incitement against Gaza, much as it did at the beginning of the war. They also warned that Israeli intelligence could use the funerals to identify field activists and later target them for assassination, as happened previously following prisoner exchanges and other events.
Two Hamas sources acknowledged that such concerns may be valid but argued that Israel does not need additional justifications. They said military operations have continued despite the declared ceasefire, with assassinations and other attacks persisting at varying levels of intensity. According to the sources, more than 1,060 Palestinians have been killed so far as a result of the continuing Israeli military operations.
A third source said: "The reality has certainly changed, and what worked before the war is no longer suited to the current circumstances. But that does not mean complete surrender. Assassinations have repeatedly shown that they do not weaken the movement. Instead, they strengthen its resolve to continue its course."
At the same time, several Israeli television channels and newspapers published reports citing official intelligence assessments submitted to the Israeli military's General Staff and political leadership. The reports claimed Hamas was rebuilding its capabilities in Gaza by manufacturing various types of weapons, restoring some tunnels, and possibly preparing attacks against Israeli forces. They also alleged that the movement continues to reject disarmament, maintain control over humanitarian aid, transfer funds from abroad to Gaza to pay its members, channel funds to its military wing to rebuild its ranks, and recruit new members.
According to the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom, the Israeli military has intensified targeted assassinations in Gaza in an effort to hinder Hamas' attempts to consolidate its presence while rebuilding its military capabilities. The newspaper quoted a political source as saying: "We are accelerating the pace of assassinations, but remain below the threshold of international criticism. This will continue as long as Hamas is unwilling to disarm."
Fighters from Al-Qassam Brigades, affiliated with Hamas, in the Gaza Strip (Archive)
Meanwhile, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that Yaniv Asor, commander of the Israeli military's Southern Command, has for some time been trying to persuade the General Staff to resume large-scale fighting in Gaza. According to the newspaper, he has so far failed because the political leadership does not currently want to resume full-scale combat, given the constraints imposed by the United States.
The four Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israeli threats and reports in the Hebrew-language media form part of an ongoing campaign of incitement that predates the war, continued throughout it, and persists to this day.
Two of the sources said Hamas is making use of some of the capabilities available to it in preparation to defend Palestinians should Israel resume the war. However, they insisted that the movement does not intend to launch another attack similar to that of October 7, 2023, or any comparable operation. Instead, they said, its objective is to reach an agreement that guarantees Palestinian rights, brings the war to a complete end, ensures humanitarian relief for Gaza's residents, restores the basic necessities of life, and enables the reconstruction of their homes.
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