US: Russia Blocks Syria Chemical Weapons Use Accountability

US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield  | Photo Credit: AFP
US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield | Photo Credit: AFP
TT

US: Russia Blocks Syria Chemical Weapons Use Accountability

US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield  | Photo Credit: AFP
US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield | Photo Credit: AFP

The United States accused Syrian President Bashar Assad and his close ally Russia on Thursday of trying to block all efforts to hold Damascus accountable for using chemical weapons during attacks on civilians.

US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield told the UN Security Council that "the Assad regime has tried to avoid accountability by obstructing independent investigations and undermining the role and work of the OPCW," the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons which is the international chemical weapons watchdog.

She accused Russia of defending Assad "despite its chemical weapons attacks," obstructing independent investigations, and undermining efforts to hold the Syrian government accountable not only for using chemical weapons but for "numerous other atrocities."

OPCW investigators blamed three chemical attacks in 2017 on Assad´s government in April 2020. The OPCW Executive Council responded by demanding that Syria provide details. When it didn´t, France submitted a draft measure on behalf of 46 countries in November to suspend Syria´s "rights and privileges" in the global watchdog which means it would lose its vote. It will be considered at the April meeting of the OPCW´s 193 member states.

Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in September 2013, pressed by Russia after a deadly chemical weapons attack that the West blamed on Damascus. By August 2014, the Assad government declared that the destruction of its chemical weapons was completed. But Syria´s initial declaration of its chemical stockpiles and chemical weapons production sites to the OPCW has remained in dispute.

UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu told the council that issues related to Syria´s declaration "remain outstanding" including a chemical weapons production facility that the Syrian government declared "as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons."

She said, however, that analysis of information and all materials gathered by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team since 2014 "indicates that production and/or weaponization of chemical warfare nerve agents did, in fact, take place at this facility."

The team asked Syria "to declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced and/or weaponized at this site," but no response has been received, Nakamitsu said.

Russia´s UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia accused some countries, which he didn´t name, of repeatedly using the chemical weapons "card" as a tool to pressure the Syrian government, using grave accusations "backed up by unconvincing evidence like video footage on social media or `testimony´ of knowingly biased witnesses, or falsified facts."

At the same time, he said, "they reject the counter-arguments provided not only by Russia and Syria, but also by independent experts and organizations, and do not give any coherent explanation as to why they do so."

Nebenzia reiterated Russia's accusations that the OPCW and its technical experts have become the "transmitter of anti-Syrian claims of the Western countries" -- an allegation strongly denied by Nakamitsu, US ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, and many other speakers.

"The root cause of the problem is that our Western colleagues have long turned Syria´s chemical file into a means of punishment of the unwanted authorities in Damascus," the Russian ambassador said. "Therefore, attempts to establish the connection between the file and actual use or non-use of chemical weapons are absolutely senseless."

Syria´s new UN ambassador, Bassam al-Sabbagh, who served as his country´s envoy to the OPCW for seven years after 2013, stressed the government´s condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and denial that it ever used chemical weapons.

He said Syria has made "tangible progress" in resolving issues in its initial declaration and expressed regrets that some countries "always see the glass half empty and don´t hesitate to criticize rather than applaud progress achieved."

France´s UN Ambassador Nicolas De Riviere countered that "the Syrian regime is still lying, hiding the truth and evading its international obligations." He emphasized "the need to fight impunity."

He sharply criticized "the unfounded accusations" against the OPCW, saying "they are undignified and, above all, they are irresponsible."

"The Security Council has a historic responsibility for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the re-emergence of chemical weapons in the world is a major threat," De Riviere said. "We cannot allow these weapons to become commonplace."



Israeli Army’s Plan to Flood Hamas Tunnels Fails

A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)
A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)
TT

Israeli Army’s Plan to Flood Hamas Tunnels Fails

A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)
A Palestinian fighter from the Islamic Jihad's armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, is seen in a tunnel in the south of the Gaza Strip (AFP)

The Israeli media on Saturday renewed talk about the Atlantis system, a significant engineering and technological breakthrough that was supposed to take out the Hamas tunnels and to kill senior Hamas officials, by pumping in seawater at high intensity.

The system was supposed to be the game changer, a new, relatively quick and lethal solution to one of the more complex fronts in the Gaza Strip.

But Israel started by adopting an old and unsuitable plan, continued by ignoring professional advice and the possible danger to the abductees – and ended quietly a few months later, anyone saying whether it achieved anything at all.

Haaretz surveys profiled the Atlantis project – a predictable military failure which no one stopped until it was too late.

“But about half a year after this system was revealed to the public, it turns out that Atlantis is lost; it's no longer in use, and nobody in the army can say what benefit, if any, was gained from this expensive project,” the newspaper wrote.

A Haaretz investigation – based on discussions with a series of different sources, who are closely involved in the development and operation of the system, as well as documents and minutes from closed discussions, in which senior officers and professionals participated– reveals a large number of screw-ups in the way it was handled by the army, and provides a profile of a failure foretold.

For example, it turns out that the system started to operate even before the necessary opinions requested by the army were given; that behind the accelerated activity there was a great deal of pressure imposed from above by the head of Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman; and that it was activated while possibly endangering Israelis who were alive when abducted to the Strip.
“The system was activated in at least one central Hamas tunnel that was clearly used by the organization during various stages of the war,” said a defense source who was deeply involved in project Atlantis. “And it's very likely that there were hostages there who served as a human shield.”

The question of how it happened that a project described by the Israeli Army as a “tie breaker” turned into a steadily growing failure has a complex answer.

One of the main causes is the backdrop, Haaretz said. During the first days of the war, says a defense source, “The achievements on the ground against Hamas officials were insignificant. Most of the Hamas forces, mainly the military arm, entered the tunnels and that created pressure on the senior Israeli Army command.”

That's why, says another source who spoke to Haaretz, Finkelman demanded solutions; ways of striking at Hamas activists in the tunnels. “There was frustration because during those stages the forces didn't really think that we'd start to enter all the tunnels,” recalls the source.

“They also began to realize the dimensions of the tunnels that Military Intelligence didn't know about.”

At that time, the Israeli Army was still learning about the tunnels they encountered in the Strip and their scope hundreds of kilometers.

“The army,” he adds, “found itself on the ground realizing that Hamas was below the ground and it had no solution for removing them from there.”

It was actually the renewal of a contingency plan that was proposed in the ground forces years before Finkelman assumed his position.

At the time the purpose was to deal with a different type of tunnel. Its chances of success in dealing with the tunnels that the army found in the Strip beginning on October 7 were low.

But according to defense sources who spoke to Haaretz, Finkelman gave a green light to taking the old plan and adapting it to the new situation.
After the plan received the necessary permits, the Army turned to the Israel Water Authority for assistance.

The authority hastened to mobilize for the mission and formed two groups of civilian experts in several fields. One group was placed in charge of pumping the water into the tunnels, the second was asked to study the subject of water loss through the walls of a tunnel. Both groups got started.
But the Israeli Army didn't wait for the conclusions, and already at this point they embarked on the next stage.

The Southern Command's 162nd division was chosen as the contractor of the operation, and infrastructure work was assigned to the fighters of the Shayetet 13 naval commandos, which for several weeks became a pipeline unit.

The main goal: joining pipes and deploying them in the combat area.

“For a month and a half the Israeli army neutralized an entire division,” says one of the commanders who took part in the project. “It assigned combat soldiers to plumbing jobs and guarding pipes, throughout the Strip, when it had no idea whether the project had any operational feasibility.”

He said, “The Army had no way of knowing whether the system was working, what had happened in the tunnels, what the situation was of the terrorists inside and whether there were hostages who were harmed as a result of the water. To this moment it isn't clear what damage was caused in the tunnels, if any. They simply don't know anything.”

According to a document issued by the experts on the subject, about three weeks after Atlantis began to operate, “The activation wasn't carried out according to the recommendations of the professionals. The pumping wasn't done according to the combat theory that was developed, no findings were gathered and they didn't take the measurements that were described.”

The experts were angry throughout the period. “There was a disconnect between the sources in the field and the accompanying unit on the one hand and the experts who planned the method of operation on the other,” they said.

And in fact, at that time, say professionals, the military lacked the requisite information and data about the tunnels, certainly not how to flood them in a way that would harm those inside or cause them to flee to the surface.

In the course of the project, the Water Authority investigators had a chance to be exposed to the study prepared by a Hamas activist who served in the tunnel system in the past 10 years. Along with his statement that the tunnels became the main system prepared by the organization for a military confrontation with Israel, he described how they were constructed and the logic behind them.