Why Did Russia Set up a New ‘Tripartite Process’ in Syria?

Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)
Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)
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Why Did Russia Set up a New ‘Tripartite Process’ in Syria?

Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)
Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)

The first test facing the newly launched “tripartite consultations process” on Syria will be the successful convening of the sixth round of the Constitutional Committee talks before the advent of the holy fasting month of Ramadan in mid-April. The new process was kicked off by Russia with Turkey and Qatar, and without Iran, on Thursday.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had vowed at the conclusion of Thursday’s talks in Doha that the committee would meet next month.

US stance
The new process was launched amid Russian diplomatic criticism while the United States was transitioning from the Donald Trump to the Joe Biden administration. Clearly, Syria is a not a priority for Biden. His administration is currently reviewing American policy in the war-torn country and Brett McGurk has been appointed White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa. All signs point to Washington’s insistence on keeping forces in northeastern Syria. The deployment will not be victim to sudden tweets by Biden, which had been the case with his predecessor.

The US will continue to express the same “moral” position on the Syrian crisis, but it will not find itself forced to take any tangible steps on the ground because it does not want to act as the world’s policeman. Washington will instead return to seeking its direct interest that lies in fighting ISIS and making do with providing political support for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2254, offering humanitarian aid and issuing statements that urge accountability for crimes.

Signs of the US stepping back were evident when Secretary of State Antony Blinken cancelled a televised address before the Brussels donor conference, set for March 30. He will not attend the event. The US will be represented by the American ambassador. Blinken will instead be present at a conference for the international coalition fighting ISIS, set for the same day as the Brussels event.

Clear priorities
Moreover, American institutions are reviewing the impact the Caesar Act is having on the fight against the coronavirus pandemic and on the humanitarian situation. This does not mean that the sanctions will be revoked as some US Congress members continue to press punitive measures on the regime.

The US has agreed to issuing a statement with Britain, Germany and France on Sunday that outlines the political stance on the situation in Syria on the tenth anniversary of the eruption of the crisis. The European Union will issue a similar statement. Among the main points is the demand for the upcoming presidential elections to be based on resolution 2254. Failure to do so will not help in restoring relations with Damascus. It also notes that the causes that sparked the crisis in 2011 remain unaddressed.

Russian attack
Amid this picture and growing tension between Washington and Moscow, Russia decided to appeal to main Arab countries in a new attempt to persuade them to normalize relations with Damascus and restore its membership in the Arab League. It is also seeking their contribution in Syria’s reconstruction and in humanitarian aid.

Some of these countries believe that the causes that led to Syria’s suspension still remain and are demanding a political solution that pleases all Syrian parties. They also believe that sectarian militias are hampering the solution and that they must pull out from the country. Other countries believe that the Caesar Act impedes the chances of normalizing ties.

Speaking alongside his Qatari counterpart Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Lavrov said he welcomes the development of a collective Arab stance over the need to return Syria to the Arab League.

“I believe that such a unified decision would play a major role in stability in this entire large region,” he added.

Evidently, this unified position has not been developed yet.

It is tempting to compare the new consultations process between Russia, Turkey and Qatar to the Astana process that was launched between Russia, Turkey and Iran in May 2017. The latter, however, was initially focused on the military aspect of the conflict before shifting to holding a national dialogue conference in Sochi in early 2018. It then turned its attention to the constitutional path in early 2021.

Lavrov said the three countries were not seeking to replace the Astana process.

The tripartite process launched on Thursday directly focuses on the humanitarian and constitutional aspects of the crisis and indirectly address political and military issues, such as the confrontation with the Kurds, Washington’s allies.

Written agreement
The statement from Thursday’s meeting is greatly similar to statements made by the Astana group, especially in regards to the constitutional process.

Russia, Turkey and Qatar stressed “the need to combat terrorism in all of its forms and to confront all separatist agendas.” These agendas refer to the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Such a statement is significant given that the US deployment in Kurdish-held regions east of the Euphrates River will continue during the Biden administration. The appointment of McGurk, who is viewed as a Kurdish sympathizer by Turkey, only cements this position and puts Washington further at odds with Moscow, Ankara and Damascus.

The gatherers on Thursday also underscored the need to increase humanitarian aid to everyone in Syria and throughout its territories. Ankara interprets such as a statement as a precursor to Russia’s extension of the resolution that allows cross-border aid deliveries. The resolution expires in mid-July. For Moscow, this statement could pave the way for the beginning of Qatari and Turkish contributions to Syria’s reconstruction, despite opposition from Europe and the US.

The consultations process also expressed its support for the constitutional path. It underlined the significant role played by the Constitutional Committee, which Moscow, Ankara and Doha hope will meet before Ramadan. On Wednesday, head of the government-backed delegation at the committee, Ahmed al-Kuzbari, submitted a proposal to head of the opposition delegation, Hadi al-Bahra, on the mechanism for the drafting of the constitution. On Thursday, Bahra submitted a “counter-proposal” to UN envoy Geir Pedersen, who will in turn send it to Kuzbari.

The test lies in whether a written agreement, desired by Pedersen, can be reached over the mechanism and whether a new round of committee talks can be held within weeks. Moscow is hoping for this, but the coming days will reveal Iran’s position after it was not invited to the Doha meeting. Damascus has also yet to declare its stance.

Representatives of the new process are set to hold their next meeting in Turkey and later in Russia.



Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
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Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.