Washington’s Conditions for Normalizing Ties with Damascus Vs. Criteria for Lifting Sanctions on Syria

A Syrian boy looks at an American military patrol east of the Euphrates region in Syria, (AFP)
A Syrian boy looks at an American military patrol east of the Euphrates region in Syria, (AFP)
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Washington’s Conditions for Normalizing Ties with Damascus Vs. Criteria for Lifting Sanctions on Syria

A Syrian boy looks at an American military patrol east of the Euphrates region in Syria, (AFP)
A Syrian boy looks at an American military patrol east of the Euphrates region in Syria, (AFP)

Washington has set seven conditions for lifting sanctions imposed under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019. But to normalize ties with Damascus, the US is demanding authorities in the Levantine country to first meet six conditions, four of which have been set before civil war breaking out in 2011.

With nearly three months having passed since the Biden administration took over in Washington, it is becoming more and more evident that Syria is not an immediate priority for the new US leadership.

While the previous two US administrations appointed a special envoy to Syria, US President Joe Biden has not yet done so, although he has assigned special envoys to Lebanon and Iran.

Brett McGurk, the former US envoy for the International Coalition against ISIS, is now the White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa and is responsible for maintaining light supervision of US policy on Syria.

Nevertheless, the US continues to impose sanctions to pressure the Syrian regime headed by President Bashar al-Assad to comply with implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire and a political settlement in Syria.

But the Syrian regime can get rid of the bans if it gets the incumbent US president to agree it had met Caesar Act’s seven conditions for suspending sanctions.

The seven criteria include the following:

i. The Syrian and Russian governments cease using Syrian airspace to target civilian populations

ii. Areas of Syria not under government control are no longer cut off from international aid and have regular access to humanitarian assistance, freedom of travel and medical care

iii. The Syrian government release all political prisoners and allow access to detention facilities

iv. The Syrian government and its allies cease the deliberate targeting of medical facilities, schools, residential areas and other civilian targets

v. The Syrian government take steps to fulfill its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and make “tangible progress” toward becoming a signatory to the Convention Prohibiting Biological and Toxin Weapons

vi. The Syrian government permit the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of Syrians displaced by the conflict

vii. The Syrian government takes “verifiable steps” to establish meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes in Syria and justice for victims of war crimes committed by the Assad government.

But for the Syrian regime to get Washington to normalize ties with Damascus it must fulfill different conditions that have been put in place by the former Trump administration.

According to the peace plan drafted by the ex-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the Assad government would have to stop supporting terrorism, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah militia.

It would also need to cease threatening neighboring countries, give up weapons of mass destruction, back the voluntary return of Syrian refugees and deliver war criminals to justice.

Some are arguing that US sanctions could be adversely affecting Syrians who are already suffering the scourge of an ongoing civil war and the fallout of a crippling economic crisis. But since coming to power, the Biden administration has launched a general revision of US sanctions everywhere based on ensuring they do not restrict the flow of humanitarian aid and efforts to fight the coronavirus pandemic.



What Message is Hamas Sending by Resuming Rocket Fire on Israel?

Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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What Message is Hamas Sending by Resuming Rocket Fire on Israel?

Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

The launch of 10 rockets by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, toward Israel on Sunday surprised many observers, marking a sharp escalation in rocket fire that had largely been limited to one or two missiles since Israel broke a truce on March 18.

Most recent rocket attacks were believed to have come from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but Sunday’s barrage was claimed by Hamas, signaling a possible shift in the dynamics of the conflict.

According to Israeli claims, the rockets were fired from the al-Zawaida area, north of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. However, field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat the rockets were launched from a different location — one that has rarely been used for such operations.

The recent rocket barrage by Hamas may have carried a deeper strategic message, the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat, suggesting the attack was intended to raise questions within Israel about the group’s ability to access its missile arsenal — or hint at a regained capacity to manufacture rockets.

Hamas sources declined to specify when the rockets used in the latest attack were produced but stressed that the decision to launch was shaped primarily by field conditions and the assessment of fighters and commanders on the ground.

“At times, we aim to send specific political messages,” said a Hamas source, who requested anonymity.

“For example, we want to underline that Israel has failed to defeat the movement and its military wing, despite carrying out assassinations of senior and field-level commanders,” they added.

Hamas has denied that its latest rocket barrage was a direct response to the recent assassinations of senior figures, saying the attack was part of its broader reaction to what it described as “ongoing massacres” committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.

“This was a routine response within the framework of confronting continuous Israeli aggression,” the Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat, rejecting suggestions that the assault was linked to specific events.

The timing of the rocket fire raised eyebrows, coming just hours after a rare protest in Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, where demonstrators chanted against Hamas, condemned the rocket attacks, and demanded an end to the war.

Protesters also called for Hamas to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and stop speaking on behalf of its residents.

Asked whether the barrage was meant to send a message to a restless population, Hamas sources denied any connection.

“The rocket fire had nothing to do with the protest in Jabalia,” one source said, pointing to similar demonstrations in recent weeks that were not followed by rocket launches.

When pressed about the implications of such protests for the group’s future in Gaza, the source said internal discussions had taken place.

“The movement recognizes people’s right to express themselves — but not at the expense of the resistance,” the source said.

“There must be clear national guidelines that prioritize ending the war while preserving the legitimacy of the resistance,” they added.

Gaza Governance

Hamas also pushed back against accusations that it is clinging to power in Gaza, placing blame on rival faction Fatah and Israel for blocking proposals aimed at resolving the territory’s political deadlock.

“Hamas has no issue stepping down from governing Gaza,” a source said. “The real obstacle lies with others who have rejected every proposal laid on the table.”

The source pointed to a proposed community support committee, formed with Egyptian mediation, which was meant to take over governance duties. “We showed maximum flexibility, but neither Fatah nor Israel accepted this mechanism,” the source added.

As for whether stepping down from power could weaken Hamas's influence in Gaza, the source appeared unconcerned. “The movement is confident in its endurance,” the source said.

“Even if Hamas relinquishes control and enters a long-term ceasefire, it will continue to exist and maintain its presence,” they affirmed.

A Fatah delegation had held talks with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty two days ago, focusing primarily on internal Palestinian reconciliation and the future governance of Gaza, as Hamas signaled readiness to hand over administrative responsibilities to a proposed community support committee.

Multiple Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group had informed Egyptian officials of its willingness to allow a minister from the Palestinian Authority’s Ramallah-based government to head the committee, with a deputy from Gaza appointed to assist.

A Hamas delegation is expected to travel to Cairo in the coming days to continue discussions with Egyptian officials on the evolving plans for Gaza’s administration and broader efforts to resolve the internal Palestinian divide.