Gaddafi and the West… The Colonel’s Need for a Foe that Legitimizes His Presence

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a book by Mojahed Bosify about the Libyan colonel and his thorny relations with the West

Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
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Gaddafi and the West… The Colonel’s Need for a Foe that Legitimizes His Presence

Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat will begin, starting on Monday, releasing excerpts from a book by Libyan author Mojahed Bosify about Libya under the rule of late leader Colonel Moammar al-Gaddafi. Today’s excerpt tackles his thorny relations with the West and how he believed that its true “religion” was money, which is how he based his approach towards it. As the years went by, Gaddafi came to view the presence of the West as an “important enemy” that offered his rule longevity at the least cost.

“Dawlat al-Khayma” (The Tent State) is published by Beirut’s Difaf Publications and will be released at the Cairo Book Fair. Bosify wrote about how Gaddafi disliked the West, a position that did not change throughout his rule. The late leader recalled an encounter in the United Kingdom in 1966 when he was undergoing further military training. He recalled how he was seated next to a Briton on a train. When drinks were served, the man only paid for his order. Gaddafi objected to his behavior, which he perceived as lacking dignity. The event would shape Gaddafi’s view of the British, whom he believed do not host you or allow you to host them, which contradicts the Bedouin values on which he was raised.

After he came to power, he would recount to the BBC how his fellow Libyans were insulted by English officers during their training in the UK. “I am certain that they hated us,” he told his interviewer.

Gaddafi would never really understand the West – as friend or foe alike. He constantly viewed the West from his own Libyan lens, not from the perspective of its own history and values. Indeed, he would come to hate the West. He was keen on relaying this hatred to everyone, developing a state of enmity that in turn would bring him fame. With time, the mutual hostility between them would constantly provide the enemy with the excuse to revolt against Gaddafi, and provide him with the justifications to remain in power.

The colonel based part of his propaganda on religion and history. He believed that the hostility was part of the tenth Crusade that was targeting Libya and the entire Muslim east. He was eager to meet this hostility and at one point during a televised address challenged US President Jimmy Carter to an armed duel to resolve wars. At another instance, he alleged that westerners were part of Darwin’s missing link between man and monkey and even tasked researchers to back his claim.

Gaddafi’s failure to learn foreign languages and deep sense of pride prevented him from understanding complex political, social and industrial issues that are integral to life in the West. For nearly two decades, he kept visiting these lands, leaving behind fear wherever he went. He carried out or supported terrorist operations in most European cities, and then sent his squads of professional murderers to the United States, to assassinate opponents in the heart of the greatest enemy.

In April 1986, US President Ronald Reagan decided to set a new rule in dealing with him, so he sent a squadron of planes that bombed his private home and a few other targets. The US army missed at least two targets and caused a massacre of which the colonel cleverly benefited. But the message had arrived and served its purpose for several years. This time, the colonel understood that he had to stay calm.

After the Kuwait war, a simultaneous announcement by Britain and the United States formally accused the Libyan regime of blowing up an American civilian plane. Two Libyan men were wanted for trial. Libya, along with Iraq, was subject to a siege that lasted for seven years, before a Saudi-South African mediation succeeded in persuading Gaddafi to hand over the accused to a neutral court, before finally acknowledging responsibility of the attack.

The Lockerbie case cost Gaddafi great efforts and losses on all fronts. But he emerged from that turmoil with a new theory, which he expressed in few words: The West’s only religion is money.

The colonel started to award contracts to Western companies and his new approach did not disappoint him at all, but opened for him the paths he desired.

With his abundant money and traveling with his tent and camel, he visited most of the capitals of the West, with the exception of London, for which he maintained a lasting hatred.

During a visit to Paris, he sat on the chair of Louis XIV, after he was officially received by French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Elysée Palace. No one had imagined at that time that he had funded Sarkozy’s election campaign.

The real problems with the West had not yet begun. They will start with the emergence of Osama bin Laden, who will strike the heart of America without mercy, in a Hollywood-like scene, from which the White House itself barely escaped.

Less than two years later, Saddam Hussein will fall in another operation. Around that day, special security units came to the heart of Tripoli at night, removing the large posters of the leader hanging on the walls, fearing that they would be too provocative. A cautious fear overwhelmed the colonel. He expected at any time the appearance of US warplanes in Libyan skies.

A week after Saddam was captured, Gaddafi finally realized that the game was over. He announced that he would abandon any programs to produce “chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.”

America waved the stick whenever necessary. In March 2004, a delegation headed by Joseph Biden, then chief Democrat in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited the Jamahiriya. After his meeting with Gaddafi near Sirte, he delivered a speech the next day, in which he said that the Libyan people had capabilities and opportunities, but suffered from a big problem, which is a “misleading ideology”.

The live television broadcast was immediately cut off at this point, and dozens of diplomats and politicians sought to reduce the intensity of those words. Biden, however, remained adamant about his opinion of the colonel, whom he described after his return to Washington as “not having a single bone that believes in democracy.”

While many Western delegations looked for investment opportunities in Libya, others wanted different type of information.

Two years after Joseph Biden’s visit, a delegation from the National Institute for Democracy in Washington, which was at that time headed by Madeleine Albright, the former Secretary of State, visited the African country.

The delegation, which included four experts in the region and observers of the progress of change, spent nine days wandering around the country, and came out with a report describing bleak conditions 37 years after the leader came to power.

“It is very clear that the executive authority is in the hands of Colonel Gaddafi... who created a system that carries a decision-making mechanism that is extremely dark and unclear,” the experts said.

The report goes on to explain the rest of the reality in Libya, where legal penalties are imposed on freedom of expression and assembly, to such an extent that the movements and communications of the delegation itself “were under close supervision throughout the mission.”

Many delegations flocked to Libya, while the colonel tried to carefully chart the new approach, without a valid infrastructure and no qualified cadres, except in rare cases, for use in the outside world. Gaddafi remained in a frenzied quest for “international legitimacy”, with which he hoped to crown his life as a global example.

Two years after resolving the Lockerbie crisis, the colonel was able to come out with the signing of the Initial Declaration of the African Union, for which he chose a date chose as he liked: 09/09/1999.

The African leaders could barely keep him away from the presidency of that union for ten years, before he finally won it at the exact time he wanted. As soon as he assumed the post in 2010, he also took on the Arab chairmanship at the Sirte summit a few weeks later.

Between these two presidencies, he finally arrived in New York for the first and last time in his life. This performance culminated in a speech on the world’s podium. But his address was a poorly formulated monologue. The tragic moment, which lasted for more than two hours and was broadcast live around the globe, saw the Libyan leader violate all protocols and laws, mixing topics and presenting his worst performance ever throughout his long history.

The New York trip marked the end of his fame. When that Bedouin boy finally reached the world’s apple and financial hub, he spoiled the precious opportunity.

The Western world meanwhile remained idle, waiting for the opportunity. It first publicly denied any connection with the colonel, then lifted its cover to later intervene directly to uproot him.



Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.


Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
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Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)

Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.

- Offline navigation -

Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position -- known as an "inertial navigation system".

"GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target," Withington told AFP.

"If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there's a lot of jamming... By not using the GPS, you avoid that."

The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.

"It's not always necessarily very accurate, but it's as accurate as it needs to be," said Withington.

- Anti-jamming mechanisms -

Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used "state-of-art antenna interference suppression" to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.

Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.

"They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has... many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has," Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.

Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.

"The Shaheds have been upgraded," said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.

- Stealth materials -

The Shahed is built from "lightweight radar-absorbing materials", such as plastic and fiberglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.

Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defense systems.

- Other positioning systems? -

Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.

And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.

Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.

LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.

But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.

- Counter-strategies -

Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.

But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can "spoofing", which involves hacking into the drone's navigation system to change its destination.

Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralize 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 -- not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.

Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defenses are often used in tandem against the drones.