Gaddafi and the West… The Colonel’s Need for a Foe that Legitimizes His Presence

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a book by Mojahed Bosify about the Libyan colonel and his thorny relations with the West

Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
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Gaddafi and the West… The Colonel’s Need for a Foe that Legitimizes His Presence

Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat will begin, starting on Monday, releasing excerpts from a book by Libyan author Mojahed Bosify about Libya under the rule of late leader Colonel Moammar al-Gaddafi. Today’s excerpt tackles his thorny relations with the West and how he believed that its true “religion” was money, which is how he based his approach towards it. As the years went by, Gaddafi came to view the presence of the West as an “important enemy” that offered his rule longevity at the least cost.

“Dawlat al-Khayma” (The Tent State) is published by Beirut’s Difaf Publications and will be released at the Cairo Book Fair. Bosify wrote about how Gaddafi disliked the West, a position that did not change throughout his rule. The late leader recalled an encounter in the United Kingdom in 1966 when he was undergoing further military training. He recalled how he was seated next to a Briton on a train. When drinks were served, the man only paid for his order. Gaddafi objected to his behavior, which he perceived as lacking dignity. The event would shape Gaddafi’s view of the British, whom he believed do not host you or allow you to host them, which contradicts the Bedouin values on which he was raised.

After he came to power, he would recount to the BBC how his fellow Libyans were insulted by English officers during their training in the UK. “I am certain that they hated us,” he told his interviewer.

Gaddafi would never really understand the West – as friend or foe alike. He constantly viewed the West from his own Libyan lens, not from the perspective of its own history and values. Indeed, he would come to hate the West. He was keen on relaying this hatred to everyone, developing a state of enmity that in turn would bring him fame. With time, the mutual hostility between them would constantly provide the enemy with the excuse to revolt against Gaddafi, and provide him with the justifications to remain in power.

The colonel based part of his propaganda on religion and history. He believed that the hostility was part of the tenth Crusade that was targeting Libya and the entire Muslim east. He was eager to meet this hostility and at one point during a televised address challenged US President Jimmy Carter to an armed duel to resolve wars. At another instance, he alleged that westerners were part of Darwin’s missing link between man and monkey and even tasked researchers to back his claim.

Gaddafi’s failure to learn foreign languages and deep sense of pride prevented him from understanding complex political, social and industrial issues that are integral to life in the West. For nearly two decades, he kept visiting these lands, leaving behind fear wherever he went. He carried out or supported terrorist operations in most European cities, and then sent his squads of professional murderers to the United States, to assassinate opponents in the heart of the greatest enemy.

In April 1986, US President Ronald Reagan decided to set a new rule in dealing with him, so he sent a squadron of planes that bombed his private home and a few other targets. The US army missed at least two targets and caused a massacre of which the colonel cleverly benefited. But the message had arrived and served its purpose for several years. This time, the colonel understood that he had to stay calm.

After the Kuwait war, a simultaneous announcement by Britain and the United States formally accused the Libyan regime of blowing up an American civilian plane. Two Libyan men were wanted for trial. Libya, along with Iraq, was subject to a siege that lasted for seven years, before a Saudi-South African mediation succeeded in persuading Gaddafi to hand over the accused to a neutral court, before finally acknowledging responsibility of the attack.

The Lockerbie case cost Gaddafi great efforts and losses on all fronts. But he emerged from that turmoil with a new theory, which he expressed in few words: The West’s only religion is money.

The colonel started to award contracts to Western companies and his new approach did not disappoint him at all, but opened for him the paths he desired.

With his abundant money and traveling with his tent and camel, he visited most of the capitals of the West, with the exception of London, for which he maintained a lasting hatred.

During a visit to Paris, he sat on the chair of Louis XIV, after he was officially received by French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Elysée Palace. No one had imagined at that time that he had funded Sarkozy’s election campaign.

The real problems with the West had not yet begun. They will start with the emergence of Osama bin Laden, who will strike the heart of America without mercy, in a Hollywood-like scene, from which the White House itself barely escaped.

Less than two years later, Saddam Hussein will fall in another operation. Around that day, special security units came to the heart of Tripoli at night, removing the large posters of the leader hanging on the walls, fearing that they would be too provocative. A cautious fear overwhelmed the colonel. He expected at any time the appearance of US warplanes in Libyan skies.

A week after Saddam was captured, Gaddafi finally realized that the game was over. He announced that he would abandon any programs to produce “chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.”

America waved the stick whenever necessary. In March 2004, a delegation headed by Joseph Biden, then chief Democrat in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited the Jamahiriya. After his meeting with Gaddafi near Sirte, he delivered a speech the next day, in which he said that the Libyan people had capabilities and opportunities, but suffered from a big problem, which is a “misleading ideology”.

The live television broadcast was immediately cut off at this point, and dozens of diplomats and politicians sought to reduce the intensity of those words. Biden, however, remained adamant about his opinion of the colonel, whom he described after his return to Washington as “not having a single bone that believes in democracy.”

While many Western delegations looked for investment opportunities in Libya, others wanted different type of information.

Two years after Joseph Biden’s visit, a delegation from the National Institute for Democracy in Washington, which was at that time headed by Madeleine Albright, the former Secretary of State, visited the African country.

The delegation, which included four experts in the region and observers of the progress of change, spent nine days wandering around the country, and came out with a report describing bleak conditions 37 years after the leader came to power.

“It is very clear that the executive authority is in the hands of Colonel Gaddafi... who created a system that carries a decision-making mechanism that is extremely dark and unclear,” the experts said.

The report goes on to explain the rest of the reality in Libya, where legal penalties are imposed on freedom of expression and assembly, to such an extent that the movements and communications of the delegation itself “were under close supervision throughout the mission.”

Many delegations flocked to Libya, while the colonel tried to carefully chart the new approach, without a valid infrastructure and no qualified cadres, except in rare cases, for use in the outside world. Gaddafi remained in a frenzied quest for “international legitimacy”, with which he hoped to crown his life as a global example.

Two years after resolving the Lockerbie crisis, the colonel was able to come out with the signing of the Initial Declaration of the African Union, for which he chose a date chose as he liked: 09/09/1999.

The African leaders could barely keep him away from the presidency of that union for ten years, before he finally won it at the exact time he wanted. As soon as he assumed the post in 2010, he also took on the Arab chairmanship at the Sirte summit a few weeks later.

Between these two presidencies, he finally arrived in New York for the first and last time in his life. This performance culminated in a speech on the world’s podium. But his address was a poorly formulated monologue. The tragic moment, which lasted for more than two hours and was broadcast live around the globe, saw the Libyan leader violate all protocols and laws, mixing topics and presenting his worst performance ever throughout his long history.

The New York trip marked the end of his fame. When that Bedouin boy finally reached the world’s apple and financial hub, he spoiled the precious opportunity.

The Western world meanwhile remained idle, waiting for the opportunity. It first publicly denied any connection with the colonel, then lifted its cover to later intervene directly to uproot him.



Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
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Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.