The Years of Innocence: As the Nationalists Raced for Gaddafi’s Support, Abdel Nasser Won

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a book by Mojahed Bosify about the Libyan colonel and the Al-Fateh Revolution

 Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)
Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)
TT

The Years of Innocence: As the Nationalists Raced for Gaddafi’s Support, Abdel Nasser Won

 Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)
Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)

In this second episode of excerpts from a book by Libyan author Mojahed Bosify about Libya under the rule of late leader Colonel Moammar al-Gaddafi, Asharq Al-Awsat sheds light on the “years of innocence,” which followed Gaddafi’s assuming power after the Al-Fateh revolution of September 1969. He explains how “national regimes” in the Arab world competed to attract the colonel – a race that was ultimately won by late Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.

“Dawlat al-Khayma” (The Tent State) is published by Beirut’s Difaf Publications and will be released at the Cairo Book Fair.

The book recounts that Muhammad Hassanein Heikal returned to his leader Gamal Abdel Nasser with an eloquent description, in which he told him that those who carried out the revolution in Libya were a group of “extremely innocent” youth - in politics and state administration - which was not necessarily a good thing, but rather represented a big problem along the way.

On the first day of their movement, the young officers had dispatched a colleague of their’s to the headquarters of the Egyptian Telecom Company in the city of Benghazi, carrying a telegram to the Egyptian leader bearing the signature of “the free unionist officers.”

They wanted to inform Abdel Nasser of the success of their revolution and their adherence to the national revolutionary line, asking him for support and proposing to send whomever he trusted to help them in the post-revolution phase.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian services had embarked on a massive immediate mission to monitor the developments in the neighboring country. After hours of reluctance, Abdel Nasser decided to respond to the rebels’ telegram, but with a lot of caution and rationality.

He drafted a letter, which included some important advice for the new leadership about dealing with major countries and the security of the leader of the movement and his close companions. Then, he took an additional day to finally decide on putting his reputation at stake and announce siding with the revolution.

At this point, the Egyptian leader summoned the head of Arab affairs of the office of the presidency, Fathi al-Deeb, to formally task him with the process.

The man was known in the Arab security and political circles as Abdel Nasser’s associate, who handled highly sensitive special security missions – operations that are characterized by complexity and overlapping logistical, political and security tasks.

On Sept. 3, Nasser received the man, who was about to head to Libya to support the nascent revolution. He informed him that Heikal would accompany him to “cover” the visit and the meeting with the leaders of the revolution, and that he would return on the same plane “with an urgent report from you.”

Heikal returned quickly with the first report, as required, in addition to impressions that he had about the developments, leaving Deeb to complete the task in the long run.

The race between the “revolutionary” regimes towards Libya began immediately after the coup.

Two days after the arrival of the Cairo mission, a senior Iraqi delegation, headed by the leader of the ruling Baath Party, Lieutenant General Salih Mahdi Ammash, carried out a surprise visit, as their plane suddenly asked the airport authorities for permission to land.

The visit also coincided with the arrival of another delegation sent by Jaafar al-Nimeiri, which proudly presented the “experiences” of the Sudanese revolution to the Libyan council.

However, this prompted a member of the council to remind the delegation that the Sudan revolution preceded the Libyan coup by only three months - a time difference that does not allow boasting about experiences. The atmosphere became tense and the mission almost failed.

Another four days later, Houari Boumediene himself landed at Benghazi to see Deeb at the airport waiting for the Sudanese delegation. During his meeting with Gaddafi and some members of the Revolutionary Command Council, he explicitly asked them to be cautious in dealing with Egypt’s man, Deeb, and to scrutinize every advice that comes from him. His words influenced some of the council officers for some time.

As a result, the relationship with Deeb began to see some tension. The latter informed Abdel Nasser of the matter, who in turn asked him to personally inform Colonel Gaddafi of his desire to leave the country immediately with his team. But following days of discussions, the council members came to Deeb apologizing, and brought with them a long new list of needs requested from Egypt. Thus, Boumediene’s advice only lasted a few days, before things got back to normal.

The winner of this Arab nationalist race over Libya was decided. While the nationalists were exploring Libya in search of some footing, Abdel Nasser had already begun to send full crews, some of them in a leadership capacity, to contribute to redrawing and establishing the needed institutions to protect the Libyan revolution.

Internally, the revolution council met little opposition. As soon as Abdel Nasser’s portraits were raised, everyone accepted the change. The people loved the Arab leader, and did not have time to go into details.

The coup officers, too, behaved with distinctive intelligence, and announced the appointment of the well-reputed colonel, Abdullatif Boushayreb, as Army Chief of Staff. This helped to give a sober national image to the event, as the reputation of the man conveyed a kind of reassurance. In the meantime, a massive security campaign was launched.

The new regime easily took control over the country. Over the days, political and administrative affairs were run by a small group of officers of the Revolutionary Command Council.

This basic chapter in building the Libyan state saw Abdel Nasser take the lead. For a considerable period of years, Libya will represent a miniature example of Egypt, in almost everything, including the flag and the national anthem.

Abdel Nasser’s first concern remained that no new Boumediene would come out in Libya and undermine any arrangements made between the two countries. Pressured by this obsession, he took great care of Gaddafi’s personal security, and made important suggestions in this regard.

When he felt that the time had come to protect his investments in Libya, he sent Muhammad Hassanein Heikal again, carrying a specific vision of the form of the relationship between the two countries.

Although the Egyptian plan was closer to security and political tutelage than to anything else, Abdel Nasser was worried because he threw all his weight to the side of the Libyan revolution, and was not in a position to bet on his reputation.

In that atmosphere, Heikal arrived in Libya, carrying with him a message from the leader. Deeb, in turn, conveyed it directly to Gaddafi, in line with the instructions.

The letter, personally addressed to the colonel, began with a preamble explaining the reasons and benefits of the proposal, which aims to provide assistance in order to protect the young revolution. For this purpose, Abdel Nasser emphasized “prior planning that assesses all possibilities” to deal with dangers coming from outside and from within.

The planning, as the letter says, requires a coordination process at the highest level. The Egyptian leader proposed forming a joint committee to research, study and present proposals, and expressed his desire to hear the colonel’s opinion.

Gaddafi immediately expressed his consent. No sooner had Heikal arrived in Cairo to inform his superior of that approval, than the colonel was on his way to Benghazi to meet with Deeb and ask him for a report about an “assessment of the situation”, the possibilities of a counter-revolution, and the needed measures to confront any enemies. Less than a week later, the report was in the colonel’s hands for execution. Deeb was in fact the shadow man who weaved all the threads.



Negotiators Zero in on Potential Deal to Disarm Syria’s Last Battleground

A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)
A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)
TT

Negotiators Zero in on Potential Deal to Disarm Syria’s Last Battleground

A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)
A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)

Negotiators are zeroing in on a potential deal to resolve one of the most explosive questions looming over Syria's future: the fate of Kurdish forces that the US considers key allies against ISIS but neighboring Türkiye regards as a national security threat.

Diplomatic and military negotiators from the United States, Türkiye, Syria and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are showing more flexibility and patience than their public statements suggest, a dozen sources told Reuters, including five directly involved in the intensive web of discussions in recent weeks.

This could set the stage for an accord in the coming months that would see some Kurdish fighters leave Syria's restive northeast and others brought under the authority of the new defense ministry, six of the sources said.

However, many thorny issues need to be resolved, they said. These include how to integrate the SDF alliance's well-armed and trained fighters into Syria's security framework and administer territory under their control, which includes key oil and wheat fields.

In an interview with Saudi Arabia's Asharq News channel on Tuesday, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said the alliance's "basic demand" is for decentralized administration - a potential challenge to Syria's new leadership, which wants to bring all of the country back under the government's authority after ousting Bashar al-Assad last month.

Abdi indicated that the SDF has no intention of dissolving, saying it was open to linking with the defense ministry and operating according to its rules, but as "a military bloc".

Syria's new defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, rejected that approach in an interview with Reuters on Sunday, saying the suggestion that the SDF remain one bloc "is not right."

The former opposition fighters now in power in Damascus have said they want all armed groups to integrate into Syria's official forces, under a unified command. The SDF, when asked for comment, referred Reuters to its commander's interview.

How much autonomy Kurdish factions retain likely hinges on whether incoming US president Donald Trump continues Washington's longtime support of its Kurdish allies, according to diplomats and officials on all sides.

Trump has not spoken publicly about his intentions, including his plans for some 2,000 US troops stationed in Syria. A Trump representative did not comment.

Any deal also depends on whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds off on a threatened military offensive against the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Kurdish group that spearheads the SDF alliance.

Ankara views them as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 and is deemed a terrorist group by both Türkiye and the US.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said this month that Syria's new authorities "should be given an opportunity to ... end the occupation and terror the YPG created", but he did not say how long Ankara would wait for it to disarm before launching an incursion.

A Turkish Foreign Ministry source said disarming armed groups and the departure of "foreign terrorist fighters" were essential for Syria's stability and territorial integrity, so the sooner this happens the better.

"We are voicing this expectation of ours in the strongest terms during our contacts with both the United States and the new administration in Damascus," the source said.

INTENSIVE TALKS

US and Turkish officials have been holding "very intensive" discussions since fighters led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, launched a lightning offensive from their northwestern stronghold that deposed Assad on Dec. 8, a senior US diplomat told Reuters.

The two countries share a "common view of where things should end up", including a belief that all foreign fighters should exit Syrian territory, the diplomat said, noting Turkish negotiators "have a very high sense of urgency" to settle things.

However, the diplomat, who like some other sources requested anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, said the talks were "hugely complex" and would take time.

Parallel talks are taking place between the US and both the SDF and HTS, Türkiye and HTS, and the SDF and HTS, officials from all sides say.

Part of a stateless ethnic group straddling Iraq, Iran, Türkiye, Armenia and Syria, Kurds had been among the few winners of the Syrian conflict, gaining control over Arab-majority areas as the US partnered with them in the campaign against ISIS. They now hold nearly a quarter of the country.

But Assad's fall has left Syrian Kurdish factions on the back foot, with Türkiye-backed armed groups gaining ground in the northeast and the country's new rulers in Damascus friendly with Ankara.

Türkiye, which provided direct support to some opposition groups against Assad, has emerged as one of the most influential power brokers in Syria since his fall. Like the US, it has designated HTS a terrorist group because of its al-Qaeda past, but Ankara is believed to have significant sway over the group.

Officials on all sides worry that failure to reach a ceasefire and longer-term political accord in the northeast could destabilize Syria as it seeks to recover from a 13-year civil war that killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions and drew in countries including Russia, Iran and Israel.

Dozens of people in northern Syria have been reported killed since December in clashes between the Kurdish-led SDF and Türkiye’s allies, and in cross-border Turkish airstrikes.

Failure to resolve the fate of Kurdish factions in Syria could also undermine nascent efforts to end the PKK's insurgency in Türkiye.

The United Nations has warned of "dramatic consequences" for Syria and the region if a political solution is not found in the northeast.

POTENTIAL TRADE-OFFS

US support for the SDF has been a source of tension with its NATO ally, Türkiye.

Washington views the SDF as a key partner in countering ISIS, which Secretary of State Antony Blinken has warned will try to use this period to re-establish capabilities in Syria. The SDF is still guarding tens of thousands of detainees linked to the group.

Erdogan said on Wednesday that Türkiye has the power to "crush" all terrorists in Syria, including ISIS and Kurdish militants.

Türkiye wants the management of camps and prisons where ISIS detainees are being held transferred to Syria's new rulers and has offered to help them. It has also demanded that the SDF expel all foreign fighters and senior PKK members from its territory and disarm the remaining members in a way it can verify.

Abdi, the SDF commander, has shown flexibility regarding some Turkish demands, telling Reuters last month that its foreign fighters, including PKK members, would leave Syria if Türkiye agrees to a ceasefire.

The PKK said in a statement to Reuters on Thursday that it would agree to leave if the SDF maintains control of the northeast or a significant role in joint leadership.

Such assurances are unlikely to satisfy Ankara at a time when the SDF is "trying to stay alive and autonomous" in Syria, Omer Onhon, Türkiye’s last ambassador to Damascus, told Reuters.

In Ankara on Wednesday, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani said the extensive US-backed SDF presence was no longer justified, and the new administration would not allow Syrian land to be a source of threats to Türkiye. Standing next to him, his Turkish counterpart, Fidan, said it was time to put anti-terror pledges into practice.

Abdi told Asharq News that he has met with Syria's de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the two sides agreed to set up a joint military committee to decide how the SDF would integrate with the defense ministry. He described the meeting with Sharaa, who heads HTS, as positive.

Abu Qasra, the defense minister, accused SDF leaders on Sunday of "procrastinating" on the issue, saying "consolidation of all areas under the new administration ... is a right of the Syrian state."

The new leadership believes that allowing SDF fighters to continue operating as a bloc would "risk destabilization, including a coup", a ministry official told Reuters.

Abdi argued that a decentralized administration would not threaten Syria's unity, saying the SDF is not demanding the kind of federalism introduced in Iraq, where Kurds have their own regional government.

Some Syrian officials and diplomats say the SDF will likely need to relinquish control of significant territory and oil revenues, gained during the war, as part of any political settlement.

In return, Kurdish factions could be granted protections for their language and culture within a decentralized political structure, said Bassam al-Kuwatli, president of the small Syrian Liberal Party, which supports minority rights but is not involved in the talks.

A senior Syrian Kurdish source acknowledged that some such trade-offs would likely be needed but did not elaborate.

Abdi told Asharq News that the SDF was open to handing over responsibility for oil resources to the new administration, provided the wealth was distributed fairly to all provinces.

Washington has called for a "managed transition" of the SDF's role.

The US diplomat said Assad's ouster opens the door for Washington to eventually consider withdrawing its troops from Syria, though much depends on whether trusted forces like its Kurdish allies remain engaged in efforts to counter any ISIS resurgence.

Trump's return to the White House on Monday has raised hopes in Türkiye of a favorable deal, given the rapport he established with Erdogan during his first term.

Trump has spoken approvingly about Erdogan's role in Syria, calling him a "very smart guy", and said Türkiye would "hold the key" to what happens there.

"The Americans won't abandon (the SDF)," said Onhon, Türkiye’s former ambassador. "But the arrival of someone as unpredictable as Trump must worry them in a way too."