The Years of Innocence: As the Nationalists Raced for Gaddafi’s Support, Abdel Nasser Won

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a book by Mojahed Bosify about the Libyan colonel and the Al-Fateh Revolution

 Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)
Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)
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The Years of Innocence: As the Nationalists Raced for Gaddafi’s Support, Abdel Nasser Won

 Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)
Abdel Nasser and Gaddafi arrive together in Rabat to attend the Arab Summit in December 1969. (Getty Images)

In this second episode of excerpts from a book by Libyan author Mojahed Bosify about Libya under the rule of late leader Colonel Moammar al-Gaddafi, Asharq Al-Awsat sheds light on the “years of innocence,” which followed Gaddafi’s assuming power after the Al-Fateh revolution of September 1969. He explains how “national regimes” in the Arab world competed to attract the colonel – a race that was ultimately won by late Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.

“Dawlat al-Khayma” (The Tent State) is published by Beirut’s Difaf Publications and will be released at the Cairo Book Fair.

The book recounts that Muhammad Hassanein Heikal returned to his leader Gamal Abdel Nasser with an eloquent description, in which he told him that those who carried out the revolution in Libya were a group of “extremely innocent” youth - in politics and state administration - which was not necessarily a good thing, but rather represented a big problem along the way.

On the first day of their movement, the young officers had dispatched a colleague of their’s to the headquarters of the Egyptian Telecom Company in the city of Benghazi, carrying a telegram to the Egyptian leader bearing the signature of “the free unionist officers.”

They wanted to inform Abdel Nasser of the success of their revolution and their adherence to the national revolutionary line, asking him for support and proposing to send whomever he trusted to help them in the post-revolution phase.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian services had embarked on a massive immediate mission to monitor the developments in the neighboring country. After hours of reluctance, Abdel Nasser decided to respond to the rebels’ telegram, but with a lot of caution and rationality.

He drafted a letter, which included some important advice for the new leadership about dealing with major countries and the security of the leader of the movement and his close companions. Then, he took an additional day to finally decide on putting his reputation at stake and announce siding with the revolution.

At this point, the Egyptian leader summoned the head of Arab affairs of the office of the presidency, Fathi al-Deeb, to formally task him with the process.

The man was known in the Arab security and political circles as Abdel Nasser’s associate, who handled highly sensitive special security missions – operations that are characterized by complexity and overlapping logistical, political and security tasks.

On Sept. 3, Nasser received the man, who was about to head to Libya to support the nascent revolution. He informed him that Heikal would accompany him to “cover” the visit and the meeting with the leaders of the revolution, and that he would return on the same plane “with an urgent report from you.”

Heikal returned quickly with the first report, as required, in addition to impressions that he had about the developments, leaving Deeb to complete the task in the long run.

The race between the “revolutionary” regimes towards Libya began immediately after the coup.

Two days after the arrival of the Cairo mission, a senior Iraqi delegation, headed by the leader of the ruling Baath Party, Lieutenant General Salih Mahdi Ammash, carried out a surprise visit, as their plane suddenly asked the airport authorities for permission to land.

The visit also coincided with the arrival of another delegation sent by Jaafar al-Nimeiri, which proudly presented the “experiences” of the Sudanese revolution to the Libyan council.

However, this prompted a member of the council to remind the delegation that the Sudan revolution preceded the Libyan coup by only three months - a time difference that does not allow boasting about experiences. The atmosphere became tense and the mission almost failed.

Another four days later, Houari Boumediene himself landed at Benghazi to see Deeb at the airport waiting for the Sudanese delegation. During his meeting with Gaddafi and some members of the Revolutionary Command Council, he explicitly asked them to be cautious in dealing with Egypt’s man, Deeb, and to scrutinize every advice that comes from him. His words influenced some of the council officers for some time.

As a result, the relationship with Deeb began to see some tension. The latter informed Abdel Nasser of the matter, who in turn asked him to personally inform Colonel Gaddafi of his desire to leave the country immediately with his team. But following days of discussions, the council members came to Deeb apologizing, and brought with them a long new list of needs requested from Egypt. Thus, Boumediene’s advice only lasted a few days, before things got back to normal.

The winner of this Arab nationalist race over Libya was decided. While the nationalists were exploring Libya in search of some footing, Abdel Nasser had already begun to send full crews, some of them in a leadership capacity, to contribute to redrawing and establishing the needed institutions to protect the Libyan revolution.

Internally, the revolution council met little opposition. As soon as Abdel Nasser’s portraits were raised, everyone accepted the change. The people loved the Arab leader, and did not have time to go into details.

The coup officers, too, behaved with distinctive intelligence, and announced the appointment of the well-reputed colonel, Abdullatif Boushayreb, as Army Chief of Staff. This helped to give a sober national image to the event, as the reputation of the man conveyed a kind of reassurance. In the meantime, a massive security campaign was launched.

The new regime easily took control over the country. Over the days, political and administrative affairs were run by a small group of officers of the Revolutionary Command Council.

This basic chapter in building the Libyan state saw Abdel Nasser take the lead. For a considerable period of years, Libya will represent a miniature example of Egypt, in almost everything, including the flag and the national anthem.

Abdel Nasser’s first concern remained that no new Boumediene would come out in Libya and undermine any arrangements made between the two countries. Pressured by this obsession, he took great care of Gaddafi’s personal security, and made important suggestions in this regard.

When he felt that the time had come to protect his investments in Libya, he sent Muhammad Hassanein Heikal again, carrying a specific vision of the form of the relationship between the two countries.

Although the Egyptian plan was closer to security and political tutelage than to anything else, Abdel Nasser was worried because he threw all his weight to the side of the Libyan revolution, and was not in a position to bet on his reputation.

In that atmosphere, Heikal arrived in Libya, carrying with him a message from the leader. Deeb, in turn, conveyed it directly to Gaddafi, in line with the instructions.

The letter, personally addressed to the colonel, began with a preamble explaining the reasons and benefits of the proposal, which aims to provide assistance in order to protect the young revolution. For this purpose, Abdel Nasser emphasized “prior planning that assesses all possibilities” to deal with dangers coming from outside and from within.

The planning, as the letter says, requires a coordination process at the highest level. The Egyptian leader proposed forming a joint committee to research, study and present proposals, and expressed his desire to hear the colonel’s opinion.

Gaddafi immediately expressed his consent. No sooner had Heikal arrived in Cairo to inform his superior of that approval, than the colonel was on his way to Benghazi to meet with Deeb and ask him for a report about an “assessment of the situation”, the possibilities of a counter-revolution, and the needed measures to confront any enemies. Less than a week later, the report was in the colonel’s hands for execution. Deeb was in fact the shadow man who weaved all the threads.



Iran-Israel War: A Lifeline for Netanyahu?

FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)
FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Iran-Israel War: A Lifeline for Netanyahu?

FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)
FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)

The Iran-Israel war has helped strengthen Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu domestically and overseas, just as his grip on power looked vulnerable.

On the eve of launching strikes on Iran, his government looked to be on the verge of collapse, with a drive to conscript ultra-Orthodox Jews threatening to scupper his fragile coalition.

Nearly two years on from Hamas's unprecedented attack in 2023, Netanyahu was under growing domestic criticism for his handling of the war in Gaza, where dozens of hostages remain unaccounted for, said AFP.

Internationally too, he was coming under pressure including from longstanding allies, who since the war with Iran began have gone back to expressing support.

Just days ago, polls were predicting Netanyahu would lose his majority if new elections were held, but now, his fortunes appear to have reversed, and Israelis are seeing in "Bibi" the man of the moment.

– 'Reshape the Middle East' –

For decades, Netanyahu has warned of the risk of a nuclear attack on Israel by Iran -- a fear shared by most Israelis.

Yonatan Freeman, a geopolitics expert at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, said Netanyahu's argument that the pre-emptive strike on Iran was necessary draws "a lot of public support" and that the prime minister has been "greatly strengthened".

Even the opposition has rallied behind him.

"Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is my political rival, but his decision to strike Iran at this moment in time is the right one," opposition leader Yair Lapid wrote in a Jerusalem Post op-ed.

A poll published Saturday by a conservative Israeli channel showed that 54 percent of respondents expressed confidence in the prime minister.

The public had had time to prepare for the possibility of an offensive against Iran, with Netanyahu repeatedly warning that Israel was fighting for its survival and had an opportunity to "reshape the Middle East."

During tit-for-tat military exchanges last year, Israel launched air raids on targets in Iran in October that are thought to have severely damaged Iranian air defenses.

Israel's then-defense minister Yoav Gallant said the strikes had shifted "the balance of power" and had "weakened" Iran.

"In fact, for the past 20 months, Israelis have been thinking about this (a war with Iran)," said Denis Charbit, a political scientist at Israel's Open University.

Since Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, Netanyahu has ordered military action in Gaza, against the Iran-backed Hezbollah group in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as targets in Syria where long-time leader Bashar al-Assad fell in December last year.

"Netanyahu always wants to dominate the agenda, to be the one who reshuffles the deck himself -- not the one who reacts -- and here he is clearly asserting his Churchillian side, which is, incidentally, his model," Charbit said.

"But depending on the outcome and the duration (of the war), everything could change, and Israelis might turn against Bibi and demand answers."

– Silencing critics –

For now, however, people in Israel see the conflict with Iran as a "necessary war," according to Nitzan Perelman, a researcher specialized in Israel at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France.

"Public opinion supports this war, just as it has supported previous ones," she added.

"It's very useful for Netanyahu because it silences criticism, both inside the country and abroad."

In the weeks ahead of the Iran strikes, international criticism of Netanyahu and Israel's military had reached unprecedented levels.

After more than 55,000 deaths in Gaza, according to the health ministry in the Hamas-run territory, and a blockade that has produced famine-like conditions there, Israel has faced growing isolation and the risk of sanctions, while Netanyahu himself is the subject of an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes.

But on Sunday, two days into the war with Iran, the Israeli leader received a phone call from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, while Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has held talks with numerous counterparts.

"There's more consensus in Europe in how they see Iran, which is more equal to how Israel sees Iran," explained Freeman from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Tuesday that Israel was doing "the dirty work... for all of us."

The idea that a weakened Iran could lead to regional peace and the emergence of a new Middle East is appealing to the United States and some European countries, according to Freeman.

But for Perelman, "Netanyahu is exploiting the Iranian threat, as he always has."