Syria’s Presidencies: A History of Coups, Assassinations with Only One Smooth Transition

Photo of the handover ceremony between President Hashem Al-Atassi (right) and President Shukri Al-Quwatli in 1955. (Archive of late Presidential Secretary Abdullah Al-Khani)
Photo of the handover ceremony between President Hashem Al-Atassi (right) and President Shukri Al-Quwatli in 1955. (Archive of late Presidential Secretary Abdullah Al-Khani)
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Syria’s Presidencies: A History of Coups, Assassinations with Only One Smooth Transition

Photo of the handover ceremony between President Hashem Al-Atassi (right) and President Shukri Al-Quwatli in 1955. (Archive of late Presidential Secretary Abdullah Al-Khani)
Photo of the handover ceremony between President Hashem Al-Atassi (right) and President Shukri Al-Quwatli in 1955. (Archive of late Presidential Secretary Abdullah Al-Khani)

Syria’s modern history witnessed many military coups and assassinations of former presidents, in contrast to only one “smooth transition” that took place in 1954, when the presidency was transferred from Hashem al-Atassi to Shukri al-Quwatli.

The upcoming polls, which will be held on May 26, are the 18th since 1932, when the first elections took place under the French mandate.

The deadline for submitting candidacies ends on April 28. Mahmoud Marai – a representative of the opposition – submitted his candidacy along with 12 others, including President Bashar al-Assad. The number of candidates is unprecedented since the first elections nearly nine decades ago.

According to UN Security Council Resolution 2254, credible elections in Syria require UN supervision and a safe environment that ensures the protection of all Syrians, including refugees and internally displaced persons, to exercise their right to vote. However, most of the refugees abroad - except in Lebanon - will not be able to vote due to the requirement of “legal exit” from the country. In addition, most Western countries have closed Syrian diplomatic missions.

In 1936, Al-Atassi won by uncontested due to the absence of opponents, while Charles de Gaulle appointed Tajuddin Al-Atassi commander of the Free France Forces in 1941. Al-Quwatli, a member of the National Bloc, became president after his unrivaled victory in 1943 and 1947. In 1949, Hosni al-Zaim carried out the first coup in the history of Syria and held a referendum.

Shortly after, Sami Al-Hinnawi staged a coup against Al-Zaim and became chief of staff of the army, asking “the historical leader” Al-Atassi to “supervise the elections for a founding conference.”

After the conference, Al-Atassi was elected president. When Adib Al-Shishakli carried out his coup, he immediately appointed Defense Minister Fawzi al-Selu to the presidency. In 1953, elections held at the “mini parliament” saw the arrival of Shishakli to office.

But the latter resigned in 1954 to avoid bloody clashes. Al-Atassi returned to complete his term. A year later, the most famous elections in the contemporary history of Syria took place. Khaled Al-Azem, a former head of state during World War II and prime minister in 1948, ran against Al-Quwatli, who won.

Few years later, Al-Quwatli gave up the presidency to Egyptian Leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who won a referendum after Syrian-Egyptian unity in 1958. During the “era of separation,” Nazem al-Qudsi won against Said al-Ghazzi in a vote held in parliament in 1961 to succeed Abdel Nasser.

Upon the arrival of the Baath party to power in 1963, the Revolutionary Command Council appointed Officer Luay Al-Atassi to the Council presidency. After the July uprising, Amin Al-Hafez became president of the Presidency Council until Salah Jadid established the February Movement in 1966, and Noureddine Al-Atassi assumed the position of head of state.

After Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad launched the Corrective Movement on Nov. 16, 1970, Ahmad Al-Khatib was appointed head of state until March 1971. Then, the latter became speaker of parliament, and Assad won the presidency through a referendum that was repeated until his death in 2000.

Following the amendment of the constitution, Bashar Al-Assad won the presidency in a referendum.

In 2012, a new constitution was adopted, instating the elections instead of the referendum. In 2014, Assad and two candidates ran for office, Hassan Al-Nouri, Minister of Administrative Development, and MP Maher Al-Hajjar.

But what about the fate of former presidents and presidential candidates?

In 1936, Muhammad Ali al-Abed was forced to resign, as was the case with Hashem al-Atassi in 1939. The first died in exile in the French city of Nice in 1939, while the second departed in Homs in 1960.

Tajeddine Al-Hasani, appointed by the French in 1941, was the only president to pass away in office on Jan. 17, 1943. Al-Quwatli was ousted from the palace in a military coup led by Al-Zaim in March 1949. Al-Zaim would in turn be overthrown in a coup in August led by Sami Al-Hinnawi.

Al-Zaim was killed by 176 bullets to his body. A few years later, Al-Hinnawi was imprisoned and then killed by Hersho Al-Barazi in Beirut in 1950.

Al-Shishakli staged his coup in December 1949 and jailed Al-Hinnawi for a certain period before releasing him in response to pressure. He left the country at the end of his tenure and was assassinated in Brazil in 1964 because of his “practices against the Druze” in southern Syria.

In February 1955, the famous handover ceremony took place between Al-Atassi and Al-Quwatli. This was the only “smooth transition” in the country’s history.

Al-Quwatli, who resigned in favor of Abdel Nasser in 1958, died of a stroke in his exile in Beirut following the June 1967 events. Al-Hafez, who was ousted by Jadid in 1966, was imprisoned and then went into exile before returning to Aleppo, where he passed away in 2009.



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times