Abdel Halim Khaddam’s Memoirs: Bashar Assad, Khamenei, Khatami Agreed to Prolong War in Iraq

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from the late Syrian vice president’s memoirs.

Bashar Assad (C) seen standing between his father Hafez and Abdel Halim Khaddam in 1994. (Getty Images)
Bashar Assad (C) seen standing between his father Hafez and Abdel Halim Khaddam in 1994. (Getty Images)
TT
20

Abdel Halim Khaddam’s Memoirs: Bashar Assad, Khamenei, Khatami Agreed to Prolong War in Iraq

Bashar Assad (C) seen standing between his father Hafez and Abdel Halim Khaddam in 1994. (Getty Images)
Bashar Assad (C) seen standing between his father Hafez and Abdel Halim Khaddam in 1994. (Getty Images)

Abdel Halim Khaddam’s political career witnessed a major part of the story of Syria in recent decades.

The late Khaddam, who was known as Abu Jamal, occupied several positions and witnessed major events in Syria and the region, since the Baath Party took over power in 1963 until he left the country and announced his defection from the regime in 2005.

During decades of political work, Abu Jamal assumed different responsibilities. He was governor of Hama at the moment of the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1960s and governor of Quneitra when it fell at the end of that decade.

He was minister of Foreign Affairs, then Vice President during Syria’s expansion in its neighboring country, to the extent that he was called “the ruler of Lebanon.” The Lebanese file remained in Khaddam’s custody until 1998, when Assad transferred it to his son, Dr. Bashar, who had returned from London after the death of Bassel, his older brother, in 1994. Neither Khaddam, nor his allies in Lebanon, were comfortable with the new decision.

With the decline of his political role in Damascus, Khaddam resigned from his position as vice president but remained member of the Baath Party’s central leadership. After that, he went to Lebanon on his way to exile in Paris, where he lived until his death last year.

Following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Damascus was subjected to a regional and international isolation. On Sept. 30, Khaddam announced his defection, accusing the Syrian regime of “killing a friend, the Lebanese prime minister.”

In his exile, he formed with the Muslim Brotherhood led by Sadreddine al-Bayanouni, the Salvation Front coalition to oppose the regime. In Damascus, he was accused of high treason and his property was confiscated.

Khaddam did not play a prominent political role after the 2011 uprising, as he devoted his time to writing his memoirs. In 2003, he published a book on his political views and position on democracy and freedom, entitled: “The Contemporary Arab System.”

Asharq Al-Awsat went through Khaddam’s papers and documents and will begin on Monday publishing chapters from his memoirs, in a series of episodes on key stages of Syria’s history.

Khaddam recounts that after the death of President Hafez al-Assad, his son, Bashar, assumed power and focused on relations with Iraq. Syria exerted efforts on the Arab and international scenes to defend the Iraqi regime against the aggressive acts committed by the United States.

During that period, Bashar received a number of Iraqi leaders, including those who were the most hostile to the regime in Syria and Iran, mainly Ali Hassan al-Majid and Taha Yassin Ramadan. Thus, Syria moved from working to topple the Iraqi regime, to defending it in Arab and international forums, at a time when Iran, through its allies in the Iraqi opposition, sought to get rid of Saddam Hussein.

An Iraqi opposition conference was held in London under Iranian and US sponsorship. The Iranian side was represented by a senior intelligence official with an accompanying delegation, and the US side comprised three members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The two delegations worked for the success of the conference, which took a set of decisions that America used to cover its war.

With the intensification of the US campaign, the mobilization of forces in the region, and the inability of Washington to persuade the Security Council to adopt a resolution supporting its action against Iraq, it became clear that war was inevitable, which raised concern in Syria about the conflict spreading to its territories. Consequently, Bashar went to Tehran, accompanied by Khaddam, to discuss the situation with the Iranian leadership and work to unify the stance in the face of the mounting tension.

“We went to Tehran on March 16, 2003. Upon our arrival, we held talks with President Muhammad Khatami, and then the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei,” Khaddam says.

The following are excerpts from the minutes of meetings in Tehran:

“What can we do shortly before the war? And what will we do in the event of a war that will last for a long time, and perhaps for years?” Bashar asked.

Khatami replied: “These are correct and timely questions… Let me explain it to you. I held two meetings: the first was with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and the second was with French President Jacques Chirac. Mr. Chirac initiated, and the call lasted for half an hour. The two men are worried that Iraq will be attacked, but their concern was greater than that, and both of them expressed that the war would break out soon.”

The Iranian president continued: “The decisive victory that America can get is to shorten the period of war and claim victory in a short time. However, if the period is prolonged, America will lose. It is sufficient for the bodies of American soldiers to return to America for the US public opinion to turn against President George W. Bush. So I don’t think America will be able to end this war.”

Khatami told the Syrian officials that the other issue he raised with Chirac was that the war would increase the wave of violence in the world.

“America in Afghanistan did not achieve its goal of eliminating the former (al-Qaeda) leader Osama bin Laden, rather it made him a hero. Now, it is producing another hero named Saddam, and the wave of extremism will increase. Chirac agreed with me, but he said that the Americans were not people from this region,” Khaddam quoted Khatami as saying.

Bashar returned to the conversation, saying: “We are the country that stands the most with Saddam, but he merely coordinates with us. It is a strange system that lives in another world.”

“As Syrians and Iranians, how can we deal with the Iraqi opposition? The opposition abroad must be absorbed, but it cannot have a role. We need a wider relationship inside Iraq. For us in Syria, the relationship is weak due to lack of trust between our two regimes,” he remarked.

Kamal Kharrazi interjected in the conversation: “President Khatami proposed the national reconciliation.” Khatami replied: “The problem is that no one liked this idea.”

Bashar noted: “We can give it [the opposition] fake promises, according to the American way. Nevertheless, the issue can be raised with the Iraqi foreign minister. The first problem in the war is Saddam himself.”

The Iranian president added: “All the opposition today is against the US. We must try to push the Shiites and Sunnis to overcome their differences… Turkey has a big role at this stage. Despite Turkey’s commitments to America, I note that the governing group tends to work with us and with the Islamic world. We must be wary of the establishment of a Kurdish state, and the idea that the Kurds of Iran are Iranians, the Iraqi Kurds are Iraqi, and the Turkish Kurds are Turkish. In this regard, the Turks must be reassured and their fears dispelled.”

Following the meeting with Khatami, the two Syrian officials met with supreme leader Khamenei, “who started the conversation, welcoming us, hoping that the visit would be beneficial to both countries.”

Bashar replied: “Our conversation today reflected the similarity of views between our two countries. We discussed the issue of Iraq extensively, and there are many analyses. The vision is dark, but the light side is our alliance, our stance and our history.”

“The truth is we are two brotherly countries, facing common dangers. This should encourage us to increase full cooperation between us. The region faces a dangerous situation,” Khamenei was quoted by Khaddam as saying.



Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
TT
20

Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.