Votel to Asharq Al-Awsat: It’s in Washington’s Interests to Help Saudi Arabia Defensively

Former Commander of the United States Central Command General Joseph Votel.
Former Commander of the United States Central Command General Joseph Votel.
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Votel to Asharq Al-Awsat: It’s in Washington’s Interests to Help Saudi Arabia Defensively

Former Commander of the United States Central Command General Joseph Votel.
Former Commander of the United States Central Command General Joseph Votel.

Former Commander of the United States Central Command General Joseph Votel acknowledged that the United States’ withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 helped lead to the emergence of the ISIS terrorist organization and its atrocities in the region.

He also largely blamed former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki whose management “politicized the Iraqi military” that weakened it in the ensuing fight against ISIS and allowed it to capture Mosul city in 2014.

Two years after his retirement from the US military, Votel revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that he is still involved in the Middle East, viewing it as a region of strategic importance to Washington. Saudi-American ties must also continue, he remarked, urging the US to maintain its support to its ally in the war in Yemen and in defending itself.

After your retirement from the Central Command operations in the Middle East, how do you view the region and American presence there?
First off, I think the Middle East region remains a very important area for the United States. We have a lot of national security interest there. And in just the last couple of weeks, with the incident that took place in the Suez Canal where we had a ship that was blocking the canal, we were reminded how important the waterways of the Middle East are for global commerce. And that's just one of our interests in the area.

I think the United States has long-term interest in this region. It is important to our overall security strategy and important to our economic health. I think it remains an important region to the United States. That doesn't necessarily mean that we have to have large numbers of troops there forever. But we do have interest in this area and we need to make sure that we are pursuing strategies and policies that support those interests.

How do you assess the situation in the region?
I think the situation in the Middle East is getting more and more complex. We've seen things that could be viewed as positive, for example the improved relationships between Israel and other Arab countries. This I think is a positive thing, but I think it also makes things more complicated for Iran. On the other hand, we've seen Iran be more aggressive. We’ve seen that with the attack on Saudi Aramco facilities a while back. This is another example of how complex the region has become.

So, in my view, this is a region that continues to breed complexity and will continue to grow more complex in the future. I believe planning is more complex today than it was when I was there.

- War on ISIS -
Why hasn’t the global coalition to defeat ISIS succeeded in eliminating the group?
This is a very good question and I think what we have learned over time is that violent extremist organizations like ISIS are very hard to completely destroy. We were successful in taking away the “caliphate” and in breaking them up and killing their leaders, but many fighters go to ground and many of the underlying conditions that support organizations like ISIS or al-Qaeda really remain and so those take more than just a military solution to it.

The host nations have to address these problems, the coalition members have to address these problems, diplomats have to address these problems. While we've had some military success. Military success by itself is not enough to completely address the problem of ISIS, and we will need to continue to apply pressure, whether that is military, or whether it is, diplomatic. I would say that we are making some progress in some areas. Our work with Iraq, for example, I think has been good. And we've continued to save their capabilities. On the other hand, we still have a lot of refugees and we still have ISIS fighters that remain behind and that's not good. Those are the seeds of the next group.

Who made ISIS? You once said that former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki contributed in its birth when he prevented the military from confronting it in Mosul in 2014. Talk to us more about this.
There are a variety of contributing factors that give rise to organizations like ISIS. In this case, I think we can see that at the end of the war and in 2011 when the United States left Iraq. We took a lot of pressure off of the remnants of those organizations. We did not, however, stay and continue to remain partnered with the Iraqi forces, so we may have contributed to that. At the same time though there were social, economic and political issues. All of these factors gave rise to organizations like ISIS.

Host countries were also in the wrong because they had to assume responsibility as well. think it's important to recognize the responsibility for organizations like this comes from a variety of different factors.

As for Mosul in 2014, I think it happened because we stepped away from the Iraqi army. The military largely became a political tool for Maliki and he replaced very good competent military leaders with those who are more politically beholden to him than they were militarily competent.

As a result, when they came up against a very vicious and capable enemy like ISIS, they lacked the professionalism, cohesiveness and military leadership that they needed to defeat that organization early on. You saw the Iraqi army collapse at places like Mosul, and really throw the country of Iraq into a very, very serious panic because they were unable to defend their own cities, their own borders, their own territory. In this regard, Maliki bears some responsibility for that

How do you assess the ability of the Iraqi military today?
I think it today it is good. The coalition led by the US, starting in 2014 and working for a number of years, helped to rebuild the army. The Iraqis did a lot of this work themselves. We didn't try to create them in our own image. We supported them as they grew, but I think today, we see them performing at a good level, conducting a wide variety of operations on their own without a lot of our or coalition assistance. I think their progress has been very good.

General Frank McKenzie, the head of CENTCOM today, said that the threat of ISIS making a resurgence exists in regions held by the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Do you agree with him?
I do agree and I have always agreed with his assessment, which is very accurate. I think it's important today to look at some of the conditions in places like northeast Syria and the displaced persons camps there, such as al-Hol. This can be a problem again if we don't address it. Al-Hol is home to some 70,000 refugees, including relatives of ISIS members. We are beginning to see today a dangerous mix of these refugee families, who have been infiltrated by ISIS fighters who are trying to take advantage of these particular people.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) conducted an operation there recently and arrested, I think, about 50 ISIS fighters, who are operating in these camps. We have to pay attention to this in the coalition and Western nations. A variety of nations have to help address the problem of remaining detained ISIS fighters and the refugee families that have been left behind because they will be radicalized. They will be exploited and they will be the seeds of the next terrorist group that we will have to deal with.

Do you think the SDF needs more support from the US?
I think the SDF deserves support from the United States and from the coalition, because it has played such an important role in helping us achieve our objectives and in helping defeat the ISIS “caliphate”. Whether that means more troops or more weapons or whatever I think that can help. This will have to be determined by General McKenzie, and the leadership in our department and in the new administration.

Do you see any change on the ground from the previous administration and this current administration?
I think it may be too early to judge. We've seen this administration sustain the current level of support, which I think is good. We will have to see what direction they go in addressing the problems of ISIS and Syria. Syria is not just a military problem. It has to be addressed through diplomatic and political efforts. That is the only way you will have a final resolution. The military can support, but it's going to take more than that to resolve these long intractable problems.

- Confronting Iran -
Iran is destabilizing the region through its militias and it controls four Arab capitals. Who is supporting it and why?
I think the Iranian leadership is behind these activities. Qassem Soleimani and the supreme leader definitely have been supporting these things and perpetrating these activities for a long period of time, so they are certainly behind it.

But I would also like to point to the recent agreement struck between Iran and China. It is a long-term 25-year agreement, worth around $400 billion. It seems that countries like China are positioning themselves where they can benefit from some of the activities that Iran is perpetrating across the region. Iran is principally responsible for this, but what we do see other states, other actors who are also trying to benefit from the instability that has been sown by Iran.

What about Russia? You only mentioned China.
Russia and Iran are partners with the Assad regime in Syria, and so they are operating together. The discussion could be had about whether Iran is benefitting from Russia or whether Russia is benefiting from Iran there. They are, however, operating in a symbiotic relationship here. They are both, therefore, benefitting from Iran’s activities.

What is the common interest between Iran, China and Russia?
I think their common interest is to minimize the influence of the United States in the Middle East. There's no doubt that Iran wants us out of this region. Russia wants us out as well so that they can exert their own influence. China has economic objectives in this region that I believe they may think are threatened by our presence, by our influence and by the relationships we have with so many countries in the region. I think a major part of their motivation is getting the US out of this region, forever.

Do you think we will witness a direct war between the US and Iran similar to what happened in the war in Iraq?
I don’t know, but I certainly hope not. I don’t think this is in anybody's interest. It's not in Iran's interests and it's certainly not in the United States’ interest in getting involved in a fighting war with Iran. Such a development would work against many of our other strategic priorities, such as competing in the Pacific and pursuing our own economic resiliency as we move forward. It would significantly impact our broader strategy. A war between the US and Iran would wreak devastation on the region. So it wouldn't be in the region's interest either. I think we have to hope that cooler heads will prevail and we will find ways to de-escalate the tension and not get to a point where we get into a hot fighting war.

Do you think Qassem Soleimani’s killing was good for the region? Was he among your targets while you were in the field?
He was not directly on my target list. At the time that I was the CENTCOM commander we were mostly focused on the anti-ISIS campaign plan in Iraq and Syria. There were Iranian backed militias that were fighting in places like Iraq against ISIS. So we were not trying to provoke Iran at that particular time. We were really focused on the mission at hand so he was not my priority at the time.

But he was targeted and killed in a US strike. In my estimation, from everything that I know that the United States took prudent action in this case, that he was planning and plotting. He was getting a position where he could perpetrate attacks against Americans and our friends and allies in the region. We had to protect ourselves. I think Qassem Soleimani got what he deserved. He was a destabilizing influence on the region. He was a destabilizing influence in Iran. There were many people in Iran who suffered under the hand of Soleimani so we shouldn’t sympathize over him. He got what he deserved. It's a very complex region and I think the United States took the action that it deemed it had to at the time.

How do you see Iran after his killing? What effect has it had?
The effect is quite great. Soleimani played an extraordinary role in Iran. He was not only a military commander but he was an intelligence leader, a quasi-diplomat. If you looked at the United States, he combined things that our CENTCOM commander does, things that our CIA director does, things that our secretary of state does all in one man. He was in many cases the face of Iran as it operated around the region and he was responsible for orchestrating that. His killing is not something that Iran can easily replace. It will take a generation or more to replace somebody like Soleimani.

So I think his killing has a very significant impact on Iran. They will not be able to replace them. I don't know that this necessarily diminishes any other threats that Iran perpetrates. In some cases it may make them even more dangerous because there is no centralized control over all of these different elements under Iranian influence.

- Supporting Saudi Arabia -
How do you perceive Saudi Arabia’s efforts in confronting attacks from Yemen?
I think Saudi Arabia has taken the responsibility of protecting itself. They have a lot of equipment that has been sold to them by the US over a number of years. The equipment has been designed to help them have a strong defense and protect their own borders, both maritime and physical land borders. It is in our interest to help them, so they can defend themselves. I think it is in our interest to make sure that the war in Yemen doesn't spread across the region.

A media report said a “tiger team” from the Pentagon was headed to Saudi Arabia to help its army in terms of training and providing it with defense equipment. What do you know about this?
I don't know much about that initiative. I think it's a good idea. It’s a good example of how we can work to help Saudi Arabia without taking this over ourselves and without trying to take on the military responsibilities of protecting the Kingdom

We have to look at it through the long relationship that we have had with Saudi Arabia, that goes all the way back to 1945 and President Franklin Roosevelt when he met with King Abdulaziz bin Saud on board the USS Quincy. No relationships are perfect, there's going to be problems, but we have to work through them. I think for Saudi Arabia to be a strong, vibrant force for good in the region, we need to help them get there.

- Pullout from Afghanistan -
Is it time to withdraw from Afghanistan?
It seems so. We must do it in as responsible a manner as we can. We've been there a long time, there's a lot of history here. There are very hard decisions before us right now, for the new administration and it's not as easy as saying “yes, we stay” or “no, we don't stay”. I think we have to think very, very carefully about this. It would be helpful if we could see if our efforts can help reduce some of the violence or get to some kind of diplomatic peace, but I think we have to think very carefully about this.

We still have concerns about terrorist organizations that emanate from this part of the world to Afghanistan. We have to think carefully about this and if we make the determination that we are not going to stay on the ground and we have to accept the fact that we may be subject to plotting, and then potentially attacks against our citizens, our interests, our friends or our own land. These are not easy yes or no questions. They are very, very complex. As Secretary Lloyd Austin said, all conflicts need to end. And so we need to pursue an approach that gets us to be as responsible as we can.

You were on the ground. What are the difficulties there and how can they be addressed?
The difficulties I saw are probably the difficulties that many people read about. The Kabul government is weak. They have challenges exerting their influence beyond the major urban areas. Beyond those areas, Taliban still holds sway. They still have challenges with effective military and other leadership out in these areas. They have challenges with corruption and they have a very resilient adversary in the Taliban, who has not given up easy and who has not played cleanly in this.

Do you think the Taliban is a threat to America? Can an agreement be struck with it?
I think they are an indirect threat to the American people and many Western countries, because they continue to refuse to break their support to organizations like al-Qaeda. It’s hard to trust an organization that won't repudiate an organization like al-Qaeda.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
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Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.