Sudan Is Reconsidering Ethiopia's Sovereignty over Benishangul Region

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a source of discord for years. (AP)
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a source of discord for years. (AP)
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Sudan Is Reconsidering Ethiopia's Sovereignty over Benishangul Region

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a source of discord for years. (AP)
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a source of discord for years. (AP)

Sudan said it might reconsider Ethiopia's sovereignty over the Benishangul region, where the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is built if Addis Ababa continues to disavow international agreements.

The Sudanese Foreign Ministry denounced statements by Ethiopian officials who rejected the “colonial agreements” - a reference to the 1902 and the 1959 border treaties.

The ministry stressed that the “irrational complacency in using these misleading claims and disavowing previous agreements also means compromising Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Benishangul region, which was transferred from Sudan under some of these agreements.”

The claim that the relevant agreements are an “insignificant colonial legacy is an explicit fallacy of historical facts,” read the statement, indicating that Ethiopia was an independent sovereign state and a member of the international community at the time of the conclusion of those agreements.

The ministry warned that rejecting previous agreements compromises Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Benishangul.

Benishangul was transferred from Sudan to Ethiopia in 1902 according to the agreements.

Moreover, the ministry told Ethiopia that the introduction of other issues into the GERD discussion is not productive and obstructs negotiations in an attempt to impose de facto policies that do not serve the issues of good neighborliness and the security and stability of the region.

Sudan has started mobilizing global and regional public support to continue serious negotiations to reach a binding legal agreement over the dam.

Over the past two days, Sudanese Foreign Minister Maryam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi visited Kenya and Rwanda, as part of an African tour to harness support in the negotiations.

Al-Mahdi called on African leaders and the African Union (AU) to pressure Ethiopia into reaching a binding agreement between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt.

Last week, the Sudanese Foreign Minister held meetings with the EU and AU ambassadors in Khartoum, during which they discussed the negotiations.

Border tension between Sudan and Ethiopia escalated during the conflict in the Tigray region, after Ethiopian forces and militias attacked Sudanese forces inside their territory, killing three people and a high-ranking officer.

As a result, the Sudanese army redeployed within its territory and regained control of more than 80 percent of the areas where Ethiopians were present for several years.

Sudan has threatened to sue the Ethiopian government and the Italian company implementing the dam if the filling is completed for the second year, without reaching a legal agreement.

Meanwhile, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed committed to the second filling during the coming rainy season, stressing that the country will overcome the challenges.

In a message on Easter Day, Ahmed asserted that his country will complete the second filling as scheduled next July, saying some countries, which did not name, are trying to obstruct Addis Ababa.

Meanwhile, former aide to the Egyptian foreign minister Ambassador Gamal Bayoumi told Asharq Al-Awsat that attempts to create a political crisis complicate reaching an agreement.

He pointed out that Addis Ababa’s actions during the negotiations reveal that it does not harbor good intentions.

The Ethiopian government recently announced it will start the second phase of filling the reservoir with about 13.5 billion cubic meters. The first phase was completed in July 2020.



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.