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Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: I Told Arafat He Was Lying, Plotting Against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria

Episode Eight

An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
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Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: I Told Arafat He Was Lying, Plotting Against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria

An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).

In this eighth episode of the memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam, published by Asharq Al-Awsat, the late Syrian vice-president narrates the decisive moments of the military intervention in Lebanon in 1976, the parallel contacts that took place between Syria and the Arab countries to form an Arab deterrent force, in addition to the role of the Syrian forces.

He says: “In light of the insistence of the Palestinian leadership and the allied Lebanese parties on continuing the fighting and the refusal to lift the siege on Zahle and the Christian villages in the north of Lebanon, and in the face of all the damage inflicted on the Lebanese people… the Syrian military intervention became urgent to stop this dirty war, so our forces crossed the Lebanese borders on June 1, 1976, on the day Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, arrived in Damascus.”

Khaddam devotes a large part of his account to the conflict with the head of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), in the diplomatic corridors, especially during a meeting that coincided with the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon.

“On June 1, 1976, the Coordination Office of the Non-Aligned Movement convened in the city of Algiers, in the presence of Arafat, who gave a theatrical speech and talked about an American-French-Israeli plot against the Palestinian revolution and the national forces in Lebanon, and that he feared it would be implemented by Arab hands”, in reference to Syria.”

Khaddam added that he responded to Arafat loudly so that everyone could hear him, saying: “You lied, Yasser, as is your habit, and did wrong to Syria and the Palestinian cause… You are tearing Lebanon apart, tearing the Palestinians apart, and serving Israel.”

Arafat replied, saying: “You entered Lebanon and hit us.” Khaddam answered: “We will strike everyone who tries to divide, and we will hold accountable everyone who sheds blood. Lebanon is not Palestine. You will pay a dear price for your conspiracy against Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.”

The late Syrian vice-president recounts: “During the discussions to amend the Lebanese constitution to elect a new president, it was agreed that President Sleiman Franjieh would submit his resignation, so that the new president, Elias Sarkis, would exercise his powers, work to end the war and achieve reconciliation. Despite the election, tension remained and the shooting continued. The national movement campaign escalated under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, and the Palestinian leadership continued to play with fire to prevent a serious cessation of fighting and the start of a national dialogue to end the crisis, according to the constitutional document.”

In May 1976, Khaddam received Karim Pakradouni, who conveyed a message from President Sarkis, saying: “[Sarkis] believes that his first contact should be with Syria to explain his perception. He is confident that the first step they should take is political dialogue with the conflicting parties. This must take place in two stages: The first is to ask the parties to end the fighting, while the second is to have a round-table meeting.”

Despite the efforts made to calm the situation in preparation for the presidential transition from Franjieh to Sarkis, the political atmosphere witnessed further tension after an alliance was forged between Raymond Edde, Kamal Jumblatt, and Saeb Salam, in addition to the forces of the national and progressive parties, and the efforts made by Arafat to continue the fighting.

Khaddam says: “The military pressure of the Palestinian forces and their Lebanese allies intensified in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, and some Christian forces were attacked in the south. The siege also intensified around Zahle and Christian villages in Akkar, including Qobayat and Andaqt. Lebanon was threatened by the widening of the circle of sectarian massacres, which provided the best opportunities for Israel to intervene and find an ally in the Lebanese arena.

The late Syrian official said that with the escalation of the fighting, Jumblatt made proposals, including: “A serious ceasefire without the withdrawal of fighters from their positions, engaging into round table negotiations without preconditions, the gradual withdrawal of the Syrian army, and defining the agenda of the dialogue: political reform, amendment of some articles of the constitution and the political system… and the re-arrangement of institutions in a national, non-sectarian order.”

According to Khaddam, it was clear that Jumblatt had a vision to build a new regime in Lebanon that would free the people from the sectarian system, and that would constitute a guarantee for some segments of Lebanese society, and end the Maronite domination of the country’s leadership.

“On June 2, 1976, the Palestinian coalition, along with some Lebanese forces, called for a general strike to protest the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon. The Palestinian militias and their allied forces (the Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, the Syrian Nationalist Party, Al-Mourabitoun, and other organizations imposed by Arafat from Fatah) forced shop owners to close their stores under death threats.

“It is evident that the strike only took place in areas controlled by the Palestinian forces and their allies. As for the other regions, they were in a different situation, as the entry of the Syrian forces, which was carried out at the request of President Franjieh, lifted the siege on the threatened Christian areas and dispelled their fears.

“On June 3, the Lebanese National Movement held a meeting headed by Jumblatt, and issued a statement declaring the sweeping success of the general strike that included all Lebanese regions in rejection of the Syrian military occupation and of every foreign intervention… In parallel, the commander of the Arab Lebanon Army, Lieutenant Ahmed Al-Khatib, a Lebanese Army dissident, made an appeal to confront the Syrian army.

“Despite this media propaganda, the militias of the Palestinian factions and their allies from the Lebanese parties were fleeing our forces. As usual, Arafat started shouting and crying out. He called for a meeting of the Arab League, which was scheduled for June 9.

Khaddam continues: “On the morning of June 9, I headed to Cairo, and was met at the airport by Mamoun Al-Atassi, our embassy’s Chargé d'Affairs. As the plane landed, he came up to me and informed me that a meeting took place the day before, on June 8, and a delegation was formed (to go to Damascus), headed by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Mubarak bin Hamad Al Khalifa, head of the session, and the foreign ministers of Algeria (Bouteflika) and Libya (Ali Triki) and Secretary-General of the Arab League (Mahmoud Riad). I asked the pilots to prepare an immediate departure plan for Damascus to meet with President Assad, and I asked Atassi to contact Damascus, to inform him that he would not receive the delegation before my arrival.

“Atassi had informed me of the text of the ministerial meeting’s decision, which included several items, including, “requesting all parties to stop the fighting immediately” and “establishing symbolic Arab security forces, under the supervision of the League’s Secretary-General, to maintain security and stability in Lebanon… to replace the Syrian forces, while the Arab security mission ends at the request of the elected President of the Lebanese Republic…

“I immediately returned to Damascus. The director of Damascus airport kept the plane of the Arab ministers in the air until after my arrival, so I called Assad and told him about the latest developments. Assad refused to discuss any issue [with the Arab ministers] before the holding of a new Arab League meeting, in which I would present Syria’s stance.

“We agreed to hold a meeting the next day, that is, on June 10. Indeed, I went to the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, entered the hall, where the atmosphere was tense…

“I said in the session: “Oh Yasser, I came from Damascus with two handkerchiefs to wipe my tears because of the massacres that took place against you, which you were talking about with our brothers in the previous sessions... Yasser, your place is not here, but at the Rihani Theater (in Beirut) because you are an actor.” He interrupted me, saying: “I represent the Palestinian people.” I replied: “You are on a stage, and you are the enemy of the Palestinian people. Yasser, I advise you… your methods will destroy the Palestinian cause.”

“Then I turned to the ministers (...) and requested that the decision be taken without my presence to be reconsidered, so that any reference to the Syrian forces be deleted, emphasizing that the work of these forces comes within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty. After discussion, the council responded to my request.”

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.