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Will ‘Syrian Understandings’ Stop the American-Russian Collapse?

US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)
US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)
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Will ‘Syrian Understandings’ Stop the American-Russian Collapse?

US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)
US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)

Ever since Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria in late 2015, every summit between President Vladimir Putin and his American counterpart former President Donald Trump was an opportunity to reach understandings that would bring Washington closer to Moscow’s stance on the crisis.

Now, Syria, in wake of Wednesday’s summit between Putin and US President Joe Biden, has become a “buffer zone” to halt the major collapse between Washington and Moscow. The leaders discussed cooperation in limited files – small or strategic – playing out in Syria.

Trump, who “trusted” Putin, agreed during an unannounced meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017, to a ceasefire in southern Syria. He also proposed ending the secret program that was run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the participation of Arab and western countries, to support the Free Syrian Army through Jordan to the south. The program helped the FSA combat the Syrian government.

This was a “gift” offered by Trump to Putin before their meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vietnam in 2017.

The two leaders did not hold a direct announced meeting, rather they sufficed with issuing a statement in which they expressed their “rejection of a military solution in Syria.” They also agreed to keep open channels of military communication between Russia and the US with the aim of averting dangerous accidents between forces fighting ISIS.

Previously, the American and Russian armies had agreed to a deconfliction arrangement in Syria. They also designated a separating line, which is the Euphrates River, whereby US-backed forces would be deployed east of the river and Moscow-backed forces would be deployed to its west.

In July 2018, Putin and Trump met in Helsinki. Among several points, they announced their commitment to “guaranteeing Israel’s security”. Then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been pushing the two leaders to take efforts to “keep Iran out of southern Syria.”

In August 2018, it was announced that an international-regional deal on southern Syria was reached. Russia's special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev said that Hezbollah fighters and Shiite militias backed by Iran had pulled out of the area. The Iranians, who work as military “advisors” to the government forces, were not included in the deal.

Wednesday’s Putin-Biden summit differs from previous meetings between the Russian and American leaders. The goal behind the cooperation in Syria has changed. It is no longer about building trust or offering American “gifts” to Russia. But Syria is now being used as an arena to stop the collapse in American-Russian relations, which are at their lowest point since the Cold War. Ties have deteriorated because of sanctions, cyberattacks, diplomatic tensions, meddling in interna affairs and differences over North Korea, Ukraine and others.

It is widely believed that despite the “red lines” that Putin and Biden sought to draw over contentious issues, they sought cooperation over others, such as the Iran nuclear file, Syria and the fight against terrorism.

On Syria, the Biden administration is prioritizing the continued defeat of ISIS, halting the regime’s chemical weapons program, ensuring Damascus’ commitment to the 2013 Russian-American agreement and delivering cross-border humanitarian aid to Syrians.

Ahead of Wednesday’s summit, the Americans and Russians on the highest levels sought to exchange various political and field messages in all files. This included Russia’s strikes on Idlib that targeted leading members of the terrorist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group and the Americans’ push to increase the number of border crossings to deliver aid.

It all likelihood, the Geneva summit will give the green light for keeping open the channel of dialogue between Russia and the US in Vienna. Washington was awaiting a call from Moscow, while Moscow was waiting for Washington to take the initiative. The Geneva summit probably put a stop to this endless loop and will pave the way for the two sides to renew cooperation in several files:

1 – They will maintain military arrangements east of the Euphrates to prevent any collision. Moscow would also encourage Damascus and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to hold dialogue over operational and perhaps even political arrangements.

2 – Damascus would be pressured to respond to inquiries by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in return for restoring the government’s privileges at the group. The government was recently included in the World Health Organization’s executive board in the Eastern Mediterranean region and a Syrian special representative was appointed to the Special Committee on Decolonization.

3 – The ground would be paved for extending the international resolution on cross border aid that expires next month. The Biden administration is seeking the opening of three crossings, while Russia’s agreement to extend the opening of the current crossing – Bab al-Hawa – would be interpreted as a sign that it agrees to the continued cooperation.

Arab and regional countries will draw their own conclusions over the Putin-Biden summit and what it entails for Syria.

The implications of the summit on Syria will be revealed during the briefing by UN special envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen to the organization in New York on June 25. They will also be revealed when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken chairs the meeting of the small group of foreign ministers ahead of the meeting of members of the international coalition to defeat ISIS on June 28. The implications of the summit will be tangibly felt on July 11 when the Security Council votes on the cross-border aid resolution.

Some observers believe that these specific Syrian signals could expand to include other issues, such as Iran’s military presence in the war-torn country, especially if Washington and Tehran agree to return to the nuclear deal. This issue would in turn be tied to Damascus normalizing relations with Arab countries and its return to the Arab League. In return, it would receive help in its reconstruction.

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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.